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Survey of Florida Law
Keynote Address at the Annual Nova Law Review Banquet
March 29, 1996
Honorable Gerald Kogan
It is always very nice to appear here with the Nova Law Students. For
those of you who do not realize it, at one time, while I was living in this area,
I taught at Nova on the adjunct faculty. I taught trial advocacy and I also
taught professional responsibility, and I always loved the students here
because you are so active and so alive and it is a great pleasure for someone
to teach in that type of environment.
I am proud to say I think that certainly, in recent years, we have come
down with some very important, and in some respects, monumental deci-
sions from our Court. Our Court has really been on the cutting edge of a lot
of things. I am also proud to say that many of the reforms we have instituted
in regard to the regulation of the practice of law; with regard to our relation-
ships with the attorneys that are practicing, have really been a model for the
rest of the nation. Some of our programs have been adopted all over the
country. You ought to be proud that your Court has been able to do these
things and I am very proud that I am part and parcel of that entire operation.
Hopefully, over the next years, during my term as Chief Justice, we can
increase our visibility around the nation and do things for the people of the
State of Florida, as well as the legal profession, that have never been done
before.
We are very excited about our "Home Page" on the Internet and you
might be interested in this: a "kid's court" which you might be able to dial
into this summer. And we are thinking about having the "talking gavel"
where school children will be able to dial in, ask questions about the legal
system, and we will be able to answer these questions for them. This is our
attempt to make the Court more accessible to people and also to allow school
children, from the youngest age, to understand what the legal system is, and
what it can, and at the same time, cannot do for them. We are looking
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forward to this and we are excited about it. Personally, the computer, in my
opinion, will never replace the law book because I get neck strain and eye
strain trying to read opinions off of the computer screen. I still like to sit
back in my chair, cross my legs, and put that Southern Reporter in my lap,
and read it that way. It's much more entertaining and besides, it's hard
sometimes to "teach an old dog new tricks." And speaking of teaching an
old dog new tricks . . . when I first started practicing law, it was a whole
different world. Nowadays you are fortunate, especially at Nova, where you
have a super clinical program, one of the finest around. I had the pleasure of
meeting your Dean about two weeks after he became Dean. I headed a
committee to study the Board of Bar Examiners. We brought Dean Har-
baugh in to talk to us about an exciting new principle in taking the bar exam
called "performance testing." And one day you may all see that in Florida.
As soon as we bring some of these people into the twenty-first century, who
have the say about these things, we may be able to put that on-line. It is an
exciting concept, and I am really looking forward to hopefully one day
adopting it.
Now, I want to discuss with you a few matters and then I am going to
give you the opportunity which you may never have again in your lifetime,
and that is the opportunity to ask questions of a Justice on the Florida
Supreme Court. The only things you cannot ask me about are pending cases
or something which may come before the Court. Do not worry, you will not
embarrass me. I have been around long enough now where absolutely no
question is embarrassing.
What I do want to discuss with you are a couple of subjects that I do
think are very important, especially for those of you who are going into the
practice of law. I am going to make some statements to you which some of
you may acknowledge and some of you may not want to accept. But I'll tell
you at the onset as I lead into what I want to talk to you about: most of you
will never ever get rich practicing law. So if any of you think you will one
day be able to sit back, and rake in the money, and watch it pile up high,
very few of you will be in that position. The practice of law is not for the
purpose of making yourself wealthy. It is for the purpose of assisting people
within our society and our community to find their way through our legal
system. It is the job of the attorney to assist our citizens in working their
way through that complicated and mysterious world of the legal system. It is
a profession in the truest sense. What has happened recently, and this
distresses me a great deal, is that we have, by our fee-setting practices,
managed to price out of the legal system (except in the case of contingent
fees), that great middle income group that makes up the majority of people
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who live in this country. If you are indigent, truly indigent, you've got Legal
Aid. If you are a defendant in a criminal case, you've got the Public De-
fender. If you're wealthy, you don't have a problem, you can afford to pay
attorney's fees. But the great mass of Americans are out there unable, or
find it extremely difficult, to buy their way into the legal system. Now I told
you before, "don't expect to get rich." And I know there are a number of
you out here worried, "Will I get a job?" "Can I pay these loans?" "How am
I going to be able to manage this?" Well, I want to tell you something: there
is a lot of work out there if you are willing to look for it. But you have to
say to yourself: "Okay I am not going to live in a million dollar mansion or
drive a Rolls Royce or Mercedes, and I am not going to Europe for vacation
every summer. Instead, I'll live in a much more affordable home, I'll drive a
Chevrolet, and I'll go to the Great Smokies or the Grand Canyon instead of
going overseas each year." And the reason you will do that is that you will
create and establish the service which the legal profession was designed to
do. That is: provide access and effective access to the legal system. You
are going to make your fees more affordable so that we can bring back into
the fold those many many people who make up our middle income group in
this country and give them better access to our legal system. And, along
with that, you are going to give only twenty hours per year of pro bono work.
And, by the way, pro bono does not mean that "I sent the client a bill and he
never paid it." Pro bono means: "I started out knowing that I was not going
to charge for the service and I knew I was not going to get paid when I
started it because the client could not afford my regular fee." Twenty hours
per year-that's only two and one-half days per year in a forty hour week
and most of you going into the legal profession will work a lot more than
forty hours in one week. But this is an absolute necessity in our society
because we cannot have a legal system for the wealthy; a legal system for the
elite. We need a legal system that is going to meet the needs of all of our
people. So you have got to get out there and you have got to give back to the
system for the privilege of practicing law. Which brings us to: "How am I
going to practice law?"
I'll tell you how you're going to practice law. You are going to say to
yourselves: "I am going to practice in a professional manner, and I am not
going to be a 'Rambo-type litigator."' A Rambo-type litigator is someone
who sends you a Notice of Hearing the next morning on your fax machine
after you've closed the office at five o'clock that night. Then the next
morning shows up in court and says, "Judge, I faxed them a notice of the
hearing and I do not know why they are not here." Or somebody who files
interrogatories by the pound and drives the other side crazy. Let me tell you
19961
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something: you can be a good, tough litigator; you can represent your client
in the best traditions of the profession and win cases for your client without
destroying the integrity of this profession.
This may sound strange to you but many years ago when I was a young
lawyer-and despite the color of my hair, I was a young lawyer-and I was a
young prosecutor many years ago, I remember convicting people who were
sentenced to life in prison who would shake my hand and say, "Mr. Kogan, I
want to thank you for giving me a fair trial." So you can win your cases, you
can win the tough ones, but you have to do it with dignity and with honor. I
am not telling you anything new. All of you know that the legal profession
is not admired. I think the only people who we actually rank ahead of in the
mind of the public are the politicians. That is a horrible way for us to even
look at something. We are a noble and an honorable profession. We can
only remain a noble and honorable profession if we give up that feeling of
greed-that desire to make piles and piles of money and we don't care how
we make it or what we have to do to make it. If you can reconcile in your
own mind that you are able to put that aside and do what you know you have
to do and be a professional, we're all going to be a lot better off, including
the people that we serve.
I want you to understand one thing and this is very, very important.
There will be times where you will be sitting in your office, especially as a
young lawyer, and you will say, "the mortgage payment is due, the student
loan payment is due, I have got to make the car payment, and I do not know
where the money will come from." And there will be temptations to find
that money in a way which is not consistent with the honesty, dignity, and
integrity of the legal profession. I want to tell you right here and now, that
there is no case and there is no client that is worth your sacrificing your
honesty and your integrity and dignity as a lawyer, because the entire system
rests upon the honesty and the integrity of the persons who make up that
system, and lawyers are an integral part. So say to yourself, "If I am going
to be a lawyer, I am going to be what I am supposed to be and that is some-
one of the highest reputation and someone who, whatever you do, you can be
proud of." I remember my old boss, State Attorney, Richard Gerstein. Some
of you may have heard of him, some of you may have known him, and he
always said to us when he spoke about honesty and integrity, "Never do
anything in the practice of law that you would not want to read about the
next morning in the Miami Herald." I think there is a lot to that and I think
that tells you what is right and what is wrong. The Florida Bar has an ethics
hotline you can call if you have close questions, but I think all of you should
have a sense of what is right and a sense of what is wrong, and whenever you
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are faced with those problems to ask yourself. "Is it right, or is it wrong?"
You need to do right. That's my little lecture for this evening and now I
want to open it up for questions.
Question: How do you react to the quality of advocacy of the lawyers
who appear before you and what, if anything, would you like to see law
schools do a better job in training?
Answer: First of all, learn to read, learn how to write, and learn how to
speak. Some of the briefs filed with the highest court in the state: the
sentence structure is abominable, punctuation is terrible. It is just unbeliev-
able! These are not just new graduates of law schools but these are people
who have practiced for a long time in the profession. Also, all communica-
tion is just as important as the written word because many of you will not be
writing briefs or legal memos but will be dealing with clients, appearing in
court, so you have to learn to communicate. The one thing I think you have
got to do is make sure that the students, upon graduation, can communicate
both in writing and orally. The quality of argument in front of us ranges
from "outstanding" to "abominable." Quite frankly, at times I really feel
embarrassed for the attorneys who appear in front of us with the arguments
they present. If they would make a concentrated effort to learn how to
communicate we would be a lot better off.
Question: About a week ago, a tort reform measure in California failed
and the evening news reported that big business was defeated by consumer-
ism or consumer advocates. On the other hand, it is even more common-
place to see disgruntled consumers of legal service as the primary motive
behind tort reform. From your prospective, do you see this legal re-
form/ tort reform primarily motivated by corporate America, or consumers
who have been "ripped off" by unethical attorneys?
Answer: Let me say this to you. I think if I were a big corporation, I
would not want to be sued for a defective product that I might put out. I do
not want big verdicts against me. I do not want to see especially punitive
damages which really entirely outweigh what the actual compensatory
damages are. So, I don't want to put the blame on anything. But my
philosophy has always been this: these cases essentially go to juries who are
citizens selected by both sides during the lawsuit and the trial. This is the
way that our system works. If that jury finds for a particular side, so be it. I
have my own personal opinion but, as a Justice on the Supreme Court, I
don't want to give it to you so I am skirting around the edge. But I think that
the fact that these are not juries that are picked out of the sky by plaintiff's
attorney; these are juries picked by both the Plaintiff and the Defense, and
1996]
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they are the ones who render the final decision in a particular case and that is
something you have to consider.
Question: There is also an amendment to limit the percentage of the
claim which the lawyer can collect on. What is the Court's view on this?
Answer: We have already come out with an opinion which limits, on a
contingent fee basis, the amount of fees which an attorney can make in the
State of Florida. There are arguments both ways. One of the arguments is
that the client would not have gotten anything if it were not for the attorney's
efforts. So, really, why does the client complain when the attorney gets "x"
percentage of that recovery? That is one of the arguments. The other
argument is that really it is the client that is entitled to it and not the attorney.
So there are arguments on both sides of that.
Question: You were a practicing lawyer and judge, which one do you
prefer?
Answer: Really want to know? Practicing lawyer. That is the greatest
part of this profession: the ability to go into court and represent somebody.
I was a trial lawyer for twenty-five years. The glory that goes with it: the
arguing to the Judge, the questioning of witnesses, the cross examination, the
arguing of the case to the jury. And then the true moment in every trial
lawyer's life is when the knock is on the door and the Bailiff says, "Do you
have a verdict?" and the answer is "Yes" and the Bailiff looks at you and
says, "I am going to get the Judge, the jury has a verdict." From that
moment on, as your heart sinks gradually into your stomach, you wait.
There is no greater feeling of exaltation than when the clerk reads the verdict
form and they get to the end and you have won that case. That to me is the
greatest feeling in the world. I miss trying cases, but I'll be honest with you,
what really happened to me was that after twenty-five years of battling these
things, I had just reached a point. Call it burnout or whatever. It was just
time to do something different. But I love the courtroom so much that when
the opportunity came along to be a trial judge, I jumped at that opportunity.
That was fun also. Quite frankly, I miss sitting on the trial court, the
dynamics that go on in the trial court. Those of you who have been in there
know what I am talking about. There is something about the attorneys, the
litigants, the witnesses, the juries, and the excitement of the courtroom
drama that really is what I go for. That's my kind of thing.
Where I sit right now is very sterile and very antiseptic. You just have
the attorneys arguing the cases. The good part about it is how I used to read
the cases in the Southern Reporter and think, "How can these confounded
idiots come down with a decision like that?" Of course now I am one of the
"confounded idiots." But it is nice to be able to say what the law is. You
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would be amazed at the tremendous power you have when you sit on the
Supreme Court of a State because unless there is a U.S. Constitutional issue
involved, that is the last stop. For most litigants in the state system, that's it.
I remember when I was sitting there in the very beginning in 1987 and an
issue came up and everybody was discussing, "Well that really is outdated
and I really do not know why we follow that principle anymore," and
someone else popped up and said, "Why are we talking about this, we're the
Supreme Court let's change the law." And we did! You can't do that in the
trial court and you can't do that as an attorney who is practicing. Also, you
realize the tremendous and awesome responsibility.
When you sit as a trial court judge, your decision in one particular case
really only affects the persons involved in that one case. It does not even
have an affect on your fellow or sister judges down the hall, or has no lasting
jurisprudence. But I am telling you, when we make that decision, we are
conscious that it affects nearly fourteen million people who live in this State
not to mention the forty million plus visitors who come to this State each
year. So the awesome responsibility is there. Also, we are the chief admin-
istrative agency of the entire court system and every one of the Justices sits
on committees and commissions and chairs them; and a lot of our work is
administrative. It is the hardest job I have ever had in my life. You're
talking to someone who used to be a homicide prosecutor and who used to
defend people charged with capital crimes. Someone who used to really
sweat out those juries. Yet of all the work I've done, this is the hardest one
of all. It is a seven day a week job. You stay at it and go from one place to
another. It's good in that you really see the whole system. And it is even
better because it's enjoyable. Like tonight, I love coming here and speaking
to prospective lawyers and lawyers and faculty. It's great, that is one of the
advantages of the job.
Question: You mention that both sides pick the jury. I had an experi-
ence when I was called to jury duty in Broward County. I don't know if this
was a fluke or not but there were about 500 of us the first day. They gave
the jury pool a talk and said all of you who want to be excused, line up. All
of a sudden I saw every person who looked like they had a responsible job
line up to be excused. I stood up, the clerk never asked what the reason was.
This occurred about 1990.
Answer: I am familiar with the jury pool system in Dade County and I
know that the only person who can excuse a prospective juror is the judge
assigned to the jury pool. We actually had a bench in the jury pool room and
we would have them come forward one by one and find out what their
excuses were. That is the proper way to do it.
1996]
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Question: The only people left were retired, unemployed, or had labor
jobs who would rather be in an air conditioned courtroom.
Answer: That does not mean they were not competent. There are lots
of persons that are retired, unemployed, or laborers, who make good jurors.
But you are correct, there should be a judge there who will listen to the
excuses and make that determination.
Question: Currently there is a push to get away from the court system
and get into arbitration and mediation, particularly in the securities area.
The problem that I saw, and I was wondering about the Court's view, is that
one does not need to be an attorney to represent someone in an arbitration.
Answer:. The question is: are you practicing law and what capacity
that comes in. You raise a good point and I want to tell you now that we will
never have enough money appropriated by the state legislature to have the
number of judges and court facilities that we need to handle everything
through the court system, so mediation and arbitration are here. This
certainly is the wave of the future. Most cases down the line, no matter what
the field is, are going to be mediated and there is going to be arbitration.
You are going to have to do it that way or else it will be impossible to handle
the cases that we have. We have a crisis right now on criminal cases. In the
large metropolitan areas in the State of Florida, the judges don't "hear" cases
anymore they "process" the cases. Especially when-let's take Dade
County-because that is a pretty jammed up court system. Every Monday, a
criminal court judge comes out and there may be anywhere from thirty to
seventy-five cases set for jury trial that week. Now you know that you are
not going to be able to try that. As a matter of fact, you're lucky if you can
even try two cases because along with the trial, there are motions, arraign-
ments and everything else that you need to do. So what happens? Well,
obviously you've got the plea bargain. Now even if you didn't have a
speedy trial rule, what are you going to do with all those people? You can't
put them back in and say, "We'll try this case next week" because next week
you've got thirty to seventy-five more cases. So you've got to dispose of
them somehow. That is why we've developed all of these pre-trial interven-
tion programs we now have. We developed plea bargaining, domestic
violence, and other intervention programs. This State is very fortunate that
the Public Defenders have a sense of responsibility. You know, if the Public
Defenders decided not to plea bargain anymore and take every case to trial,
the legal system in this State would collapse. Even if you brought every
judge from the civil side to try these cases, you will have monumental
logistical problems carting prisoners back and forth trying these cases; with
many judges not experienced in the criminal law; and it would be an abso-
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lute mess. So you have to find alternate systems. We will have to learn to
do things differently than we thought about doing them before. And if you
think you can get away with the way you've been doing it, you have another
thought coming.
Question: What do you think about having cameras in the courtroom
and televising the trials to the general public?
Answer: Originally, when this first was approved for the State of
Florida, I was absolutely opposed to it. I thought what was going to happen
is that the attorneys would play to the cameras; that the judges in some
instances would play to the cameras; that it would have a chilling effect on
jurors who would be afraid because people would know who they are and et
cetera. But I have now come 180 degrees the other way. I think that if you
broadcast a trial complete from beginning to end, I think you go a long way
in letting people know what our system is all about. And when they start
seeing that, they begin to realize that trials like O.J. Simpson are an abomi-
nation. That is not an average run-of-the-mill criminal trial. Far from it. It
does not even resemble the average, run-of-the-mill trial. But you have to
run it from beginning to end. You can't give people thirty second sound
bites on the six o'clock news and then have them understand why a case
comes out the way it does because news media have a way of showing you
that which they would like you to see. That is not to say they are doctoring
the news. But I saw, sixteen years ago, a riot that resulted in eighteen people
dying and tens of millions of dollars of property destroyed in Dade County
because of the news media, in a trial which was moved from Dade County to
Tampa. People in Dade County were fed thirty second sound bites and
honestly believed that the police officers on trial in Tampa for murdering a
motorist in Dade County were going to be convicted-when anybody who
sat in that trial knew from the evidence that was presented that there was not
going to be a conviction. And sure enough, I'll never forget the night the
jury returned the acquittal. I'll remember this because I represented one of
the police officers in that case. I came back to Dade County, I turned on the
television and saw one of our leading educators in Dade County (who will
remain nameless), get on the air and tell everybody to go down to the metro
justice building in Dade County to protest this outrageous verdict. I remem-
ber that night we were having dinner in a restaurant in Miami Beach and
coming over the 836 and seeing the fires in front of the metro justice
building as people were trying to break in. That was the beginning of the
riot. I had spoken to one of the newspaper men covering the trial who was a
personal friend of mine for many years. I said to him, "You know you are
not reporting what is going on here. You are building up hopes of the folks
1996]
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down in Dade County that there is going to be a conviction here and you
know there is not going to be one." And his comment to me was, "I know,
but that is not the way the editors want it." What can I tell you? So I got a
little far afield in answering that question but I think you have to show it
from beginning to end and then people will understand what is happening.
Question: Two things you said tonight strikes a cord in freshmen
students: the student loans and the competition we face when we graduate.
Right now there are six ABA law schools in Florida and two more opening.
What advantage is there, if any, to the public and the profession, in opening
more law schools in the State of Florida?
Answer: I think you are now seeing a decrease in the amount of
applications in the last ten years. The word has gotten out that there is not
that great gold mine out there for jobs. What happened is that, during the
1980s, the law profession really flourished and there were a lot of jobs out
there and a lot of high-paying jobs and people went out and this was "it."
My wife, Irene, worked for awhile at the Student Aid Resource Center at
FSU. That is where students came in looking for scholarships. They would
use the computer and research and she would get into conversations with a
lot of the students and ask them their plans after graduation. They would
say, "Well, I don't really know what I want to do so I think I'll go to law
school." And this became the popular thing and people said, "I think I'll go
to law school because no matter what I do, the law degree will probably help
me." And consequently, there are a lot of lawyers.
It's not new to have a lot of lawyers out there. When I got out of law
school, we had the same problem. We had a lot of lawyers and it was very
difficult to get a job. Now I know things are relative, but when I got out of
law school, in Dade County, you were lucky to get a job with a law firm at
fifty dollars a week. Of course, fifty dollars in those days is more than fifty
dollars today, but it was still not a lot of money. You were fortunate if you
could just convince a lawyer to allow you to just sit in his or her law office
and in return for that space, do work for them. I know I started out where
my law office had been a supply closet. They took out some shelving and
they put in a desk which was not much larger than this podium-just enough
room for two other people to sit there. And the unique thing was that the
bathroom was right behind my desk. Every time someone in the office had
to use that facility, they had to walk through my office to get there. But I
considered myself very fortunate. I did not get paid at all-not one single
red cent-and I did services for the attorneys in exchange for that. The only
money I ever saw in the time that I was there was when Irene and I got
married. The attorney that I was working for gave us a $100 check and that
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was for about three to four month's work in the office. Now, $100 went a
long way then but, believe me, it did not go as far as you would think. And
that is the situation I was looking at when I got out of law school. Today
you are running into a similar situation-jobs are very very difficult to get.
Although there are some statistics I have seen that by the year 2000, there is
going to be a need for thirty percent more lawyers than we have now. So
hang in there another four years.
Question: You mentioned about going out to offer services to the
middle class, is there anything being done in the legislature to alleviate the
burden of student loans?
Answer: Not that I know of. You may have the burden of student loans
but as someone once said, "It's a business." You took out the loan, signed
your name and said you would pay it back and that is what the banks expect
you to do: pay it back. Lawyers do not invoke sympathy of the general
public and not in the state legislature, and worse than that, not in Congress
one bit. So don't expect to get any relief. I don't think you will see any.
Question: In light of the unacceptable legal system and shoddy law-
yering you've mentioned, what do you think about putting some teeth into
section 57.105 or moving toward a prevailing party attorney fee system?
Answer: The question is where do you draw the line? You can still
have a good, valid legal basis for bringing a lawsuit but you might lose it.
So if you start saying "you file that lawsuit at your peril," then what will
happen down the road is that it will have a chilling effect on people who
have legitimate lawsuits. I think that is something you want to guard against.
If you say it absolutely is not a justiciable issue at all, as we do now in the
Florida Statutes, that you are entitled to attorney's fees, I don't think we
need to put any more teeth into it. I don't want to see people chilled out of
filing what is a legitimate lawsuit. That is what you are going to do if you
say, "File at your own risk. If you lose it, we'll wipe you out financially."
Question: What about the prevailing party system?
Answer: Again you've got that same problem. You have the same,
"chilling effect." You have a legitimate lawsuit here. Let's assume you win
at trial. You go to the District Court of Appeal and win it there and you
come up to our Court and lose it by a 4-3 vote. That is just not fair. You
would give up what was a legitimate lawsuit. I think it has a disastrous
effect on the legal rights of people.
Thank you again for the privilege of being here. I really enjoyed it.
1996]
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss recent developments in the field of appellate
practice in Florida. Although this article will focus primarily on cases
decided between July 1, 1995, and June 30, 1996, it will also deal with
certain cases decided shortly before and after that period which are either of
particular interest to the appellate practitioner or which provide the back-
ground for, or the culmination of, issues that were addressed by cases
decided during that period.
In a broad sense, every appellate decision falls within the scope of
appellate practice. Decisions relating to substantive areas of the law,
however, are more properly dealt with in articles relating to those substan-
tive areas and therefore will not be discussed here. Rather, this article will
focus on matters relating to practice in the appellate courts and will deal with
substantive areas only with regard to appellate considerations unique to
those areas. Additionally, this article will not discuss cases relating to the
preservation of issues, nor the question of whether particular errors were
harmless.
II. AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA'S RULES OF PROCEDURE
The Supreme Court of Florida adopted several amendments to the
various sets of Florida procedural rules that will impact the field of appellate
practice.
A. Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 9.130(a)(5) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure was
amended' to allow for appellate review of orders entered on motions filed
under Rule 12.540 of the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure requesting
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relief from judgment, decrees or orders. This amendment was necessitated
by creation of the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure2 and is intended
only to continue allowing appeals from orders in family law cases that were
previously entered pursuant to Rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Responding to concerns expressed by the fourth district in McFadden v.
West Palm Beach Police Officer3 regarding the need for an amendment to
the rules that would allow determinations of indigency for appellate pur-
poses to be made at the appellate level,4 the supreme court, in McFadden v.
Fourth District Court of Appeal,5 adopted an amendment accomplishing that
purpose for incarcerated parties. The amendment adds to the existing
language of Rule 9.430 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
deals with the process for obtaining an indigency determination in the lower
tribunal, the following paragraph:
In lieu of the above procedure, an indigent incarcerated party
may file in the appellate court a motion for an order of indigency,
along with an affidavit showing the party's inability either to pay
fees and costs or to give security therefor. The affidavit shall be
sufficient without more for the court to rule on the appellant's indi-
gency unless an objection is filed. If an objection is filed the ap-
pellate court may determine the issue or remand it to the lower tri-
bunal for determination.
6
Although the amended rule was made "effective immediately,"7 the
court allowed any interested person to file comments regarding the matter.s
As a result of that process, seven days later, the court entered an order
staying until further order of the court implementation of the amendment
nunc pro tunc to the date of the court's decision. Subsequently, an alterna-
tive proposal was submitted by the Appellate Court Rules Committee and it
is presently pending before the court.
The supreme court created an interesting situation when it amended
both the criminal and appellate rules in an effort to ensure that criminal
2. In re Family Law Rules of Procedure, 663 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1995).
3. 658 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
4. Id. at 1048.
5. 21 Fla. L. Weekly S183 (Apr. 25, 1996).
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defendants will have the opportunity to raise sentencing errors on appeal. In
Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g) and Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.800,9 the court created a new Rule 3.800(b)
of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: "(b) Motion to
Correct Sentencing Error. A defendant may file a motion to correct the
sentence or order of probation within ten days after rendition of the sen-
tence."10 At the same time, the court amended Rule 9.020(g) of the Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure to provide that a timely filed motion to correct
a sentence or an order of probation delays rendition of the sentence or order
until the motion is ruled upon."
Taken together, these two amendments appear to create an anomaly.
The criminal rule indicates that a motion to correct a sentencing error is
timely if filed within ten days after rendition, but the appellate rule states the
timely filing of such a motion acts to delay rendition until its disposition.
The net effect is that the time period within which the motion must be filed
does not start to run until the motion has been disposed of.
At the time it adopted these amendments, the court also amended Rule
9.020(g)(3) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure to state that "a
pending motion to correct a sentence or order of probation shall not be
affected by the filing of a notice of appeal from a judgment of guilt. ' 12
B. Florida Rules of Judicial Administration
Rule 2.050(h) of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration was
amended 13 to provide that in any case in which a defendant has been sen-
tenced to death, the circuit judge assigned to the case "shall take such action
as may be necessary to assure that a complete record on appeal has been
properly prepared"'14 and that "the judge shall convene a status conference
with all counsel of record as soon as possible after the record has been
prepared... to ensure that the record is complete."'
5
9. 675 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1996).
10. FLA. R. CIuM. P. 3.800(b). This rule is entitled "Motion to Correct Sentencing Er-
ror."
11. Amendment to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g) and Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure 3.800, 675 So. 2d at 1375.
12. Id. at 1375-76.
13. In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Judicial Administration Regarding Death
Cases, 672 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1996).
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C. Florida Rules of Workers' Compensation Procedure
The supreme court adopted extensive revisions to the portion of the
Florida Rules of Workers' Compensation Procedure that deals with appel-
late proceedings. 16 In light of the large number of changes to the rules, no
effort will be made here to detail every amendment that was approved.
However, some of the more significant revisions will be discussed.
An effort was made to streamline the rules by deleting rules that were
unnecessary or duplicative of the appellate rules and by creating a new rule,
rule 4.156, which provides that "[a]ppellate review proceedings in workers'
compensation cases shall be governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure (civil) except as otherwise provided by these rules."'17 The rules
deleted in their entirety and their appellate rule counterparts [in brackets] are
rules 4.180(e) [9.200(f)(2)]; 4.225 [9.210(g)]; 4.240 [9.320]; 4.250 [9.330];
4.255 [9.331]; 4.260 [9.340].18
Rule 4.160 was amended in response to the first district's invitation in
Hines Electric v. McClure19 to the Workers' Compensation Rules Committee
to address certain problems that arose from the fact that the rule made review
of certain non-final orders discretionary with the court.20 The amended rule
requires the court to consider appeals of some of the orders in question and
divests it of the jurisdiction to consider appeals from certain other orders.2'
A new provision was added indicating that nothing in the rule should be
interpreted as precluding other original proceedings in the district court as
provided in the appellate rules.22 Presumably, this provision was intended to
clarify that when the appropriate requirements are met, orders that formerly
fell within the court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction can still be
considered by certiorari.
Rule 4.161(b) was amended to reflect that the district court upon motion
shall decide disputes as to whether challenges to certain benefits have been
abandoned.23
16. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Workers' Compensation Procedure, 664
So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1995).
17. Id. at 945.
18. 1995 Committee Note to Florida Rule of Workers' Compensation Procedure 4.156.
In re Workers' Compensation Procedure, 664 So. 2d at 946.
19. 616 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
20. For a discussion of the problems identified in Hines Electric, see Anthony C. Musto,
Appellate Practice: 1993 Survey of Florida Law, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1, 28-30 (1993).
21. Workers' Compensation Procedure, 664 So. 2d at 946.
22. Id. at 947.
23. Id. at 948-49.
[Vol. 21:13
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Rule 4.165 was amended to require that a conformed copy of the order
or orders designated in a notice of appeal be attached to the notice24 and to
provide that notices of cross-appeal are no longer to be filed with the judge,
but are to be filed directly with the district court.
25
Deleted from rule 4.180(a)(1) was a provision which allowed the
district court to consider matters not introduced into evidence if necessary
for the determination of the issues on appeal.26
Rule 4.180 (g)(1) was renumbered as (f)(1) and was revised to make the
procedures for relief from the filing fee and from the costs of the record on
appeal consistent with changes to section 57.081(1) of the Florida Statutes,
as amended by Chapter 94-318 section 18 of the Laws of Florida, and with
the dictates of caselaw,27 specifically Schwab v. Brevard County School
Board28 and Miller v. Hospitality Care Center.29
HI. COURT DmSIONS
In an unpublished order captioned Local Rule Concerning Divisions in
First District Court of Appeal, the supreme court approved as a local rule an
administrative order30 adopted by the First District Court of Appeal that
created a criminal division of that court. The administrative order provides
that the new division will consider "[a]ll criminal cases and all cases that
originate from prisoners involving their conviction or sentence, juvenile
delinquency cases, and criminal derivative actions such as gain time or
parole decision challenges, original writ proceedings, including but not
limited to habeas corpus. 31
The approval of this rule gives the first district, which had previously
created a General and an Administrative Division,32 three subject matter
divisions. It remains the only Florida appellate court to sit in divisions.
24. Id at 950.
25. Id at 951.
26. Workers' Compensation Procedure, 664 So. 2d at 951.
27. See 1995 Committee Note to Florida Rule of Workers' Compensation Procedure
4.180. Workers Compensaton Procedure, 664 So. 2d at 955-56.
28. 650 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). For a discussion of the decision in
Schwab, see Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L.
REv. 1, 23-25 (1995).
29. 431 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
30. Fla. First District Court of Appeal Admin. Order No. 95-2.
31. Id. at 1.
32. See In re Court Divisions, 648 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
1996]
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IV. SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of
North America,3 the supreme court dealt with a case in which the fourth
district had upheld a judgment against two defendants.3 4 One of the defen-
dants timely filed a motion for rehearing, which was denied some three
months later.35 Within thirty days of the denial, but 114 days after the
opinion, the other defendant filed a notice invoking the supreme court's
discretionary jurisdiction.36
The plaintiff moved to strike the notice as untimely and to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, claiming that the notice was not filed within thirty days
of rendition, as required by Rule 9.120(b) of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure.37 The plaintiff relied on rule 9.120(g), which provides that
rendition is delayed by the pendency of motions for rehearing, but which
also states that when such a motion is pending, "the final order shall not be
deemed rendered with respect to any claim between the movant and any
party against whom relief is sought by the motion. 38
The court found this rule to be inapplicable, however, concluding that it
applied only to orders entered by trial courts.39 The court buttressed its
finding by noting that when the rule was amended to include the relevant
portion, both the court's opinion40 and the Report of The Florida Bar
Appellate Court Rules Committee explained that the amendment was to
clarify that in a multi-party situation, a single order can be rendered at
different times depending on when the trial court resolved authorized post-
trial motions.4'
"In contrast," 42 the court continued, "the motions permitted in an
appellate proceeding follow the procedure set forth in" Rule 9.300 of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.43 That rule states that "service of a
33. 675 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1996).
34. See Florida Medical Malpractice Underwriting Ass'n v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North
America, 652 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
35. St. Paul Fire, 675 So. 2d at 591.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. FLA. R. App. P. 9.120(g)(1).
39. St. Paul Fire, 675 So. 2d at 591.
40. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 609 So. 2d 516, 517
(Fla. 1992).
41. St. Paul Fire, 675 So. 2d at 591-92.
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motion shall toll the time schedule of any proceeding in the court until
disposition of the motion." 44 This provision, the court found, "is clear on its
face that it suspends the time schedule of any and all proceedings irrespec-
tive of the movant." 45 The court therefore denied the plaintiff's motion,
concluding "that appellate motions are governed by rule 9.300(b), and a
district court's order is not 'rendered' until there has been a disposition of all
motions relative to that order."
46
V. VENUE
A. When Changes of Venue Are Deemed Effective
In Cottingham v. State,47 the supreme court clarified an aspect of its
decision in Vasilinda v. Lozano,4 which established the standards for
determining in which court appellate jurisdiction lies when the trial court has
granted a change of venue to a circuit court located within another district.
In Vasilinda, the court found that if a change of venue has not yet become
effective when appellate jurisdiction is invoked, the appellate proceeding
goes to the district court to which appeals are taken from the transferor
court.49 Conversely, the court found, when the change of venue has become
effective, the appellate proceeding goes to the district court to which appeals
are taken from the transferee court.
50
The decision in Cottingham focused on the issue of when changes of
venue are deemed effective in civil cases. The court in Vasilinda had
discussed that question, concluding that changes of venue in civil cases
become effective when the court file has been received in the transferee
court and costs and service charges required by the applicable statutes and
rules of procedure are paid.5'
In the decision under review in Cottingham, the first district had
certified as being of great public importance the question of whether the date
44. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.300(b).
45. St. Paul Fire, 675 So. 2d at 592.
46. Id.
47. 672 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1996).
48. 631 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1994).
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of payment of the costs and charges is the date they are mailed by the party
responsible for payment or the date of receipt by the transferee court.52
The supreme court found that the date of receipt by the transferee court
is deemed to be the date of payment, and thus the date on which the change
of venue is effective.
53
B. Venue in Appeals from Orders of the Unemployment Appeals
Commission
In Mendelman v. Dade County Public Schools,54 the third district had
for review a decision of the Unemployment Appeals Commission. The
unemployment appeal hearing had been conducted by telephone, with the
claimant participating from Key Largo, the employer from Miami, and the
appeals referee from Tallahassee.
55
The Commission moved to transfer the case to the first district, relying
on section 443.151(4)(e), of the Florida Statutes, which states that appeals
of commission orders are to go to the district court "in the appellate district
in which the issues involved were decided by an appeals referee .... ,,56 The
Commission reasoned that since the written ruling was issued by its Talla-
hassee office, the appeal could only go the first district.
57
The third district disagreed, noting that the proceeding at which the
referee reaches a decision is the final hearing and concluding that when the
participants are located in two appellate districts, "the fairest interpretation
of the statute is that the appeal will lie in either appellate district." 58
The court indicated that a factor demonstrating that its interpretation of
the statute is workable is the "many years' experience under the Florida
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides for judicial review either in
'the district court of appeal in the appellate district where the agency
52. Cottingham, 672 So. 2d at 28. For a recitation of the complicated factual circum-
stances that led to the certified question, as well as a more complete statement of the standards
established by Vasilinda, see Musto, supra note 28, at 18-20.
53. Cottingham, 672 So. 2d at 29-30.
54. 674 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
55. Key Largo is located in Monroe County, which constitutes the sixteenth circuit, a part
of the third district. Miami is located in Dade County, which constitutes the eleventh circuit, a
part of the third district. Tallahassee is located in Leon County, which is one of the counties
in the second circuit, a part of the first district.
56. FLA. STAT. § 443.151(4)(e) (1995).
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maintains its headquarters or where a party resides."' 59 The court also stated
that in taking its view, it was "influenced by practical considerations,"
' 6
specifically the fact that it generally grants requests for oral argument in
unemployment compensation appeals and the court's belief that its interpre-
tation would therefore "provide more convenient access to the appellate
courts.'
The decision in Mendelman raises a number of questions about the rule
of law applicable to other factual situations. For instance, if a claimant and
an employer participate from locations in two different districts, while the
appeals referee is in a third, is a party taking an appeal able to select venue
from among three district courts? Does the rule of law set forth in Mendel-
man apply if a party who lives in one district travels to another district and
participates in a hearing for the sole purpose of being able to subsequently
appeal to the court of appeal for that district? Can parties and their attorneys
expand the number of possible venues by participating from different
locations? If a party participates on a cellular phone while driving through
several districts, can an appeal go to any of those districts? To the extent
that the practical consideration of providing convenient access for oral
argument underlies the rule of law adopted in Mendelman, would a different
conclusion be reached when the oral argument in the more distant court
would be heard by video teleconference? 62
These questions and others will likely have to be dealt with at some
point. If they prove too troublesome, consideration of whether the third
district's approach should be abandoned in favor of the position advocated
by the commission in Mendelman might also become a question that will
need to be addressed.
59. Id. at 196 (footnote) (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.68(2) (1995)).
60. Id. at 196.
61. Id.
62. In In re Oral Argument By Video Teleconference Network, 648 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1994), the first district established. remote facilities for arguments by video
teleconference. That court is presently conducting such arguments only when all attorneys
expected to present argument are located near a single remote facility. Since the attorney
representing the commission in Mendleman was from Tallahassee, and since it appears that the
appellant, who represented himself on appeal, was from south Florida, this factor apparently
had no applicability in that case. It may well play a role in striking the proper balance in
future cases, however. For instance, if the parties are both from Ft. Myers, one of the
locations at which the first district has established a remote facility, it would clearly be more
convenient for the parties to present oral argument to the first district by video teleconference
than it would be to travel to either Tampa or Lakeland, the locations at which the second
district, which includes Ft. Myers, generally hears oral arguments.
1996]
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VI. ORDERS REVIEWABLE
The courts decided a large number of cases dealing with the issue of
whether certain orders were reviewable, either by appeal or by certiorari.
The sheer volume of such cases precludes discussion of the reasoning of
each case. This article will therefore focus on some of the more significant
cases in this regard and set forth a sampling of other decisions, noting the
type of order involved, and the conclusion reached by the court as to whether
it was reviewable.
A. Orders Denying Motions to Dismiss Based on Claims of Untimely
Service
Concluding that an order denying a motion to dismiss based on the
failure to effect service within 120 days, as required by Rule 1.070(i) of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, is not appealable, the second district
dismissed the appeal in Nowry v. Collyar.63 The court recognized, however,
that its decision was in conflict with decisions of other districts64 and it
certified the following question to the supreme court:
DOES AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO DISMISS A
COMPLAINT CLAIMING UNTIMELY SERVICE PURSUANT
TO FLORIDA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.070(i) FAIL TO
CONSTITUTE AN ORDER DETERMINING THE JURISDIC-
TION OVER THE PERSON,[65 1 THUS MAKING IT A NONAP-
PEALABLE, NON-FINAL ORDER?
66
The first district addressed the same issue in Novella Land, Inc. v.
Panama City Beach Office Park, Ltd.,67 noting the conflict recognized in
Nowry and agreeing with the second district that such orders are not appeal-
63. 666 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
64. See Comisky v. Rosen Management Servs., Inc., 630 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (en bane); Mid-Florida Assocs., Ltd. v. Taylor, 641 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
65. Orders determining the jurisdiction of the person are appealable pursuant to Rule
9.130(a)(3)(C)(I) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.
66. Nowry, 666 So. 2d at 556.
67. 662 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
[Vol. 21:13
26
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss1/1
Musto
able.68 The first district also pointed out that the third district in RD & G
Leasing, Inc. v. Stebnickt69 had reached a similar conclusion. 0
B. Declaratory Judgments
In Canal Insurance Co. v. Reed,71 the supreme court determined that
when an insurance coverage issue has been decided in a third party declara-
tory judgment action between an insurer and its insured prior to a final
determination of liability in the underlying action, and, as a result, the
insurer must provide liability coverage for the insured in the underlying
action, the order entered in the declaratory judgment action is a final order
72subject to appellate review. Pointing out that under section 86.011 of the
Florida Statutes, "a declaratory judgment has 'the force and effect of a final
judgment,' ,73 the court found itself "compelled to find that a declaratory
judgment is appealable as a final order regardless of whether the judgment is
rendered in a separate declaratory judgment action or as part of a third-party
action such as that at issue here."
74
Although finding the declaratory judgment regarding a determination of
insurance coverage to be reviewable as a final order, the court stated that it
"must also stress that such a judgment will not automatically result in a stay
in the independent underlying cause of action. 7 5 The court explained that
"[t]his is because the underlying personal injury action is separate and
distinct from the insurance coverage dispute"76 and that "[t]he trial judge has
the discretion to stay the underlying action between the parties pending
resolution of the appeal or to permit it to continue concurrently with the
appeal process. 7
The court acknowledged that "it would be in the best interests of all the
parties for coverage issues to be resolved as soon as possible."78 The court
therefore "suggest[ed] that the district courts expedite review of appeals
68. Id. at 794.
69. 626 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
70. Novella Land, 662 So. 2d at 743.
71. 666 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1996).
72. Id. at 889-90.
73. Id at 891 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (1995)).
74. Canal Ins. Co., 666 So. 2d at 891.
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involving the sole issue of coverage 79 and "that the Appellate Court Rules
Committee consider an appropriate method for providing expedited review
of these cases to avoid unnecessary delays in the final resolution of the
underlying actions."
8 °
C. Orders Denying Motions for Summary Judgment Based on Claims
of Sovereign Immunity
In Department of Education v. Roe,8' the supreme court rejected an
effort to extend to claims of sovereign immunity the rationale of Tucker v.
Resha,82 which held that with regard to federal civil rights claims brought in
state courts, public officials are entitled to interlocutory review of orders
denying motions for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified
immunity.83 The decision in Tucker was based on the fact "that qualified
immunity of a public official best achieves its purpose as an immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability"84 and the fact that such immunity
"is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. 85
The court relied on a number of factors in declining to extend the
Tucker rationale beyond the facts of that case. These factors included: 1)
the fact that permitting interlocutory appeals when claims of sovereign
immunity are rejected would "add substantially to the caseloads of the
district courts of appeal;, 86 2) the fact that since "the applicability of the
sovereign immunity waiver is [often] inextricably tied to the underlying
facts, [thus] requiring a trial on the merits .... many interlocutory decisions
would be inconclusive and ... a waste of judicial resources; '87 3) the fact
that "qualified immunity is rooted in the need to protect public officials from
undue interference, whereas sovereign immunity is not; ' 88 and 4) the fact
that in Tucker, the court "had an interest in affording federal causes of action
brought in state court the same treatment they would receive if brought in
79. Canal Ins. Co., 666 So. 2d at 892.
80. Id.
81. 21 Fla. L. Weekly S311 (July 18, 1996).
82. 648 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1994).
83. Id. at 1190.
84. Roe, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at S311.
85. Tucker, 648 So. 2d at 1189 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
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federal court,"8 9 while sovereign immunity cases deal "with a state law
defense to an ordinary state law cause of action." 90
D. Nonappealable Orders
Orders deemed to be nonappealable included: An order denying a
motion to amend a complaint to add a punitive damage claim;91 a partial
summary judgment on liability as to four counts of a six-count complaint,
when those counts, although based on different legal theories, were interre-
lated with and interdependent on the two remaining counts; 92 a non-final
order striking a pleading as a discovery violation sanction;93 a final order of
the Board of Clinical Laboratory Personnel granting a petition for a clinical
laboratory supervisor license;94 an order setting aside a clerk's default;95 an
order denying a motion to dissolve an agreement to engage in alternative
dispute resolution when the parties had already entered into the resolution
process; 96 and a non-final order striking a defendant's compulsory counter-
claim.
97
E. Orders Reviewable by Certiorari
Orders found to be reviewable by certiorari included: An order trans-
ferring a case from circuit court to county court;98 an order granting a motion
to conduct a postverdict jury interview;99 and an order requiring production
of records and documents asserted to be confidential as work product and by
operation of the attorney-client privilege, or, in the alternative, the construc-




91. King v. Odle, 665 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
92. El Segundo Original Rey De La Pizza Cubana, Inc. v. Rey Pizza Corp., 676 So. 2d
1031 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
93. Hi-Tech Mktg. Group, Inc. v. Thiem, 659 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
94. Agency For Health Care Admin. v. Board of Clinical Lab. Personnel, 673 So. 2d 531
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
95. Collins v. Penske Truck Leasing, 668 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
96. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 664 So.
2d 332 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
97. Cole v. Bayley Prods., Inc., 661 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
98. David v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 676 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
99. Pesci v. Maistrellis, 672 So.2d 583 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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F. Orders Not Reviewable by Certiorari
Orders held not to be reviewable by certiorari included: An order
denying a motion to consolidate two separate lawsuits when the case does
did fall within the catagory of cases in which the possibility of repugnant
and inconsistent verdicts would result in a manifest injustice and a material
injury to the petitioners; °10 an order denying a motion to strike a demand for
a jury trial;102 an order denying a motion in limine to exclude expert scien-
tific testimony;10 3 an order determining that a prior judgment of dissolution
of marriage was not res judicata on the issue of paternity;" 4 an order on a
motion in limine precluding the introduction of evidence regarding insurance
coverage;105 and an order prohibiting a plaintiff from engaging in ex parte
communications with any of the defendant's employees.'
16
VII. RENDITION
A. Delay in Rendition Due to Pendency of Motion for Rehearing
In Pennington v. Waldheim,'0 7 the trial court entered a series of final
summary judgments in favor of the defendants. 10 8 Within the time period
contemplated by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure for service of motions
for new trial or rehearing, the plaintiff filed, but did not serve, a motion for
rehearing. °9 Several weeks later, the defendants learned of the motion and
moved to strike it." 0 The plaintiff asserted that the failure to serve the
defendants was due to clerical error and contended that the defendants had
101. Friedman v. Desoto Park N. Condominium Ass'n, 678 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
102. Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1995).
103. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Glazer, 671 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
104. Elder v. Department of Revenue, 670 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
105. Riano v. Heritage Corp. of S. Fla., 665 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
106. Boyd v. Pheo, Inc., 664 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
107. 669 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
108. Id. at 1159.
109. Rule 1.530(b) of the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure provides that such motions
shall be served not later than 10 days after the judgment. In Pennington, the 10th day was a
Sunday, so the time period for seeking rehearing was extended by the dictates of rule 1.090(a)
until the following day. The motion in the case was filed on that following day and was
therefore timely.
110. Pennington, 669 So. 2d at 1159.
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not been prejudiced."' The plaintiff also filed a pleading entitled "'Motion
for Relief in Accordance with Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.540,
'
,u12
requesting "'relief from 'damage resulting from clerical error in failing to
properly serve defendants on a timely basis."" 13 The trial court granted the
defendants' motions and denied the motion filed by the plaintiff."4 On the
thirtieth day after the trial court's ruling, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal
from the orders granting final summary judgment." 5
The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that the appeal was un-
timely. The fifth district, "writ[ing] to warn counsel of the danger posed by
the failure to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(b), 1 16
agreed. The court noted that under Rule 9.110(b) of the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure, notices of appeal must be filed within thirty days of
rendition of the order to be reviewed 17 and that under rule 9.020(g), rendi-
tion is suspended by a motion for rehearing only when the motion is
"authorized and timely.""18 The court concluded that rendition was not
suspended in Pennington because, under the civil rules, the motion had to be
served within ten days in order to be timely. 19 Since the motion was
untimely, so was the notice of appeal and dismissal was therefore man-
dated.1 20 "Although it may be counter-intuitive for civil lawyers to view
service as an event of jurisdictional dimension,"' 2' the court wrote, "in the
case of this particular rule, timely filing is of no moment, timely service is
everything."'
122
The question of whether a motion had to be served or filed within the
appropriate time period was also at issue in Department of Revenue v.
Loveday.'23 There, the appellee moved to dismiss as untimely an appeal
from a child support judgment, asserting that the pendency of a motion to










120. Pennington, 669 So. 2d at 1160.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 659 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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served on the tenth day after the judgment was entered, did not delay
rendition of the judgment.1 24
The court pointed out that "[u]nlike most of the rules of civil proce-
dure"' 2 this rule, which allowed parties to "move to vacate the order within
10 days from the date of entry"'126 did not state whether the motion had to be
served or whether it had to be filed within the ten days. 127 "Because this
motion is similar to a motion for rehearing, which must be served within 10
days,"' 28 the court stated, "and because most other time requirements in the
rules are governed by service, we interpret the rule as requiring a party to
serve a motion to vacate within ten days of the entry of the order."'1
29
This determination did not end the court's inquiry, however. The court
noted that only "authorized and timely" motions under Rule 9.020(g) of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure delay rendition of an order and that
the list of such motions in that rule does not include motions to vacate under
former rule 1.49 1.130 Drawing the same analogy it drew in deciding the issue
of whether the motion had to be served or filed within ten days in order to be
timely, the court found that the motion "functions as a motion to rehear,
alter, or amend a judgment.,"131  Since such motions are listed in rule
9.020(g) as being among those that suspend rendition, the court found that
the motion to vacate had that effect as well.
Given these two conclusions,' 32 the court found that the thirty-day
period within which a notice of appeal must be filed 133 did not start to run
until the trial court's disposition of the motion to vacate, and that the notice
124. Id at 1240.
125. Id. at 1241.
126. Id
127. Id.
128. Loveday, 659 So. 2d at 1241.
129. Id. It is not likely that the court's conclusion in this regard will have a significant
precedential impact. The rule that the court interpreted has been deleted from the civil rules
and incorporated into the new family rules as Rule 12.491 (f) of the Florida Family Law Rules
of Procedure. The new family law rule states that a party "may move to vacate the order by
filing a motion to vacate within ten days form the date of entry." FLA. FAM. LAW R. P.
12.491(0.
130. Loveday, 659 So. 2d at 1241.
131. Id.
132. The court also rejected a claim that the motion did not delay rendition because it was
not heard within 10 days. Id. at 1242.
133. FLA. R. App. P. 9.110(b).
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in Loveday, filed within that period, was therefore timely.134 The motion to
dismiss was therefore denied.
135
B. Orders Denying Motions
In Turner v. State,136 the second district found no appealable order to
exist when the record disclosed a handwritten margin note on the face of a
motion for post-conviction relief that read "Denied 11/2/95,' 37 and that was
followed by some symbol that appeared to be initials. 38  Noting that in
Gibson v. State,139 it had disapproved of the use of a rubber stamped denial
signed by a trial judge and entered on the face of a motion for postconviction
relief, the court stated: "Here we have even less. ' 14° The appeal was
therefore dismissed with directions to the trial court to reconsider the motion
and to "render an appropriate order susceptible of this court's review.,' 4'
C. Relinquishment of Jurisdiction
In State v. Siegel,142 the state attempted to appeal an order granting a
motion to suppress evidence. 43 When it was learned that no signed, written
order was ever entered, 144 the state moved to temporarily relinquish jurisdic-
tion for the entry of an order.145 The fifth district denied the motion and
dismissed the appeal.146 The court recognized that Rule 9.110(m) of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure "permits an appeal to proceed where
an appealable order is rendered prior to dismissal of a premature appeal,"'147
but pointed out that this provision is applicable only to final orders.
48
134. Loveday, 659 So. 2d at 1242.
135. Id
136. 667 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
137. Id. at 882.
138. Id.
139. 642 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
140. Turner, 667 So. 2d at 882.
141. Id
142. 662 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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VIII. NOTICE OF APPEAL
In Westfield Insurance Co. v. Sloan,149 the fifth district considered a
motion to dismiss that was based on the fact that, after the time for filing a
notice of appeal had run, an amended notice was filed adding an appellant to
the single appellant that had been named on the original, timely-filed
notice.15°
The court noted that Rule 9.110(d) of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires that the notice contain the name and designation of at
least one party on each side 15 and that the 1977 Committee Note to the rule
states that the advisory committee did not intend for defects on a notice of
appeal to be "jurisdictional or grounds for disposition unless the complain-
ing party was substantially prejudiced."'152 The court also pointed to rule
9.040(d), which provides:
At any time in the interest of justice, the court may permit any part
of the proceeding to be amended so that it may be disposed of on
the merits. In the absence of amendment, the court may disregard
any procedural error or defect that does not adversely affect the
substantial rights of the parties.
153
Finding no substantial prejudice to have been alleged or to be apparent, the
court denied the motion to dismiss.
54
The fifth district's approach in this case appears to conflict with the
conclusion reached by the third district in Ashraf v. Smith, 5 5 a case in which
a motion to amend a notice of appeal to include the appellant's insurer was
denied. 56  Although the court found the amendment "entirely unneces-
sary" 57 under the facts of the case, the denial of the motion was based on the
court's determination that it "lack[ed] the jurisdiction to permit such an
amendment."1
58
149. 671 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 996).
150. Id. at 882.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. FLA. R. App. P. 9.040(d)
154. Westfield, 671 So. 2d at 883.
155. 647 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 658 So. 2d 989 (Fla.
1995).
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Despite the decision in Ashraf, the third district, in Eisman v. Ross,159
applying an analysis virtually identical to that of the fifth district in West-
field, granted a motion to amend mandate to include as a party appellant the
name of an individual who was not named on the notice of appeal but who
was listed as a party litigant on the supersedes bond posted for the appeal.16°
IX. BOND
The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal in School Board of Hillsbor-
ough County v. Lara,161 because the appellant, a public body, failed to post
the bond required by section 440.25(5)(c) of the Florida Statutes, for appeals
from orders of judges of compensation claims. 62 The first district concluded
that the application of this statutory bond requirement to the appellant would
conflict with the dictates of Rule 9.310(b)(2) of the Florida Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, which provides that the filing of a notice of appeal by a
public body operates as an automatic stay pending review 63 and which, as is
made clear by the Committee Note to the rule,164 contemplates that the
automatic stay is to be without bond.1 65 The court stated that to the extent
that the statute and the rule conflict, the rule must control. 166 In light of this




In Kennedy v. Guarantee Management Services, Inc.,' 68 the third
district found that the circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, had erred
in dismissing an appeal because the appellant submitted his brief in hand-
written form, rather than having it typed. 69 The district court concluded that
159. 664 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
160. Id, at 1129.
161. 667 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
162. Id. at 368.
163. Id.
164. 1977 Committee Note to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310.
165. Lara, 667 So. 2d at 368-69.
166. Id. at 369.
167. Id.
168. 667 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
169. Id. at 1014.
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In Dagostino v. State,'7 1 a case in which the appellant was represented
by the Public Defender's office, the fourth district dealt with a request by the
appellant's attorney to accept the appellant's pro se brief as a supplemental
brief.
The court denied the motion,17 2 pointing out that when defendants are
represented by counsel on appeal, they do not have an absolute right to
participate and represent themselves.
73
The court "caution[ed] that the filing of pro se briefs after the public
defender has briefed the case does not aid in"' 174 resolving appeals "in some
orderly process."'
75
Noting the high regard it has for the Public Defender's office, the court
indicated that its action in denying the motion was "to reinforce that confi-
dence, not to undermine it' ' 176 and that accepting supplemental briefs in such





Two opinions provided insight into the manner in which district courts
analyze petitions for certiorari. Reviewing a petition that sought review of
the denial of a motion to strike a demand for jury trial in Parkway Bank v.
Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc.,178 the second district discussed the
"confusing distinction between a dismissal of a certiorari petition for lack of
170. Id.
171. 675 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
172. Id. at 195.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 196.
175. Id.
176. Dagostino, 675 So. 2d at 196.
177. Id.
178. 658 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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jurisdiction and a denial of a petition after a review of the nonfinal order on
its merits.' 79
The court noted that "case law usually explains that a certiorari petition
must pass a three-prong test before an appellate court can grant relief from
an erroneous interlocutory order."' 80 Under this test, the court explained,
"[a] petitioner must establish (1) a departure from the essential requirements
of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the trial (3)
that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal."'181 The court stated that
"[w]hile this traditional test is correct, the grammar of the test places the
description of the appellate court's standard of review on the merits before
the two threshold tests used to determine jurisdiction.' 8 2
This characterization of the test was based on the court's determination
that the second and third prongs deal with the court's jurisdiction to consider
a petition for certiorari and that the first prong establishes the standard to be
applied on the merits if jurisdiction is found to exist. As stated by the court,
"a petitioner must establish that an interlocutory order creates material harm
irreparable by postjudgment appeal before this court has power to determine
whether the order departs from the essential requirements of the law.'
' 83
After drawing the distinction between the jurisdictional prongs of the test
and the one relating to the merits of the case, the court proceeded to address
the proper manner for disposing of petitions. "If the jurisdictional prongs of
the standard three-part test are not fulfilled,"' 8 4 the court said, "then the
petition should be dismissed rather than denied.' 85
In Bared & Co., Inc. v. McGuire,186 the fourth district, with the excep-
tion of one "small quibble,"' 87 expressed its "complete agreement" with
Parkway Bank.'88 Concluding that "harm is not irreparable if it can be
corrected on final appeal,"'189 the court decided to "merge the second and
third prongs into a single one."
190
179. Id. at 648.
180. Id
181. Id. (citations omitted).
182. Id.
183. Parkway Bank, 658 So. 2d at 649.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 670 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (en banc).
187. Id. at 156 n.3.
188. Id.
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Noting, in the same manner as did the second district in Parkway
Bank,'9' that "in the past we have not been careful to make our jurisdictional
decisions in these cases manifest,"'192 and that "[m]ore often than not, we
have denied such petitions when we were really deciding that we lacked
jurisdiction,"'193 the court "seized on the present occasion to clarify our
dispositions and manner of proceeding."'
' 94
The court stated that when it receives a certiorari petition that seeks
review of a nonfinal order, it will "initially study it only to determine if
petitioner has made a prima facie showing of the element of irreparable
harm."
, 195
If the petitioner has failed to make such a showing, the court will
dismiss the petition. 96 On the other hand, if the petitioner meets this burden,
the court will then "study the petition to determine whether it makes a prima
facie showing that the order to be reviewed departs from the essential
requirements of law."
97
If the petition fails to make a prima facie demonstration of a departure,
the petition will be denied.198 If it does make such a showing, an order to
show cause why the petition should not be granted will be entered. 99 After
considering the response, if the court determines that there has been an
insufficient showing of irreparable harm or injury, it will dismiss the
petition. 2°° If it determines that the order under review does not depart from
the essential requirements of law, or if it decides that it will not exercise its
discretion to grant the writ, the court will deny the petition.20'
The court went on to discuss the effects of the two manners of rejecting
petitions for certiorari. "[A] dismissal of a petition seeking common law
certiorari represents only a determination that we lack jurisdiction and
nothing more, 20 2 the court said. "[A] bare denial by simple order of a
petition for common law certiorari review of a pretrial order will not
191. Parkway Bank, 658 So. 2d at 649 n.1.










202. Bared, 670 So. 2d at 157.
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represent a determination on the merits of the order to be reviewed,"203 the
court continued, "unless an opinion denying the petition indicates that
preclusive effect is intended. ' 2 4
The court noted its agreement with the second district's decision in Don
Mott Agency, Inc. v. Harrison,°5 which found that a denial without opinion
of a petition for a writ of certiorari is not an affirmance, does not establish
the law of the case, cannot be construed as passing upon any of the issues in
the litigation, and would not be res judicata as to the issues raised in thepetition.2°
B. Record
In DSA Marine Sales & Service, Inc. v. County of Manatee,0 7 the
petitioners sought certiorari review in the circuit court of the disapproval by
a board of county commissioners of a construction proposal.2 The petition
was accompanied with a motion to supplement the record as more docu-
ments became available.20 9 Shortly thereafter, the petitioner filed an
amended petition with a more thorough, but not yet completed, appendix.
210
The circuit court never ruled on the motion to supplement and denied the
amended petition without ordering a response on the merits, finding that the
petitioners failed to make a prima facie showing for relief. 211 The petitioners
moved for rehearing, seeking, among other things, guidance detailing the
insufficiency of the petition and an opportunity to amend once again.212
Reviewing the order of denial, the second district recognized that
"[b]ecause certiorari petitions must be filed within thirty days from the date
of rendition of the subject order, it is sometimes impossible to compile and
contemporaneously file the entire record as an appendix to the petition. 2 3
The court also stated that although "[s]everal elements are embraced in the
notion of procedural due process, none [are] more important than the right to
203. Id. at 158 (footnote omitted).
204. Id.
205. 362 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
206. Bared, 670 So. 2d at 158.
207. 661 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).




212. DSA, 661 So. 2d at 908.
213. Id. at 909.
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be heard., 214 Under the circumstances of this case, the court found that the
summary denial of the petition deprived the petitioner of procedural due
process.215
C. Order to Show Cause
In City of Kissimmee v. Grice,216 a police officer whose employment
was terminated filed a petition for certiorari in the circuit court, which
ordered the City to show cause why relief should not be granted.21 7 The City
moved to dismiss, asserting that the circuit court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. 1 8 Although the motion was denied,21 9 the City failed to file a
response to the order to show cause. 220 The circuit court granted the writ,
221
but "merely stated conclusions of law without indicating how the city
departed from the essential requirements of law' 222 in terminating the
officer.
On appeal, the fifth district found that the lack of response to an order
to show cause "is not tantamount to a default which automatically entitles
the petitioner to his requested relief. ' 223 The court indicated that although
the failure to respond "does limit the court's consideration to the information
contained in the record and the. allegations contained in the petition[,] ...
[s]till the court must determine if the petition is meritorious and whether the
requested relief should be granted. 224
The district court quashed the circuit court's order, characterizing it as
"in essence, a 'Per Curiam Reversal,"' 225 and stated, "[a]lthough a decision
under review may be affirmed without opinion, indicating that the presump-
tion of correctness accorded the lower tribunal had not been rebutted, an
appellate court has the responsibility to write opinions in all reversals. 226
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 669 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
217. Id. at 308.
218. Id. at 309.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 308.
221. Grice, 669 So. 2d at 309.
222. Id. at 309 n.1.
223. Id. at 308.
224. Id. (citation omitted).
225. Id. at 309 (footnote omitted).
226. Grice, 669 So. 2d at 309.
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In Ciba-Geigy Ltd. v. Fish Peddler, Inc.,227 the fourth district offered
guidance as to the role an amicus curiae should play in an appeal. The court
noted that a brief from an amicus curiae is "generally for the purpose of
assisting the court in cases which are of general public interest, or aiding in
the presentation of difficult issues.' 22 The court also stated that "[a]lthough
'by the nature of things an amicus is not normally impartial,' amicus briefs
should not argue the facts in issue.'
229
Applying these principles, the court denied one of two requests for
leave to file an amicus brief, because the brief appeared "to be nothing more
than an attempt to present a fact specific argument '' 0 of the same type as
was contained in the appellants' fifty page brief, a brief of the maximum
allowable length under the appellate rules.231 The court pointed out that
"[s]ince the parties are limited as to the number and length of briefs, amicus
briefs should not be used to simply give one side more exposure than the
rules contemplate."
2
The court expressed some further thoughts on the subject, indicating
that "it would be helpful to the court if [multiple] amicus would attempt to
join together in one brief and cooperate with the parties so as not to be
repetitious of the parties' briefs. 233 Further, the court said that "[iln the
interest of brevity, amicus briefs should not contain a statement of the case
or facts, but rather should get right to the additional information which the
amicus believes will assist the court.' 2 4 The court concluded its discussion
by noting that "although Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.370 does not
require a motion for leave to file an amicus brief to state whether the parties
have consented, it would be appropriate for the motion to contain that
information."3
227. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1562 (4th Dist. Ct. App. July 3, 1996).
228. Id. at D1562 (citing Alexander v. Hall, 64 F.R.D. 152 (D.C.S.C. 1974)).
229. Id. (citing Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1970)).
230. Id.
231. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210(a)(5).
232. Ciba-Geigy, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1562.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (citation omitted).
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XII. PROHIBITION
In Brooks v. Lockett,23 6 plaintiffs and prospective plaintiffs in a putative
class action suit in Orange County sought a writ of prohibition against a
circuit judge in Lake County, where a similar class action against the same
defendant was pending, who had entered an order abating the Orange County
proceeding,237 as well as other cases against the defendant.238 The fifth
district found that the Lake County judge "was not empowered to issue an
order staying a pending action in another jurisdiction. 2 39 It recognized that
"prohibition generally is not available to revoke an order already entered, ' 24°
but granted the writ nonetheless, 241 because "the order in the instant case
attempts to exert an ongoing effect on pending class-action litigation
involving [the defendant] throughout the State of Florida.,
242
XIV. THE EFFECT ON APPEALS OF PRIOR DENIALS OF PROHIBITION
In Barwick v. State,24 3 the defendant raised on appeal to the supreme
court from his convictions and sentences a claim that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for disqualification. This same issue had been the basis
for a pretrial petition for a writ of prohibition that the supreme court had
denied244 in an order which did not indicate the grounds for denial. 245
The State argued that the denial of prohibition should be deemed a
ruling on the merits of the issue.246 In support of this position, the State
relied on the third district's opinion in Obanion v. State,247 which was
advocated by (then Judge and present Supreme Court of Florida) Justice
Anstead's specially concurring opinion in the fourth district's decision in
236. 658 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
237. Lake County is located in the fifth circuit, while Orange County is located in the
ninth circuit. Id. at 1207.
238. Brooks, 658 So. 2d at 1206.
239. Id. at 1207.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1208.
242. Id. at 1207-08.
243. 660 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1995).
244. Id. at 690.
245. Id. at 69 1.
246. Id. at 690-91.
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DeGennaro v. Janie Dean Chevrolet, Inc.,24s cases that the supreme court
categorized as "recogniz[ing] that a denial of a petition for writ of prohibi-
tion in those districts should henceforth constitute a ruling on the merits
unless otherwise indicated."249
The supreme court "approve[d] of the procedure adopted by the Third
District in Obanion and advocated by Justice Anstead's concurring opinion
in DeGennaro as to the effect of the denial of a petition for writ of prohibi-
tion in those district courts, ' ' 50 but did not agree that its denial of the petition
in Barwick was a decision on the merits.251 Noting that its order did not
indicate the grounds for the denial252 and the fact that the court had not
"clearly expressed an intention to have a denial of a petition for writ of
prohibition, without more, serve as a ruling on the merits,' z 3 the court
"recognize[d] a need to clarify the effect of this Court's denial of a prohibi-
tion petition.' 254
Satisfying the need that it had identified, the court stated:
248. 600 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Anstead, J., concurring specially).
249. Barwick, 660 So. 2d at 691. While Obanion certainly established this principle in
the third district, the impact of DeGennaro in the fourth district is less clear. Justice
Anstead's sentiments in that decision cannot be reconciled with those expressed by Judge
Farmer in his dissenting opinion in Thomason v. State, 594 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (Farmer, J., dissenting), quashed on other grounds, 620 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1993). In
Thomason, the defendant, who was appealing from an order withholding adjudication and
placing him on probation, raised a double jeopardy claim that he had previously asserted in a
petition for prohibition that had been denied without opinion. The court affirmed without
opinion, but Judge Farmer, who wrote primarily to dissent on the merits, discussed the
question of whether consideration of the double jeopardy claim was proper in light of the prior
petition. He noted that such consideration was appropriate because "prohibition is an
extraordinarily prerogative writ... that is sometimes denied for good reasons having nothing
to do with the underlying merits of a petitioner's position." Id. at 312 n.2. He recognized that
his view was contrary to Obanion, but stated that the fourth district had never adopted the
Obanion approach and that he hoped it never would, "at least as long as prohibition is deemed
a matter of mere grace." Id. Although disagreeing with Judge Farmer on the merits of the
case, it appears that the other members of the panel agreed with him on the jurisdictional issue
because the case was affirmed, rather than dismissed, because Judge Stone wrote a specially
concurring opinion that set forth the reasons why he felt the case should be affirmed on the
merits, and because the court, on rehearing, certified a question that dealt only with the merits
of the case. Id. at 318.
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We hold that from this time forward, if an order from this Court
denying a petition for a writ of prohibition based upon an unsuc-
cessful motion for disqualification is to constitute a decision on the
merits and, thereby, foreclose further review of the disqualification
issue on direct appeal, the order will state that it is "with preju-
dice." 25
The court's decision to use qualifying language that refers only to a petition
"based upon an unsuccessful motion for disqualification"2 56 leaves open the
question of whether the court means to apply this same rationale when a
petition is based on some other ground, such as the double jeopardy issue in
Thomason or the speedy trial claim in Obanion.
The court's specific approval of the Obanion procedure for the third
district and the procedure advocated by Justice Anstead in DeGennaro for
the fourth district,2 57 while it adopted a different procedure for itself, at least
with regard to petitions raising disqualification issues, seems to indicate that
each district court will be allowed to adopt the approach it deems best.
XV. MOOTNESS
In J. M. v. State, 8 the third district reversed an adjudication of delin-
quency based on its conclusion that the trial court's stated reasons for its
departure from the recommendation made by the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services ("IRS") as to the appropriate level of restrictiveness
were not supported by the record.2 5 9 The district court remanded for a new
disposition hearing, finding that the issue was not moot even though the
juvenile had served his residential sentence and had been released by
HRS. 260 The court stated:
Depending upon the evidence, if any, presented at the new disposi-
tion hearing on remand, the trial court, in its finding of delin-
quency, may conceivably decide to withhold adjudication, impose
a less restrictive sentence and give the juvenile credit for the origi-
255. Barwick, 660 So. 2d at 691.
256. Id.
257. See supra note 249. This footnote addresses the reasons why the court's approval of
this procedure for the fourth district may not mean a great deal, since the fourth district itself
may prefer a different approach.
258. 677 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
259. Id. at 892.
260. Id. at 893.
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nal sentence served or suspend entry of sentence altogether. As
stated by this court in R.A.B. v. State, 399 So.2d 16, (Fla 3d DCA
1981): '"The very fact of adjudication, apart from disposition, has
potential collateral effects which are not harmless." Id. at 18. In-
deed, a withhold of adjudication as opposed to an adjudication for
this offense would certainly be relevant to future dispositions if this
juvenile is ever rearrested or if he decided to enter a profession
which required him to disclose any juvenile record. See § 39.045,
Fla. Stat. (1993).261
XVI. HARMLESS ERROR
In Heuss v. State,262 the fourth district found that the trial court erred by
failing to make findings sufficient to support the admission of certain
statements. 263 The court concluded that the error was harmless, 264 however,
and affirmed the convictions and sentences under review. 265 In a motion for
rehearing, the defendant pointed out that the state had not made a harmless
error argument and contended that the court lacked authority to sua sponte
266
apply the harmless error doctrine.
Noting that section 59.041 of the Florida Statutes requires the court to
consider whether any error is harmless, 267 the court rejected the defendant's
contention. The court stated that it could "discern no public policy support-
ing a conclusion that a review court must reverse an otherwise valid convic-
tion for an error that is deemed harmless simply because harmless error was
not argued in the state's brief.
' 268
XVII. SANCTIONS
In several cases, orders were entered imposing sanctions on pro se
litigants. One particularly active litigant received sanctions from three
261. Id. (footnote omitted). See also FLA. STAT. § 39.045 (1993).
262. 660 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
263. Id. at 1057.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1058.
266. Id.
267. A similar requirement is set forth in section 924.33 of the Florida Statutes.
268. Heuss, 660 So. 2d at 1059.
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district courts. In Attwood v. Eighth Circuit Court,2 69 Attwood v. Single-
tary,270 and Attwood v. State ex rel. Florida Department of Corrections,271
the first, second, and fourth districts, respectively, decided to take action
against an individual who had instituted an extraordinary number of cases,
virtually all of which challenged prison conditions.272
Attwood had filed seventeen appeals or petitions in the first district in
the period of just over ten months preceding the court's order,273 seventeen
cases in the second district in the six-month period ending June 1, 1995,274
and thirty-one appeals or petitions in the fourth district in the first half of
1995.275 The fourth district also noted that Attwood had eighteen cases, one
of which had 200 defendants, pending in the circuit court for Martin
County,276 and that as of the date of a hearing held in October, 1993, in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Attwood
had filed more than forty cases in that court.277 The fourth district addition-
ally pointed out that at the federal hearing, Attwood admitted that he had
also filed "several thousand' 278 internal grievances in the Florida system. 279
The first district indicated that its clerk's office received mail from
Attwood "on almost a daily basis." 2 0 The fourth district noted that at the
federal hearing, Attwood "admitted mailing 'pounds of mail a week' to the
courts." 28 1
In addition to commenting on the quantity of Attwood's efforts, the
district courts made it clear that they were unimpressed with the quality of
those efforts. The fourth district referred to Attwood's "frivolous claims,
' 282
the second district to his "baseless appeals, petitions, and related unauthor-
ized motions, 28 3 and the first district to his "simply incomprehensible"
284
269. 667 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
270. 659 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
271. 660 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
272. See Attwood, 667 So. 2d at 357 n.4; Singletary, 659 So. 2d at 1128; Department of
Corrections, 660 So. 2d at 358.
273. Attwood, 667 So. 2d at 356.
274. Singletary, 659 So. 2d at 1128.
275. Department of Corrections, 660 So. 2d at 358.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 359.
279. Id.
280. Attwood, 667 So. 2d at 357.
281. Department of Corrections, 660 So. 2d at 359.
282. Id. at 360.
283. Singletary, 659 So. 2d at 1128.
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pleadings. Attwood's pleadings were also apparently quite repetitive. The
first district indicated that he filed "numerous copies of the same pleading in
different cases.' 85 The fourth added that he often "makes copies of what he
has already filed, signs the copied version, and handwrites an additional
allegation, which must be treated as a new petition or appeal. ' 2 6
The fourth district also expressed concern over the fact that Attwood,
claiming indigency, had paid no filing fees in any of his cases2 87 despite
evidence adduced at the federal hearing to the effect that he was the sole
owner of a rental income-generating apartment building with an estimated
value of $57,000 to $69,00028 and that he had a bank account about which
he refused to testify.289
The first district prohibited Attwood from filing any document on his
own behalf in the case under review or in any other case, as either appellant
or petitioner,290 directed its clerk to "refuse any document filed by Attwood
unless signed by a member of The Florida Bar"291 and, in Attwood's pending
cases that were not yet mature, afforded Attwood thirty days within which to
file and serve a notice of appearance of counsel,292 noting that it would
dismiss any case in which such a notice is not timely filed.293
The second district directed its clerk to reject the filing of all future
notices of appeal and petitions for extraordinary relief in civil matters sent
by or on behalf of Attwood unless submitted and signed by a member of The
294Florida Bar. The court stated that any papers filed in violation of its order
would be "automatically placed in an inactive file," 295 and that any notices of
appeal received from circuit courts would be "summarily stricken. 296 The
court noted that its order would not apply to any criminal appeal filed by
Attwood which directly concerns a judgment and sentence.29
284. Attwood, 667 So. 2d at 356.
285. Id at 357.
286. Department of Corrections, 660 So. 2d at 360.
287. Id at 358.
288. Id at 359.
289. Id.
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The fourth district ordered that Attwood "be denied indigent status for
the filing of appeals or petitions for extraordinary relief' 298 and directed its
clerk "to refuse any such notice of appeal or petition for filing unless
accompanied by the proper filing fee or submitted and assigned by a member
of the Florida Bar. 299  Like the second district, the court indicated that its
order would not apply to "any criminal appeal filed by Robert Attwood
which directly concerns a judgment and sentence. ''3 °°
The fifth district, apparently unaffected by Attwood's output, deter-
mined that sanctions were appropriate for another litigant. In Holmes v.
State,30 1 the court entertained a defendant's fifth petition for writ of habeas
corpus and his eleventh post-conviction proceeding, 30 2 all unsuccessful
challenges to a 1989 conviction and sentence.
30 3
Finding the defendant "has disrupted the fair allocation of judicial
resources of this court, '" 3°4 and "this activity now rises to the level of being
an abuse of process, 30 5 the court prohibited the defendant from filing "any
further pro se pleadings regarding his 1989 conviction and sentence."3°
XVIII. REHEARING
In Thompson v. Singletary,3 °7 the fourth district entered an initial
opinion ordering a new trial for a criminal defendant. No motion for
rehearing was filed within the fifteen days allowed by Rule 9.330(a) of the
309 3 10Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, and mandate therefore issued.
The state subsequently filed an untimely motion for rehearing, a motion
to accept the motion for rehearing as timely filed and a motion to recall the
mandate.31 1 Attached to the motion for rehearing were portions of the trial
transcript not previously furnished to the court that demonstrated that the
298. Department of Corrections, 660 So. 2d at 360.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. 669 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
302. Id. at 360.
303. Id. at 360 n.1.
304. Id. at 361.
305. Id.
306. Holmes, 669 So. 2d at 361.
307. 659 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
308. Id. at 435-36.
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defendant was not in fact entitled to a new trial.312 Eleven days after the
state's motions were filed, and before the court ruled on them, the term of
court ended.313
The court found that the untimeliness of the motion for rehearing
presented no impediment to its consideration, because the fifteen-day time
limit of the rule is not jurisdictional 314 and the motion was filed in the same
term of court.315 The fact that the term of court ended after the issuance of
the mandate, however, was a matter of greater concern.
The court began its analysis by focusing on the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Judges
of District Court of Appeal, Fifth District.316 There, the district court
affirmed a case without opinion.317 When the appellant filed a motion for
rehearing four months later during the next term of court, the district court
denied the motion as untimely, but sua sponte decided to reconsider the case
en banc because it conflicted with an opinion in another case that was
written in the interim.318 The party opposing the rehearing then obtained a
writ of mandamus from the supreme court, which held that an appellate court
is without jurisdiction to recall its mandate beyond the term of court during
which the mandate was issued.319
After its discussion of State Farm, the fourth district pointed out that if
the state had called its attention to the impending expiration of the court's
term of court by designating its motion to recall mandate as an emergency
motion, the court would have recalled mandate before the end of the term.
320
The court noted that in the absence of such a designation, it had followed its
normal procedure with motions for rehearing, which is to hold them in the
321
clerk's office until a response is filed or the time for a response expires.By the time that process was completed, so was the term of the court.322
312. Thompson, 659 So. 2d at 436.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 437.
316. 405 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1981).





322. Thompson, 659 So. 2d at 436.
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The court next turned its attention to Washington v. State,323 a case in
which the supreme court stated that "[t]he prevailing rule is that an appellate
court is without power to recall a mandate regularly issued without inadver-
tence and resume jurisdiction of the cause after the expiration of the term at
which its judgment was rendered and the mandate issued. ' 324 The supreme
court in Washington also recognized "the power.., to recall a mandate sent
down by inadvertence."
325
Seizing on the references in Washington to "inadvertence," the fourth
district concluded that its failure to grant the State's motion to recall the
mandate during the eleven day period between its filing and the expiration of
the term of court was "inadvertent under Washington. ,326 Repeating its
previous pronouncement that it would have recalled mandate prior to the end
of the term had the State called its attention to the need to do SO, 32 7 the court
concluded that "[u]nder these facts, which we believe make this case
distinguishable from State Farm, ... we have not lost jurisdiction." 328 The
court therefore granted the State's motions, withdrew its original opinion,32 9
and denied relief on the merits.
330
XIX. APPELLATE ATroRNEYS' FEES
A. Offer of Judgment on Appeal
In Deleuw, Cather & Co. v. Grogis,331 when the fourth district upheld a
trial court's judgment taxing costs, the appellee moved for appellate attor-
ney's fees and costs on the basis of an offer of judgment served during the
pendency of the appeal.332 The court struck the motion and the offer of
judgment based on its conclusion that section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes
under which the offer was made, "does not contain any language which
would indicate that the legislature contemplated its use during appeals. 333
323. 110 So. 259 (Fla. 1926).
324. Id. at 260-61 (citations omitted).
325. Id. at 261.
326. Thompson, 659 So. 2d at 437.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. The original opinion was published in the advance sheets at 655 So. 2d 1282. It was
not included in the bound volume, however, in light of the fact that it was withdrawn.
330. Thompson, 659 So. 2d at 437.
331. 664 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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Additionally, the court found the statute inapplicable to the case under
review because the statute applies only to damages 334 and the proceeding
dealt only with the correctness of the amount of costs, 335 which are not
considered a part of a claim which forms the basis of a suit.
336
B. Violations of the Government in the Sunshine Law
In School Board of Alachua County v. Rhea,337 the first district rejected
a claim that because section 286.011(4) of the Florida Statutes provides that
"the court shall assess a reasonable attorney's fee" against agencies deter-
mined to have violated the Government in the Sunshine Law, there is no
requirement for a party seeking appellate attorney's fees in such a case to
file a motion in the appellate court.338 The court found that the statute's
mandatory language "does not supersede the requirements of Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.400(b),,, 339 which dictates that such motions must be
filed in the appellate court, "nor does it authorize the trial court to make an
initial award of appellate attorney's fees."'
340
XX. MANDATE
The supreme court, in State v. Roberts,341 clarified the procedure for
obtaining a stay or recall of a district court's mandate when discretionary
review is sought. The issue came before the court after the first district's
denial of a motion to recall mandate.342 The motion had been filed four days
after the party seeking the recall had filed a notice invoking the supreme
court's discretionary jurisdiction. In its denial, the district court relied on the
supreme court's opinion in State v. McKinnon343 for the proposition that a
party desiring a stay of mandate during the pendency of a petition for review
must apply to the supreme court for the stay.3"
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Deleuw, 664 So. 2d at 989.
337. 661 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
338. Id. at 332.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. 661 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1995).
342. Id at 821.
343. 540 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1989).
344. Roberts, 661 So. 2d at 821.
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The supreme court recognized that McKinnon "contained language" 345
supporting such a conclusion, but pointed out that "the issue in that case was
,,346
not where the motion for stay should be filed. Rather, the court stated,
the holding of McKinnon was that the pendency of a petition for review "did
not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to resentence a defendant pursuant
to the district court's mandate which had reversed and remanded the case for
resentencing. 347 Ending any confusion as to the effect of McKinnon, the
court stated that "[w]hile a motion for stay and to recall a mandate may be
filed in this Court, it may also be filed in the district court of appeal. 348
Relying on Rule 9.130(a) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which indicates that lower tribunals "have continuing jurisdiction" 349 to
consider motions for stay pending review, the court said, "[t]he fact that a
notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of this court has already been
filed does not deprive the district court of appeal of jurisdiction to rule upon
the motion. 350 In fact, the court went on to indicate that "[g]enerally
speaking, the Court prefers that motion for stay be filed in the district court
of appeal because at that stage of the case the district court ordinarily will be
better informed concerning the case and thereby better able to predict the
likelihood of this Court's accepting jurisdiction. 351  The court therefore
receded from McKinnon "to the extent that it suggests that the filing of a
notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction precludes the district court of
appeal from entertaining a motion to stay or withdraw its mandate.
352
XXI. APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. Death of Defendant
In State v. Clements,353 the supreme court dealt with the effect of
defendants' deaths during the pendency of direct appeals from judgments
and sentences. Despite the fact that each of the district courts of appeal had
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 821-22.
348. Id. at 822.




353. 668 So. 2d 980 (FIa. 1996).
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found abatement ab initio to be proper under such circumstances,35 4 the
supreme court concluded that "the appeal of a conviction may be dismissed
but is not to be abated ab initio.'355 The court pointed out that the theory
upon which abatement ab initio had been applied was the fact that it left in
effect upon a defendant's death the legal presumption of innocence.3 5 6 The
court found such reasoning inapplicable in light of the fact that "the pre-
sumption of innocence ceases 'upon the adjudication of guilt and the entry of
sentence,"' 357 and the fact that "a judgment of conviction comes for review
with a presumption in favor of its regularity or correctness."
358
The court went on to indicate, however, that even dismissal is not
mandated. Finding that "monetary fines or penalties continue to be enforce-
able against assets which comprise a defendant's estate, ' 359 the court stated
that in such situations, "the estate maintains the same right to appeal that the
defendant would have had if living' 360 and that the state may also "have an
interest in seeing the appeal completed. ' 361 Thus, the court concluded that
"when a defendant dies after judgment but during an appeal, the appellate
court may, upon a showing of good cause by the State or a representative of
the defendant, determine that the appeal should proceed. 362
B. Belated Appeals
The fourth district grudgingly reversed a defendant's sentence in
Gilbert v. State363 by applying, to a belated appeal, the general rule that
appellate courts decide cases in accordance with the law in effect at the time
of the appellate decision.364 The court felt that it was bound by supreme
court precedent3 65 to apply this general rule despite "question[ing] its
354. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 648 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Carstens
v. State, 638 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Jackson v. State, 559 So. 2d 320 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Kearns v. State, 536 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Cruz
v. State, 137 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
355. Clements, 668 So. 2d at 981.
356. Id.
357. Id. (quoting Vaccaro v. State, 11 So. 2d 186, 187 (Fla. 1942)).
358. Clements, 668 So. 2d at 981 (citing Vaccaro, 11 So. 2d at 188; Hitchcock v. State,
413 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1982)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 960 (1982).




363. 667 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
364. Id. at 971.
365. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985).
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propriety in cases of a belated appeal, especially one [such as the case under
review] which is not brought until after the favorable case law change has
been announced. 366
The court expressed its belief that "a defendant should not be allowed
to sit back and await a favorable change in the law before claiming a right to
appeal, as the appellant did here. 367 Indicating that it did not believe it
should "take two years to discover and bring to the court's attention' '368 a
trial counsel's dereliction of the duty to file a notice of appeal when re-
quested to do so, the court suggested "that the time for bringing a claim for
ineffectiveness based on trial counsel's failure to appeal should be even
more limited than a routine motion for ineffectiveness pursuant to Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850,,,369 a rule which presently requires such
motions to be filed within two years of conviction,370 one year in capital
cases.
371
Judge Glickstein wrote a specially concurring opinion in which he
agreed with the majority on the merits of the case, but "abstain[ed] from
their expressed concerns as to the policy matters beyond the issues.
372
C. Appeals by the State
1. Appeals Taken After the Jury is Sworn
In State v. Livingston,373 a motion to suppress, filed prior to jury
selection, was heard after the jury was sworn but before opening state-
ments.374 The trial court granted the motion and subsequently granted a
mistrial.375
The State appealed from the order granting the motion to suppress and
the defendant contended that the order was not appealable because the jury
had been sworn prior to the suppression hearing. 376 The second district




370. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(b).
371. Id.
372. Gilbert, 667 So. 2d at 971 (Glickstein, J., concurring specially).
373. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1237 (2d Dist. Ct. App. May 22, 1996).
374. Id. at D1237-38.
375. Id. It is not clear from the opinion which party requested the mistrial, whether the
mistrial had any relation to the motion to suppress or whether the mistrial was granted before
opening statements or at some point thereafter.
376. Livingston, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1238.
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disagreed, concluding that "the granting of a motion to suppress followed by
a mistrial results in an order appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(B)." 37
2. Effect of Nolle Prosse
The State sought certiorari review of two pretrial evidentiary rulings in
State v. Spence.378 After the trial court entered the orders in question, the
State nolle prossed the case.37 9 Some three weeks later, the State refiled an
information alleging the same crime.3 0  The State then filed its timely
petitions for certiorari.81
Relying on the supreme court's decision in State v. Vazquez, 382 the court
found that the evidentiary rulings had "no carryover effect upon the new
information. 383 Given this fact, the court called the attempt to obtain review
of the rulings a "request for a futile act 384 and denied the State's petitions.385
"Even though the new case may constitute an identical allegation, 386 the
court stated, "it nonetheless constitutes a separate case and we cannot reach
back and rule and determine the validity of orders entered in a previous case
that is no longer in existence."
387
The court warned that the filing of a nolle prosse "may have awesome
consequences which should be contemplated before such action is taken, 388
and indicated that it "prepared this opinion to point out the pitfall in the
course of action taken by the state in the instant case."
389
3. Pretrial Orders Declaring a Sentencing Statute Unconstitutional
In State v. Peloquin,3 ° the second district dealt with consolidated
appeals by the State from orders declaring the DUI vehicle impoundment
377. Id.
378. 658 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
379. Id. at 661.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. 450 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1984).





388. Spence, 658 So. 2d at 661.
389. Id
390. 20 Fla. L. Weekly D2744 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1995).
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law391 unconstitutional .392 The court noted that the defendants in the cases
under review had not yet gone to trial or pleaded to the charges 393 and that
the issue of vehicle impoundment does not arise until after conviction.
Under these circumstances, the court dismissed the appeals, 395 stating that
"[a] pretrial order declaring a statute or ordinance unconstitutional, and
doing nothing more regarding the underlying case, is not appealable, ' 396 and
that since "these orders relate to sentencing, and do not impact the trial of
the cases, they do not meet the standard for review by certiorari. 397
D. Motions for Post Conviction Relief
1. Summary Denial
In Davis v. State,398 the fourth district discussed the procedure it follows
in reviewing summary denials of motions for postconviction relief.399 The
court noted that appeals in such cases are governed by Rule 9.140(g) of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 400 which requires the court to review
"the arguments made therein together with the order of denial and the
attachments thereto,"'' 1 and which states, "[u]nless the record shows
conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief, the order shall be
reversed and the cause remanded for an evidentiary hearing."4 2 The court
went on to note that if its review "shows a preliminary basis for reversing the
trial court's order,"4 3 the court will order a response from the state and will
then "allow the appellant to reply."'4 4 If the record does not show such a
basis, the court continued, "neither the appellant nor the state are required to
file briefs. ' '4°S
391. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(6)(d) (1993).




396. Id. (citation omitted).
397. Peloquin, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D2744.
398. 660 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
399. Id. at 1162.
400. Id
401. Id.
402. FLA. R. APp. P. 9.140(g).





Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss1/1
Musto
The court took the opportunity to explain its process because "we have
noted of late many pro se appellants filing briefs on orders denying postcon-
viction relief without a hearing."4°6 Stating that it "would have already
disposed of this case as an affirmance but for the fact''4 7 that the appellant
filed a brief,4°8 the court opined that such briefs "may in fact slow the
process of our review" 409 and "[g]enerally ... are not considered, because
either the arguments were made in the postconviction relief motion, or they
improperly raise additional issues not contained in ' 410 the motion.
2. Orders Granting in Part and Denying in Part
In Cooper v. State,411 the second district found to be appealable an order
granting in part and denying in part a motion for postconviction relief filed
under Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.4 1 2 Such an
order, the court concluded, "marks the end of the judicial labor which is to
be expended on the motion, and the order is final for appellate purposes."
413
The court drew a distinction between such an order and one that denies a
claim in a postconviction motion but grants an evidentiary hearing on a
different claim in the same motion. 4  In such circumstances, the court
stated, the order is "not appealable until all issues raised have been ruled
upon by the court, ' 415 because "U]udicial economy ... forbids piecemeal
appeals until all pending matters raised in a single motion have been re-
solved and ... can then be efficiently reviewed in one appellate proceed-ing.'9416
E. Cross-Appeals
In Page v. State,4 17 a criminal defendant appealed from a conviction and
the state cross-appealed, asserting that the trial court erroneously suppressed
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Davis, 660 So. 2d at 1162.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. 667 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).




416. Cooper, 667 So. 2d at 933.
417. 677 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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a statement.41 8 The first district affirmed the conviction and, in light of that
resolution, declined to address the issue raised on cross-appeal.
419
The court recognized section 924.07(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes,
which states, in pertinent part: "Once the state's cross-appeal is instituted,
the appellate court shall review and rule upon the question raised by the state
regardless of the disposition of the defendant's appeal. 420  Concluding,
however, that compliance with that provision in a case such as the one under
review would "be rendering what amounted to nothing more than an advi-
sory opinion," 421 the court found that "to the extent the statute purports to
dictate to the courts what issues must be addressed, regardless of necessity, it
constitutes a violation of the separation of powers. 422 The court certified
the following question to the supreme court as one of great public impor-
tance:
IS SECTION 924.07(l)(d), FLORIDA STATUTES (1995),
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPAL
[SIC] OF SEPARATION OF POWERS TO THE EXTENT THAT
IT PURPORTS TO MANDATE THAT AN APPELLATE
COURT MUST RULE UPON ISSUES RAISED BY THE STATE
IN A CROSS-APPEAL, REGARDLESS OF THE DISPOSITION
OF THE DEFENDANT'S APPEAL?
423
F. Disqualification of Counsel
In Colton v. State,424 a criminal defendant appealing his conviction, who
was represented by the Public Defender's Office, moved to disqualify
counsel for the State.42* The motion was based on the fact that at the time of
the filing of the notice of appeal, counsel for the state had been employed as
a trial attorney by the Public Defender's Office representing the defen-
dant.42
6
418. hid at 55.
419. Id. at 56.
420. FLA. STAT. 924.07(1)(d) (1995).
421. Id.
422. Page, 677 So. 2d at 56.
423. Id.
424. 667 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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Resolving all factual disputes in favor of the defendant,427 the first
district denied the motion. The court found a number of facts to be of
significance, including the fact that: 1) the attorney did not represent the
defendant at trial or on any previous matter;428 2) the defendant did not assert
that the attorney had received any confidential information, but only that it
was possible that he could have been exposed to such information;429 and 3)
the attorney filed an affidavit in which he stated that he was not privy or
exposed to any information regarding appellate cases, including the defen-
dant's appeal. 430
The court noted that there is no rule of Professional Conduct that
specifically addresses successive government to government employment
when those interests are adverse431 and rejected the defendant's effort to
extend to the facts of the case the dictates of Rule 2.060(c) of the Florida
Rules of Judicial Administration, which "prohibits former judicial research
aides from participating in any manner in any proceeding that was docketed
in the court during the term of service or prior thereto." 4
32
The court therefore addressed the issue in terms of whether the repre-
sentation resulted in an appearance of impropriety, noting first that such an
evaluation must be done on a case-by-case basis.433 In finding no appearance
of impropriety to exist, the court pointed out that "arguments made at trial
and on appeal are distinct and involve differing strategies," 434 that appellate
courts are "bound by the record and arguments made at the trial court
level, 435 matters with which the attorney in the case under review was not
involved,436 and that any "anonymous information '437 the attorney might
have overheard while with the Public Defender's Office would be viewed by
the court as "of little value in the appellate process. 438
427. The court noted that if the case had turned on the factual disputes, it would have
appointed a special master to make factual findings. Id.
428. Id. at 343.
429. Colton, 667 So. 2d at 343.
430. Id. at 342.
431. Id. at 342-43.
432. Id. at 343.
433. Id.
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G. Out-of-Time Rehearing
In Spaziano v. State,439 a criminal defendant with a pending death
warrant filed two out-of-time motions for rehearing. One motion was
directed to the affirmance, thirteen years earlier on direct appeal, of the
judgment and sentence of death and the other was directed to the affirmance,
nine years earlier, of the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief.
440
The court noted that the motions were "clearly not authorized." 44 It
went on, however, consistent with its "constitutional responsibility to refrain
from dismissing a cause solely because an improper remedy has been
sought,"442 to consider the contents of the motions and a supporting affidavit
"to determine whether they have any basis for relief under our jurisdic-
tion. ' 43 Such consideration led to the conclusion that one issue raised by
the defendant, relating to newly discovered evidence of the recantation of the
testimony of a significant witness, was a proper subject for a successive
motion for post-conviction relief under Rules 3.850 and 3.851 of the Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure.44 The supreme court therefore remanded the
matter to the trial court for consideration of that issue.
445
XXII. APPEALS IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES
A. Final Orders
The question of what constitutes a final order for purposes of appeal,
when parental rights are terminated was dealt with by the fifth district in
Moore v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.44 6 Uncertainty
existed on this point because the statutory scheme applicable to such cases
contemplates the entry of two written orders.447 The first order, pursuant to
section 39.467 of the Florida Statutes, is to be entered after the adjudicatory
hearing and is to set forth "the findings of fact and conclusions of law."" 8
The second, pursuant to section 39.469(3), is a subsequent order of disposi-
439. 660 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1995).
440. Id. at 1364.
441. Id. at 1365.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Spaziano, 660 So. 2d at 1365-66.
445. Il at 1366.
446. 664 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
447. Id. at 1139.
448. FLA. STAT. § 39.467(5) (1995).
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tion "briefly stating the facts upon which [the court's] decision to terminate
the parental rights is made."449
The district court held that "it is the second or dispositional order which
is the final order for purposes of appeal."450 Although the notice of appeal in
the case under review was directed to the initial adjudicatory order, the court
reached the merits of the appellant's claims, concluding that "a notice of
appeal directed to an adjudicatory order should simply be treated as a
premature notice which is held in abeyance until entry of the dispositional
order."1
4 51
B. Lack of Issue of Arguable Merit
In Ostrum v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,452 an
appeal was taken from a final order terminating parental rights. The appel-
lant's court-appointed counsel moved to withdraw and filed a brief pursuant
to the dictates of Anders v. California.4 3
In Anders, the United States Supreme Court established the procedure
to be employed by court-appointed counsel in criminal appeals when they
find no issues of arguable merit. As capsulized in Ostrum, such attorneys
are to file a brief "detailing the proceedings below with a discussion of
where error might be suggested and why none actually appears." 454
The fourth district granted the motion to withdraw, but also took the
opportunity to establish the proper procedure to be employed when court-
appointed counsel finds no issues of arguable merit in appeals from orders
terminating parental rights.455
The court concluded that "the full panoply of Anders procedures" 56 do
not apply in such situations. The court relied in part on the fact that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply to termination of parental
rights cases because they are purely civil in nature,457 and the conclusion that
449. Id. § 39.469(3) (1995).
450. Moore, 664 So. 2d at 1139.
451. Id.
452. 663 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
453. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
454. Ostrum, 663 So. 2d at 1361.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. The court recognized that the right to counsel in termination of parental rights cases
is compelled by both the Florida Constitution and the United States Constitution, albeit on a
due process theory. See In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 90-91 (Fla. 1980).
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"the interest of the children in quitting the uncertainties surrounding their
future should be put to rest as soon as it can fairly be done. 458
"More importantly, however," 459 the court stated, "Anders represents a
radical departure from the traditional role of appellate judges as neutral
decision makers without bias or prejudice for or against any party,"4 6
turning the judges instead "into advocates for the party whose counsel seeks
to withdraw."46'
"Whatever may be the rationale for requiring that departure from
neutrality in criminal cases," 462 the court continued, "we are quite unwilling
to allow it in purely civil matters. To do so is to favor one class of litigants
over the other. That circumstance will understandably be seen by other
parties as a classic denial of equal protection of the law. 463
Accordingly, the court concluded that in cases of this nature, counsel
should simply move to withdraw.464 The court then set forth the procedure
that it will follow with such motions. As in other civil appeals, the court will
give the party a period of time within which to argue the case without an
attorney."5 If the party fails to file a brief, the court will dismiss the appeal
for failure to prosecute.466 If the party does file a brief and it fails to present
a preliminary basis for reversal, the court will summarily affirm under Rule
9.315 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.467 If the brief does
present a preliminary basis for reversal, the case will proceed as an ordinary
appeal.468
In Jiminez v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,4 9 the
third district applied the Ostrum reasoning to similar facts, noting addition-
ally one point not specifically addressed by, but presumably implicit in,
Ostrum. The Jiminez court stated that in cases in which a party's brief does
show a preliminary basis for reversal, the "court will retain discretion to










468. Ostrum, 663 So. 2d at 1361.
469. 669 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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deny the motion to withdraw and direct that appointed counsel proceed with
the appeal. 470
XXIII. APPEALS IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES
In Millinger v. Broward County Mental Health Division,471 the appel-
lant's notice of appeal from an order denying a claim for compensation was
mailed to the district court two days before the expiration of the thirty-day
period for filing such notices,472 but was not received until after that period
had expired.473
The appellant filed a "Motion for Extension or in the Alternative
Motion for Remand," 474 requesting that the appeal be accepted as timely or
that the case be remanded to the judge of compensation claims ("JJC") to
determine whether excusable neglect existed so as to allow the JJC to vacate
and reenter the already final order.475 The motion was accompanied by an
affidavit of appellant's counsel's secretary stating that she had called the
clerk's office of the district court and was given erroneous information that
the notice of appeal would be timely if it was postmarked within the thirty-
day period.476 The district court denied the motion and dismissed the
appeal.477
The appellant then filed with the JJC a motion for rehearing and motion
to vacate based on the same grounds as the motion in the district court.478 At
the hearing on the motion, appellant's counsel testified that he was aware of
the fact that the notice had to actually be filed within thirty days,479 that he
had instructed his staff on the point,4 0 and that his secretary had acted on her
own in contacting the clerk's office.481 The JJC vacated the original order
and reentered an identical order to allow the appellant an opportunity to
appeal.482
470. Id. at 342 (footnote omitted).
471. 672 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1996).
472. FLA. R. WORK. COMP. P. 4.165(a).
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The appellant instituted a timely appeal from the second order and the
appellee cross-appealed, challenging the vacation of the original order.483
The district court agreed with the appellee, holding that the JJC was without
jurisdiction to vacate and reenter the judgment.484
The supreme court approved the district court's decision485 and found it
to be inapplicable to the case relied upon by the appellant, New Washington
Heights Community Development Conference v. Department of Community
Affairs.4
86
In New Washington Heights, the appellant's counsel's secretary
telephoned the clerk of an administrative agency and was erroneously told
that the agency would consider an appeal from one of its orders to be filed as
of the postmark date, if sent by certified mail.487 The third district dismissed
the appeal, but did so "without prejudice to the appellant to apply to the
Department to vacate and re-enter the operative order. ' 488 The court stated
that "[i]f the Department acts favorably upon such application, the appellant
may timely appeal the re-entered order and thereby challenge the merits of
the original adverse agency action., 489 The court's decision was based on
the principle that "where state action deprives a party of the ability to file a
timely notice of appeal, the appellate court, although deprived of jurisdiction
over the appeal, will provide the thus-rejected appellant with an alternative
,,490avenue of review.
The supreme court found that the reasoning of New Washington Heights
was "not dispositive ' 49' in Millinger "for at least two reasons. 492 First, the
court stated, the untimely notice in Millinger "was not the direct result of
misrepresentations of a state official. 49 3 Second, the court continued, not
only was it "both inappropriate and unnecessary for counsel's secretary to
call the court clerk for legal advice ' 494 in Millinger because "[i]t is a settled
rule of law that mailing, as opposed to filing, a notice within the thirty-day
483. Millinger, 672 So. 2d at 25.
484. Millinger v. Broward County Mental Health Div., 655 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
485. Millinger, 672 So. 2d at 25.
486. 515 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
487. Id. at 329.
488. Id. at 330.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 329-30.
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filing period is insufficient to preserve appellate rights, '49 5 but the appel-
lant's "counsel admitted that he knew the notice had to be filed in the district
court within the thirty-day filing period. 496 Under these facts, the court
found that "[i]t was counsel's responsibility to adequately supervise and
instruct his staff to ensure" 497 that the notice was timely filed. The court
also "disapprove[d] New Washington Heights to the extent that it is incon-
sistent with our holding here.,
498
The supreme court additionally rejected a claim that because a JJC
"may ... do all things comformable to law which may be necessary to
enable him effectively to discharge the duties of his office,, 49 9 the JJC had
the "inherent authority to vacate and reenter his final order."5°° The appel-
lant's argument in this regard was based on the decision in Morgan Yacht
Corp. v. Edwards,501 which interpreted section 440.331(1) "as giving a JJC
the authority to rescind his approval of a settlement upon discovering that
the settlement was based on the claimant's 'flagrant fraud and misrepresen-
tations.' 5
02
The supreme court distinguished Morgan Yacht on the basis that
counsel in Millinger did not miss the deadline "due to fraud or deliberate
deception," 503 but because he "failed to manage his office professionally.
XXV. APPEALS IN JUVENILE CASES
A. Final Orders
In A.N. v. State,5°5 an appeal was taken by a juvenile from an adjudica-
tion of delinquency.5 6 The State moved to dismiss, asserting that the order
of adjudication was a nonappealable, nonfmal order.507
495. Id. (citations omitted).
496. Millinger, 672 So. 2d at 26.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 27.
499. FLA. STAT. § 440.33(1) (1993).
500. Millinger, 672 So. 2d at 27.
501. 386 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
502. Millinger, 672 So. 2d at 27 (quoting Morgan Yacht, 386 So. 2d at 884).
503. Id.
504. Id. (footnote omitted).
505. 666 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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The third district pointed out that under the Florida Constitution, the
right to appeal interlocutory orders exists only "to the extent provided by
rules adopted by the supreme court" 508 and that the supreme court has not
adopted a rule that permits interlocutory appeals in juvenile delinquency
cases.509 The court recognized the fact that the legislature "created the right
to appeal a final order in a delinquency case by enacting paragraph
39.069(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). "51 The court noted, however, that the
statute "does not itself define what is a final order in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding. 5 1'
Agreeing with the first district's decisions in C.L.S. v. State512 and
T.L.W. v. Soud,51 3 which found that the final order in a delinquency case is
the order of disposition because that order marks the end of the judicial labor
in the case,514 the third district concluded that since no disposition order had
been entered,515 there existed no appealable order516 and dismissal was
517appropriate.
B. Evidence Sufficient to Prove Only Lesser Included Offense
In LT. v. State,51 8 the second district found the evidence insufficient to
support adjudications of delinquency based on the offense of grand theft
auto. 519 The court concluded, however, that the evidence did support a
finding of trespass in a conveyance.
520
Citing to the supreme court's decision in Gould v. State,521 the second
district recognized that when an appellate court finds the evidence insuffi-
cient in a criminal case to support the offense for which a defendant was
convicted, but sufficient to prove a lesser included offense, the appellate
508. FLA. CONST., art. V, § 4(b)(1).
509. A.N., 666 So. 2d at 930.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. 586 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
513. 645 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review dismissed, 650 So. 2d 992
(Fla. 1995).




518. 657 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
519. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(2)(c) (1993).
520. Id. § 810.08(1) (1993).
521. 577 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 1991).
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court can order the trial court to enter a conviction for the lesser crime only
when that crime is a necessarily lesser included offense.
522
The court pointed out, however, that in G.C. v. State,-52 the third district
concluded that "an appellate court may affirm a juvenile adjudication on an
alternative ground that is not a necessary lesser included offense," 524 and that
the supreme court, in its review of the third district's decision,525 iapproved
this procedure."
526
The court acknowledged that in N.C. v. State,527 the fourth district
followed a different procedure, reversing an adjudication for grand theft auto
and discharging the juvenile defendant based on Gould.528 Concluding,
however, that Gould is limited to adult criminal cases, 529 and that the
supreme court did not intend in Gould to overrule G.C.,530 the court affirmed
the adjudications in LT. with directions to modify them to reflect trespass in
a conveyance as their basis.531 The court also certified conflict with N.C.
532
C. Sentencing
In J.M. v. State,533 the third district concluded that a trial court's
departure from the recommendations set forth by HRS in a delinquency
disposition proceeding is appealable. 534  The court relied on section
39.052(3)(e)3 of the Florida Statutes, which states: "The court shall commit
the child to the department at the restrictiveness level identified [by HRS] or
may order placement at a different restrictiveness level.... Any party may
appeal the court's findings resulting in a modified level of restrictiveness
pursuant to this subparagraph. 535
522. LT., 657 So. 2d at 1242.
523. 560 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
524. LT., 657 So. 2d at 1242.
525. State v. G.C., 572 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1991).
526. LT., 657 So. 2d at 1242.
527. 581 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).





533. 677 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
534. Id. at 891.
535. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(e)3 (1993).
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Judge Cope dissented, believing that the court is not permitted to review
a trial court's discretionary sentencing decision536 because of section
39.052(3)(k) of the Florida Statutes.537 That provision states:
It is the intent of the Legislature that the criteria set forth in
paragraph (d) are general guidelines to be followed at the discre-
tion of the court and not mandatory requirements of procedure. It
is not the intent of the Legislature to provide for the appeal of the
disposition made pursuant to this subsection.
538
The majority, however, interpreted the second sentence of section
39.052(3)(k) to refer to the first sentence of the provision.5 39 "That is to
say,' the court indicated, "we believe the legislature did not intend to
create an appealable issue out of the fact that the trial court considered only
certain of the criteria listed in paragraph (d) and not other listed criteria.' 541
The majority also found what it considered to be "a second, more
fundamental reason for why this statutory provision cannot be construed to
preclude appellate review.'5 42 Noting that "[t]he commitment of a child to
HRS is a deprivation of liberty which triggers significant due process
protection, 543 the court stated that it "simply cannot agree with an interpre-
tation of any statutory language which permits such a fundamental liberty
interest to rest solely on the unbridled discretion of the trial judge."544
The court went on to note that in A.S. v. State,545 it had found that the
trial court violated a juvenile's constitutional rights by imposing a harsher
sentence than that recommended by HRS because the juvenile had exercised
his constitutional right to assert his innocence, even after adjudication as a
delinquent.546 The court stated that if there was no right for juveniles to
appeal their dispositions, the juvenile in A.S. would have had to "serve a
536. Judge Cope indicated that the question was not whether there existed an appealable
order, but whether the trial court's departure from the recommendation made by HRS was an
appealable issue. Id. at 894-95 (Cope J., dissenting).
537. Id. at 896 (Cope, J., dissenting).
538. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(k) (1993).
539. J. M., 677 So. 2d at 891-92.




544. J.M., 677 So. 2d at 892.
545. 667 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
546. J. M., 677 So. 2d at 892.
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significantly enhanced sentence as a result of his exercise of a fundamental




In State v. C.W-,54 9 the fourth district dismissed an appeal by the state
from a final order denying restitution in a juvenile proceeding.550 The court
recognized that such orders can be appealed in criminal cases under section
924.07(1)(k) of the Florida Statutes,51 but pointed out that there is no
comparable provision in sections 39.069(1)(b) and 39.0711,552 which list the
types of orders from which the state may appeal in juvenile proceedings.
XXV. APPEALS IN BOND VALIDATION CASES
In Rowe v. St. Johns County,553 an appeal from a decision declaring a
proposed bond issue valid,554 the named appellant filed a notice of appeal,
but did not submit the initial brief.55 Rather, the appellants were "three
citizens who did not intervene in the bond validation proceeding below."
556
The supreme court found that "as citizens and taxpayers" 5 7 of the county
that authorized the issuance of the bonds, the three appellants "were proper
parties to that proceeding and thus may properly appear for the first time on
appeal.
558
XXVI. A LOOK TO THE FuTURE
In the upcoming year, the supreme court, pursuant to Rule 2.130 of the
Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, will adopt its four-year cycle
amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is likely that
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. 662 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
550. Id. at 769.
551. Id.
552. Id.
553. 668 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1996).
554. Id. at 197.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id. at 197-98.
558. Rowe, 668 So. 2d at 198.
1996]
69
: Nova Law Review 21, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
68 Nova Law Review [Vol. 21:13
these amendments will significantly impact the appellate process in Florida.
Of course, the supreme court and the courts of appeal will also provide
answers to many of the questions raised by the cases discussed in this article.
The answers, as they usually do, will likely generate new questions. Those
questions, and others, will continue to provide the large number of court
decisions that shape the field of appellate practice.
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which is approved for Continuing Legal Education Credit by the Florida Bar and is the largest
annual symposium on community association law in Florida.
1. The reference to "community associations" means any mandatory membership corpo-
ration tied to the ownership of real property, which corporation has a right of lien for the
collection of assessments. See FLA. STAT. § 468.431(1) (1995). The most common forms of
community associations are condominium associations, cooperative associations, and
homeowners' associations. This survey covers legislation and cases from July 1, 1995 to June
30, 1996.
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I. LEGISLATION
A. Condominiums and Cooperatives
The first half of the 1990s might be described as the zenith of legislative
micromanagement for Florida's condominium and cooperative communities.
Various perceived abuses of power by boards of directors led to significant
"reform" legislation in 1991,2 the sweeping nature of which resulted in public
outcry and a resultant deferral of implementation of that law until 1992.3 Since
that time, most legislative efforts appear to have focused on removal of
"glitches" created by the 1991-92 "reforms" to the law.
The year of 1996 saw little in terms of significant policy shifts in the
condominium and cooperative statutes. Perhaps most indicative of the laissez-
faire legislative philosophy of 1996 were the pre-filed bills that were not sent
to the floor for vote. For example, legislation was introduced,4 and subse-
quently withdrawn, which would have overruled the 1995 amendment to the
statutes5 which permitted the right to "opt out" of the statutory election
procedures, including the ability of an association 6 to use proxies in the
election of directors.
The main operational change to the statutes involves whether meetings
of "committees" are subject to the "sunshine" requirements of the statutes,
which generally require posting of meeting notices, right of attendance by
unit owners, and the right of unit owners to speak to designated agenda
items. 7 The 1992 amendments to chapters 718 and 7198 of the Florida
Statutes defined a "committee" as "a group of board members, unit owners,
or board members and unit owners appointed by the board or a member of
the board to make recommendations to the board regarding the association
budget or take action on behalf of the board." 9
Notwithstanding the apparently clear intent of this language, the Division
of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes ("Division")
2. See 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 91-103.
3. 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 91-426.
4. Representative Geller introduced the relevant bill. See Fla. HB 263 (1996).
5. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-274 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 718.112(2)(d), 719.106(l)(d)
(1995)).
6. All references in this article to a particular association will be referred to as
"Association."
7. FLA. STAT. §§ 718.112(2)(c), 719.106(1)(c) (1995).
8. See 1991 Fla. Laws chs. 91-103, -426.
9. FLA. STAT. §§ 718.103(6), 719.103(5) (1995).
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advanced a restrictive interpretation, basically finding that all "committees" are
subject to the "sunshine" provision of the statutes. 10 In response to this
position, several different bills were drafted which were specifically intended
to reverse the Division's restrictive interpretation, and to promote a more
liberal application of the statutes, i.e., that a "committee" was only subject to
"sunshine" requirements if it could takefinal action on behalf of the board of
administration, or alternatively, make recommendations to the board regarding
the association budget.
The final language approved on the floors of both chambers of the
legislature introduced an additional element of compromise. Specifically,
although the more liberal provision was emplaced in the statute, the governing
documents must permit closure of "committee" meetings. The operative
language is found in sections 2" and 712 of chapter 96-396 of the Laws of
Florida, which became law without the Governor's approval on June 2,
1996.13 Section 2 provides:
Meetings of a committee to take final action on behalf of the board
or make recommendations to the board regarding the association
budget are subject to the provisions of this paragraph. Meetings of
a committee that does not take final action on behalf of the board
or make recommendations to the board regarding the association
budget are subject to the provisions of this section, unless those
meetings are exempted from this section by the bylaws of the asso-
ciation. 14
The other noteworthy operational change to the condominium and
cooperative statutes addresses delivery of notice of the annual budget meeting
of the association. Through apparent oversight in the legislative drafting
process, both the condominium and cooperative statutes previously permitted
notices of all types of meetings (except the budget meeting, the notice of which
could only be served by United States mail) to be hand delivered, upon
10. See Memorandum of Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes
Lead Attorney, Karl Scheuerman dated April 19, 1995, ref. Legal Case 94N-0144.
11. See ch. 96-396, § 2, 1996 Fla. Laws 2462, 2462 (amending FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(c)
(1995)).
12. See id. § 7, 1996 Fla. Laws at 2465 (amending FLA. STAT. § 719.106(1)(c) (1995)).
Section 7 of Chapter 96-396, amending the Cooperative Act, contains neutral language.
13. Chapter 96-396 may be cited as the '"sabelle Greenwald Memorial Condominium Act of
1996," and honors the deceased condominium activist from the Sunrise Lakes condominium
community in Broward County. See id. § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws at 2462.
14. Id. § 2, 1996 Fla. Laws at 2462 (amending FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(c)).
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obtaining a written waiver of notice, or in some cases, evidenced by affidavit.
Sections 2 and 7 of chapter 96-396 amended sections 718.112(2) and
719.106(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes, respectively, to remove this inconsis-
tency.
15
Under the new law, notice of budget meetings may be hand delivered to
unit owners. Evidence of hand delivery is perfected through the execution of
an affidavit of compliance, executed by an officer of the association, the
manager, or other person who delivered the notice.
16
The other notable aspect of the amendments regarding notice of the
budget meeting was an amendment that made the Cooperative Act 7 parallel to
the Condominium Act.18 Although section 718.112(2)(c) was amended in
1984 to change the minimum period required to give notice of the budget
meeting from thirty days to fourteen days, a parallel amendment was never
adopted for the Cooperative Act. The 1996 amendment to section
719.106(1)(e) of the Cooperative Act now makes the two statutes contain the
same procedural requirements.' 9
However, it must be noted that more restrictive provisions of the bylaws
of the association (condominium or cooperative) will still control.20 Therefore,
it is especially important in pre-1984 condominiums, and all cooperatives, to
examine the association's bylaws regarding notice requirements, since many
such bylaws were written to incorporate then-existing provisions of the
applicable statute.
In 1996, the Florida Legislature also attempted to refine the allocation of
common expenses in "mixed-use condominiums." The concept of "mixed-use
condominiums" was created in the 1995 legislative session through the
enactment of section 718.404 of the Condominium Act. 2' The apparent intent
of the 1995 legislation was to prevent the owners of non-residential units in
"mixed-use condominiums" from receiving preferential treatment in the
declaration of condominium relative to voting rights and sharing in the
common expenses of the association.
The 1995 version of the statute prohibited the owners of residential units
from paying more than fifty percent of the common expenses when the non-
15. See id. §§ 2, 7, 1996 Fla. Laws at 2462, 2465 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 718.112(2),
719.106(1)(e)).
16. See id. § 2, 1996 Fla. Laws at 2462 (amending FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(c)).
17. See FLA. STAT. §§ 719.101-.622 (1995).
18. See id.
19. Ch. 96-396, § 7, 1996 Fla. Laws at 2465 (amending FLA. STAT. § 719.106(e)).
20. See id.
21. See ch. 95-274, § 38, 1995 Fla. Laws 2462, 2531 (amending FLA. STAT. § 718.404).
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residential units comprised less than fifty percent of all units.22 Read literally,
the creation of a small percentage of "commercial" units, such as retail shops,
would require those units to shoulder at least fifty percent of the common
expense burden.
Sections 323 and 424 of chapter 96-396 provide that for "mixed-use
condominiums" created on or after January 1, 1996,2 the ownership share of
common elements and the concomitant sharing of common expenses and
common surplus must be based either "on the total square footage of each unit
in uniform relationship to the total square footage of each other unit in the
condominium or on an equal fractional basis."26 This change appears to be a
common sense solution to the previous anomaly in the statutes.
The "Roth Act" section of the Condominium Act, 27 governing the
conversion of existing improvements to condominium, was also amended by
chapter 96-396 of the Laws of Florida. In- 1995, section 718.616(4) was added
to the Condominium Act to provide that when a conversion occurred in a
municipality, the chief administrative official for the municipality was obli-
gated to sign a letter verifying that the proposed condominium complied with
the municipality's code, zoning ordinances, and all other local legislation.28
Due to the apparent recalcitrance of local officials to execute such letters,
section 718.616(4) of the Condominium Act was relaxed by the 1996 legisla-
tion to provide that the municipality need only verify that it has been notified
of the proposed conversion to condominium.
29
Section 719.1055 of the Cooperative Act was amended by the 1996
Legislature.30 Subsection (3)(a) of that section now provides that the associa-
tion may materially alter, convert, lease or modify common elements by a
seventy-five percent vote unless otherwise provided in the cooperative docu-
ments.31 This language appears to only apply to mobile home cooperatives. In
contrast to the Condominium Act,32 a cooperative association may also change
22. FLA. STAT. § 718.404(3) (1995).
23. See ch. 96-396, § 3, 1996 Fla. Laws 2462, 2464 (amending FLA. STAT. § 718.115(2)).
24. See id. § 4, 1996 Fla. Laws at 2464 (amending FLA. STAT. § 718.404(3)).
25. The January 1, 1996 "grandfathering" date is curious since the legislation took effect on
June 2, 1996. See id. §§ 3-4, 1996 Fla. Laws at 2464 (amending §§ 718.115(2), .404(3)).
26. See id.
27. See FLA. STAT. §§ 718.604-.622 (1995).
28. See ch. 95-274, §40, 1995 Fla. Laws 2462, 2532.
29. Id.
30. See id. § 6, 1996 Fla. Laws at 2465 (amending FLA. STAT. § 719.1055(3)).
31. See id
32. See FLA. STAT. § 718.110(4) (1995).
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the configuration or size of a unit if the action is approved by seventy-five
percent of the total voting interests of the cooperative.
B. Homeowners' Associations
A particular deed restriction (declaration of covenants and restrictions)
for an influential subdivision in the Tampa area was set to expire by its own
terms in 1996. Since the declaration contained no amendatory procedure,
Florida common law would dictate that unanimous approval would be needed
to extend the restrictions.
33
The residents in this community were able to influence the legislature to
enact new legislation. 34 Section 617.306(1)(b) of Florida's "Homeowners'
Association" statute now provides that "unless otherwise provided in the
governing documents or by law," any "governing document" may be amended
by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the voting interests of the association.35
The definition of "governing documents" includes the declaration of cove-
nants, the articles of incorporation, and the bylaws of the association.
36
One exception is that amendments pursuant to this statute may not impair
"vested rights" without unanimous approval of association members and
lienors. The creation of a statutory concept of "vested rights" will certainly
create fodder for future litigation, as that term has no apparent significance in
Florida's community association common law. Perhaps the legislature would
have been better advised to incorporate the concept of "appurtenances," as
governed by section 718.110(4) of the Condominium Act, since at least one
court has already applied that concept to homeowners' associations.37 The
amendments to section 617.306 became law without Governor Chiles'
signature on June 1, 1996.38
C. Not-For-Profit Corporations
In addition to the fairly significant amendment to section 617.306,
discussed above, the 1996 Florida Legislature also enacted various
"housekeeping" amendments to chapter 617, commonly cited as the "Florida
33. See, e.g., Harwick v. Indian Creek Country Club, 142 So. 2d 128, 129 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1962).
34. See ch. 96-343, § 4, 1996 Fla. Laws 1967, 1968 (amending FLA. STAT. § 617.306(1)).
35. See id. § 4, Fla. Laws at 1968 (creating FLA. STAT. § 617.306(1)(b)).
36. FLA. STAT. § 617.301(6) (1995).
37. See Roth v. Springlake II Homeowners Ass'n, 533 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
38. See 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-343.
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Not For Profit Corporation Act." 39 Chapter 617 not only applies to most
community associations (some pre-1977 condominium associations are
unincorporated and mobile home park cooperatives are sometimes structured
as for profit corporations), it also governs every not for profit corporation
incorporated under the laws of Florida.
In 1996, the Florida Legislature also amended section 617.0505(1) to
permit not for profit corporations to authorize distribution of corporate assets
and income upon "partial liquidation" of the corporation, but only if provided
in the articles of incorporation. 40
Chapter 96-212 of the Laws of Florida also amended certain provisions of
chapter 617.41 These changes became law without Governor Chiles' signature
on May 25, 1996.42 Subsections (3) and (5) of section 617.0502 of the Florida
Statutes were amended.43 The amendments concern the procedures for a
registered agent changing its address and authorizing an administrative fee in
connection with notification of the same to the Department of State.44
D. Fair Housing Act-Housing for Older Persons
The federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 198845 prohibited, among
other things, housing discrimination based on "familial status." Familial status
was defined by the federal legislation to mean having custody of minor
children or being pregnant. This statute essentially outlawed "adults only"
housing, which was prevalent in Florida's development landscape. Florida
followed suit through the enactment of chapter 760 of the Florida Statutes,
entitled the "Fair Housing Act," which largely mirrors the federal statute.46
One exception to both the state and federal statutes was the so-called "55
and over" provision. This exemption allowed housing providers, including
community associations, to prohibit occupancy by families with children if the
housing facility met all three of the following tests:
(i) at least eighty percent of the dwelling units were occupied
by at least one person age fifty-five or older; and
39. FLA. STAT. §§ 617.01011-.312 (1995).
40. See ch. 96-343, § 2, 1996 Fla. Laws 1967, 1967 (amending FLA. STAT. § 617.0505(1)).
41. See ch. 96-212, § 8, 1996 Fla. Laws 791, 795 (amending FLA. STAT. § 617.0502).
42. See id. at 572.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994).
46. See FLA. STAT. §§ 760.20-.37 (1995).
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(ii) the housing provider promulgated policies and procedures
demonstrating an intent to provide housing for older persons; and
(iii) the housing provider provided "significant facilities and
services" specifically designed to meet the physical or social needs
of older persons, or demonstrated that providing such facilities and
services was not practicable.
47
Many of Florida's "adults only" complexes met the eighty percent threshold.
Most community associations initiated "policies and procedures" through
amendment of restrictions such as declaration of condominium, cooperative
owners' agreements, and declarations of covenants.
The most problematic aspect of compliance was the proof of "significant
facilities and services." The United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development promulgated several sets of proposed and/or enacted administra-
tive regulations which were intended to flesh out this concept.
Ultimately, all of the proposed and/or enacted regulations proved unsatis-
factory to "seniors" communities. The federal resolution was the adoption of
the "Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995,"48 which became law on Decem-
ber 18, 1995. This law deleted the "significant facilities and services" re-
quirement as a prerequisite to compliance with the "55 and over" exemption.49
However, the federal law provided no relief to Florida communities, since
chapter 760 of the Florida Statutes and various county or municipal ordinances
still outlawed "adults only" housing. In fact, some county ordinances50 did not
even contemplate the availability of the "55 and over" exemption, even if
"significant facilities and services" were provided.5' Section 760.29(4)(b)3a of
the Florida Statutes retained the "significant facilities and services" require-
ments.52
In order to place state and local law on par with the federal statute, the
1996 Legislature adopted chapter 96-191 of the Laws of Florida, signed into
law by Governor Chiles on May 21, 1996. Essentially, the language of the
state statute provides that a community association (or other housing provider)
can provide "housing for older persons" if it complies with the federal stan-
47. See id. § 760.29(4)(b)3.
48. Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-76, 109 Stat. 787 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(c)(1994)).
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., Broward County Human Rights Ordinance.
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dards 3 Additionally, the statute prohibits counties or municipalities from
contravening the state statute54 and also mirrors the federal statute by insulat-
ing individuals from monetary liability if they reasonably relied in good faith
on the application of the exemption.
55
E. Regulatory Council of Community Association Managers
In 1987, section 468.432 of the Florida Statutes was created to regulate
the licensure, education, and discipline of community association managers. 6
These functions were delegated by this statute to the Division of Florida Land
Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes ("Division").57
Through the late 1980s and early 1990s, community association managers
("CAMs") grew increasingly disenchanted with the Division's oversight. The
Division was apparently equally disenchanted with its charge, resulting in a
call by the Division Director to abolish CAM regulation in 1994.
The result was the formation of a grass roots organization known as the
Coalition of CAM Organizations ("COCO"), which consisted of delegates
from nearly every community association trade organization in Florida. In the
face of overwhelming odds, when "rightsizing" (cutting) government was the
order of the day in Tallahassee, COCO was successful in obtaining the
enactment of chapter 96-291 of the Laws of Florida, which became law
without Governor Chiles' signature on May 30, 1996.58
Chapter 96-291 creates the "Regulatory Council of Community Associa-
tion Managers." 59  The Council displaces the Division as the body with
oversight responsibility for the licensure and education of CAMs. 60 Discipline
of CAMs was transferred to the Division of Professions.
61
The Council is to consist of seven members, all appointed by the Gover-
nor.62 Five members must be licensed CAMs, one of whom must be affiliated
53. See ch. 96-191, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 508, 509 (amending FLA. STAT. § 760.29(4)).
54. See id. § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws at 509 (amending FLA. STAT. § 760.29(4)).
55. See id. § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws at 510 (amending FLA. STAT. § 760.29(4)(d)).
56. 1987 Fla. Laws ch. 87-343 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 468.432).
57. See id. § 4, Fla. Laws at 2180.
58. See ch. 96-291, § 12, 1996 Fla. Laws 1257.
59. See id. § 3, 1996 Fla. Laws 1253 (renumbering and amending FLA. STAT. § 468.434 as §
468.4315).
60. See id. § 12, 1996 Fla. Laws 1257.
61. Id.
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with the timeshare industry.63 Members are appointed for a term of four
years. 64
F. Insurance
The "insurance crisis" in Florida, which was caused in large part by
Hurricane Andrew, has hit community associations particularly hard. For
those lucky enough to find good coverage with a reputable carrier, rates have
skyrocketed while deductibles have been raised substantially.
After considering the positions of both insureds and insurers, the legisla-
ture adopted the "Hurricane Insurance Affordability and Availability Act,"
which was signed into law by the Governor on May 21, 1996.65
Of most importance to community associations is the extension of the
policy cancellation moratorium for three additional years, for the period of
June 1, 1996 to May 30, 1999. The extension includes condominium associa-
tions. Insurers can cancel up to ten percent of their policies in each county and
up to five percent statewide each year.
G. Telecommunications Act of 1996
The effect of this federal legislation,66 signed into law by President
Clinton on February 8, 1996, may be that "[t]he right to channel surf could
surpass a community's right to preserve aesthetics .. .,,67 Section 207 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides:
Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Com-
mission shall, pursuant to section 303 of the Communications Act
of 1934, promulgate regulations to prohibit restrictions that impair
a viewer's ability to receive video programming service through
devices designed for over-the-air reception of television broadcast
signals, multichannel multipoint distribution service, or direct
broadcast satellite services.
68
On August 6, 1996, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
released a proposed rule which prohibits community associations from
enforcing restrictions which unreasonably restrict or impair an owner's right to
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. Ch. 96-194, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 574, 574.
66. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
67. P. Michael Nagle, Channel Surfing, COMMON GROUND, May-June 1996, at 31.
68. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 207, 110 Stat. 56.
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install satellite dishes of one meter or less. 69 This rule still permits some
reasonable restictions, such as location designation, or a requirement for
screening, as long as signal quality is not impaired, or costs unreasonably
increased. This rule only applies to situations where the owner actually owns
the area where the satellite dish will be installed, such as single family subdivi-
sions. Rules for commonly maintained property, such as condominium
buildings, still have not been promulgated.
II. CASE LAW
A. Condominiums
The bulk of condominium case law from July 1, 1995, to June 30, 1996,
the period which is the subject of this survey, involves collection of assess-
ments. Since this period is not considered to be one of economic downturn, it
may be that one goal of the mandatory non-binding arbitration program,
reduction of judicial adjudication of condominium disputes, 70 is being met.
Scudder v. Greenbrier C Condominium Ass'n 7' involved the propriety of
transportation expenses as a common expense. In Rothenberg v. Plymouth #5
Condominium Ass'n,72 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that bus
service was not a proper common expense for a condominium association. In
1988, section 718.115(1) was amended by chapter 88-148 of the Laws of
Florida to provide that common expenses could include reasonable transporta-
tion services if the services had been provided from the date the control of the
board of administration of the association was transferred from the developer
to the unit owners or if provision was made in the "condominium documents"
(a term not defined in the statute) or bylaws.73
The unit owner/complainants in Scudder challenged the propriety of the
association's provision of bus service, advancing several points in court. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal, rendering its second decision in this litiga-
tion,74 issued a nine-page opinion.
69. 61 Fed. Reg. 46,557, 561 (1996) (adding 47 C.F.R. § 1.4000).
70. See FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(3)(b) (1995).
71. 663 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
72. 511 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 518 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1987).
73. See 1988 Fla. Laws ch. 88-148.
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The first issue confronted by the court was the relevance of whether the
Association was the provider of the transportation services. 75 The appellate
court recited the trial court's findings of fact and intimated that the transporta-
tion services were provided through various umbrella organizations within the
Century Village Community.76 The fourth district held that a "condominium
association" must have been the provider of services to be validly charged to
unit owners.77 Although the appellate court found the evidence at trial to be
contradictory, it upheld the trial court's factual finding that the "Association"
provided the transportation services.78
The next issue adjudicated on this appeal was whether, prior to 1988, the
transportation system had actually incurred the costs to be assessed as a
common expense. Upon close reading of the 1988 amendment to section
718.115 of the Condominium Act, the fourth district concluded that the
transportation services, if continuously provided since transition of control, did
not have to be assessed as a common expense during the same time.79
The fourth district also refused to find the 1988 amendment to be uncon-
stitutionally vague. Interpreting the "ordinary meaning" of the words used in
the statute, the court found that people of common understanding and average
intelligence had fair warning that transportation expenses could be assessed as
a common expense so long as the association was continuously providing such
services since transition of control.80
In a victory for the unit owners, the court held that the Association's
"one-rider rule" unlawfully discriminated against multiple-resident units.81
The court also found that the "second rider surcharge" violated section
718.115(2) of the Condominium Act, which provides that unit owners share
common expenses in the same proportion as their ownership share of the
common elements. 82 The court also found the "one-rider rule" was unreason-
able.83
Finally, the court found the Association to be the "prevailing party,"
which entitled it to an award of its costs and attorney's fees, even though the
75. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1365.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1366.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1367.
80. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1368.
81. Id. at 1369.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1368-69.
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association did not prevail on the "one-rider rule" issue84 The fourth district
ultimately remanded the case to the trial court for re-evaluation of the attor-
ney's fees issue in light of its opinion. 5
This decision is thorough and well reasoned. The fourth district gave due
deference to the intent of the 1988 Legislature, which overruled Rothenberg.
Associations wishing to provide off-site transportation services are well
advised to carefully review this decision. Although the outcome was ulti-
mately favorable to the Association, the "continuity" of the provision of
services appears to have been the dispositive factor. Associations which
cannot show this continuity are best advised to amend the condominium
documents to legitimize the provision of off-site transportation services.
Griffin v. Berkley South Condominium Ass h86 was another assessment
case involving the definition of "prevailing party." The Association filed a
lien foreclosure action against Griffin. After realizing that it had been improp-
erly charging late fees due to lack of documentary authority s7 and had also
improperly sought electricity charges, the Association voluntarily dismissed its
lien foreclosure action.
Griffin moved for an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 718.303
of the Florida Statutes.8 On the authority of Stuart Plaza, Ltd. v. Atlantic
Coast Development Corp. of Martin County,89 the fourth district found the unit
owner to be the prevailing party, and thus entitled to an award of his attorney's
fees.
One interesting aspect of this case is the incorporation of section 718.303
of the Condominium Act. Although this is the general "prevailing party fees
clause" of the statute, it is unclear why the provisions of section 718.116,
which govern the foreclosure of liens, was not cited as the operative statutory
provision. Section 718.303 only deals with actions for "injunctions" and
"money damages," neither of which directly pertains to an action to foreclose a
claim of lien. The lesson to be learned by associations is that once legal
process is initiated to collect assessments, the association cannot "bail out" of
the case, even if brought in error, without exposure to an award of the unit
owner's fees.
84. Id. at 1369.
85. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1370.
86. 661 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
87. See FLA. STAT. § 718.116(3) (1995).
88. See id. §718.303(1) (1993).
89. 493 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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Maya Marca Condominium Apartments, Inc. v. O'Rourke,9° involves the
use of deficiency judgments in condominium assessment collection. In a
common scenario, the Association obtained a foreclosure judgment against the
unit owner in the amount of $13,748.00. The Association was the highest
bidder at the foreclosure sale.
Subsequently, the unit owner's mortgagee foreclosed the Association's
interest in the property. The Association ended up with nothing. The Asso-
ciation then moved for the entry of a personal judgment against the unit owner,
which the trial court refused to grant. The Association appealed.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and held that
the Association was entitled to entry of a money judgment. 9' The Association
argued that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a deficiency
judgment.
Perhaps giving the Association more than it asked for, the appellate court
held that the common law of deficiency judgments has no application in the
condominium foreclosure setting.92  Rather, the court reasoned, section
718.116(1) of the Condominium Act provides that a unit owner is personally
liable for all assessments that came due while he is the owner of a unit.93
This case should provide a significant advantage to associations con-
fronted with the foreclosure of superior mortgage liens. Rather than facing the
sometimes excruciating choice of electing remedies, or the vagaries of trial
courts in granting deficiency judgments, it appears that the association "can
have its cake and eat it too." Association collection practitioners should
consider the application of this case when advising clients of the benefits of
foreclosure versus money judgments.
In Oakland East Manors Condominium Ass'n v. La Roza,94 the facts of
the assessment dispute are not set forth in the court's opinion in adequate detail
to facilitate a complete understanding of the court's disposition of the legal
issues. Apparently, the Association obtained a judgment for unpaid assess-
ments against the unit owner. The unit owner subsequently paid the docketed
judgment amount.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's denial of the
Association's claim of foreclosure.95 It is unclear, procedurally, why the




94. 669 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
95. Id at 1139.
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judgment of foreclosure was not entered in conjunction with liquidation of the
amounts owed. In any event, citing the "acceptance of benefits doctrine," the
appellate court held that the Association could not accept the benefits of the
judgment, and then seek to have it reversed on appeal.96
The appellate court did, however, reverse the trial court on the issues of
prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees.97 The Association's bylaws provided
for interest of "the highest rate of interest... permissible under the usury laws
of the State of Florida."98 Since Florida's usury statute99 permits interest at
eighteen percent per annum, the appellate court held that the trial judge had no
discretion in the award of interest. '0 The court also held that the trial court
erred in not awarding the Association's attorney's fees, in light of the language
permitting recovery of the same in the Association's bylaws.' 0' Interestingly,
the court also cited section 718.303 of the Condominium Act, without embel-
lishment.'0 2
The final "assessment" case involves the law of "phantom units."
Winkelman v. Toll'03 is a complex appellate decision founded upon a quiet title
action. The issue was whether certain "declared" but "unbuilt" condominium
"units" were subjected to the terms of a declaration of condominium by virtue
of certain "phase amendments."'14 The trial court held that they were not. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. 0 5
In 1980, the declaration of condominium for Mission Lakes Condomin-
ium was recorded in the Broward County Public Records. The declaration
contained provisions for adding phases which provided that the developer
could add phases by amending the declaration. The same language also
obligated the developer to attach surveyors' certificates of completion'06 to the
amendments adding the phases. Certain "phases" were "submitted" to the
terms of the declaration, although no construction was undertaken, and no
surveyor's certificates were ever filed.
96. See id. (citing Dance v. Tatum, 629 So. 2d 127, 129 (Fla. 1993)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1139-40.
99. See FLA. STAT. § 687.02 (1993).
100. Oakland East, 669 So. 2d at 1140.
101. Id.
102. See discussion supra p. 81 (discussing Griffin v. Berkeley South Condominium Ass'n,
661 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), and its relation to the application of section
718.303 of the Florida Statues to lien foreclosure actions).
103. 661 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 107.
106. See FLA. STAT. § 718.104(4)(e) (1979).
1996]
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Relying on the operative version of the Condominium Act in effect when
the condominium was created, the court held that failure to record a surveyor's
certificate of completion does not nullify the effect of an amendment adding
the phases and the "units" therein to the term of the declaration.1°7 The court
relied upon an amicus brief filed by the Division of Florida Land Sales,
Condominiums, and Mobile Homes as justification for its interpretation of the
1979 version of the Condominium Act. 0 8 The court also found that 1984
amendments to section 718.403(1) of the Condominium Act clarified the
legislature's intent.1°9
Predictably, the party seeking avoidance of submission to the declaration
cited the fourth district's decision in Welleby Condominium Ass'n v. William
Lyon Co." 0 In its only footnote, the court carefully distinguished Welleby and
it appears to have specifically limited that case in the fourth district to the
peculiar language in the Welleby declaration of condominium."'
Winkelman appears to signal the fourth district's inclination to follow the
lead of the second district in finding that "phantom units" are generally created
upon the filing of the declaration or phase amendment, regardless of whether
actually constructed.
In addition to the five condominium "assessment" cases discussed above,
1995-96 saw a couple of other "association versus unit owner" cases litigated
in the appellate courts. These cases involve behavior oriented disputes. An
example of the bizarre extremes of the condominium experience is seen in,
Kittel-Glass v. Oceans Four Condominium Ass'n,12 which involved a unit
owner accused of seventy-nine violations of the condominium documents,
including indecent exposure, reckless display of a firearm, public intoxication,
and assault and battery.
Pursuant to section 718.303(3) of the Condominium Act, the unit owner
was fined $50.00 for each of seventy-nine alleged violations. However, the
107. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 105.
108. Id. at 106.
109. Id.
110. 522 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 531 So. 2d 169 (Fla.
1988).
111. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 107 n.1. Welleby is considered by many commentators to be
in conflict with the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal in Hyde Park Condominium
Ass'n v. Estero Island Realty, 486 So. 2d I (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) and Estencia Condo-
minium Ass'n v. Sunfield Homes, Inc., 619 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). It should
also be noted that Welleby was legislatively overruled by 1990 amendments to section 718.104(2)
of the Florida Statutes.
112. 648 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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notice of the fining hearing issued by the Association listed only fourteen
incidents. The trial court upheld the fines as levied by the Association and also
entered an injunction, punishable by contempt, barring the unit owner from the
condominium.'
13
On appeal, the fifth district reduced the fine to the fourteen specified
violations.!14 More importantly, the court held that the injunction amounted to
a judicially forced sale of the condominium unit, in violation of the owner's
right to just compensation for the taking of her property." 5 The appellate court
reasoned that the trial court could enjoin the violations, and punish noncompli-
ance through fines or incarceration.
n1
This decision, while based on sound legal reasoning, is detrimental to the
rights of unit owners to live peaceably in their community, free from threats of
irrational persons. While the law cannot cure all societal ills, it is submitted
that this case justifies the view that some statutory provision for "forced buy-
out" (at fair market value) should be available to associations in controlling the
composition of their community.
Woodlake Redevelopment Corp. v. Woodlake Condominium Ass'n of
Marco Shores" 7 also involves internal "disputes" and the use of that term of
art regarding the necessity of the use of mandatory, nonbinding arbitration." 
8
A group of unit owners sued the Association and its individual directors,
alleging five counts. The trial court dismissed all five counts, finding that the
subject matter of all counts were arbitrable "disputes," as defined in the
statute." 9 The unit owners appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court.'
20
The reported decision does not detail the basis of Counts I, II, or n.
121
Apparently, they pertain to disagreements involving maintenance of the
common elements. Count IV was an action for breach of fiduciary duty
against the individual directors. 22 Count V was an action for an accounting
against the condominium association. 23
113. Id. at 828.
114. Id. at 829.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 671 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
118. See FLA. STAT. § 718.1255.
119. Woodlake, 671 So. 2d 254.
120. Id. at 255.
121. Id.
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The court concluded that two counts of the complaint (breach of fiduciary
duty against the directors and the accounting action against the association) are
subject to arbitration, while three counts (those involving disagreement over
maintenance of the common elements) were not subject to arbitration. 12
4
Finding that the Association arbitration rules provided no guidance, the
court turned to the Florida Arbitration Code25 and held that Counts IV and V
should be stayed in the main action, while Counts I, II, and Ell should proceed
in the trial court.
12 6
Clearly, the court correctly found that Counts I, II, and IT[, to the extent
they involve disagreement over maintenance of common elements by the
Association, are not "disputes" as defined in section 718.1255(1)(a)2 of the
Florida Statutes, unless the "dispute" involved the authority of the board to
alter or add to the common elements. 27 However, without discussion, the
court found Counts IV (breach of fiduciary duty) and V (accounting) to be
"arbitrable" disputes.12 Unfortunately, there is no support in the statute for the
court's conclusion.
Section 718.1255(1)(b) deals with those alleged actions of the association
which are arbitrable "disputes."'129 The same includes the failure to: 1)
properly conduct elections; 2) give adequate notice of meetings or other
actions; 3) properly conduct meetings; or 4) allow inspection of books and
records.
30
An action against individual directors (not the association) for breach of
fiduciary duty and an action for an accounting against the association do not
fall within any of these categories. The court's invocation of the Arbitration
Code is also disturbing. Arbitration is typically the result of contractual
selection of that forum for dispute resolution. In the condominium context, the
statutorily mandated arbitration is "nonbinding," in apparent recognition of the
parties' constitutional right of access to the courts. Limitation on those rights
should be applied sparingly. This decision is not predicated on a reasoned
analysis of the intention of the Condominium Act regarding the use of alterna-
tive dispute resolution.
124. Woodlake, 671 So. 2d at 55.
125. FLA. STAT. § 682.03(3) (1995).
126. Woodlake, 671 So. 2d at 255.
127. Id. at 254.
128. I1 at 255.
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The final series of condominium cases involve unit owner and/or associa-
tion disputes with third parties, including developers, recreational facilities
lessors, and an insurance company. Island Breakers-a Condominium, Inc. v.
Highlands Underwriters Insurance Co.131 reversed a summary judgment
entered in favor of the insurance company. At issue was whether a commer-
cial "all risk" insurance policy provided coverage for building "collapse"
caused by "hidden decay."1 32 In its per curiam opinion, the Third District
Court of Appeal found that issues such as the nature, extent, and cause of
damage to the condominium building's balconies, as well as when the prob-
lems were discovered by the association, could only be resolved by the trier of
fact, not at summary judgment. 133
Judge Cope, in his concurring opinion, fleshes out the nature of the
dispute in more detail, including the relevant policy language and the nature of
the problem at the condominium (the common scenario of cracked concrete,
and rusting of steel reinforcing bars). 34 To Judge Cope, the issue was whether
there was a "collapse," which does not require the balcony to fall off the
building. 35  Judge Cope also discussed the issue of "hidden decay" and
whether the existence of the balcony cracks placed the association on notice of
the decay.1
36
This case does not plow new legal ground with respect to the propriety of
summary judgment in resolving factual disputes. However, the case does send
community association practitioners an important message in advising their
clients regarding the often-encountered "spalling" cases. Simply stated,
counsel should advise their client to review current and historical insurance
policies to ascertain whether there is "collapse" coverage. These cases usually
involve substantial sums of money, which may justify the extra effort in
ascertaining the existence of potential insurance coverage.
Another association "pleading" case, this one involving a motion to
dismiss, is Moorings at Aberdeen Homeowners' Ass'n v. UDC Homes, Inc.
137
Various entities served as the developer of a planned development known as
Aberdeen. 138 The developers created a master association. 139 Count IV of the
131. 665 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1085.
134. Id. (Cope, J., concurring).
135. Id.
136. Island Breakers, 665 So. 2d at 1086.
137. 673 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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complaint alleged that UDC Homes, through control of its subsidiary, caused
master association expenses to be improperly shifted to plaintiffs (three
homeowners' associations and one condominium association, all "sub-
associations" under the Aberdeen master declaration). 140
The trial court dismissed the claim against UDC Homes as insufficient to
"pierce the corporate veil." 141 Applying Steinhardt v. Banks,142 the fourth
district held that the subassociations' allegations that UDC Homes (the
subsidiary) was a "mere device to engage in improper conduct of managing
Sunbelt and the Master Association [Aberdeen POA] in a manner contrary to
the Declaration in order to obtain a financial benefit for Sunbelt and UDC
Homes" were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
43
Although this case is not remarkable from a common law pleading
standpoint, it serves as a reminder to association practitioners and developer
counsel that "corporate shell games" in the development of real estate projects
are subject to attack if corporate formalities are not adhered to.
Brickell Biscayne Corp. v. WPL Associates,144 involves common law
indemnity and equitable subrogation in the condominium setting. As part of its
settlement with a condominium association which had sued for construction
defects, Brickell Biscayne Corporation (the condominium's developer)
obtained an assignment of all of the Association's rights. 45
The developer subsequently sued several parties, some of which were not
parties to the original action. 46 Having reached a fifth amended complaint, the
trial court dismissed the developer's action for common law indemnity and
subrogation, which was filed against subconsultants which were not parties to
the original action. 147 In affirming the dismissal of common law indemnity
claims, the appellate court reasoned that since the association had not sued the
subconsultants, and since the developer had no relationship with the subcon-
sultants, the developer had no indemnity rights. 48 Additionally, since the
association assigned only rights arising out of the main action, there were no
rights to assign regarding parties who were not subject to that action. 49
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 511 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 518 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1987).
143. Moorings, 673 So. 2d at 983.
144. 671 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
145. Id. at 248.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 249.
148. Id.
149. Brickell, 671 So. 2d at 249.
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The third district likewise affirmed dismissal of the developer's claim for
equitable subrogation. 50 Since the subconsultants were not parties to the main
action, the court ruled that the policy of equitable subrogation, to avoid unjust
enrichment of the party at fault, would not apply. 51 The court distinguished
Kala Investments v. Sklar,15 2 where the party against whom equitable subroga-
tion was sought was a co-defendant in the main action.1
53
For practitioners of complex construction litigation, the lesson from this
case appears to be that the right of recovery from a third party under indemnity
or subrogation theories is dependent upon that party's privity of contract with
the indemnitee and/or the party being named in the main action.
Gomez-Ortega v. Dorten, Inc.15 4 involved a class action suit brought by,
and on behalf of, "secondary purchasers" of condominium units subject to a
recreation lease which contained an escalation clause. The validity of the
recreation lease had been resolved in favor of the lessors in previous litiga-
tion.15
5
The plaintiffs in this case argued that the lease was not enforceable
against them since they were not parties to it.15 6 The case was dismissed on
the basis of res judicata157 In affirming the trial court's dismissal, the Third
District Court of Appeal reasoned that the "secondary purchasers" were in
privity with the condominium Association, which had previously (and unsuc-
cessfully) challenged the escalation clause in the lease. 58 The court found that
the privity between the "secondary purchasers" and the Association invoked
the requisite identity of parties to permit application of the doctrine of res
judicata.'59 Furthermore, the court found the requisite identity of issues, since
there were also "secondary purchasers" when the Association brought the
previous action, and that such claims could have been properly raised in the
previous action, although they were not.16°
To the extent the doctrine of res judicata is designed to avoid multiplicity
of actions by the same parties involving the same matter, the court's decision is
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 538 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 551 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1989).
153. Brickell, 671 So. 2d at 249.
154. 670 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
155. Maison Grande Condominium Ass'n v. Dorten, Inc., 600 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1992).
156. Gomez-Ortega, 670 So. 2d at 1108.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1108-09.
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demonstrative of sound judicial policy. This is especially true since the
"secondary purchasers" could have (or should have) discovered the existence
of the lease, its escalation clause, and previous appellate decisions with respect
thereto.
B. Cooperatives
In Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley,161 the Supreme Court of
Florida answered the following question certified from the Fourth District
Court of Appeal' 62 as one of great public importance:
WHETHER SECTION 719.401(1)(f)1 APPLIES TO AN EXIST-
ING LONG TERM GROUND LEASE ENTERED INTO AT
ARM'S LENGTH UPON WHICH ALL IMPROVEMENTS OF A
COOPERATIVE APARTMENT COMPLEX HAVE BEEN
CONSTRUCTED.' 63
The supreme court answered in the negative and affirmed the holding of
the fourth district. 164 Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. was the governing
Association of a twenty-unit cooperative apartment building with a pool, a
dock, and parking areas, all on three subdivision lots.' 65 Moonlit Waters had a
99-year ground lease, which commenced in 1965, providing for annual rental
payments adjusted at ten-year intervals based upon changes in the consumer
price index.' 66 Joseph J. Cauley was the lessor. In 1991, Moonlit Waters
informed Cauley that it wished to purchase the entire property, pursuant to
section 719.401(1)(t)1 of the Florida Statutes, which requires a lease of
recreational or other commonly used facilities, entered into before the unit
owners received control of the association, to include an option to purchase.
67
Cauley refused to enter into negotiations with Moonlit Waters to sell the
property.
168
161. 666 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1996).
162. Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley, 651 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App.), decision approved, 666 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1996).
163. Moonlit Waters, 666 So. 2d at 899.
164. Id. at 900.
165. Id. at 899.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Moonlit Waters, 666 So. 2d at 899.
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Moonlit Waters filed a motion to appoint an arbitrator to decide upon a
sales price for the property pursuant to section 719.401(1)(f)1.169 The circuit
court denied the motion, finding that the statute violated both the United States
Constitution and the Florida Constitution.170  The court reasoned that ap-
pointing an arbitrator would violate Cauley's due process rights by denying
him the opportunity to retain property in which he had a vested rightY"1 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal declined to reach the constitutional issue,
finding that the statute applies only to a lease of recreational or other com-
monly used facilities, and does not apply to an all-encompassing underlying
land lease.
172
In affirming the fourth district, the supreme court applied the "plain
meaning rule" of statutory construction. 173 The court found the statute to be
unambiguous in its application to leases of "recreational or other commonly
used facilities" and not "land leases."' 74 The court also considered the
language of section 719.4015(1) of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits
escalation clauses in "land leases" and leases of "recreational facilities land, or
other commonly used facilities."'75  Applying another maxim of statutory
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,176 the court found a specific
legislative intent to exclude land leases from the operative provisions of the
subject statute.177
Downey v. Surf Club Apartments178 was a cooperative case involving
unique facts. In 1977, the cooperative Association's board approved a
resolution authorizing the Association to lease certain rooms in the building to
shareholders. 179 However, no formal documentation was ever executed. 80
Downey subsequently sold his cooperative unit, but claimed a residual
right to continue leasing the "extra room."' 81  The Association notified




172. Id. at 899.
173. Moonlit Waters, 666 So. 2d at 900 (citing Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.
1992)).
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 719.4015(1) (1993)).
176. Id (citing Bergh v. Stephens, 175 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965)).
177. Id.
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respect to the "extra room."'8 2 Downey subsequently sold his unit. The
Association sued Downey for declaratory relief. Downey counterclaimed for
wrongful eviction. The trial court ruled in favor of the Association.
8 3
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Third District Court of Appeal
held that Downey divested himself of all ownership rights in the Association,
and consequently, all real property interest he might claim in the apartment
cooperative complex.184 The court further held that upon Downey's sale of his
unit, the "extra room" reverted to the Association.
85
The rationale for the court's holding was that a person can have no
interest in a cooperative apartment aside from his ownership of stock in the
corporation. 186 The court further held that since Downey never received stock
"which carried with it the right to lease the subject room," he had no real
property interest in the room.
87
Although the result appears appropriate, the logic used by the court is not
easy to understand. What if the Association had issued Downey stock that
entitled him to lease the room? Would that right be severable from the stock?
Would it be an "appurtenance?"' 88 If the end justifies the means, the court's
opinion can be defended.
C. Homeowners' Associations, Common Law Covenant Enforcement,
Miscellaneous
In contrast to the paucity of case law involving internal condominium
disputes, 1995-96 produced its fair share of non-condominium, community
association case law. Perhaps the most significant case for homeowners'
associations is the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Holly Lakes
Ass'n v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n.189 The issue decided relates to a
mortgagee's lien priority, an issue that is statutorily regulated in the condo-
minium context.'g°
Holly Lakes is a mobile home park with a declaration of covenants
recorded in 1974.' ' The declaration required a monthly assessment payment
182. Id.





188. See FLA. STAT. § 719.105 (1995).
189. 660 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1995).
190. FA. STAT. § 718.116(1) (1995).
191. Holly Lakes, 660 So. 2d at 267.
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for maintenance and provided that if the monthly charge was not paid when
due, that the Holly Lakes Association had the right to place a lien against the
lot and the improvements. 92 The McKessens purchased a mobile home site at
Holly Lakes and gave a mortgage for the purchase price to the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association ('FNMA").193 The mortgage was recorded in
1983.94 FNMA brought a foreclosure action against the McKessens in 1992.
The Association alleged that it had superior lien rights to FNMA's mortgage
rights against the property because its lien related back to the 1974 declaration
of covenants.
95
The trial court ruled in favor of the Association. 196 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, but certified the question to the
supreme court as being one of great public importance.197 The supreme court
affirmed the ruling of the district court, answering the certified question in the
negative. 98 The supreme court held that the language of the declaration of
covenants did not create an ongoing automatic lien, but rather created a right to
a lien in the event the maintenance assessment was not paid when due.
199
Because the mortgage was recorded in 1983, prior to the Association's lien
(which was recorded in 1991), the court held that FNMA's lien had priority.200
The court distinguished the case of Bessemer v. Gersten,201 which dealt
with a conflict between a creditor's lien and the owner's homestead right. 
2
The supreme court held that the declaration of covenants of Holly Lakes failed
to put FNMA on notice that the Association claimed a continuing, automatic
lien on the property securing the monthly maintenance assessments, and that
FNMA could not be charged with constructive notice of the existence of the
Association's lien.203 The court intimated, in dicta, that in order for an
association's claim of lien to have priority over an intervening recorded





196. Holly Lakes, 660 So. 2d at 268.
197. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. McKesson, 639 So. 2d 78, 80 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994), decision approved, 660 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1995).
198. Holly Lakes, 660 So. 2d at 269.
199. Id. at 268.
200. Id.
201. 381 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1980).
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association's lien relates back to the date of the filing of the declaration, or that
it otherwise takes priority over intervening mortgages.2 4
Although the court's ruling leaves association practitioners with the right
to create (or in some cases amend) non-condominium covenants with "super-
lien" rights, caution should be exercised before advising a client to do so.
Specifically, the client needs to be aware that such "super-lien" status runs
afoul of secondary mortgage market guidelines, and may deter lenders who
would not accept mortgages with lower priority than an assessment lien.
Jakobi v. Kings Creek Village Townhouse Ass'n205 is another significant
(and troubling) homeowners' association case. Jakobi involves the application
of section 57.105(2) of the Florida Statues. Jakobi, a townhouse owner, filed a
suit against the Association after his request for permission to install a
screened enclosure was denied. 2°6 Ultimately, the parties executed a stipula-
tion whereby the Association agreed to allow Jakobi to construct the enclo-
sure.2°7 The Association had previously approved similar installations.
Subsequently, Jakobi moved for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to
section 57.105(2), reasoning that the Association's bylaws contained a
provision allowing the Association to recover fees incurred in litigation with
an owner.20 8 The trial court held that the bylaws did not constitute a contract
within the meaning of the statute. °9 The Third District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court, holding that the bylaws were a contract within the
meaning of the statute.210 The premise for the court's decision was that since
Jakobi had to file suit to prevent the Association from arbitrarily refusing to
approve his installation, this was an action "with respect to the contract" as
contemplated by section 57.105(2) of the Florida Statutes.211
The court rejected the Association's argument that the bylaws (initially
adopted before 1988) predated the October 1, 1988 "grandfathering" date
referenced in the statute. 12 The court reasoned that the 1992 deed transferring
title to the owner created a "novation. 21 3 Because the owner took title with
record notice of the bylaw provisions, the court held that he assumed a new
204. Id.
205. 665 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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personal contractual obligation with the Association for compliance with its
restrictions, and for payment of fees, which formed the basis for the contrac-
tual undertaking required by the statute.214 This, the court held, gave rise to a
new contract which, by law, had the attorney's fees clause of the bylaws
incorporated within its terms.215
This logic, if not result-oriented, is certainly problematic. Taking the
court's position to its logical conclusion, an association's legal relationship
with its members will depend on the date that the owner purchased, and on the
law in effect at that time. This is certainly the "morass of legal entanglement"
that the courts have sought to avoid in the condominium setting.
2 16
As a practical matter, the enactment of section 617.305(a) of the Florida
Statutes should minimize the impact of this decision. The referenced statute
now provides for the recovery of prevailing party attorney's fees in homeown-
ers' association disputes.
Kay v. Via Verde Homeowners Ass'n217 is a homeowners' association
collection case. The trial court granted the Association's claim to foreclose its
lien for unpaid assessments and dismissed the owner's counterclaim for breach
of contract, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.218 The trial court ruled that the
counterclaims did not state a cause of action.219
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the
counterclaim, except for dismissal of the owner's cause of action for breach of
contract.220 In her counterclaim, the owner had alleged that the Association
had agreed to repair and maintain certain sub-surface air conditioning pipes in
the common property, that the Association failed to do so, and that the owner
was damaged by the Association's failure to perform.22'
The appellate court, accepting these allegations as true, found the same
sufficient to state a cause of action for breach of contract.222 The court does
not discuss whether the alleged contract was oral or written, nor does it discuss
whether the governing documents for the community required the Association
to maintain these particular pipes.223 Had that issue been litigated in the case,
214. Id.
215. Jakobi, 665 So. 2d at 327.
216. See, e.g., Rothfleisch v. Cantor, 534 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
217. 677 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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it would have been interesting to see whether the court would still have
dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim.
Carmelitas Holding Co. v. Paradise Beach Resorts St. Augustine, Inc.24
is a homeowners' association case involving enforcement of judgments against
a homeowners' association and its successor in interest. The Association
apparently took out a loan with Barnett Bank and defaulted. Although the
opinion does not contain great detail about the apparently unusual transfer of
all of a homeowners' association's rights and assets to a successor entity, the
trial court essentially treated the Association and its successor as one party.
The successor to Barnett Bank attempted to impose a creditor's bill
against the Association's right to assess its members. The trial court held that
the Association could only levy assessments for specified purposes, and that
payment of judgments was not one of such purposes.2 25 Thus, the trial court
refused to grant a creditor's bill against the Association's right of assessment.
The appellate court initially noted that the articles of incorporation for the
Association authorized the Association to levy assessments to pay all lawful
obligations incurred in connection with the affairs of the Association. 226 The
court also found it noteworthy that the articles of incorporation authorized the
Association to borrow money.22 7
Having concluded that the Association had the authority to borrow money
and that the declaration authorized assessments for general expenses of the
Association, the court held that "[t]he law simply does not allow an associa-
tion to borrow money and then absolve itself from repayment through its
declarations or bylaws.22 8
There are two points from this case which merit discussion. First, the
court appears to implicitly accept that the Association's authority to borrow
money is predicated solely on enabling authority in the governing documents.
The court does not consider (perhaps it was not raised by the parties) the
provisions of section 617.0302(7) of the Florida Statutes, which permit all not-
for-profit corporations to borrow money, unless otherwise specified in the
articles of incorporation.
A second related point is the court's consideration of the governing
documents without regard to the complementary or supplementary nature of
the governing statute. This is, somewhat curiously, the opposite of the
224. 675 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
225. Id.
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philosophy often exhibited by the courts in condominium issues where the
language of the statute is found to control, without regard to the language in
the governing documents.
229
Americas Homes, Inc. v. Esler 023 involves free speech with regard to a
dissatisfied homeowner's "picketing" in a residential development. The Eslers
bought a home from an affiliate of Americas Homes, Inc. ("Americas"). The
property was classified as being in flood zone "C," a zone which the court said
is not normally prone to flooding.23l The Eslers lived in the home for two
years without a flooding incident, and apparently decided to sell their home.
Right after the Eslers listed their property for sale, a flooding condition
occurred in the vicinity of the Eslers' property.
According to the opinion, a broker advised the Eslers that they would not
be able to sell their home without disclosing the flooding condition.3 2 The
Eslers complied with their broker's request by posting a sign in their yard
which read: "DUE TO LOCAL FLOODING THIS PROPERTY IS FOR
SALE."233 The sign also posted photographs of the area during flooding. The
sign did not disparage Americas in any fashion, or even mention that Americas
had sold Eslers the property.
Americas sued Eslers, seeking a temporary injunction requiring removal
of the sign. The trial court refused to grant the injunction and Americas
appealed. In affirming the denial of the temporary injunction, the court found
Zimmerman v. D.C.A. at Welleby, Inc.2 34 to be dispositive. Zimmerman
involved unhappy condominium owners picketing a developer's sales office.23
5
The Zimmerman court allowed the owners to picket and peacefully protest
because it was protected speech under the First Amendment and not subject to
prior restraint (although the Zimmerman court held that the conduct could be
tortious and actionable in damages). 6
The appellate court in Esler affirmed that freedom of speech is a funda-
mental personal right and liberty which is constitutionally protected under both
the United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution.37 The court held
that the Eslers, by placing a sign on their property in compliance with the
229. See, e.g., Towerhouse Condominium, Inc. v. Millman, 475 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1985).
230. 668 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 240.
233. Id.
234. 505 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
235. Id. at 1372.
236. Id. at 1374.
237. Americas Homes, 668 So. 2d at 240.
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instructions from their broker, were exercising their right of free speech. 38
Accordingly, the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial
of the temporary injunction.239
This case affirms the proclivity of the courts to treat free speech as
sacrosanct, event though "commercial speech" may be involved. In Esler, the
developer did not seek damages at the trial court (and in fact alleged that it had
no remedy at law). However, counsel is wise to re-read Zimmerman when
considering the availability of picketing or other protest as a means of influ-
encing dispute resolution. Although the Zimmerman court also declined prior
restraint of the picketing, it was clear that the court held open the possibility of
a damages award (which in such cases could obviously be significant) if the
conduct was found to be tortious. In other words, although this type of
"speech" may be insulated from prior restraint through injunction, it is not
absolutely privileged in terms of tort liability.
A year of community association case law would not be complete without
a "dog case." Although these cases are usually considered one of the least
glamorous aspects of practicing community association law, Barrwood
Homeowners Ass'n v. Maser 40 reinforces the sometimes serious aspect of
animal control in common interest communities.
Alexander Maser, a minor, was bitten by a dog. Apparently, the bite
occurred on the common areas owned by the Association. Although not
specifically set forth in the facts of the opinion, it appears that the dog be-
longed to one of the owners in the community.
Maser's parents sued the Association, but not the dog's owner. A jury
verdict was rendered against that Association for negligence. The trial court
also ruled during the trial that the dog's owner should be put on the verdict
form and that the minor's damages would be reduced by the dog owner's
percentage of fault.24' Maser appealed this aspect of the case.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's verdict
form, which permitted apportionment of liability to the dog's owner, even
though he was not a party to the case.242 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
also upheld the jury's verdict against the Association.243 Citing Vasques v.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. 675 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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Lopez,2 4 the court concluded that a land owner could be held liable for
damages caused by a dog on its property if the landlord had knowledge of the
dog's vicious propensities. 245
Although many associations are wont to become involved in internal
disputes between community residents, this case demonstrates the need for an
association to pay serious attention to complaints regarding potentially
threatening animal behavior.
Robins v. Walter246 is a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal
involving the application of subdivision covenants. Mr. and Mrs. Robins
purchased a lot in Highlands, a platted subdivision, in Walton County.247 The
Robins obtained a building permit which allowed them to construct a residen-
tial home with attached garage and a "mother-in-law apartment" above the
garage. 248 According to the plans, the Robins built a five-bedroom main home
and a "carriage house" above the garage.249 Each bedroom in the main home
had a separate entrance to the outside.20
The Robins then advertised the facility as a "bed and breakfast."' 1 Other
lot owners in the subdivision sued the Robins, resulting in an order after
nonjury trial which enjoined the Robins from renting out the "carriage house,"
or operating the main structure as a bed and breakfast.252 The order also
precluded the Robins from selling food from their property, whether charged
separately or included as part of a rental.z 3
The three covenants in question were articles 2, 3, and 6 of the declaration
of covenants. 4 The appellate court held that while not a model of clarity, the
244. 509 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
245. Barrwood Homeowners, 675 So. 2d at 984.
246. 670 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).




251. Robins, 670 So. 2d at 973.
252. Id. at 974.
253. Id.
254. The three covenants provided:
2. No structure shall be erected, altered, placed, or permitted to remain on
any residential building lot other than one detached single family dwelling unit
with attached or detached garage, with quarters for domestics attached to the ga-
rage.
3. No structure of any said lot shall be used for business or commercial pur-
poses provided, however, the renting of the premises in whole or in part shall not
be construed to be a business or commercial operation....
1996]
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intention of the covenants was to allow parties to lease or rent their premises
for residential purposes, but not to allow an ongoing commercial enterprise to
take place on lots which are designated for noncommercial purposes.25
The Robins also argued that article 2 of the covenants, while limiting
original construction, does not limit the use of the structure once it is built.
2 56
Although the appellate court recognized case law from other jurisdictions
which stands for this proposition, the court read article 2 in conjunction with
articles 3 and 6.257 After reading the covenants as a whole, the court found that
a "bed and breakfast inn" is an ongoing business or commercial use of the
property in violation of the intent of the covenant. 58 The court then went on
the find that a "bed and breakfast inn" is essentially the same thing as a
"motel" which have been precluded by the courts in other Florida decisions
involving similar covenant language.259
The court also distinguished Moss v. Inverness Highlands South and West
Civic Corp. 26 on the basis that an adult congregate living facility (at issue in
Moss) is entirely different than a transient motel.26' Finally, the court held that
in light of the language in the restrictions which exempts rentals from being
designated commercial (meaning that rentals can be "residential"), the trial
court's ruling on the "carriage house" rental was "overly broad" and
stricken.262 The apparent intent of the appellate court's pronouncement on this
issue was that the lot owners could rent out the "carriage house" as a residen-
tial apartment.
Although courts tend to strictly construe covenants, the court in Robins
gave a fair meaning to the covenants as a whole and reached a just result in this
case. The court's ruling on the "carriage house" may have been an attempt to
"split the baby" since article 2 of the covenants specifically contemplates that
quarters detached from the main residences are for "domestics," which would
typically be considered an adjunct of a "single family" usage, as clearly
contemplated by article 2 of the covenants.
6. No business shall be permitted or maintained on any lot or lots except lot
16-A, 17, 18, 19 and 20 in Block B, lots 1, 2, 14 and 15 in Block D, and lots 1, 2
and 3 in Block F.
Robins, 670 So. 2d at 973.




259. Robins, 670 So. 2d at 974.
260. 521 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 531 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1988).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida courts continue to decide numerous cases in the area of sub-
stantive criminal law. Keeping up with the recent pronouncements of
Florida's courts in this area obviously presents a challenge to the busy
practitioner. This article discusses Supreme Court of Florida decisions in
the area of substantive criminal law handed down between July 1, 1995 and
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; LL.M., Temple University, 1978; J.D., Catholic University, 1973; B.A.,
Georgetown University.
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July 1, 1996.1 As with past survey articles on criminal law, this one does not
discuss issues regarding the death penalty or other sentencing issues. Both
these topics have become so specialized that they deserve separate, special
treatment. Even after cases mainly involving the death penalty and other
sentencing issues2 are eliminated, the survey does not discuss every Supreme
Court of Florida case. Cases which merely discuss the application of settled
or fairly standard fact situations to a well-settled rule of law have also been
eliminated.3 When a particular area of substantive criminal law is discussed
in the text of this article, cases from the Florida district courts of appeal
discussing the same area are mentioned in the footnotes accompanying that
section to help supplement the textual discussion. Otherwise, Florida district
court opinions are not the subject of this article. Similarly, new legislation is
mentioned only when it relates to the continuing importance of a discussed
case.
This article is divided into two main parts. The first part discusses the
Supreme Court of Florida cases concerning major questions of substantive
criminal law that do not involve constitutional issues. The second part
discusses Supreme Court of Florida cases involving constitutional challenges
to substantive criminal law statutes in Florida.
1I. NON-CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
A. Kidnapping
This past year the Supreme Court of Florida decided an important
case clarifying once again what constitutes the offense of kidnapping in
Florida. Section 787.01(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes defines the basic
1. The author has chosen as a cut-off point decisions reported up to, and including 673
So. 2d. Thus, as in last year's article, some major Supreme Court of Florida cases decided
before July 1, 1996 may not be included in this article. Major Supreme Court of Florida cases
decided before July 1, 1995, but not included in last year's survey, are discussed in this year's
article.
2. Indeed, cases discussing sentencing guidelines and related topics were a major focus of
a significant number of Supreme Court of Florida cases this last survey year. Readers
interested in these areas should consult the recent supreme court decisions referenced in
APPENDIX A to this article.
3. Thus, a number of Supreme Court of Florida decisions involving homicide offenses are
not discussed in this article. Readers interested in supreme court cases discussing whether the
state has proven a particular homicide offense may wish to consult the opinions in APPENDIX B
to this article.
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offense of kidnapping.4  This section provides that either "confining,
abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful
authority" 5 by any of three specified means is kidnapping when the act was
done to further or to accomplish a specific purpose. The three specified
means are "forcibly, secretly, or by threat." 6
Kidnapping is a specific intent crime.7 There are four different specific
purposes for kidnapping under section 787.01(a):8  1) kidnapping for
ransom, reward, or as a shield or hostage;9 2) kidnapping in connection with
4. The remaining two subsections of section 787.01 set forth the sentencitig provisions
and establish an additional offense when a young child (under 1) is kidnapped with
aggravating circumstances.
5. See FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(a) (1995). One recent Supreme Court of Florida opinion
implies that the confinement, abduction, or imprisonment must be at least partially successful
for there to be a kidnapping. See Rogers v. State, 660 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1995) (reversing the
kidnapping conviction of a driver whom the defendant ordered at gunpoint to drive in a
certain direction). In Rogers, the court held that since the driver refused and drove in a
different direction, there was insufficient evidence to support a kidnapping conviction. Id. at
241. As kidnapping is a specific intent crime, one would think that attempted kidnapping
would be a possible lesser included offense here. However, for reasons not stated, the court's
opinion does not discuss this.
6. Id. Chapter 787 provides no definition of these specified means. Arguably, the term
"forcibly" means by actual use of physical force, while the term "by threat" means by
threatened use of either physical force or some other harm. Otherwise, the terms would be
redundant.
"Secretly" has been defined as "intended ... to isolate or insulate the intended victim
from meaningful contact or communication with the public." See Robinson v. State, 462 So.
2d 471, 476 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 471 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1985) (citing
Miller v. State, 233 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970)). See also McCarter v. State,
463 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 472 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1985). For
example, the Robinson court found that the defendant's act of asking a sexual assault victim
whether she needed a ride and then driving to a secluded area without the victim being aware
of what was happening or where she was being taken constituted a secret abduction.
7. See Heddleson v. State, 512 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Gra-
ham, 468 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Mills v. State, 407 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
8. See Justus v. State, 438 So. 2d 358, 367 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052
(1984) (declaring that "the four clauses pertaining to criminal intent [are] set out [in the]
disjunctiv[e], so that there are four alternative means by which one can form the intent to
commit kidnapping.").
9. FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(a)1. This section was discussed in a recent important case
decided during this survey period. In Lafleur v. State, 661 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1995), the defendant appealed a conviction for the armed kidnapping of his infant son.
Lafleur claimed that as he was the boy's father, therefore, he could not be legally convicted of
kidnapping his own child. The district court disagreed for two reasons, First, the court noted
that another district court opinion, Johnson v. State, 637 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1996]
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another felony; ° 3) kidnapping to inflict bodily harm or to terrorize;" and 4)
kidnapping to interfere with a governmental or political function. 12  The
most frequently encountered factual scenario involves allegations that the act
constituting the kidnapping was done with the intent to satisfy the second of
these four possible purposes, i.e., to "[c]ommit or facilitate commission of
any felony."'13 Florida courts recognize that there are problems with apply-
ing this subsection too literally to other felonies, the elements of which
involve some confinement or movement of another person. Indeed, the
Supreme Court of Florida, in its first case discussing section 787.01(1)(a)2
after its passage, noted that "[i]f construed literally this subsection would
apply to any criminal transaction which inherently involves the unlawful
confinement of another person, such as robbery or sexual battery."' 4 Thus,
any confinement for purposes of these crimes would automatically make the
offender liable for kidnapping as well.
States have adopted three basic approaches to deal with this issue: 1)
the "any movement or confinement" approach, making any movement or
confinement of another except those absolutely necessary to commit the
other felony kidnapping;' 5 2) the "incidental" approach making only those
1994), review denied, 649 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1994) which announced "[t]he general rule ...
that a parent cannot be found guilty of kidnapping ... for taking his child from the other
parent" was inapplicable because in Johnson there was no court order awarding custody to the
parent from whom the child was taken, whereas in Lafleur such an order had been made.
Lafleur, 661 So. 2d at 348. Second, Johnson does not control when the child is taken for an
ulterior purpose, as opposed to exercising the taking parent's parental rights. Id. Lafleur,
during the abduction, had initially refused to give the boy up as the boy was "his 'ace in the
hole."' Also, the boy was taken to force his mother to return to Lafleur. This second reason,
if taken literally, will become the primary focus of inquiry whenever a parent is accused of
kidnapping his or her child. Regardless of whether a custody order exists or not, taking one's
child for an unlawful purpose should not be condoned. However, applying this reasoning too
literally may result in turning domestic disputes into kidnapping offenses. Where a child is
forcibly taken at gunpoint by one parent from another parent, no one will probably feel any
qualms in having the parent who used potentially deadly force convicted of kidnapping. But
in other scenarios, applying Lafleur's language literally may lead to unwarranted extensions of
the kidnapping offense.
10. FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(a)2.
11. Id § 787.01(l)(a)3.
12. Id § 787.01(1)(a)4.
13. Id. § 787.01(1)(a)2. This subsection has by far the most reported cases discussing
kidnapping and seems to be the most common intent charged for kidnapping in Florida.
14. See Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031, 1034 (Fla. 1982).
15. This approach would appear to produce a larger number of convictions than the other
two. For a list of cases illustrating this approach, see Comment, Criminal Law: Lowering the
Threshold for Kidnapping to Facilitate a Felony, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 528, 529 nn. 15-16
(1983).
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acts of victim movement or confinement that are materially different from
the other felony kidnapping; and 3) the Model Penal Code approach making
only "[movement] from [the victim's] place of residence or business, or a
substantial distance from the vicinity where [the victim] is found"'16 or
"unlawfully confin[ing the victim] for a substantial period in a place of
isolation" 17 kidnapping.1
8
The Supreme Court of Florida in Faison v. State19 selected the second
of these three approaches. Faison required that a three-part test be satisfied
before an accused could be convicted of kidnapping under section
787.0(1)(a)2. Under this test, the movement or confinement:
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental
to the other crime;
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other
crime; and
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other
crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of com-
mission or substantially lessens the risk of detection. 20
Proof of each factor is necessary for a kidnapping conviction under section
787.01(1)2.21
Unfortunately, this test has been easier to state than to apply. Once
again during this survey year, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Berry v.
State,22 reconciled a split between two district courts of appeal as to whether
certain facts support a conviction under section 787.01(1)(a)2 for kidnap-
ping. Berry and some accomplices entered an apartment and robbed two
victims at gunpoint. One victim was immediately bound and left in the same
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1.
17. Id.
18. In Faison, Justice Boyd forcefully argued for a fourth approach which would make
victim movement or confinement during another felony kidnapping only when such acts
"expose the victim to a risk of physical or mental harm substantially greater than the risk of
harm ordinarily encountered by the victim of the forcible felony being committed ......
Faison, 426 So. 2d at 968 (Boyd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a
discussion praising this approach and urging its adoption, see Matthew J. King, Note,
Kidnapping in Florida: Don't Move or You've Done It, 13 STETSON L. REv. 197, 205-08;
211-14 (1985).
19. 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983).
20. Id. at 965.
21. Kirtsey v. State, 511 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing FLA.
STAT. § 787.01(1)2).
22. 668 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1996).
19961
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room where he was when the robbers entered. The robbers forced the other
victim to accompany them to each room and show them where any valuables
may be located. Afterwards, this victim was tied hand and foot before the
robbers left. Unfortunately for the robbers, he freed himself shortly after
their departure and called the police. At trial, Berry was convicted of both
armed robbery and kidnapping. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed his kidnapping conviction finding that the act of tying up a victim
by itself could support a kidnapping under Faison.23 The supreme court
granted review to resolve an apparent conflict between this decision and the
first district's opinion in another case.24
The supreme court first noted that tying someone up clearly constituted
a "confinement" under section 787.01(1) and that under the facts, such
confinement was also clearly not willful.2 5 Likewise, the court noted that the
defendant's actions constituting the alleged kidnapping were done to commit
or facilitate commission of a felony, in this case robbery.26 Therefore, taken
literally, the elements of section 787.01(1)(a) had all been proven. However,
because of the purpose for which the alleged acts of kidnapping were taken,
the Faison test needed to be applied to see if Berry could be found guilty of
this offense.
Applying Faison, the supreme court easily concluded that tying up the
victims satisfied the first Faison requirement that the confinement 7 "not be
slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime."28  The
court noted that if the victims had been held at gunpoint until the robbery
was completed, this would be a confinement, but that the court would have
found it incidental to the robbery's commission. Likewise, if the robbers
had made the victims go from room to room and later merely left them in a
room with orders to stay there until the robbers had left, this would also be
incidental. The court noted that "[i]n both hypotheticals, any confinement
accompanying the robbery would cease naturally with the robbery. '2 9 Here,
23. Berry v. State, 652 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
24. See Brinson v. State, 483 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 492 So.
2d 1335 (1986).
25. Berry, 668 So. 2d at 969.
26. Id.
27. In Berry, the court noted that the Faison test should be read in the disjunctive as
applying to either confinement or movement. Here, the supreme court focused on the
defendant's actions in tying up the victims and thus only discussed "confinement." Berry, 652
So. 2d at 838.
28. Faison, 426 So. 2d at 965.
29. Beny, 668 So. 2d at 969.
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however, the robbers clearly intended the confinement to continue after the
robbery was over.
30
Faison's second requirement that the confinement "not be of the kind
inherent in the nature of the other crime" 31 was also easily satisfied. Tying
someone up is not needed to commit a robbery. Indeed, the victims could
have been left untied and a robbery would have still occurred.
Finally, Berry concluded that Faison's third requirement was also met.
The court concluded that tying the victims up "was a confinement with
independent significance from the underlying felony in that it substantially
reduced the risk of detection." 32  Indeed, the court could find no other
purpose for leaving the victims bound other than to limit the risk of being
caught. The fact that one victim shortly afterwards untied himself and
frustrated this purpose made no difference as attainment of the confine-
ment's objectives was irrelevant; what mattered was the intended purpose
behind them.
33
Berry demonstrates that questions about the proper application of
Faison will continue to arise in the Florida courts. The court attributes some
of the difficulty in applying Faison to both the failure to distinguish between
"confinement" and "movement" and the failure to recognize Faison used
these terms disjunctively rather than conjunctively. However, Berry can-
30. Despite the robbers' goal in tying up the victims, one of them was able to free himself
almost immediately and call the police. The supreme court discusses this fact with reference
to Faison's third requirement but not with the first requirement. Id. at 970.
The court's language could bring about very different results depending on the words the
robbers use. Under the court's test, if the robbers put victims in a room and tell them not to
come out until the robbers leave, the confinement would be inconsequential. But what if the
robbers tell the victims not to leave until ten or twenty minutes have passed? The victims
would still not be bound as in the first scenario but they would be confined longer than needed
for the robbery to be completed if they comply with the robbers' commands. Under this
second scenario, would the robbers additionally be guilty of kidnapping?
This question, and others that could be posed about differences in the court's examples,
show that under Faison, as with probably any test designed to be applied to a myriad of fact
situations, questions about the test's proper application will continue to persist.
31. Faison, 426 So. 2d at 965.
32. Berry, 668 So. 2d at 970.
33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. The Berry opinion does not discuss what
possible effect on the first Faison requirement one victim's being able to free himself quickly
had. The court's discussion of the first Faison requirement speaks in terms of actual
continued confinement beyond a robbery's completion. If this is really what the court intends
is needed to satisfy this requirement then why didn't the escape of one victim frustrate that
here? Was the state perhaps lucky in that there was a second victim who was not freed until
later? Does that mean Berry actually committed only one kidnapping and not two?
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didly acknowledges that "the diverse factual situations to which [Faison]
must be applied" 34 means that the complete elimination of questions under
this test is not likely to occur.35 In Berry, the supreme court discussed how
Faison should be applied to a particular situation. The trial and district
courts now have one more useful opinion to serve as guidance in applying
the law of kidnapping in Florida.
B. Felon in Possession of Weapons
Under section 790.23(1) of the Florida Statutes, persons convicted of a
felony under the law of any state or country are prohibited from possessing
or controlling firearms or other electric weapons including tear gas guns and
chemical weapons.36 Violation of this section is a second degree felony.37
The status of the accused as a convicted felon must be proven as an
element of this charge.38 The Florida district courts of appeal have been split
as to whether the pendency of an appeal renders one a "convicted" felon
within the meaning of section 790.23. During this last survey year, the
Supreme Court of Florida handed down two short, but important, opinions
dealing with this question.
The first case, State v. Snyder,39 directly addressed the split between the
appellate districts over when someone should be considered a "convicted"
felon for purposes of section 790.23. 40 Snyder had been convicted and
sentenced for grand theft.4 1 During the pendency of his appeal from this
34. Berry, 668 So. 2d at 970.
35. See supra notes 30 & 33 (providing further questions which the author believes Berry
leaves unanswered).
36. This includes juveniles adjudicated for an offense that would be considered a felony if
the juvenile was an adult. FLA. STAT. § 790.23(l)(c) (1995). Proof of the possession element
needed to sustain a conviction under this section may be based on the uncontroverted
testimony of a single witness. See Cordero v. State, 669 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 678 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1996).
37. FLA. STAT. § 790.23(3).
38. See Killingsworth v. State, 584 So. 2d 647 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
39. 673 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1996).
40. Snyder dealt with former section 790.23. See FLA. STAT. § 790.23 (1991). Since
Snyder's conviction the legislature has amended this section. Unlike present section
790.23(1), the former version of this statute did not apply to juveniles adjudicated of what
would have been felonies had the proceedings taken place in an adult court.
41. Snyder was a minor but was convicted and sentenced as an adult. At the time of his
later charge, if Snyder had merely been adjudicated a delinquent, section 790.23(1) could not
have been used to support a felon in possession of a firearm charge. See J.B.M. v. State, 560
So. 2d 347 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Section 790.23 has been amended to include
juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses. See FLA. STAT. § 790.23(1)(a).
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conviction, he was arrested for firing a rifle in his backyard. Shortly after
his arrest, the second district affirmed his treatment as an adult for the grand
theft conviction, but remanded due to other errors in sentencing.42 Subse-
quently, Snyder was tried and convicted of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Snyder appealed claiming that he had not been "convicted"
for purposes of section 790.23 at the time he had possessed the rifle since his
appeal was still pending.
The second district reluctantly agreed but noted the direct conflict with
cases from other districts. The supreme court framed the issue before it as
"whether a defendant is 'convicted' for purposes of section 790.23 ... when
adjudicated guilty in the trial court, notwithstanding [the existence of an
appeal or other procedure to challenge the conviction]." 43 The court noted
that the one district court" which answered this question affirmatively did so
for two distinct reasons: the presumption of the correctness of verdicts and
the irrelevancy of a pending appeal or other post conviction procedures to
the legislative policy behind section 790.23. The supreme court in Snyder
focused on the second of these reasons to uphold the conviction in this case.
The court found that this criminal offense provision was "intended to
protect the public by preventing the possession of firearms by persons who,
because of their past conduct, have demonstrated their unfitness to be
entrusted with such dangerous instrumentalities." 45 Whether an appeal or
other procedure challenging a felon's conviction is pending was found
irrelevant to this legislative policy.46 An adjudication of guilt, even if later
found to be incorrect for whatever reason, thus serves as a kind of prima
facie indication of dangerousness, indicating the person adjudicated is
presumptively unfit as a matter of law to carry dangerous items.47 Thus, the
42. Snyder v. State, 597 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
43. Snyder, 673 So. 2d at 10 (footnote omitted).
44. Burkett v. State, 518 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
45. Snyder, 673 So. 2d at 10 (citing Nelson v. State, 195 So. 2d 853, 855 & n.8 (Fla.
1967)).
46. Indeed, Snyder declared that "[t]he legislature never intended for convicted felons to
posses firearms during the pendency of their appeals." Id. at 11.
47. This presumption or assumption behind section 790.23 is obviously not universally
true in fact for all cases. Clearly the commission of all kinds of felonies are not in actuality a
true indication of dangerousness. A person who commits a grand theft by stealthy means is
certainly a lot less dangerous than one who commits a robbery or an aggravated battery. The
latter two kinds of felonies involve some element of violence or intimidation while the former
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court held that "a defendant is 'convicted,' for purposes of [section 790.23,]
when he is adjudicated guilty in the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that
he has the right to contest the validity of the conviction by appeal or by other
procedures."48
Snyder's holding is clearly correct for several reasons. One, it certainly
seems to help promote the legislative policy behind section 790.23. Appeals
and other challenges to the validity of convictions take at least months, if not
years, to exhaust. Should a convicted felon be allowed to posses a firearm
during this time? If the conviction is affirmed, the defendant has received an
undeserved grace period during which firearm possession would be allowed.
Second, a contrary decision in Snyder would only raise additional questions
about when a person should be considered a "convicted" felon under section
790.23. For example, what if the conviction is affirmed by a district court
but the defendant tries either successfully or unsuccessfully to convince the
supreme court to review it? How about the time when habeas corpus or
other post-conviction relief challenges can still be filed, could a defendant
still possess firearms during this time? In this situation, line-drawing is
inevitable. Thus, the most logical place to draw the line would be where it
most effectuates legislative and other policies. This is clearly at the trial
court level. After Snyder, all persons who are accused and adjudicated as
felons have clear notice they cannot possess, at least until something
happens to officially undermine the validity of their convictions, the items
specified in section 790.23.49 Finally, although the supreme court did not
However, section 790.23 makes no distinctions between the kinds of felonies or how they
were factually committed. Anyone convicted of a felony, no matter how non-dangerous that
person may actually be, is considered legally too dangerous to possess the kinds of items
noted in section 790.23.
48. Burkett, 518 So. 2d at 1366 (footnote omitted).
49. Notice is clearly an important concept in the criminal law. However, all persons are
presumed to know the law and conduct themselves so as not to violate it. Therefore, a
convicted felon should not be able to plead ignorance of the law as a defense, nor should
convicted felons be able to plead ignorance of their predicate felonies as a defense. See
Burkett v. State, 518 So. 2d 1363, 1364 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
However, at least one decision from another state has allowed an accused's ignorance of
his underlying felony to serve as a defense to this type of charge. In People v. Bray, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), the accused had made multiple attempts to ascertain if his out-
of-state conviction was a felony. Even the prosecuting attorney admitted to having had
difficulty in finding out this fact. The appellate court under these circumstances found that
Bray's conviction should be reversed. To this writer, Bray is an example of where the sound
exercise of prosecutorial judgment in not filing charges to begin with should have been
followed.
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discuss this as a reason behind its decision, the holding in Snyder promotes
the principle of verdict finality. Even though a result may later be over-
turned on appeal, we should treat a verdict as final unless or until it is
otherwise unreasonable to do so.
50
Snyder also addressed the issue of what should happen to a defendant
convicted under, section 790.23 during the pendency of an appeal from the
conviction of a predicate felony which is subsequently reversed. If the court
chose to strictly follow the public policy behind section 790.23, one result
would be to say that the subsequent reversal has no effect on the conviction
under section 790.23. However, this result also appears inherently unfair.
What if the appellate reversal came one day after the adjudication of guilt
under section 790.23, should the conviction still stand? The supreme court
in Snyder decided that "fairness requires that [a defendant] be permitted to
attack a conviction for possession of a firearm when the predicate felony
conviction is subsequently reversed on appeal."5' Thus, the court held that
"such a defendant is entitled to relief through a Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 motion to vacate judgment. 52
In its second decision discussing section 790.23 during this survey
period, the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Johnson53 followed Snyder's
reasoning to approve a lower court decision vacating the defendant's
conviction for felony possession of a firearm under section 790.23. Johnson
had first been convicted of a felony battery and had appealed this conviction.
During the appeal's pendency, he was arrested for possession of a firearm
and charged under section 790.23. Johnson plead nolo contendere to this
charge but moved to set it aside when the appellate court later reversed his
battery conviction. The trial court denied the motion. However, the district
Ironically in Snyder, the notion that people should know the law worked to the defen-
dant's benefit. Since the controlling law in the second district would have allowed Snyder to
continue legally possessing firearms at the time he fired the rifle, the supreme court found that
he was entitled to rely on it. Thus, applying the supreme court's decision to his case to uphold
his conviction would be analogous to convicting him under an ex post facto law. The supreme
court therefore approved the reversal of Snyder's conviction although it disapproved the
second district's reasoning for it.
50. Snyder's holding is consistent with the principle of verdict finality found in other
substantive law areas. For example, under section 90.610(2) of the Florida Statutes, the
pendency of an appeal does not make an otherwise admissible conviction inadmissible for
impeachment purposes.
51. Snyder, 673 So. 2d at 11.
52. Id. See also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(a) (providing the appropriate method for filing
such a motion).
53. 668 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1996). Johnson and Snyder were actually decided on the same
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court of appeals found Johnson was entitled to post-conviction relief based
on the same reasoning the supreme court used in Snyder.5 4 The Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed the granting of such relief and the vacating of
Johnson's conviction for possessing a firearm while a convicted felon.
Snyder and Johnson will most likely somewhat increase the number of
convictions being vacated on post-conviction relief, as well as possibly
increasing the number of rule 3.850 motions filed. However, the combined
result of the decisions in these two cases help bring certainty and fairness to
the law.
C. Tampering With Evidence
Under section 918.13 of the Florida Statutes, it is a third degree
felony55 to tamper with or fabricate physical evidence under certain situa-
tions. There are several elements which must be proven before a conviction
under this section appears possible. First, a "criminal trial or proceeding or
an investigation" 56 must be in existence or about to be initiated. Second, this
must have been begun by a lawful authority. 57 Third, the accused must know
about the existence of the first two elements. Fourth, the accused must
"[a]lter, destroy, conceal or remove' '58 some physical object. Finally, this
must be done "with the purpose to impair its ... [use] in [the particular]
proceeding or investigation. 59
The Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Jennings60 recently discussed
how this statute can be violated. In this case, the defense filed a motion to
dismiss to the State's charge that Jennings tampered with physical evidence.
The defense alleged that police officers approached Jennings after seeing
him holding what they believed was marijuana. As one officer approached
Jennings, the officer also believed Jennings was holding cocaine rocks in his
hand. This officer shouted "police" and Jennings either simultaneously or
immediately afterwards tossed the suspected cocaine into his mouth. The
officers grabbed Jennings and eventually arrested him. However, Jennings
had swallowed the objects tossed into his mouth, and these were never
54. Johnson v. State, 664 So. 2d 986, 987-88 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
55. FLA. STAT. § 918.13(2) (1995).
56. Id. § 918.13(l).
57. The specific authorities listed in section 918.13(1) are a "prosecuting authority, law
enforcement agency, grand jury or [state] legislative committee." Id.
58. IM § 918.13(1)(a).
59. Id.
60. 666 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1995).
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recovered. Since the State did not file a traverse, the alleged facts were
assumed to be true for purposes of ruling on the motion.
The trial court granted the motion finding as a matter of law, that
swallowing the suspected cocaine rocks could not constitute the needed act
of "conceal[ment], remov[al], [destruction or alteration].' The third
district affirmed, but on a different basis.62  That court concluded that
Jennings could not be guilty of the charged offense since he "was neither
under arrest nor did he know that a law enforcement officer was about to
instigate an investigation." 63 The supreme court granted review to resolve a
certified conflict split between this district courts on this issue.
4
The supreme court first addressed the trial court's ruling that, as a
matter of law, swallowing an object65 could not constitute the needed
destruction or concealment for a conviction. The trial court had relied on
Boice v. State66 for this conclusion. In Boice, undercover police sold the
defendant a bag of cocaine. Immediately after this, uniformed officers
surrounded Boice's car. Boice threw the bag out of his car, but officers
retrieved it from the roadway. The bag and cocaine had not been altered in
any way. The second district found that since the bag had been tossed into
the open roadway and not otherwise concealed in any manner, there had
been no alteration or concealment under the statute. Rather, the district
61. FLA. STAT. § 918.13(1)(a).
62. State v. Jennings, 647 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
63. Id. at 295. The district court distinguished this case from other cases where the de-
fendant had been placed under arrest before swallowing the object involved. See McKinney v.
State,640 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); McKenzie v. State, 632 So. 2d 276 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Under this scenario, the district court would either have found
Jennings guilty of tampering with evidence if the swallowed object was not recovered and
attempted tampering if it was recovered. For a post-Jennings case finding the accused not
guilty of tampering with evidence and citing McKinney, as authority, see State v. Gilmore, 658
So. 2d 629 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), where an accused who was confronted by officers
for the purpose of arresting him placed a bag of marijuana in his mouth but later spit it out on
the officer's demand and was found not guilty of tampering with evidence. The court found
that "[a]t most, such conduct may be attempted tampering." Id. However, the court did not
rule as such for unexplained reasons.
64. The district court and the supreme court found that there was conflict between the
third district's opinion and the fourth district's decision in Hayes v. State, 634 So. 2d 1153
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 645 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1994).
65. The supreme court noted that it made no difference what Jennings had swallowed, as
long as all the elements were satisfied, since section 918.13(1)(a) pertained to "any record,
document, or thing." Thus, as long as a physical object of some sort is involved, section
918.13 forbids its tampering or alteration under the circumstances specified.
66. 560 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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court characterized this as "merely abandon[ing] the evidence,"67 which
would not violate section 918.13.68 In Jennings, the Supreme Court of
Florida rejected the district court's interpretation of Boice as too broad.6 9
The supreme court found that depending on the circumstances,70 "tossing
evidence away in the presence of a law enforcement officer ... could
amount to tampering or concealing evidence.'
The supreme court then turned to the district court's ruling that under
the facts Jennings could not have known an investigation of the object was
about to occur. The supreme court agreed with the district court's conclu-
sion that Jennings was not under arrest when he swallowed the suspected
rocks. However, that did not mean he could not possess the requisite
67. Id. at 1384.
68. Boice felt that a contrary decision could lead to scenarios that the legislature did not
intend. The court gave as an example a teenager, who when confronted by police for illegally
drinking beer, throws the beer can from his car. Boice noted that if this was concealment
under section 918.13, the teenager could be guilty of a third degree felony when the suspected
crime initiating the act of concealment was merely a misdemeanor.
69. Thus, the supreme court did not disapprove Boice, but merely limited its holding to
the specific situation involved.
70. The court unfortunately did not explain what these circumstances were. However,
Jennings cites, with apparent approval, Hayes v. State, 634 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied, 645 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1994), wherein the district court found that
throwing a bag of suspected rock cocaine into a drain while being chased by a law enforce-
ment officer was tampering with evidence.
If the supreme colrt intended Hayes to serve as an example of when tossing something
away in an officer's presence can be tampering or concealing evidence, then courts will have
to distinguish between acts of merely discarding an object and acts of discarding an object in
such a way that it cannot likely be retrieved and used against the person getting rid of it.
For a recent case from another state finding that merely abandoning narcotics while being
pursued by a law enforcement officer is not sufficient to support a conviction for tampering
with evidence, see Commonwealth v. Delgado, 679 A.2d 223 (Pa. 1996). The Pennsylvania
statute in question in this case is substantially similar to section 918.13 of the Florida
Statutes.
71. Jennings, 666 So. 2d at 133. The court cited with approval both McKinney and
McKenzie, two cases also cited with approval by the district court. Since the supreme court
reversed the district court's decision, readers of these two opinions may be initially confused
with how both courts could cite the same two cases with approval. However, the cases were
cited by these two courts when discussing different issues. The supreme court cited them to
refute the trial court's reasoning, not the district court's.
Readers should also note that the supreme court did not find that the act of swallowing
potential evidence will always be concealment, merely that it sometimes could be. The trial
court had ruled, pursuant to its ruling on the motion to dismiss (which could only be granted if
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knowledge. Jennings had swallowed the objects as soon as the word
"police" had been shouted. Again, viewing this fact from the standard of
whether reasonable people could find Jennings knew of the impending
police investigation, the supreme court found reasonable minds could differ
and thus found that granting a motion to dismiss on this point was inappro-
priate.
Jennings is clearly an important decision from a law enforcement
standpoint. Section 918.13 was passed to protect the integrity of criminal
proceedings by preventing destruction or alteration of evidence relevant to
them. Swallowing drugs is one of the easiest ways to avoid their seizure by
police. If such an act could not constitute destruction or concealment, then
suspects could possibly avoid prosecution both under section 918.13 and
drug offense statutes by simply tossing the suspected items into their mouths
and gulping them down before the police could stop this.72 Surely, the
legislature would not want such absurd results along with the obvious
frustration of law enforcement efforts. Likewise, people may know that they
will be the subject of an investigation prior to being formally under arrest.
The supreme court was clearly correct in deciding that both questions posed
by Jennings should be determined on a case by case basis according to the
facts and not as an absolute matter of law in either situation.
D. Burglary
Burglary, at common law, was the breaking and entering of the dwelling
house of another in the nighttime in order to commit a felony therein.
Modem burglary statutes have significantly broadened this definition. 73
72. Alternatively, following the trial court's ruling would possibly lead to more situations
where police would wrestle with or choke suspects to avoid having them swallow evidence.
This could lead to more injuries to the police and suspects alike.
Of course, police could also wait until the suspect defecates or alternatively have the
suspect's stomach forcibly pumped. One assumes that few officers would have the incentive
to go to such lengths.
Readers who believe such scenarios never occur should remember Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952), where police officers broke into a suspect's bedroom and then choked
Rochin in an effort to prevent him from swallowing two capsules that he had tossed into his
mouth. When the police were unsuccessful in these efforts to obtain the potential evidence,
they handcuffed Rochin and took him to a hospital where his stomach was pumped to force
him to vomit up the items. Although these efforts were successful, the Supreme Court
suppressed the evidence because the police actions were so extreme that they violated Due
Process.
73. Section 810.02(1) of the Florida Statutes defines "burglary" as "entering or remain-
ing in a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein,
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Florida's definition of burglary has been expanded beyond the common law
to protect structures and conveyances as well as dwellings.74 Similarly, the
intruder need not have the intent to commit a felony; the intent to commit
any criminal offense would do. The burglary chapter's definitions of
"structures, 75 and "dwellings ' 76 also include the "curtilage" 77 of these two
places. However, the term "curtilage" is not specifically defined in chapter
810 or elsewhere in the Florida Statutes.7 8 Florida courts have previously
unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to
enter or remain." FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1) (1995).
Under this definition, non-consent to the entry or remaining in the dwelling is not an
element of the offense. Rather, consent is an affirmative defense which the accused must
raise. See Strachn v. State, 661 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Ordinarily, a
person would ordinarily be incapable of burglarizing his own home. However, this may not
always be the case. Recently, in a case of apparent first impression, the Second District Court
of Appeal found that a husband who violated a court restraining order by entering his former
home to commit a crime inside could be legally found guilty of burglary, since at the time of
entry he "did not have a possessory right in the premises." State v. Suarez-Mesa, 662 So. 2d
735, 736 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 669 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1996).
For a recent case discussing the "entering" element of burglary, see Braswell v. State, 671
So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. 88,012, 1996 LEXIS 1588, at *1 (Fla.
Aug. 26, 1996) (finding that the accused entered a conveyance by reaching into the open bed
of a pickup truck and taking personal property from it).
For recent cases discussing the sufficiency of evidence to support burglary convictions,
see Persaud v. State, 659 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 667 So. 2d
775 (Fla. 1996) (finding that when the defendant was stopped in his car filled with stolen
property from a dwelling, shortly after a citizen had reported what looked like a possible
break-in, this could support a burglary of a dwelling conviction) and Walker v. State, 656 So.
2d 950 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that a defendant could be convicted of burglary
based on the finding of his fingerprint on the window of a back bedroom that was used as the
point of illegal entry).
74. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1).
75. See id. § 810.011(1). This section begins its definition by describing a "[s]tructure"
as "a building of any kind .... Similar language is used at the start of the definition of
"[d]welling." See id. § 810.011(2).
The word "building" is not defined in chapter 810. Recently, the fourth district in Dozier
v. State, 662 So. 2d 382, 383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), found no error in a trial court's
instruction to jurors in a burglury trial that for the purpose of defining structure, "there's no
special legal definition for building, so you should take building to mean what is normally
associated with the term in your every day life."
76. See FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2).
77. Both subsections (1) and (2) of section 810.011 contain the language "together with
the 'curtilage' thereof' in their definitions of structure and dwelling. FLA. STAT. §
810.011(l)-(2). However, not all statutory definitions of burglary include "curtilage." See
MODELPENALCODE § 221.1(1).
78. Whether certain conduct takes place within the "curtilage" of a dwelling is also rele-
vant to charges of disorderly conduct under section 877.03 of the Florida Statutes. See Miller
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interpreted the term "curtilage" to include a structure's enclosed grounds, 9
fenced-in yard,80 enclosed parking area,8 1 garage,8 2 and driveway.8 3 Under
the current definition of "curtilage," some past Florida decisions have even
held that merely walking up to the door of someone's house with the intent
to break in and commit a crime will be a burglary even if the house's
threshold is not crossed, since the "curtilage" has been entered.84 Recently,
the Supreme Court of Florida settled any question concerning what basic
requirements there are before a particular area can be considered a structure
or a dwelling's "curtilage."
In State v. Hamilton,8 5 Hamilton and an accomplice, Thomas, entered
the yard of a home intending to steal motors from a boat located in the yard.
The homeowner saw the two would-be thieves and confronted them with a
shotgun. Subsequently, the homeowner shot and killed Thomas. Hamilton
was charged with one count of burglary of a dwelling and a second count of
second degree felony murder for the death of his accomplice, Thomas. At
trial, the prosecution presented very little evidence concerning the appear-
ance of the backyard where the motors were located. 6 Hamilton requested
that the trial court give the definition of structure that is found in the Florida
Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases. Under that definition, a
"structure" is "any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, that
has a roof over it, and the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings
immediately surrounding that structure."87  Despite this request, the trial
court gave a modified instruction that omitted any requirement that the area
beyond the building itself be "enclosed" and which defined "curtilage" as
v. State, 667 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing the defendant's conviction
for disorderly conduct based on his loud cursing in his yard as this occurred in his dwelling
and no facts showed that the language used incited others or posed an imminent danger to
them).
79. See Tobler v. State, 371 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d
76 (Fla. 1979).
80. See T.J.T. v. State, 460 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
81. See Greer v. State, 354 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
82. See State v. Rolle, 577 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
83. See J.E.S. v. State, 453 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Joyner v. State, 303
So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. discharged by 325 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1976).
84. See M.M. v. State, 610 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
85. 660 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1995).
86. The State only presented a photograph showing the place as a "'semi-secluded area
adjacent to the home surrounded by several unevenly spaced trees."' Id. at 1039 n.2 (quoting
State v. Hamilton, 645 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)). Other than this, there
was no evidence that the backyard was enclosed in any matter.
87. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCrIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 136 (1981).
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"the ground and buildings immediately surrounding a structure and dwelling
and customarily used in connection with it."' 88 Following these instructions,
the jury found Hamilton guilty of burglary of a dwelling and second degree
felony murder.
The Second District Court of Appeal89 found the trial court committed
reversible error by deviating from the standard jury instruction on
"structure" by not including in its instructions the requirement that the
"curtilage" be enclosed. 90 The court, however, declined to decide to what
extent the area around a structure must be enclosed before it could be
considered to meet the meaning of "curtilage." Although it reversed Hamil-
ton's convictions for burglary and for second degree felony murder, 91 the
district court certified both of these issues to the Supreme Court of Florida as
questions of great public importance.
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted the certified questions and
affirmed the decision of the second district.92 In so doing, the Hamilton
88. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d at 1039. Both the supreme court and the district court noted
that this definition was based on virtually identical language as that found in A.E.R. v. State,
464 So. 2d 152, 153 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 472 So. 2d 1180 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1011 (1985) (footnote omitted).
89. Hamilton, 645 So. 2d at 556.
90. Both the district court and the supreme court also found that the trial court should
have explained on the record why the standard instruction was not given. The State had
requested the deviation from the standard language, evidently to cure problems with the
deficiency of proof that the yard was within the "curtilage." As the district court noted, the
State's prosecution rested solely on the jury finding that the killing took place during the
commission of a burglary. Without such a finding there would not be any statutorily required
predicate felony for application of the felony murder doctrine. Although Hamilton was
convicted of third degree grand theft, this is not one of the specifically enumerated felonies
under section 782.04 of the Florida Statutes, which can support a felony murder conviction.
See FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1995).
The instruction that the trial court gave was based on the language of another district court
opinion. Thus, the trial court had some basis for its deviation from the standard instruction.
However, this ultimately turned out to be incorrect. Prosecutors and trial judges should
carefully note the second district's admonition in this case that "[p]assages from appellate
opinions, taken out of context, do not always make for good jury instructions." Hamilton, 645
So. 2d at 559 n.5 (quoting Sarduy v. State, 540 So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
91. The district court also reduced Hamilton's conviction for grand theft from a second
degree to a third degree felony. Additionally, the district court rejected claims that Hamilton's
motion for judgment for acquittal should have been granted and that the trial court erred by
not instructing the jury on justifiable and excusable homicide. The district court's opinion
does not give any reasons for these rulings.
92. The exact question both certified and accepted is "DOES FLORIDA'S BURGLARY
STATUTE REQUIRE THAT THE 'CURTILAGE' BE ENCLOSED AND, IF SO, TO WHAT
EXTENT?" Hamilton, 660 So. 2d at 1039.
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opinion provides an organized and thoughtful discussion of the gradual
evolution of burglary law in Florida. Florida's original statutory definition
of burglary was extremely close to the common law definition.93 This
original definition protected mainly dwellings. Any other "building or
structure" 94 was only included within the scope of this original definition if
they were "within the 'curtilage' of a dwelling house though not forming a
part thereof."95 However, this definition was repealed in 1974, and burglary,
as an offense, was expanded to apply to all roofed buildings of any kind.
The current definitions of structure and dwellings both explicitly contain
language making the "curtilage" part of these places. Thus, the present
Florida burglary statute extends protection not only to buildings, but also
potentially to the grounds around them.96 As the Hamilton court succinctly
noted, "[t]he legislature has [therefore] redefined the crime of burglary as it
was treated at common law, but has utilized the common law term 'curtilage'
to expand the reach of the burglary statute beyond buildings and vehicles." 97
Thus, deciding whether a particular locale now comes within the definition
of "curtilage" is of extreme importance for determining potential criminal
liability.
Hamilton began its exploration of what should be considered as the
present appropriate definition of "curtilage" by discussing the earlier
meanings given to this term. The court noted that at common law, the
cluster of buildings and the surrounding ground near the dwelling home
would usually be enclosed in some fashion. At common law, use of the
word "curtilage" with reference to burglary was a way of protecting not only
the dwelling itself but also the buildings and areas so intimately associated
with the dwelling that they were virtually a part of it. The court found that
early treatises and dictionary definitions generally required some sort of
As the second district's opinion recognized, this actually is two questions, not one. The
second district found that beyond requiring that the "curtilage" be enclosed it was hard "to be
more precise given the myriad arrangements an owner can fashion in enclosing ......
Hamilton, 645 So. 2d at 561. The second district thus left the second question unanswered.
Similarly, the supreme court failed to expressly address this second question. Like so many
other factual issues, this second question is likely to be gradually answered on a case-by-case
basis, rather than in one sweeping decision.
93. See 1895 Fla. Laws ch. 4405 (later codified at FLA. STAT. § 810.01 (1941)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The burglary statutes also protect conveyances, but the term "curtilage" is not used in
the definition of "conveyance." Thus, there is presently no such concept as a "curtilage of a
conveyance" for purposes of burglary in Florida.
97. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d at 1041.
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enclosure in order for a place to be considered part of a dwelling's
"curtilage." Hamilton concluded that the term "curtilage" had a rather
precise definition at common law.
The supreme court noted that Florida has expressly incorporated the
common law into its own body of law. 98 Despite this incorporation, Florida
courts have been inconsistent in defining what constitutes a "curtilage."
Hamilton mainly attributed this inconsistency to the different factual and
legal contexts in which the term "curtilage" is used. The court noted that
most district court opinions had construed the term "curtilage" for purposes
of the burglary statute as requiring some sort of enclosure. However, the
same courts have used a different definition when examining the term
"curtilage" for purposes of deciding whether an illegal search and seizure
has taken place. In United States v. Dunn,99 the United States Supreme
Court adopted a four-part test for determining whether a certain location was
a part of a building's "curtilage" when trying to determine if an illegal search
occurred. Whether the area was enclosed within the same immediate area as
a home was only one part of that test.1°° Under the Florida Constitution,
Florida courts are required to interpret the Florida Constitution's prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizures 1 in conformity with the decisions
in the United States Supreme Court construing the Fourth Amendment. In
Hamilton, the Supreme Court of Florida found no inconsistency in using
different tests for determining whether a place was within the "curtilage"
depending upon the legal issue involved.
In addition to noting that Florida's criminal law had expressly incorpo-
rated the common law, Hamilton also found that other basic principles
involving construction of criminal statutes required that the "curtilage," for
purposes of burglary statutes, must mean an enclosed area. First, there is the
principle that citizens must be given ample notice as to which aspect of their
conduct will violate the criminal law. Although ignorance of the law is
generally no defense, a certain amount of notice must be given or else there
will be due process problems.10 2 Second, Florida statutory criminal law
98. See FLA. STAT. § 775.01 (1995).
99. 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
100. The other three parts of the test were: (1) the proximity of the area alleged to be
"curtilage" to the dwelling; (2) the nature and use to which this area was put; and (3) the steps
taken to protect the area from observation by passersby. Id. at 301.
101. See FLA. CONST. art I, § 12.
102. Lack of adequate notice brings up questions of vagueness. See infra text accompa-
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expressly provides that criminal statutes should be strictly construed in a
fashion "most favorabl[e] to the accused.' 0 3 Since the supreme court could
not determine whether the legislature intended to adopt the common law
definition of "curtilage" or to eliminate the requirement of enclosure, as
some jurisdictions had, fairness required the current burglary statute to be
interpreted to contain such a requirement. Finally, the supreme court agreed
with the district court's reasoning that to not require some sort of enclosure
could possibly lead to harsh and absurd results.
Hamilton is clearly an important case on construction of the Florida
burglary statute. As a result of Hamilton, the Supreme Court of Florida has
provided a somewhat more precise definition for the concept of
"curtilage. ' 1°4 However, in so doing, the court expressly acknowledged that
the legislature could amend the burglary statutes and give the term
"curtilage" any definition that it believed to be appropriate.'0 5 This could
include eliminating the requirement of an enclosure for certain areas, as had
been done in other jurisdictions. So far, the legislature has not so acted. The
real question facing the legislature is whether it wishes to use the burglary
statute as a means of expanding criminal responsibility and punishment for
offenders who otherwise are breaking the criminal law. Hamilton's facts
provide a classic example of this scenario. Presently, Hamilton could only
be successfully prosecuted for theft.1°6 If the burglary statute is amended to
expand the definition of "curtilage" to include areas close to a dwelling or
structure but not necessarily enclosed, then the two perpetrators would be
guilty of burglary as well. Certainly, if one believes in the deterrent theory
behind criminal law, expanding the definition of "curtilage" to make
Hamilton's act a burglary in addition to maybe a trespass'07 and theft is not
troubling. Theoretically, people would then know that entering another's
103. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) (1995).
104. As previously noted, the supreme court only answered one of two questions certified
by the district court. See supra note 92.
105. The legislature has recently amended the definition of "dwelling" to include any
"attached porch" on a building or conveyance that would otherwise qualify as a "dwelling."
See ch. 96-388, § 47, 1996 Fla. Laws 2301, 2337 (amending FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2)
(effective October 1, 1996)). However, so far the legislature has not statutorily defined what
should be considered as "curtilage."
106. Hamilton could probably not be successfully prosecuted for trespass, under section
810.09(1) of the Florida Statutes, unless the homeowner had given the two would-be thieves
actual notice to get off of his property. See FLA. STAT. § 810.09(1) (1995). Even if such
notice had been given here, the trespass would be only a first degree misdemeanor under the
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property might make them susceptible to harsher punishment. However, the
critical issue behind expanding the definition of "curtilage" for purposes of
the burglary statute is really posed by the felony murder rule. When the
death of someone occurs during certain enumerated felonies, then the
surviving felons are liable for first degree murder under the theory of felony
murder. Unlike some other jurisdictions, which have adopted different
means of abrogating the harshness of the felony murder doctrine, Florida has
adopted a relatively strict and harsh interpretation of this doctrine. 0 8 Thus,
the fact that the killing in this particular case was not done by one of the
felons, or that the person killed was a co-felon, 10 9 would not make a differ-
ence in applying the felony murder doctrine to Hamilton. Whether the
Florida Legislature wishes to achieve such a result should be one of the
prime concerns in considering whether "curtilage" should be legislatively
defined to abrogate the result reached in Hamilton."°
E. Attempted Murder of a Law Enforcement Officer
Florida criminal law punishes attempted as well as completed crimes.
The rationale for so doing that a person who possesses the requisite intent to
108. The Florida Legislature could have adopted an even harsher version of the felony
murder rule. Florida currently applies the felony murder rule only to a certain number of
specifically enumerated felonies. The harshest version of the felony murder doctrine would be
to apply it to all statutory felonies.
The felony murder rule's harshness may also be alleviated by applying the independent act
doctrine. Generally, felons are responsible for all killings committed by their accomplices
during the course of the underlying felony. However, when a co-felon's homicidal act so
deviates from the original plan and does not further the commission of the felony, it will not
be attributed to the other co-felons. Obviously whether such a deviation exists must be
determined under the particular facts of each case. For a recent case discussing this doctrine,
see Dell v. State, 661 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), which found no error in the
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury about the independent act doctrine and discussed
situations where such an instruction would be appropriate.
109. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (1965) (reversing defendant's conviction
for felony murder where his accomplice was killed by the victim during a robbery).
110. The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases has
proposed the following new definition for "[d]welling" in section 810.02: "'Dwelling"'
means a building [or] [conveyance] of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or
immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at
night, together with enclosed space of ground and outbuildings immediately surrounding it."
Proposed Standard Jury Instruction Amendments, FLA. BAR NEws, Aug. 1, 1996, at 14.
There is no indication in the published version of the new instruction that it was proposed
in response to Hamilton. If this is indeed the reason, one would also expect a new instruction
for "structure."
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commit a criminal act and takes some steps toward the completion of this
criminal act poses a sufficient threat to society for the criminal law to
intervene. Generally, attempted crimes are punished to a lesser degree than
completed crimes.' There are two justifications for such difference in
punishment. First, since the criminal object was not actually obtained,
generally punishing an attempted crime to the same extent as a completed
crime would pose problems of disproportionality. Second, and perhaps more
important, punishing attempts to a lesser degree than the completed offense
provides an incentive for a perpetrator to abandon his or her criminal scheme
before attaining its completion.
During this past year, the Supreme Court of Florida, in State v. Iaco-
vone,112 addressed challenges to the former sentencing schemes for the
offense of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer. lacovone became
involved in a violent domestic dispute with his former girlfriend who also
happened to be the mother of their three children. When a police officer
tried to intervene, lacovone tried to flee in his car. During his escape
attempt, lacovone struck the officer with the car. Jacovone was subsequently
tried and convicted of several offenses," 3 including attempted third degree
murder of a law enforcement officer. Under the general statutory provisions
for third degree murder and for attempt crimes, third degree murder would
have been considered a second degree felony" 4 and would be punished as a
third degree felony. 115 However, since the attempted murder here involved a
crime against a police officer, special statutory sections regarding punish-
ment applied. Former sections 775.0823, 775.0825, and 784.07 of the
Florida Statutes attempted to provide increased protection to Florida law
111. Section 777.04(4)(d) of the Florida Statutes lists several exceptions to this principle.
FLA. STAT. § 777.04(4)(d) (1995). Where an attempted crime is punished to the same degree
as the completed offense, the attempted crime is not considered a lesser included offense of
the completed crime. In such a situation, it is error to instruct a jury on both the completed
offense and the attempted offense. See Nurse v. State, 658 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1995), review denied, 667 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1996) (finding that the trial court committed
reversible error by instructing the jury on attempted burglary of a dwelling as well as burglary
of a dwelling, both of which were punishable as third degree felonies under the facts). Nurse
contains an excellent, extensive discussion on what are necessary lesser included and
permissive included offenses under current Florida criminal law.
112. 660 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1995).
113. The other offenses were burglary, criminal mischief, aggravated assault, and aggra-
vated battery. None of these offense convictions are pertinent to the issue discussed in the
appellate decision in this case.
114. See FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1991).
115. See id. § 777.04(4)(c) (1991).
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enforcement officers and other law enforcement officers acting within the
course of their duties by providing increased penalties for certain offenses
committed against them. The obvious purpose of these sections is to deter
the commission of such offenses against law enforcement officers.
In his appeal, lacovone challenged the constitutionality and rationality
of these former sentencing provisions. Under former section 775.0823(3), a
person convicted of third degree murder of a law enforcement officer would
have received a sentence of fifteen years with a fifteen year mandatory
minimum. However, former section 784.07(3) contained a special sentenc-
ing provision for attempted murder of law enforcement officers. This
section made all attempted murders of law enforcement officers life felonies.
Additionally, former section 775.0825 made anyone convicted of the
attempted murder of a law enforcement officer ineligible for parole until
twenty-five years incarceration have been served. If read literally, an
accused would actually receive less punishment for the completed third
degree murder of a law enforcement officer than for an attempted murder.
Iacovone claimed that the special offense classification and sentencing
provisions of former sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Second District Court of Appeal1 6 recognized the legislature's
general power to fix the offense classifications and to determine the punish-
ment for these offenses. Additionally, the court acknowledged the general
rule that "[s]tatutes are presumed to be constitutional.""17 However, in this
case, these two principles were insufficient to uphold the constitutionality of
the sections involved. The district court noted that traditional equal protec-
tion analysis did not apply here," 8 but found that "irrational [offense and
sentencing] classifications may violate fundamental constitutional princi-
ples ... ,, 19 Protecting law enforcement officers in the performance of their
duties was certainly a valid legislative goal. However, punishing some
attempted murders of law enforcement officers more harshly than completed
murders of the same personnel did not further that goal. Indeed, such a
punishment scheme would actually be inconsistent with the furtherance of
that goal. Thus, the second district found that the statutory sections would
116. Iacovone v. State, 639 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
117. Id. at 1109 (citing State v. Wilson, 464 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
118. The court reasoned that this was because people charged with an attempted murder
and those charged with a completed murder are "not similarly situated because they are
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be unconstitutional as applied due to the irrational results that they would
cause.
Although the Supreme Court of Florida arrived at the same ultimate
conclusion as the district court, it did so for different reasons. The supreme
court avoided reaching the constitutional issue addressed below. Instead, the
court relied on standard principles of statutory construction. Two such
principles are that courts must construe statutes to effectuate the legislative
intent behind their passage. However, statutes should not be read literally, if
doing so would lead to results conflicting with their purpose. Here, the court
found that "[t]he legislature unquestionably intends to give law enforcement
officers the greatest possible protection."' 12° This object would not be
attained by applying former sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 to all degrees
of murder. 121 If applied to all degrees of murder, a would-be killer would
actually be sometimes better off as far as punishment if his victim was killed
rather than if the victim survived. As the court noted, this "would seem to
encourage, not discourage, lethal attacks."'122 However, if these sections
were applied only to first degree murder, then their application would be
rational because the penalty for an attempted first degree murder of a law
enforcement would still be less than that for the completed act although both
would be enhanced. Thus, the court held that former "sections 784.07(3)
and 775.0825 apply only to first-degree murder."'
' 2
The long range effect of the supreme court's holding in Iacovone is not
likely to be significant. The legislature has already repealed both former
sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825. Penalties for violent crimes against law
enforcement officers are still enhanced under sections 775.0823 and 784.07.
All degrees of both attempted and completed murders of law enforcement
officers are now punished under the Florida sentencing guidelines, with the
exception of first degree murder. However, the significance of the court's
reasoning in Iacovone should apply to all offense classification and punish-
ment. Both the district and supreme court opinions require rationality in
criminal statutes. When such rationality does not exist on the face of a
statute, the statute will either be construed in a way such that rationality can
be provided or it will be declared invalid. Indeed, literally applying these
former sections would have been inconsistent with the general principles
behind punishment. One goal of punishment is deterrence. The theory
120. State v. Iacovone, 660 So. 2d 1371, 1373 (Fla. 1995).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id at 1374.
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behind this is that the potentially higher the punishment the less incentive
there is to commit the forbidden act. Here, as both courts recognized, literal
application of these sections would actually have provided a disincentive to
desist, rather than an incentive to desist. Another theory behind punishment
is retribution. However, one principle of retribution is proportionality.
Under this principle, commonly stated as "let the punishment fit the crime,"
vastly disproportionate sentences for virtually the same acts should not exist,
and when they do so, such disproportionality must be strictly justified. As
no such justification existed for the sections in question in Iacovone, the
supreme court really had no choice but to either find them unconstitutional
or construe them in a way to avoid reaching a disproportionate and absurd
result.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO FLORIDA CRIMINAL LAWS
A. Vagueness
Due process challenges to Florida criminal statutes based upon alleg-
edly vague language continue to concern the Supreme Court of Florida.
Criminal statutes must give a reasonable person sufficient notice of what
conduct is likely to be proscribed for a number of reasons. First, the crimi-
nal law expects that every citizen will conform his or her conduct so as to
avoid violating the law. Without knowing exactly what conduct violates the
law, reasonable people cannot possibly be expected to govern their actions
accordingly. Second, vague statutes allow the police undue freedom to
interpret what actions violate the law. This potentially allows the police to
arrest, search, and charge citizens in an inconsistent and potentially dis-
criminatory manner. Third, if the statute is so vague that the conduct which
violates it is unclear, citizens can find themselves being charged at the whim
of a prosecutor. Fourth, citizens fearing potential imposition of criminal
sanctions may forego the valid exercise of their constitutional rights rather
than risk arrest and/or conviction. Finally, without sufficient standards as to
what conduct violates a statute, jury decision making as to when individuals
are guilty of violating the criminal law is not likely to be sufficiently
consistent to merit public confidence. Thus, unconstitutionally vague
statutes are general risks to the rights of individual citizens and to the
confidence of the general public in the criminal justice system. Individual
[Vol. 2 1: 101
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Supreme Court of Florida cases addressing challenges to Florida criminal
statutes based on vagueness are discussed below. 124
1. Negligent Treatment of Children
In State v. Mincey,125 the Supreme Court of Florida considered argu-
ments that Florida Statute section 827.05 concerning negligent treatment of
children was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. The state charged
Mincey under the negligent treatment statute after his five-year-old stepson
was found wandering the streets late at night clad only in pajamas. This
charge was based purely on simple negligent conduct. Mincey moved to
dismiss the charges claiming that section 827.05 was unconstitutionally
vague. The county court agreed and certified its decision to the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, which likewise found section 827.05 constitution-
ally deficient. 26  However, the Supreme Court of Florida accepted the
124. In addition to the recent Supreme Court of Florida cases discussing the void for
vagueness doctrine, a number of district court of appeal decisions dealt with this topic.
During the last two survey periods, vagueness was the most frequently raised basis for
constitutional challenges to Florida criminal laws. The relatively large number of cases
raising vagueness challenges suggest that this will continue to be the one of the most, if not
the most, popular grounds on which to attack criminal statutes. For further general discussion
on the void for vagueness doctrine, see LAFAVE & Scorr, CRIINAL LAW 2.3 (2d ed. 1986).
For district court of appeal decisions during this survey period raising vagueness chal-
lenges to Florida Statutes, see Morey's Lounge, Inc. v. State of Florida, Dept. of Business and
Professional, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 673 So. 2d 538, 540 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No, 88,240, 1996 LEXIS 1723, at *1 (Fla. Sept. 18, 1996)
(upholding the constitutionality of section 561.29(1)(a) which allows the Department to
suspend or revoke a beverage license for violation of "any of the laws of this or of the United
States") (quoting Florida Bar v. Dubow, 636 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 1994)). See also Jennings v.
State, 667 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 676 So. 2d 1368 (Fla.
1996) (finding that the words "12 A.M." in section 893.13(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes,
increasing the penalty for selling narcotics near a school during certain hours, were not
unconstitutionally vague); Falco v. State, 669 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 672 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1996) (finding that the term "custodial authority" in
section 794.041(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes, criminalizing sexual activity by a person in
custodial authority with a child, was not vague); and Quinn v. State, 662 So. 2d 947, 949 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of section 337.135 of the Florida
Statutes, under which it is a second degree felony, to "fraudulently represent an entity as a
socially and economically disadvantaged business enterprise" to qualify for certification under
a Department of Transportation program to assist such businesses in obtaining contracts)
(quoting FLA. STAT. § 337.135 (1989)).
125. 672 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1996).
126. State v. Mincey, 658 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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certified question concerning validity of section 827.05127 from the district
court's decision.
Florida Statute section 827.05 makes it a second degree misdemeanor
for a person "though financially able" to "negligently deprive a child" of the
necessities of life when such deprivation either significantly impairs the
child's physical or emotional health or significantly endangers it.128 This
section is not Florida's first attempt to criminalize the negligent treatment of
children. Former section 827.05 of the Florida Statutes had made it a
second degree misdemeanor to "negligently depriv[e] a child of, or allo[w] a
child to be deprived of' necessities. However, this statute had not passed
constitutional muster. In State v. Winters,'29 the supreme court found this
language constitutionally deficient because the statutory language evidently
punished simple negligent conduct without any showing of willfulness.
After Winters, the legislature amended section 827.05 to add the words
"though financially able" and additional language of causation which would
link the alleged deprivation to the danger of harm.130 Besides former section
827.05, Florida also at the same time had a general child abuse statute,
former section 827.042, which made it a crime to "wilfully or by culpable
negligence" deprive a child of life's necessities when doing so either caused
the child's "physical or mental health ... to be endangered."' 31 The year
after Winters, in State v. Joyce, 32 the defendants attempted to convince the
Supreme Court of Florida that the general criminal child abuse statute,
127. The exact question accepted by the supreme court is as follows:
WHETHER THE ADDITION OF LANGUAGE ADDRESSING FINANCIAL
ABILITY AND A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEN THE RESIDENTIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND SIGNIFICANT IMPAIRMENT OF THE CHILD'S
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HEALTH IN SECTION 827.05 AMOUNTS
TO A WILLFUL INTENT OR SCIENTER REQUIREMENT SUFFICIENT TO
OVERCOME THE HOLDING IN WINTERS.
Mincey, 672 So. 2d at 525 (footnote omitted).
128. See FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1995).
129. 346 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1977).
130. The additional causation language in revised section 827.05 which was added to the
end of the former statute provides: "when such deprivation ... causes the child's physical or
emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly
impaired ...." FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1995).
131. FLA. STAT. § 827.04(2) (1975). Section 827.04 has since been amended to prohibit
depriving a child of necessities when such deprivation "inflicts or permits the infliction of
physical or mental injury to the child." FLA. STAT. § 827.04(2) (1995). Depending upon the
degree or duration of the injury, the crime will be either a third degree felony under 827.04(1),
or a first degree misdemeanor under 827.04(2).
132. 361 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978).
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former section 827.04, was unconstitutional for the same reasons that former
section 827.05 had been found deficient. However, the supreme court
rejected this argument and distinguished the two. Joyce noted that the basis
for holding former section 827.05 unconstitutional in Winters was that "the
negligent treatment statute [827.05] made criminal acts of simple negli-
gence-conduct which was neither willful nor culpably negligent."' 33 Since
former section 827.04(2) had a requirement of willfulness or culpable
negligence, the deficiency present in former section 827.05 was not present
with the statute in Joyce.
In Mincey, both the fourth district and the supreme court noted the
different results reached on the vagueness challenges in Winters and Joyce.
Both courts also noted that the only difference between former section
827.05 and the present version was the additional statutory language relating
to causation and the offender's financial ability. The district court found
that the addition of this language did not "address the lack of willfulness,
scienter, or mens rea,"'134 and thus did not cure the defect in former section
827.05. The Supreme Court of Florida arrived at the same result, finding
that the addition of the new statutory language "does not clarify the type of
conduct that is prohibited under the statute."'135 Thus, the Mincey court held
that the new language did not correct the vagueness problems recognized in
earlier decisions and found section 827.05 unconstitutionally vague.
Mincey is an interesting decision because it may have arrived at the
right result for the wrong reason. Arguably, section 827.05 does have a
mens rea requirement in it. If so, then how could it be considered vague?
The statute explicitly contemplates a person who "negligently deprives a
child." 36 The type of conduct involved here seems to involve negligence.
Certainly the language found constitutional in section 827.04 requiring
willfulness explicitly requires a much higher mens rea than negligence.'
37
133. Id. at 407.
134. Mincey, 658 So. 2d at 598.
135. Mincey, 672 So. 2d at 526.
136. See FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1995).
137. "Willfulness" generally requires an act as opposed to a failure to act. See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 202(8) (providing that "[a] requirement that an offense be committed
wilfully if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless
a purpose to impose further requirements appears."). Under a "negligence" standard, deciding
whether a person has acted or failed to act may not be as easy as it seems. For example, did
Mincey act negligently by affirmatively allowing his child to wander the streets or did he "act"
negligently by not preventing his child from wandering the streets?
The Supreme Court of Florida in Winters recognized that negligence can arise from both
action or inaction. As the court noted in Winters, "[n]egligence may consist either in doing
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On the other hand, section 827.04 also criminalizes "culpable negligence" in
addition to willfulness.' 38  But when one looks at how the Florida courts
have defined "culpable negligence,"' 139 it is clear that this is the equivalent or
virtually the equivalent of what would be considered "recklessly" by some
criminal codes.1
40
Mincey and the court's previous decision in Winters therefore seem to
stand for the simple proposition that statutes which criminalize simple
negligent conduct will not pass constitutional muster.1 4' Section 827.04
already criminalizes willful child abuse. Thus, persons who willfully harm
children can be punished under that statute. The same statutory section also
punishes what would be considered "culpable negligence." Those individu-
als exhibiting a high degree of lack of care for children can likewise be
prosecuted. One of the purposes of the criminal law is to clarify what
conduct will subject someone to criminal liability. If a statute makes it too
easy to subject someone to criminal liability, then there is the problem that
something that a reasonabl[e] ... person would not do ... or in failing to do something that a
reasonabl[e]... person would do under like circumstances." Winters, 346 So. 2d at 993.
138. See FLA. STAT. § 827.04(l)-(2).
139. For example, in Hodges v. State, 661 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995),
review denied, 670 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 1996), the court mentioned that the culpable negligence
needed for a manslaughter would have to be "of a gross and flagrant character, evincing
reckless disregard of human life ... or that reckless indifference to the rights of others, which
is equivalent to an intentional violation of them." Id. at 109 n.2 (emphasis added).
140. The Model Penal Code defines the culpability level of "Recklessly" as "consciously
disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk...." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
The disregard of the risk involved must be "a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation." Id.
Under the Model Penal Code, there are four levels of culpability or mens rea that can
support a criminal charge depending upon the wording of the statute involved: purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. See id. § 2.02(2). The first three levels of culpability
reflect some level of awareness of the conduct the defendant is accused of doing. Id. §
2.02(2)(a)-(c). Negligently, the fourth and lowest level of culpability, does not reflect a level
of awareness and is only sufficient to support a conviction in rare circumstances. Id. §
2.02(d).
141. The only other case during this survey period which discussed section 827.05 also
found it unconstitutional. See State v. Ayers, 665 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995),
aft'd, 673 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1996). However, Ayers noted in its opinion that child abuse
statutes from several other states that had negligence as one of the levels of culpability had
been upheld against vagueness attacks. Id. at 298. Ayers also noted that at one time certain
acts of negligence, such as careless driving, had been punished criminally. Id. at 299.
Neither the district court nor the supreme court in Mincey make any mention of these other
state statutes which appear to prohibit much the same conduct prohibited by section 827.05.
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virtually anybody can be held liable. 142 The facts in Mincey are a good
example. Although one would surely not want to have a five-year-old
wandering the streets at night (whether clad only in pajamas or fully
dressed), charging somebody with a second degree misdemeanor for one
simple act of negligence for allowing such a thing to happen seems a little
severe. Many parents, at one time or another, probably do something that
negligently expose their child to danger. Luckily, the vast majority of
parents hardly ever do this, and luckily most children are not hurt despite
being exposed to such dangers. Furthermore, parents who consistently
negligently fail to care for their children are subject to state intervention
under statutes other than those for criminal offenses. The decisions in
Mincey, Winters, and Joyce show that these statutes are probably the
appropriate avenue to pursue when parents engage in simple negligence with
regards to their children.
2. Bribery
In Roque v. State,143 the Supreme Court of Florida sustained a vague-
ness challenge to section 838.15 of the Florida Statutes, which created the
crime of commercial bribe receiving. This statute made it a third degree
felony' 44 for a person to "solicit[], accept[], or agree[] to accept a benefit
with intent to violate a statutory or common-law duty"'145 which that person
owes another in a certain capacity. 146 Part of Roque's job as a company
credit manager was to extend credit to companies seeking to finance con-
struction equipment. Roque worked with Mr. Smith, an independent
contractor, who located suitable candidates for loans from Roque's com-
pany. Smith, as an independent contractor, was paid by commission. The
state charged Roque with entering into an unauthorized side agreement
142. The language in section 827.05 actually would pose this very problem if construed
literally. This section is not limited to parents or those in a caretaking posture towards
children. Instead, section 827.05 applies to whoever "is financially able." FLA. STAT. §
827.05 (1995). Thus, one must ask if a millionaire who knows that children are starving and
neglects to donate some money to see that the starving children are fed would be prosecutable.
Since the purpose of the criminal statute is to not only specify what acts are prohibited but
also to clarify who may be criminally responsible for acting or falling to act under certain
circumstances, then arguably section 827.05 could have been declared vague because by
making so many persons potentially responsible, it falls to give the notice which due process
of law requires.
143. 664 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1995).
144. FLA. STAT. § 838.15(2) (1995).
145. Id. § 838.15(1).
146. Id. § 838.15(1)(a)-(e).
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whereby Smith kicked back to Roque part of each commission he received
for finding a suitable candidate. At the trial court level, Roque successfully
moved to dismiss the commercial bribery charges against him, claiming that
section 838.15 was unconstitutionally vague and susceptible to arbitrary
application. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and found section
838.15 to be constitutional. 47 The district court found that there are two
separate questions under a vagueness challenge. The first was whether "the
statute [in question] gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
what constitutes [the] forbidden conduct."'148 Second, a challenged statute
had to be "specific enough that it is not susceptible to arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement."'' 49 Roque claimed that the inclusion of the words "with
intent to violate a statutory or common law duty" made section 838.15
unconstitutionally vague.' 50  The district court of appeal rejected this
argument for two reasons. This statutory language was found to be specific
enough by its reference to the professional or legal relationships specified
elsewhere in the statute. The court found that "[a] person who fits into one
or more of these categories is certainly aware of the duties which are
commensurate with that station."' 51 The use of the word "bribe" also helped
indicate the nature of the prohibited conduct. When given its common
meaning, this word sufficiently conveyed such notice that a person with
reasonable intelligence would understand what conduct section 838.15
prohibited. The district court then turned to the second question of the
vagueness analysis; whether the statute is susceptible to arbitrary enforce-
ment, and it answered in the negative. Since the word "commercial"
modified the words "bribe receiving" in the title of section 838.15 and in its
definitional section, the statute by its language only applied to private
industry and commercial transactions, not to public officials. Additionally,
the court found that the specific professions and relationships enumerated in
the statute served to limit the amount of prosecutorial discretion in charging
violations of section 838.15.
The district court's opinion had briefly noted the Supreme Court of
Florida's previous discussion of the void for vagueness doctrine in its
147. State v. Roque, 640 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 650 So.
2d 991 (Fla. 1995).
148. Id. at 99 (quoting Brown v. State, 629 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. 1994)).
149. IM
150. FLA. STAT. § 838.15(1).
151. Roque, 640 So. 2d at 99. See also FLA. STAT. § 838.15(1).
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relatively recent decision in Cuda v. State152 which contrasted the different
results in two other previous decisions. The Cuda court found that former
section 415.111(5) of the Florida Statutes, which made it a third degree
felony for anyone to exploit an aged or disabled adult "by the improper or
illegal use or management"'153 of such person's property was unconstitution-
ally vague. 54 In this case, the supreme court had focused on the words
"improper" and "illegal" in finding this section unconstitutional. In so
doing, the court had contrasted Cuda with its decision in two earlier cases,
one holding a statute unconstitutionally vague and the other upholding a
statute against such a challenge. In State v. Rodriguez,155 the court had
upheld former section 409.325(2)(a)'56 of the Florida Statutes, which
criminalized certain acts regarding food stamps when the acts done were
"not authorized by law."'157 Rodriguez found that because of the program's
peculiar nature and because chapter 409 itself gave notice that there were
federal regulations governing the program, these words actually meant "not
authorized by state and federal food stamp law."' 58 Thus, when the section
being challenged was read in conjunction with the remainder of the chapter,
constitutional notice problems were satisfied. Contrary to its decision in
Rodriguez, in Locklin v. Pridgeon,I5 9 the supreme court had struck down a
statute containing the exact same language. Former section 839.22 of the
Florida Statutes made it unlawful for any government officer to "commit
any act under color of authority ... when such act is not authorized by
law .... 160 This statute was considered unconstitutionally vague because it
required every governmental employee to determine what acts were author-
ized by law and what acts were not authorized by law. The "law" in Locklin
was not limited to a narrow area like the "law" in Rodriguez. Thus, the term
"law" could mean any and all laws, civil or criminal. A person could never
know how to govern their conduct to avoid violating the section without
152. 639 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1994). For extensive discussion about this decision, see Mark
M. Dobson, Criminal Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REv. 67, 104-08
(1995).
153. FLA. STAT. § 415.111(5) (1993).
154. Cuda, 639 So. 2d at 25.
155. 365 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1978).
156. Section 409.325(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes contains this challenged statutory
language. See FLA. STAT. § 409.325(2)(a) (1995).
157. Rodriguez, 365 So. 2d at 159.
158. Id.
159. 30 So. 2d 102, 103 (Fla. 1947).
160. FLA. STAT. § 839.22 (1945).
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having an all-encompassing knowledge of all law--something which was
definitely an impossible task. The third district in Roque had found that
section 838.15 was more like the statute found constitutional in Rodriguez
than the ones declared invalid in Cuda and Locklin. Since section 838.18
specifically referred to certain professional relationships that the appropriate
statutory and common law applied to, the district court determined this gave
sufficient notice of the law which a person must avoid to not violate section
838.15.
When it came time for the Supreme Court of Florida to adjudicate the
constitutionality of section 838.15, it was not so generous, nor detailed in its
analysis. The supreme court focused on the statutory language "common
law duty" in finding section 838.15 unconstitutionally vague. The court felt
that few people would be aware that they owed such a "common duty" to
their employers and that fewer still could define the duty's dimensions. In
order to do so Roque found that "substantial legal research would be re-
quired by many employees to determine their obligations under the law.'
16 1
Therefore, the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Additionally, the court
found that the statute could be susceptible to arbitrary applications. Since
section 838.15 prescribed the violation of every statutory or common law
duty many acts could be prosecuted, according to the court, "no matter how
trivial or obscure, whether it results in harm or not."'1 62 Thus, individual
prosecutors must decide, based on their own subjective opinion, which
violations are sufficiently substantial to warrant criminal prosecution. The
statute considered in Roque therefore failed the second part of the vagueness
analysis described in the district court's opinion.
The Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in Roque is important for
several reasons. First, besides invalidating section 838.15, Roque also calls
into question the constitutionality of section 838.16, titled "Commercial
bribery." 163 Section 838.16 defines the crime of commercial bribery as
"knowing that another is subject to a duty described in s. 838.15(1) and with
intent to influence the other person to violate that duty .. ."164 the offender
gives that person a benefit. If Roque found that a person receiving a com-
mercial bribe could not possibly know which acts "violate a statutory or
common-law duty" under section 838.15(1) then logically a person charged
161. Roque, 664 So. 2d at 929.
162. Id. at 930.
163. See FLA. STAT. § 838.16 (1995).
164. Id. § 838.16(1).
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with making a commercial bribe would not know the same thing.165 Thus, it
is hard to see how section 838.16(1) could be considered constitutional if the
language that it refers to was found deficient in Roque. Roque is also
important because it indicates that the Supreme Court of Florida is not
disposed to uphold the constitutionality of statutes containing language
which criminalizes the violation of certain legal duties when those duties are
broadly defined. If it wishes to criminalize conduct similar to that pro-
scribed in sections 838.15 and 838.16 perhaps the best approach that the
legislature could undertake is the approach suggested by the decision in
Cuda. There the court had discussed a similar statute from another state
which imposed criminal sanctions for financial exploitation of the elderly
that had been upheld against challenges for vagueness. As noted in Cuda,
the Illinois statute the supreme court cited with approval was quite specific
in describing the conduct prohibited. Unfortunately in Roque, the supreme
court did not give any examples of commercial bribery statutes from other
jurisdictions which had been upheld against vagueness attacks. Perhaps, if
the legislature could find statutes from other states which contain more
specific language than that found in sections 838.15 and 838.16, these would
be more likely to be upheld.
B. Overbreadth
1. Stalking
Several recently decided Supreme Court of Florida cases considered
challenges to criminal statutes on the grounds that they were both vague and
overbroad. Bouters v. State166 presented such challenges to the constitution-
ality of the Florida Stalking Law, which is codified at section 784.048 of the
Florida Statutes.167 This section actually contains three separate offenses.
Under subsection (2), anyone who "wilfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follows or harasses another person" is guilty of stalking, a first degree
misdemeanor. 168 Under subsection (3), any person who does the same things
and additionally "makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person
[the victim] in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury" is guilty of aggra-
vated stalking, a third degree felony. 169 Finally, under subsection (4),
165. Id. § 838.15(1).
166. 659 So. 2d 235 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 245 (1995).
167. FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (1995).
168. Id. § 784.048(2).
169. Id. § 748.048(3).
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anyone who engages in similar conduct after the person being harassed or
followed has attained an injunction against this activity also commits
aggravated stalking, again a third degree felony. 70 The terms "harasses,"
"course of conduct," and "credible threat" are all defined in subsection (1) of
the statute.' 7 '
Bouters had been charged with aggravated stalking under subsection (4)
due to a series of alleged acts against his former girlfriend. The former
girlfriend filed a complaint with the police alleging that Bouters had been
calling her several times daily causing emotional distress and that he had
beaten her in the past and threatened to kill her. The girlfriend had obtained
a domestic violence injunction against Bouters, but that evidently did no
good as the defendant had allegedly entered her home without permission
but left when the victim called the police. The victim claimed that she
believed that Bouters would have hit her if she had not been on the phone
with the sheriffs office and that she was in fear for her safety as well as her
life due to his actions against her. At the trial level, Bouters moved to
dismiss the charges contending that section 784.048(4) was facially uncon-
stitutional due to vagueness and overbreadth. When that motion was
unsuccessful, Bouters pled nolo contendere and then filed an appeal. In a
short opinion, the Fifth District Court of Appeal 72 upheld the constitution-
ality of section 784.048. The Supreme Court of Florida, in a short but
important opinion, laid to rest any questions about the constitutionality of
this criminal law.
The Supreme Court of Florida turned to United States Supreme Court
decisions for the procedure to use in analyzing overbreadth and vagueness
challenges to the facial validity of section 748.084. Under the procedure laid
down by the United States Supreme Court in Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 7 3 when such a challenge is brought, a court
must first "determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct."' 74 If it does not, then the overbreadth
challenge must be rejected. Following this analysis, the reviewing court
should examine whether the challenged statute is facially vague. According
to the Village of Hoffman Estates test, "assuming the enactment implicates
170. Id. § 748.048(4).
171. Id. § 748.048(1).
172. See Bouters v. State, 634 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
173. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
174. Id. at 494 (footnote omitted).
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no constitutionally protected conduct," 175 the statute should be declared
unconstitutional due to facial vagueness "only if the enactment is impermis-
sibly vague in all of its applications."' 176 The Supreme Court of Florida
followed this two-step procedure and first examined whether section
784.048 was overbroad due to its interference with either Bouters's own
First Amendment rights or the First Amendment rights of others. Bouters
contended that under this section an arrest could occur if he engaged in
almost any "emotionally charged activity."'77 In his view, as long as the
complaining victim and a law enforcement officer both agreed that the
activity engaged in served no legitimate purpose and that the person com-
plaining to the police showed substantial emotional distress, someone could
be arrested for such constitutionally protected activities, such as political
protest or investigative reporting. The Supreme Court of Florida rejected
this argument, finding that "[s]talking, whether by word or deed, falls
outside the First Amendment's purview."' 178 Section 784.048 proscribed a
certain type of criminal activity which was particularly described in the
statute. This conduct had to be malicious, repeated and designed to cause a
reasonable person distress. Furthermore, the supreme court noted that under
the definition of "harasses,"'179 the conduct must "serve[] no legitimate
purpose" and that under the definition of "course of conduct,"' 80 constitu-
tionally-protected activity was explicitly excluded from the statute's cover-
age. The court recognized that the First Amendment gives a citizen the right
to express himself or herself. However, this does not give one the right to
engage in conduct which jeopardizes the health and safety of others. In this
particular case, the supreme court found that Bouters had indeed allegedly
engaged in this type of behavior. Bouters allegedly repeatedly threatened to
kill his former girlfriend, and his threats were deemed credible as he had
battered her before. Finally, Bouters allegedly violated the domestic
violence injunction by entering the victim's home and leaving only when he
believed law enforcement authorities would arrive. Thus, the conduct that
Bouters engaged in was not constitutionally protected.
The Supreme Court of Florida likewise had no difficulty in rejecting
Bouter's claim that section 784.048 was facially vague. To sustain such a
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Bouters, 659 So. 2d at 237.
178. Id.
179. See FLA. STAT. § 784.048(1)(a).
180. See id. § 784.048(1)(b) (Supp. 1992).
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claim, Bouters had to show that "the law [was] impermissibly vague in all its
applications"'181 and thus vagueness could occur only if the prohibitions of a
statute were not clearly defined. With regard to section 784.048, Bouters
claimed the statutory definition of "harasses" was unconstitutionally vague.
Under that definition, "harasses" meant "to engage in a course of conduct
directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in
such person and serves no legitimate purpose."'' 82 The defendant claimed
that this definition created a subjective standard for "substantial emotional
distress" and that someone who was unduly sensitive could suffer such
distress from what would be entirely innocent and permissible contact. If
this was so, and if the party causing the distress could be criminally charged,
then the average citizen could never be sure that any of his or her conduct
towards another person could not end up subjecting the citizen to the reach
of section 784.048.
The Supreme Court of Florida had no problem rejecting such a claim.
According to the court's analysis, the stalking statute was analogous to the
criminal assault statute. Under the criminal assault statute, the well-founded
fear necessary to be caused by another person was measured by the reason-
able person standard rather than a subjective standard. Here the same
principle was found to apply to the stalking statute. If the conduct was such
that it would cause substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person,
then it would violate section 784.048. Conduct causing substantial emo-
tional distress in another person but which would not have caused such in a
reasonable person would not come within the purview of section 784.048.
Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected both attacks on the stalking
law's constitutionality.
2. Cross Burning
Florida's criminal "cross burning" statute also came under constitu-
tional attack under this survey period. Section 876.18 of the Florida Statutes
makes it a first degree misdemeanor "to place ... on the property of another
... a burning or flaming cross or any manner of exhibit in which [such a
cross] is a whole or part without first obtaining written permission of the
owner or occupier of the premises to do so. ''183 In State v. T.B.D.,' 84 the
181. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497
(1982).
182. FLA. STAT. § 784.048(l)(a) (1995).
183. Id. § 876.18 (1995).
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State charged a minor with erecting a flaming cross on another's property in
violation of this section. However, the trial court found that this section was
unconstitutional, because it infringed upon protected First Amendment
rights. The First District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's ruling
and held that section 876.18 "criminalizes a substantial amount of expres-
sion protected by the First Amendment and is, therefore, overbroad."' 8 5 The
district court first found that since the activity prohibited by section 876.18
was undoubtedly a form of expressive conduct, this conduct fell within the
purview of the First Amendment's protection. While the district court
recognized that the state has more leeway to restrict expressive conduct than
merely written or spoken expression, the court noted that the state cannot do
so because of the content of the message to be conveyed. Thus, although the
message behind placing a flaming cross in another's property was reprehen-
sible, this conduct still implicated protected First Amendment concerns,
making section 876.18 subject to particularly close scrutiny. United States
Supreme Court decisions have decreed that when conduct and not speech is
involved "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial
as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."186
Applying this test to section 876.18, the district court concluded that the
overbreadth here was both "real" and "substantial." The expressive conduct
prohibited here could not be considered limited to "fighting words," words
which by their very utterance tend to inflict injury and/or incite an immedi-
ate breach of the peace. Although the conduct here and the message it
conveyed might be reprehensible, the government was still not free to
prohibit such activities merely because of its offensive nature. 187 The district
court also concluded that even if section 876.18 could be narrowly construed
and was limited only to fighting words, it would still have to be found
unconstitutional for several reasons. First, the court found that the section
184. 638 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 656 So. 2d
479 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
185. Id. at 166.
186. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
187. The district court's opinion gives one example of how the court believed the state
could end up using section 876.18 to suppress prosecution conduct, which although offensive,
was still protected by the First Amendment. The court posited the situation where the Ku
Klux Klan erected a flaming cross on one of its member's property but failed to "first obtain[ ]
written permission of the owner." T.B.D., 638 So. 2d at 168 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 876.18).
The owner might have even been happy to see the cross go up and might orally have
consented to having it on the property. However, if read and enforced as literally written,
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proscribed only one type of conduct based upon the content of the message
expressed. Second, such conduct discrimination was not necessary in order
to further the legitimate interests which the statute sought to promote. 88 On
this basis, the first district upheld the constitutional challenge to section
876.18.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in a relatively short opinion, given the
questions involved, disagreed with the district court's analysis and found
that section 876.18 passed constitutional muster. 89 The supreme court
recognized that under the First Amendment "[c]ontent-based restrictions are
presumptively invalid."''9 However, one exception to this general principle
is where the speech or conduct was of such slight social value that it is
outweighed by "the social interest in order and morality."' 9' Three examples
of this exception are: 1) defamatory speech; 2) obscenity; and 3) fighting
words. The supreme court noted that threats of violence can be regulated
because citizens have an interest in being protected by the government from
fears of violence. Fighting words are such that "by their very utterance
[they] inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."'' 92
The court found that section 876.18 was concerned with conduct that came
within these "threats of violence."'1 93 Given the historical background to
cross burning in the United States and its relationship to such lawless
activity as lynchings, shootings, and other means of persecution, the court
easily determined that "[t]he connection between a flaming cross in the yard
and forthcoming violence is clear and direct."' 94 When such a symbol is
placed without authorization on someone's property, it cannot help but to
inflict harm by causing the occupant fear. The Supreme Court of Florida
noted that United States Supreme Court had recently struck down an
ordinance from another state attempting to deal with similar conduct. In
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,195 a juvenile had been charged with placing a
188. The court specifically stated that the conduct which section 876.18 proscribes could
already make one subject to prosecution under a number of other sections of the Florida
Statutes including section 784.011 (assault); section 877.03 (breach of the peace or disorderly
conduct); section 806.13 (criminal mischief); section 823.01 (criminal nuisance); section
877.15 (failure to control or report a dangerous fire); and sections 810.08-.09 (trespassing).
189. State v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
190. Id. at 480.
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
193. Id. at 481.
194. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d at 481.
195. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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burning cross in a neighbor's yard. The City statute there made it a crime to
"plac[e] on public or private property a symbol.., including, but not limited
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender... ,196 The Court found this ordi-
nance invalid because rather than prescribing all sorts of fighting words, the
ordinance only prohibited them when they offended due to reasons such as
race, color, creed, etc. Therefore, the statute did not provide protection to all
citizens from such fighting words but only to exclusive groups, constituting a
form of impermissible favoritism to certain subjects while prohibiting others.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Florida found that section 876.18,
protected all citizens who had flaming crosses placed, without authorization,
on their property; therefore the law showed no unconstitutional favoritism to
select groups or topics. Once the supreme court found that section 876.18
proscribed fighting words not constitutionally protected, it also had no
difficulty in concluding that the statute was not overbroad. The court agreed
that when applied to conduct, the overbreadth of a challenged statute must be
both real and substantial. Because the conduct prohibited by the statute, the
unauthorized placing of flaming crosses on the property of another, was not
protected by the First Amendment, it likewise could not be considered
unconstitutionally overbroad.19 7 Thus, the supreme court upheld the consti-
tutionality of Florida's cross burning law.
196. Id. (quoting St.Paul, Minn. Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
197. The Supreme Court of Florida did not directly address the first district's example of
how section 876.18 could be used impermissibly to suppress offensive but protected conduct.
Instead, the supreme court's opinion merely declared that the threat of impermissible
suppression by overbroad application was "speculative at best and is insufficiently substantial
to invalidate the statute on its face." T.B.D., 656 So. 2d at 482. Even if one could conceive of
isolated instances were section 876.18 could be improperly utilized, this was not enough to
find it was substantially overbroad. Id.
1996]
143
: Nova Law Review 21, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
APPENDIX A: SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND RELATED ToPIcs
Cases discussing sentencing guidelines and related topics were a major
focus of a significant number of Supreme Court of Florida cases this last
survey year. Readers interested in these areas should consult the following
recent supreme court decisions as listed below:
A. Sentencing Guidelines
1. Collateral Attack on Departure Sentence
Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1995).
The court found that an improper departure sentence due to the trial
court's failure to timely file written reasons could not be challenged for
the first time through collateral attack under Rules 3.800(a) and 3.850
of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, as long as the sentence it-
self was within the maximum period set forth by statute. Such a sen-
tence is not an illegal sentence and thus cannot be considered
"fundamental error" which can be raised in collateral proceedings.
2. Scoring of Prior Convictions on Appeal
State v. Peterson, 667 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1996).
In this decision, the Supreme Court of Florida found that when the de-
fendant is to be sentenced for a subsequent offense, prior convictions on
appeal should be included for scoring purposes on a sentencing
scoresheet. However, the court noted in dicta that if the prior convic-
tion was reversed after the defendant was sentenced for the subsequent
offense, the defendant could file for post-conviction relief. This dicta is
consistent with the supreme court's recent decisions regarding the crime
of felony possession of a firearm. For a discussion of these cases, see
supra text accompanying notes 36-54.
3. Scoring of Out-of-State Convictions
Dautel v. State, 658 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1995).
The court held that only the elements of an out-of-state crime, and not
the underlying facts, should be considered in determining what Florida
offense the out-of-state conviction is analogous to for purposes of
scoring the conviction under the sentencing guidelines.
4. Reasons for Departure
Rahmings v. State, 660 So. 2d 1390 (Fla. 1995).
This case stands for the proposition that a convicted defendant's subse-
quent failure to appear for sentencing was not a valid reason for de-
parting upward from the sentencing guidelines; however, the court dis-
tinguished this decision from its previous decision in Quarterman v.
State, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1988), where it upheld departure due to the
defendant's failure to appear at sentencing. The accused in Quarter-
[Vol. 2 1: 101
144
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss1/1
Dobson
man had agreed, pursuant to a negotiated plea, that such failure would
serve as grounds for a departure. There was no such negotiated plea ar-
rangement in Rahmings.
State v. Darrisaw, 660 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1995).
Here, the court found that a convicted felony defendant who was previ-
ously convicted of two misdemeanors could not be given a departure
sentence based on an escalating pattern of criminal conduct since the
offenses, while "escalating" in nature, were not part of a pattern since
they were not temporally close or similar in nature.
Jory v. State, 668 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1996).
The court concluded that the defendant's professed belief that sexual
acts with minors were not wrong and that his prosecution was part of a
homophobia by the State did not show that the defendant was uname-
nable to rehabilitation and that he posed a danger to society. Thus, the
defendant's statements were inadequate to support an upward departure
under the sentencing guidelines.
5. Correct Sentencing Procedure When Probation Cases are Sentenced in
Conjunction with a New Substantive Offense
State v. Lamar, 659 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1995).
The court held that where two offences exist, two sentencing
scoresheets should be prepared. The new offense should be listed as
the primary offense in one scoresheet and the prior offense in the other.
The sentencing court should then use the scoresheet which would result
in the more severe sanction.
B. Sentences for Misdemeanors
Armstrong v. State, 656 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1995).
A defendant convicted of multiple misdemeanors can be sentenced to
consecutive terms in a county jail even if the cumulative effect of the
sentence exceeds one year.
C. Jury Instructions on Punishment
Knight v. State, 668 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1996).
The court held that a defendant accused of a non-capital offense for
which a minimum mandatory sentence must be imposed is not entitled
to have the jurors instructed as to that minimum mandatory sentence
since it is irrelevant to their decision.
D. Plea Agreements and Sentencing
1. Departure Sentences Pursuant to Plea Agreements
State v. Williams, 667 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1996).
This decision provides authority for the proposition that a departure
sentence imposed pursuant to a valid plea agreement does not need to
be accompanied by written reasons for the departure as long as the
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum and the record reflects
the agreement's terms.
2. Withdrawal of Plea Due to Court's Departure from Plea's Terms
19961
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Goins v. State, 672 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1996).
The court found that if there is a firm agreement for a specified sen-
tence, as opposed to an agreement only to recommend a specified sen-
tence, a trial judge's decision to dishonor the agreement gives the de-
fendant the right to withdraw the plea. Furthermore, the defendant does
not have to immediately make a motion to do so in order to preserve the
issue for appeal.
E. Habitual Offender Sentences
1. Habitual Violent Felony Offender
White v. State, 666 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1996).
Here, the court held that a prior conviction for manslaughter by culpa-
ble negligence can serve as a predicate offense for the imposition of a
subsequently convicted felon's sentence as a habitual violent felony of-
fender pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(b)(1) (1995).
See also case cited infra Part I.
2. Collateral Attack on Consecutive Habitual Felony Offender Sentences
State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1995).
Defendants who received consecutive habitual felony sentences arising
out of same criminal episode more than two years prior to the decision
in Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993), cert. denied, 115 U.S. 278
(1994) (declaring such sentences statutorily impermissible). The de-
fendant should be given a two-year time period after Hale to move pur-
suant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedue for an
evidentiary hearing to challenge these convictions.
F. Control Release
1. Denial of Control Release Eligibility
Gramegna v. Parole Commission, 666 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1996).
The court held that an offender convicted of committing a lewd assault
upon a child pursuant to section 800.04 of the Florida Statutes is auto-
matically, as a matter of law, deemed ineligible by former section
947.146(4)(d) (1991) (which is now codified as section 947.146(3)(c)
(1995)) for control release despite the victim's actual consent to the act
involved.
2. Evidentiary Basis for Denial of Control Release
See id.
In the Gramegna decision, the court also decided, citing section
947.146(3) (1991) of the Florida Statutes, that the Control Release
Commission can rely on any official document in the court record that
was generated during a criminal investigation or proceeding, including
an arrest report, which is similar to the present statutory law.
G. Revocation of Probation
Credit for Time Previously Served
Shoda v. State, 666 So. 2d 134 (Fla 1996).
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When probation is revoked and the accused receives a new community
control sentence, credit must be given for time previously spent on pro-
bation so that the total period does not exceed the statutory maximum
for a particular offense.
Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1995).
A result similar to that obtained in Shoda is required where the new
sentence following a probation revocation is a probationary split sen-
tence combination of actual incarceration followed by probation.
H. Conditions of Probation
Notice to Defendants of Imposition of Conditions
State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1996).
The court construed the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and
found that general conditions 1 to 11 contained in the probation form in
rule 3.986 are standard conditions of probation which need not be
orally announced at sentencing to give adequate notice of such; how-
ever any special conditions of probation must be orally pronounced so
that the defendant has an opportunity to object to them.
I. Stacking of Minimum Mandatory Sentences
Jackson v. State, 659 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1995).
This decision held that a defendant could not be sentenced to a mini-
mum mandatory sentence as a habitual offender followed by a firearm
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APPENDIX B: HOMICIDE OFFENSES
A number of Supreme Court of Florida decisions involving homicide
offenses are not discussed in this article. Readers interested in supreme
court cases discussing whether the state has proven a particular homicide
offense may wish to consult the following cases:
A. First-Degree Murder
1. Insufficient Evidence of Premeditation
Rogers v. State, 660 So. 2d 237, 241 (Fla. 1995).
Here, the court found that there was insufficient evidence of premedita-
tion where the evidence merely showed that the accused shot the victim
during a struggle over a gun as there was no evidence the defendant had
ever "formed a conscious purpose to kill"; however, the court found
sufficient evidence for a second degree murder conviction. Id. (quoting
Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1986).
Mungin v. State, 667 So. 2d 751, 754 (Fla. 1995).
The court concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to support a
premeditated murder conviction where the evidence of guilt was wholly
circumstantial and there was no confession or other evidence to suggest
the proof was not "consistent with a killing that occurred on the spur of
the moment;" however, the general first degree murder verdict was af-
finned on the state's alternative theory of felony murder.
2. Sufficient Evidence of Premeditation
Finney v. State, 660 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 823
(1996).
A defendant's contention that he did not kill a bound and gagged victim
who died from multiple stabs wounds was sufficiently inconsistent with
the theory that the victim died during consensual erotic sex that a jury
could find premeditation.
B. Instructions on Premeditation
Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677, 681 (Fla. 1995).
In this decision, the court held that the trial court did not err by adding
language to the standard premeditation instruction. The language stated
that "[a]mong the ways that premeditation may be inferred is from evi-
dence as to the nature of the weapon used, the manner in which the
murder was committed and the nature and manner of the wounds in-
flicted." Apart from the court's use of the word "murder," the remain-
ing language was a correct statement of the law, thus the trial judge
could use it since part of a trial judge's responsibility is to accurately
and completely charge the jury. The court agreed that the word
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"murder" should not have been used but found that the failure to object
to this at trial waived this issue for appeal.
C. Felony Murder
Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1995).
Kearse also held that an indictment does not need to separately charge
felony murder for the prosecution to proceed on both this theory and
one of premeditated murder; likewise, the state does not have to give
defense notice of the underlying felony that it will use to prove felony
murder.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This year's survey of Florida law demonstrated a familiar pattern in
Florida evidence. Criminal evidentiary cases outnumbered civil evidentiary
cases almost four to one. Once again, hearsay was the predominant area,
with expert testimony and scientific evidence drawing the most divergent
opinions. A troubling theme throughout the survey period was the incredibly
high number of cases being reversed without timely objections being made
to the error.1  The majority of these reversals occurred during closing
argument, although cases involving improper voir dire and opening state-
ments also received reversals.2 The district courts seem intent on curbing the
unethical behavior of attorneys who use "scorched earth" tactics in the
presentation of their case to the jury.3 It appears that the appellate courts
1. See FLA. STAT. § 90.104 (1995). Section 90.104(1)(a) requires a timely objection in
order to preserve error for appeal. Id.
2. A few of the cases that have been reversed without objection are: Baptist Hosp., Inc. v.
Rawson, 674 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reversed for improper closing
argument, calling defendant's witnesses "idiots," referring to defenses as "unbelievable" as to
insult jurors, and including numerous other improper comments); Norman v. Gloria Farms,
Inc., 668 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reversed for threat to jurors that a verdict
for opposing side would destroy jurors' lifestyles); Muhammad v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 668 So.
2d 254 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reversed for improper closing arguments, including
personal opinion and comments which accused plaintiff of perpetrating fraud upon court and
jury).
Although an objection was made in Williams v. State, 673 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1996), the comment was deemed innocuous. This case was reversed due to an improper
comment which was made by the prosecutor during closing argument, wherein the prosecutor
stated: "'I submit to you that it's not reasonable to consider that sworn police officers, doing
their job, could come into court and perjure themselves."' Id. at 975. The district court felt
that this was improperly bolstering the credibility of the police officers. Id. However, this
was one of the more innocuous comments as compared to many other cases.
3. The district courts of appeal should be commended for attempting to stop this type of
in-court behavior, such as when attorneys call witnesses and other attorneys "liars," "scum,"
and other expletives too numerous to discuss. However, this praise is not without reservation.
It seems that there could be a growing trend toward "gotcha" trial tactics when one side is able
to sit idly by and make no objections and then complain for the first time on appeal that there
was error warranting a reversal. Section 90.104 of the Florida Evidence Code requires a
timely objection in order to preserve a point for appeal. FLA. STAT. § 90.104(1)(a). The
district courts are unable to consider an assertion of error in the admission of evidence, made
in the trial court, if counsel fails to make a contemporaneous objection at trial. Only if the
error is fundamental should an appellate court consider the issue on appeal. However, the
Supreme Court of Florida has indicated that fundamental error should be found infrequently.
Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970). As the supreme court stated: "The
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have had enough of attorneys "pushing the envelope" of unethical behavior
during trial.4 The Florida Legislature made no significant changes to the
evidence code this year. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Florida took up
the issue of DNA admissibility, and the district courts of appeal were
divided over the admissibility of child abuse profile evidence.5
II. OFFERS OF PROOF
One of the most important provisions in the Florida Evidence Code is
the offer of proof provision in section 90.104.6 The importance of this
section cannot be overlooked if a chance at a successful appeal is being
considered. Section 90.104(1)(b) provides that when a trial judge errone-
ously sustains an objection, counsel must make an offer of proof of how the
witness would have responded if allowed to answer the question, in order to
preserve the point for appeal.7  An offer of proof may be made in the
following ways: 1) by having the witness answer the question on the record
out of the presence of the jury; 2) by including in the record a written
statement of the anticipated answer; or 3) by a professional statement of
counsel to the court divulging the answer which is made on the record. An
offer of proof permits the trial court to learn the answer of the witness to the
excluded question. An offer of proof gives the trial court the opportunity to
change its ruling and provides the appellate court the opportunity to properly
examine the full question and answer in determining if an error was made by
the trial court. If an appellate court has to speculate as to the answer to an
excluded question, it is unlikely that error will be preserved or found. 8
Appellate Court should exercise its discretion under the doctrine of fundamental error very
guardedly." Id
4. See Devlin v. State, 674 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Dauksch, J., dis-
senting), wherein the dissent reproduced a page of improper comments and stated that these
comments were inappropriate because they: "1) evoke sympathy for the state's witness; 2)
constitute an improper comment on defendant's right to remain silent; 3) shift [the] burden of
proof; 4) vouch for the credibility of the state's witnesses; 5) state the prosecutor's beliefs; 6)
disparage defense counsel; and 6) [sic] invade the jury's province." Id. at 798 (footnote
omitted). This case provides a plethora of improper and inflammatory comments that should
be avoided by counsel during trial.
5. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 671 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
6. FLA. STAT. § 90.104. This section is entitled "Rulings on Evidence."
7. Id. § 90.104(l)(b).
8. See Nava v. State, 450 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cause dismissed, 508
So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1987). Section 90.104(1)(b) also provides that an offer of proof is not
necessary if the substance of the answer "was apparent from the context within which the
questions were asked." FLA. STAT. § 90.104(1)(b). However, counsel should never count on
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During the survey period, the Third District Court of Appeal addressed
the issue of how an offer of proof is made when the trial court excludes
documents from evidence. In Brantley v. Snapper Power Equipment,9 the
third district reversed the trial court's ruling, granting the defendant's motion
in limine, which excluded from evidence post-manufacture, pre-accident
notices, service bulletins, and correspondence on which the plaintiffs were
relying to prove the existence of a defect in a product.' 0 At the hearing on
the motion in limine, the plaintiffs made no offer of proof of the excluded
documents, nor were the excluded documents made part of the record at the
trial. Although the plaintiffs felt they were excused from making the
necessary offer of proof, the district court disagreed." The district court
stated:
When the trial court excludes evidence, an offer of proof is
necessary... if the claimed evidentiary error is to be preserved for
appellate review. This can be done without violating the order in
limine by offering the excluded documents at trial outside the pres-
ence of the jury. "Excluded documents ... should be marked for
identification with a number and described fully in the record. This
makes a record of the excluded evidence available to an appellate
court so it can determine if error was committed in excluding the
the appellate court's generosity in finding that an answer was "apparent" from the context of
the questions. A proffer should always be forthcoming. See Dale A. Bruschi, Evidence: 1992
Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REv. 255, 257 (1992). This article provides additional
cases which discuss offers of proof in criminal and civil cases.
9. 665 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
10. Id. at 242.
11. Id. at 243. Apparently, the plaintiffs attempted to rely on Bender v. State, 472 So. 2d
1370, 1372-73 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), for the proposition that once the trial court has
excluded evidence pursuant to a pretrial motion in limine, the proponent of the evidence
should not attempt to elicit the testimony to preserve the error. Brantley, 665 So. 2d at 243.
Professor Ehrhardt, in his treatise on evidence, seems to agree with this position, in stating
that, "[s]ince the purpose of the motion [in limine] is to prevent a proffer of the evidence at
trial, a party who abides by the court's ruling should not be put in a position of waiver."
CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENc E § 104.5, at 22 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
However, the Third District Court of Appeal in Brantley stated that Bender (also a Third
District Court of Appeal case) stands for the proposition that the proponent of the excluded
evidence should not violate the order in limine by offering the excluded evidence at trial in the
presence of the jury. Brantley, 665 So. 2d at 243 n.3. Bender does not preclude the proffer of
excluded evidence outside the presence of the jury. Id. The court felt that Bender proceeded
on the implied assumption that an adequate record of the excluded evidence had been made
during the motion in limine hearing. Id. However, where that has not been done, an offer of
proof must be made at trial. Id. Unless an adequate offer of proof has been made in the
motion in limine hearing, the necessary offer of proof must be made during the trial. Id.
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evidence and also makes it available for post trial motions." ...
Alternatively, if an adequate record of excluded evidence has been
made at the hearing on the motion in limine, it is not necessary to
make an offer of proof at trial.
12
Naturally, the most prudent course of action, when a motion in limine
has been granted excluding evidence, is to make an offer of proof during the
trial. An offer of proof should still be made, outside the presence of the jury,
even if an adequate record was made at the motion in limine hearing. This
will give the trial court an opportunity to reconsider the ruling in light of the
changing dynamics of the trial.' 3 This procedure will also demonstrate to the
appellate court that trial counsel has not abandoned this matter and that the
trial court has remained steadfast in its determination to exclude the evi-
dence.
IE[. SUMMING UP AND COMMENT BY THE JUDGE
During the survey period, one of the few cases that discussed trial
judges interrogating witnesses was reviewed by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal. In Moton v. State,14 the defendant appealed a trial court's convic-
tion for armed robbery of a convenience store clerk.' 5 The defense at trial
was that the State had charged the wrong man. During the examination of a
key prosecution witness (the store clerk), the trial judge asked a series of
questions regarding the enclosure that separated the clerk from the shopping
area. The trial judge then inquired of the clerk where the defendant was
standing. 16 The defense timely objected to these questions.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the defendant that
questioning by the trial judge can, and often does, suggest to the jury that
some evidence may be more important than other evidence.17 This causes
12. Brantley, 665 So. 2d at 243 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
13. See Swan v. Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 404 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
14. 659 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
15. Id. at 1269.
16. As can best be gleaned from the opinion, this was in an apparent attempt to clear up
some confusion regarding which individual the witness was referring to when he was
examining a group photograph (or videotape) which contained the defendant's picture.
17. Moton, 659 So. 2d at 1270; but see Williams v. State, 143 So. 2d 484, 488 (Fla.
1962) (holding that the judge is permitted to ask questions in order to clarify the issues but he
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the jury to focus on evidence it may not otherwise have strongly considered.
In Moton, the case was apparently a very close call, with the identification of
the defendant being a central issue in the case. 18  Because of the closeness
of the case, the district court was unable to find the questioning by the trial
judge harmless and reversed the case for a new trial. 19
IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE
In the case of Cordova v. State,20 the Third District Court of Appeal
wrestled with judicial notice in criminal cases.2 ' In Cordova, the defendant
was found guilty of indirect criminal contempt, for violating a domestic
violence injunction.22 During the nonjury trial, the court took judicial notice
of the fact that the defendant had been served with a copy of the injunction.
The trial court based this, in part, on the stamped return of service for the
injunction.
The district court framed the issue to be "whether a trial court may
judicially notice the fact that a defendant was served with an injunction
where he is charged with indirect criminal contempt for violating its provi-
sions. 23 The parties to the action agreed that notice of an injunction is an
essential element of the charge of violating its provisions.2 4
The district court noted that before the enactment of the evidence code,
judicial notice of a fact meant that it was taken as true without the necessity
18. Moton, 659 So. 2d at 1270. It appears that there was little other evidence, such as
fingerprints, etc., to tie the defendant to the crime. Thus, the case balanced on the credibility
of the eyewitness and his ability to make a positive identification of the defendant during an
emotionally charged few moments.
19. Id. The two concurring opinions make it clear that questioning by the trial judge,
though not specifically improper, is unwise. Justice Stone indicated that neutral questions by
the trial judge to "clarify the direction from which a photograph is taken or a diagram viewed,
or, as here, where a witness has referred to an individual on a videotape containing more than
one person in the picture and it is not clear to which individual the testimony refers," can be
helpful to the jury and the appellate court. Id. (Stone, J., specially concurring). However, a
judge travels a dangerous road in attempting to avoid the pitfalls associated with questioning
witnesses in front of a jury and, for the most part, should remain a neutral and impartial
mediator.
20. 675 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
21. M at 634.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. In criminal cases, the state must prove every essential element of the crime charged by
proof beyond a- reasonable doubt. Therefore, the analysis must be aimed at the effect the
judicial notice has on the state's constitutional burden.
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of offering evidence by the party who would do so.2  However, the rule did
not prevent an opposing party from introducing rebuttal evidence after a fact
had been noticed. Therefore, judicial notice served as prima facie evidence
of the fact so noticed.
When the evidence code was enacted in 1976, section 90.206 required
the trial judge to instruct the jury to accept as a fact, a matter judicially
noticed.26 A matter judicially noticed was meant to be binding on the trier of
fact, and no evidence disputing or rebutting the matter was permitted, once it
had been noticed by the judge.27 The mandatory "shall" section of the rule
was later changed to "may," and the provision now reads that the judge "may
instruct the jury during the trial to accept as a fact a matter judicially
noticed." 8 The district court found that the change now allowed the trial
court the discretion to determine whether taking judicial notice of a particu-
lar fact is conclusive as to that fact, or whether the opposing party can
introduce conflicting evidence.
29
The district court examined the use of judicial notice in a criminal case
and noted that for a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to
operate within constitutional boundaries, "judicial notice should only be
used as a device to establish the prima facie existence of a particular fact
which the finder of fact is free to disregard despite the defendant's failure to
introduce evidence to the contrary."30 The district court's main concern now
was whether the foregoing principles would apply in a case where the
defendant does not have a right to a jwry trial. The district court examined
the law regarding mandatory presumptions in making its determination and
stated:
Conclusive judicial notice not only establishes the existence of a
particular fact, it precludes the adverse party from introducing evi-
dence to rebut it. Such a device would certainly run afoul of the
same due process rights implicated in the case of mandatory pre-
sumptions. Even in the case of a bench trial, judicial notice "must
not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evi-
dence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a rea-
25. Cordova, 675 So. 2d at 635 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.206 (West 1979) (Law
Revision Council Note-1976)).
26. Id. (citing EHRHARDT, supra note 11, § 206.1).
27. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.206).
28. Id. (quoting EHRHARDT, supra note 11, § 206.1).
29. Id.
30. Cordova, 675 So. 2d at 635.
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sonable doubt." Accordingly, much like a permissive inference, a
constitutional use of judicial notice in a criminal case allows, but
does not require, the trier of fact to accept as true a fact so no-
ticed.3
Having determined that judicial notice of elemental facts in a criminal
case is constitutionally permissible, the district court turned its attention to
whether the judicial notice in this case was correctly taken.32 The trial court
took judicial notice under sections 90.202(11) and (12) of the evidence
code.33 The district court determined that these sections were inappropriate
for judicial notice of an injunction. 34 First, an injunction is not "'generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court."' 35 Judicially noticing
an injunction simply does not fit under this exception. Second, the district
court found that service of the injunction is not the type of fact that is not
subject to dispute because it is capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to a source whose accuracy cannot be questioned.36 This section
was also improper for judicially noticing an injunction.37
Having determined that the injunction could not be judicially noticed
under the sections argued by the State, the district court upheld the convic-
tion, finding that the trial court was right for the wrong reasons.38 The
district court found that the trial court could allow the State to use a permis-
sive inference to establish the fact of service.39 "'A permissive inference
allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer an elemental fact
[service] upon proof of a basic fact [return of service] and places no burden
on the defendant." ' 40 The defendant would also be permitted to introduce
evidence to rebut these facts."'
31. Id. at 636 (citation omitted).
32. Id.
33. Section 90.202(11) of the Florida Statutes states, "[f]acts that are not subject to dis-
pute because they are generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court." FLA.
STAT. § 90.202(11) (1993). Section 90.202(12) states, "[flacts that are not subject to dispute
because they are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot be questioned." Id. § 90.202(12).
34. Cordova, 675 So. 2d at 636.




39. Cordova, 675 So. 2d at 636-37.










During the survey period, an interesting case arose regarding the use of
a computer generated accident reconstruction animation to illustrate an
accident reconstruction expert's opinion. In Pierce v. State,42 the defendant
appealed from a conviction when he was found guilty of vehicular homicide
and leaving the scene of an accident, involving the death of a young girl.43
Eyewitnesses to the accident indicated that the vehicle which struck the child
was a Chevrolet Silverado truck with a camper top. At the scene of the
accident, the police investigators located a piece of a grille and a piece of
plastic from a turn signal lens. The medical examiner opined that there
might be a dent in the vehicle caused by the impact on the victim's head.
Three weeks after the accident, the police located the defendant's truck,
which had a dent where the hood meets the grille. Although this truck did
not have a camper top, neighbors stated that the defendant recently removed
the camper top from his vehicle.
The State Attorney's Office filed a Notice of Intent to offer computer
generated animation of its expert's accident reconstruction.44 The State
intended to illustrate its expert's opinions of how the accident occurred
through the computer animation. The State's expert in accident reconstruc-
tion testified that the AUTOCAD computer program which was used for the
illustration was accepted in the engineering field as one of the leading
computer aided design programs. The expert's accident reconstruction
measurements were fed directly into the computer.
The State contended that the computer animation was a visualization of
its expert's opinion as to how the accident occurred. The State proffered the
computer animation as a demonstrative exhibit, to help its accident recon-
struction expert explain his opinion to the jury, and as substantive evidence.
The trial court found the computer animation would express the expert's
opinion and was not a scientific or experimental test which would subject its
42. 671 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
43. Id. at 187.
44. Id. at 188.
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animation to the Frye test.4 5 The trial court also ruled that the computer
animation could not be used as substantive evidence.
46
Demonstrative exhibits may be used during a trial as an aid to help the
jury understand a material fact or issue. A demonstrative exhibit must be an
accurate and reasonable reproduction of the object involved. This is the
same foundation that must be established for any photographic evidence,
such as a videotape, motion picture, or photograph. However, before
admitting the computer generated animation, the proponent of the evidence
must first establish the foundational requirements necessary to introduce an
expert opinion. 47
Any preliminary facts constituting the foundation for the admissibility
of evidence must be proven to the court by a preponderance of the evidence,
even in a criminal case.48 In Pierce, the appellate court found that the trial
court made the appropriate findings of preliminary facts, supported by
evidence introduced at the pretrial hearing.49 The expert was found to be
qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction and his opinion as to how
the accident occurred was applied to evidence offered at trial.50 The data the
expert relied on in forming his opinion was of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field.5' Finally, the trial court specifically found that the
computer animation was a fair and accurate depiction of the expert's opinion
as to how the accident occurred and that the expert's opinion and the
computer animation would aid the jury in understanding the issues in the
case.
52
45. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Tests such as DNA or blood
splattering are subject to the Frye analysis to determine whether they are accepted in the
scientific community.
46. Pierce, 671 So. 2d at 188.
47. The foundation requirements for expert testimony are: 1) the opinion evidence must
be helpful to the trier of fact; 2) the witness must be qualified as an expert; 3) the opinion
evidence must be applied to evidence offered at trial; and 4) pursuant to section 90.403 of the
Florida Statutes, the evidence, although technically relevant, must not present a substantial
danger of unfair prejudice that outweighs its probative value. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1995).
See Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), cause dismissed,
507 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1987). Another foundational requirement is that the facts or data relied
on by the expert in forming the opinion expressed by the computer animation must be of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject area. FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (1995).
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B. Bolstering Witness Credibility
In Smith v. State,53 the district court reversed the conviction of a New
Smyrna Beach police officer who was found guilty of lewd and lascivious
assault upon a child under the age of sixteen years.54 The district court
reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court committed reversible
error.55 The trial court erred by allowing the victim's mother to testify that
the victim never made false statements against anyone, and for allowing the
State's expert witness to bolster the victim's credibility.
56
The testimony at trial indicated that the defendant was a twenty-four-
year-old police officer. He met the victim through her boyfriend, who was a
police explorer. A short time after, the victim tried to commit suicide. The
defendant befriended the victim and her mother and acted as a counselor to
the victim. After getting to know the child and his mother, the victim would
go to the defendant's house to watch Music Television ("MTV"). It was
during one of these visits, that the defendant allegedly fondled, caressed, and
had intercourse with the victim, which was consensual. After intercourse,
the defendant allegedly told the victim to keep it a secret because he was
twenty-four and she was fourteen and, as a police officer, he could get into
trouble.
The victim allegedly told her best friend about the incident and some
weeks later, she told her mother about the sexual relationship. The mother
reported the allegations to the police. The crime was reported approximately
one month after it occurred, and the police could not obtain any medical or
physical forensic evidence to corroborate the child's testimony. The only
direct evidence was the child's testimony and hearsay statements. This
testimony was contested by the defendant, who testified that the victim had
been to his house, but they did not have sex.
During trial, the State offered the testimony of the victim's mother and,
over defense objection, elicited from the mother that the victim had never
"'made any false criminal allegations against anyone else.' 57 This was
error.58 The victim's credibility was a crucial factor in the case, since no
medical or physical evidence corroborated the victim's testimony. 9 Allow-
53. 674 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
54. Id. at 792.
55. Id. at 794.
56. Id. at 793.
57. Id. (citation omitted).
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ing the mother to testify that the child never made false statements against
anyone was extremely prejudicial, unnecessarily bolstered the credibility of
the victim, and was improper character evidence.60
The district court also found that testimony from the State's child abuse
expert was reversible error. 61 The State's expert testified that most sexual
abuse victims come from single parent households, that children who were
previously sexually abused were at a greater risk of being abused a second
time, and that this victim was sexually abused by the defendant. Evidence at
trial indicated that the victim's parents were separated, that the victim lived
with her mother, and that the victim had been previously sexually abused.
The district court found that admission of this testimony was reversible
error.
6 2
The district court distinguished Glendening v. State,63 in which the
Supreme Court of Florida held that it was not fundamental error to allow a
child abuse expert to testify that the child had been abused. 64 However, in
Glendening, the child was three and one-half-years-old at the time of the
abuse, which would make it difficult for the child to describe the incident.
Here, in Smith, the victim was fifteen years of age. Additionally, the
expert's testimony in Glendening was limited to and supported by a recorded
"doll interview" which was played for the jury.
The district court noted that in the present case, the State's expert
provided no support for her opinion that the victim had been abused 5 The
State's expert testified regarding the numerous child abuse cases she worked
on and testified that she reviewed the child's deposition and her statements
to the police and victim's advocate, but she did not give any foundation in
science, or any other area of specialized knowledge, to support her belief
that the victim had been abused.66 The district court found that with no
foundation for this belief, "the expression of this belief amounted to no more
than an impermissible comment on the credibility of the child." 67 Addition-
ally, the district court noted that, unlike the expert testimony in Glendening,
60. Id. The district court indicated that the defense did not attack the victim's character
relating to truthfulness or put the child's character or reputation at issue. Id. Therefore, the
testimony was not admissible under either section 90.609(2) or 90.404(l)(b). Id.
61. Smith, 674 So. 2d at 794.
62. Id.
63. 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989).
64. Id. at 220.
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the State's expert testimony in Smith was not helpful to the jury, since the
child in this case was fifteen-years-old and fully capable of describing what
happened.68 The testimony by the State's expert that she believed the
defendant abused the child is a classic example of irrelevant and impermissi-
ble evidence. Testimony regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused is
almost always inadmissible because the probative value of the testimony is
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 69
The district court also examined the logical relevance70 of the expert's
statistics regarding abused children. The State's expert stated that most
abused children came from single family homes and that children who have
been previously abused are at a greater risk of being abused a second time.
The district court questioned how these statements, or statistics, make it
more likely than not that a crime was committed against this victim and/or
that the defendant committed the crime.71 Conversely, if the evidence was
presented to demonstrate the propensity on the part of a child to be victim-
ized, the district court found it to be impermissible character evidence.72
VI. IMPEACHMENT
During the survey period, a rather novel piece of impeachment work
was discussed by the Third District Court of Appeal in Little Bridge Marina,
Inc. v. Jones Boat Yard, Inc.7 3 In this case, the plaintiff appealed from an
adverse final judgment in a breach of contract action.74 Since each party
disputed the facts upon which the case was based, the trial centered around
the question of credibility of the main witnesses on each side.
At trial, defense counsel questioned the plaintiff about being an attor-
ney. Defense counsel's cross-examination in this area ended with the
following question: "In fact, the type of law you did you represented crimi-
68. Id.
69. See FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1995). This section is titled "Exclusion on Grounds of
Prejudice or Confusion." See also Glendening, 536 So. 2d at 221.
70. Evidence should always be examined from the standpoint of whether the evidence is
logically relevant and whether the evidence is legally relevant. Logical relevance is simply
whether the evidence will make a fact in issue more or less probative. Evidence is examined
for legal relevancy to determine whether another rule of law excludes the evidence even if it
proves a fact in issue. For a thorough explanation of logical and legal relevancy, see Dale A.
Bruschi, Evidence: 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1131, 1136 (1991).
71. Smith, 674 So. 2d at 794.
72. Id.
73. 673 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
74. Id. at 78.
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nals. You got them off. '75 It is presumed that defense counsel felt this
impeachment was a rather brilliant tactic. However, as pointed out by the
district court, and probably by defense counsel's trial advocacy professor,
this was patently improper.76
The resolution of the case depended upon the jury's view of the
credibility of the parties' account of the facts. The district court found that it
was reversible error to allow the trial attorney to use the plaintiff's past
career as a criminal defense attorney as impeachment.77 The district court
went on to say:
These statements by appellee's attorney were not only inappropri-
ate, but they were also legally immaterial and irrelevant to the case.
Furthermore, the statements cannot be condoned by this court as a
form of impeachment. Clearly, these recriminations were intended
to denigrate the witness, Mr. Gustinger, in the eyes of the jury by
inflaming the jury against Mr. Gustinger based on the sentiment
held by many laypersons in the community to the effect that attor-
neys are not to be respected.78
The district court found the statements to be even more damaging, since
the credibility of the witness was critical, as it was the primary testimony to
be measured against the testimony of the appellee.79 The district court also
noted that the cross-examination did not attempt to demonstrate that the
witness had done anything wrong, but was merely done to establish that the
witness was a criminal attorney and was meant to lower the jury's opinion of
the witness. Since the outcome of the case hinged on the credibility of the
witnesses, the improper impeachment destroyed the plaintiff's opportunity
for a fair trial.8'
75. Id. at 79.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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VII. EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY
A. Scientific Evidence
In Hayes v. State,8 2 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed, for the first
time, the admissibility of DNA evidence in a criminal trial.8 3 The facts in
Hayes revealed that a female groom at the Pompano Harness Track was
murdered in her dormitory room. Crime scene investigation found the victim
on the floor wearing only blue jeans and a T-shirt. A tank top shirt was
found lying nearby on the floor. The victim was clutching a piece of brown
hair. Seminal fluid was found on the tank top, the blue jeans, and in a
vaginal swab taken from the victim. Robert Hayes, another groom who
worked at the harness track, was arrested for the murder.
In addressing the issue of the admissibility of DNA evidence, the
Supreme Court of Florida made it clear that Florida utilizes the Frye test8 4 to
determine the admissibility of new or novel scientific evidence.8 5 A four-
part inquiry must be addressed by the trial court before expert opinion
testimony will be admitted at trial.8 6 First, the expert testimony must assist
the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in
issue. 7 Second, the scientific principle or discovery must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the scientific field in which
it belongs.88 Third, the expert witness must be qualified to present evidence
on the subject in issue.89 Fourth, expert opinion must be presented to the
jury.9°
The Supreme Court of Florida earnestly examined the report on DNA
standards and methodologies drafted by the National Research Council of
the National Academy of Sciences. 91 The report explains that in applying
82. 660 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1995).
83. Id. at 259.
84. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
85. Hayes, 660 So. 2d at 262.
86. See Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. 1995) (holding that Florida utilizes
the Frye test to determine the admissibility of new or novel evidence, such as DNA evidence).




91. Id. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE
(1992). This report and the full language of this case should be meticulously studied by
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the Frye test to DNA testing procedures, there are four pertinent assump-
tions.92 Though all four of these assumptions are important, the Supreme
Court of Florida focused on the second and fourth assumptions.93 The
second assumption concerned the reliability of the underlying theory
regarding "correcting for band shifting. ' 94 The fourth assumption concerned
the proper procedures that must be followed for DNA evidence to be
admissible.95
In the Hayes case, the DNA test on the tank top was inconclusive.
However, after the prosecution's expert witness applied the controversial
"band shifting" technique, a three band match was found with samples taken
from the defendant. The defense challenged the expert on the "band shift-
ing" technique, claiming that a three band match was not truly a match. The
defense also claimed that any corrections that were made due to "band
shifting" were not accepted in the scientific community. The supreme court
examined the findings of the National Research Council and agreed with the
Council's report that "[uintil testing laboratories have published adequate
studies on the accuracy and reliability of such corrections, we recommend
that they adopt the policy of declaring samples that show apparent band
shifting to be 'inconclusive.' 96 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida
found that the test on the tank top was unreliable.97
The Supreme Court of Florida next examined the DNA test done on the
vaginal swab taken from the victim. 98 There was a seven band match on this
sample. The supreme court felt that this DNA evidence could not be
excluded as a matter of law. 99 However, the supreme court also believed that
it could not approve this evidence for admission at this juncture, since it
found that the Frye test was not properly applied, as suggested in the
National Research Council's report.'
°°
In summarizing its findings, the Supreme Court of Florida stated:
92. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 91, at 133-34.
93. Hayes, 660 So. 2d at 263.
94. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 9 1, at 133-34.
95. Id. Even if proper procedures are followed, the probative force of the evidence will
depend on the quality of the laboratory work.
96. Hayes, 660 So. 2d at 264 (alteration in original) (quoting NATIONAL ACADEMY OF




100. Id. The supreme court suggested that the vaginal swab DNA evidence could be
presented by the State if the methodology utilized by the technician in performing the test met
the requirements of the Frye test. Hayes, 660 So. 2d at 264.
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[W]e find that the DNA evidence would assist the jury in this case
in determining a fact in issue. We take judicial notice that DNA
test results are generally accepted as reliable in the scientific com-
munity, provided that the laboratory has followed accepted testing
procedures that meet the Frye test to protect against false readings
and contamination. With regard to the tank top, we find that the
DNA test was inadmissible because it did not meet accepted scien-
tific principles. Finally, we find that, while this record does not
support a proper application of the required Frye test to the proce-
dures utilized to obtain the DNA test results on the vaginal swab,
the DNA evidence may be presented upon retrial subject to a
proper finding under the Frye test.101
B. Testimony by Experts
During the survey period, two district courts of appeal 0 2 wrestled with
the dilemma of whether the Frye'0 3 standard should be applied to testimony
of a psychologist that the alleged victim in a child sex abuse case exhibits
symptoms consistent with those of a child who has been sexually abused.
This is commonly referred to as the "child abuse profile."
The child abuse profile arises when an expert in the area of psychology
gives an opinion that the victim in a child abuse case fits within the profile.
Naturally, in child abuse cases, there are no eyewitnesses, and the evidence
generally comes down to the statements of the child victim and, in some
cases, the protestations of innocence by the defendant.1°4 However, the
addition of a psychological expert testifying that the child victim fits within
the profile of an abused child, or that the child victim's case is consistent
with that of other abused children, tends to bolster the credibility of the
child's story. This is generally to the detriment of the defendant, who may
be claiming that another individual abused the child.
Syndrome testimony has been difficult for the Florida district courts of
appeal to interpret due to the divergent opinions rendered by the Supreme
101. Id. at 264-65.
102. Beaulieu v. State, 671 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Hadden v. State,
670 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
103. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
104. This is so often the case because there is generally no objective physical evidence of
the abuse which may have occurred months or years before.
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Court of Florida in the last few years.' 0 5 The inconsistency is due in part
because the court in Flanagan v. State'°6 held that "profile" evidence is
inadmissible because it does not meet the Frye test. 0 7 However, the court in
State v. Townsend,108 apparently relying on the relevance standard of section
90.702,09 held that "if relevant, a medical expert witness may testify as to
whether, in the expert's opinion, the behavior of a child is consistent with
the behavior of a child who has been sexually abused.""O
The First District Court of Appeal in Hadden v. State,"' attempted to
harmonize these cases by intimating that Flanagan dealt only with new and
novel scientific profiles, which requires a Frye analysis." 2 Townsend, the
Hadden court surmised, recognized that evidence which is not new or novel
and which has been received in cases under the more relaxed relevancy
standard, does not have to meet the Frye standard."
3 In Beaulieu v. State," 4
as well as in Hadden, the issue was the admissibility of the child abuse
syndrome, or child abuse profile. Both courts reasoned that this evidence
had been admissible in a number of cases and was, therefore, no longer new
and novel and subject to Frye.1 5 However, the issue remains whether the
Supreme Court of Florida follows the view that the child abuse profile need
not be subjected to a Frye analysis. The Fifth District Court of Appeal in
Beaulieu was so perplexed that it stated: "Because Flanagan did not
mention Ward or Kruse, Townsend did not mention Flanagan, and Ramirez
... did not mention Townsend, who can tell? ' 116  Both courts certified the
105. State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827
(Fla. 1993); Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907
(1989).
106. 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993).
107. Id. at 829.
108. 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
109. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1993). This section is entitled 'Testimony by Experts."
110. Townsend, 635 So. 2d at 958.
111. 670 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
112. Id. at 82. The Hadden court felt that new and novel scientific profiles included
pedophile and child sex offender profiles. Id.
113. Id. at 82.
114. 671 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
115. Id. at 809; Hadden, 670 So. 2d at 82. See also Ward v. State, 519 So. 2d 1082 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
116. Beaulieu, 671 So. 2d at 809 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). See Ramirez v.
State, 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995) (establishing a four-step process under section 90.702 in
order to determine the admissibility of a new or novel scientific principle; one such step
requires a Frye analysis); Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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issue to be of great public importance,1 7 so a decision clearing up this
quandary should be forthcoming from the Supreme Court of Florida in the
coming year.
C. Basis of Expert Opinion
In a lengthy personal injury case, the First District Court of Appeal
examined the use of expert testimony relative to the seat belt defense.
Although no startling evidentiary issues are present, the case does elaborate
on the use of expert opinions and the facts which experts rely on in forming
their opinions.
Houghton v. Bond' 8 is a classic case of an attorney stepping over the
bounds of proper trial advocacy and pushing the limits of ethical behavior." 9
A head on collision was the impetus of the Houghton case. Mr. Houghton,
the single occupant of his vehicle, was killed in the accident. The driver of
the other vehicle was the plaintiff, Mr. Bond, who was not wearing a
seatbelt. Mr. Bond was seriously injured in the crash. However, his passen-
ger, Mr. Lindsay, was wearing a seat belt and walked away from the accident
with only superficial injuries.
The two main contentions at trial were who caused the accident, and the
seat belt defense. The plaintiff's expert on accident reconstruction opined
that Mr. Houghton was partially in Bond's lane when the accident occurred.
The plaintiff's expert was not qualified to render an opinion regarding
seatbelts and offered no crash test testimony.
The defendant's expert was qualified at trial as an expert on accident
reconstruction, occupant kinematics, and biomechanics related to an auto-
mobile seat belt restraint system in a motor vehicle involved in a crash. The
testimony from the defendant's expert dealing with accident reconstruction
demonstrated that the vehicle in which Bond and Lindsay were riding drove
off the shoulder of the road, and Bond over-corrected and swerved across the
center line of the highway into the path of Houghton's vehicle. 20
In examining the use of a seat belt in this accident, the defense expert
opined that had Bond been wearing his seatbelt, the forces he experienced
and injuries he sustained would have been less than or, at most, equal to
117. Beaulieu, 671 So. 2d at 811; Hadden, 670 So. 2d at 83.
118. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1067 (1st Dist. Ct. App. April 24, 1996).
119. The district court points out these shortcomings in a sharply written opinion that is
recommended reading for anyone interested in doing trial work.
120. Apparently, the jury was convinced by the defendant's accident reconstruction ex-
pert, as the verdict was clearly in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
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those sustained by Lindsay. 121 The defense expert also testified regarding
government crash test data on cars including head injury criteria. This
material was important because had Bond been wearing a seatbelt, the
defense expert contended, the forces inside the car during the collision
would not have been sufficient for him to sustain a serious head injury.
The jury returned a verdict, finding that Bond was eighty percent
responsible for the collision, and ninety percent of Bond's injuries resulted
from his failure to wear a seatbelt. Therefore, Bond's damages of
$3,000,000 were reduced to $60,000.122 Bond's counsel filed post-trial
motions for a new trial and directed verdict. Bond's counsel also filed
affidavits contesting the defendant's expert's opinions. The purpose of these
affidavits was to contradict and discredit portions of the defense expert's
testimony.123
The trial court inexplicably granted the plaintiff's motions and allowed
the plaintiff's attorney to "draft a detailed order that makes specific refer-
ence in the record to the testimony necessary to support the court's order on
appeal."'124 This order granted Bond's post trial motion for directed verdict
and struck the defendant's seatbelt defense in its entirety.
125
121. Lindsay walked away from this accident with only superficial injuries. The plaintiff,
Bond, on the other hand, was not expected to live, since his injuries were so severe when he
was brought to the hospital. Both Lindsay and Bond were riding in the same vehicle. This is
a pretty clear indication that seatbelts should always be worn and the seatbelt defense should
be used to properly apportion those damages associated with not wearing one.
122. Mr. Houghton sustained damages of $472,000 which was reduced by twenty percent
to $377,600.
123. How the attorney determined this was proper is hard to say. The district court was
unable to find any authority to support this action. Houghton, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1069.
Since the plaintiff's attorney did not assert any of the grounds laid out in the affidavits prior to
or during trial, he cannot seek a reversal of the judgment now. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.480;
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 619 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
124. Houghton, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1069.
125. Id. The district court's review of this order is some of the more interesting reading
that will be found in an appellate opinion and is recommended reading for those who do not
wish to be embarrassed by the appellate court for inappropriate behavior. The district court
stated:
Notwithstanding Bond's counsel's commitment to the trial court to make
"specific reference in the order to the testimony necessary to support the court's
order" if permitted to draft a "detailed order," the order entered contains no such
references. Indeed, the order primarily reflects counsel's rather generalized dis-
dain for both Dr. Benedict and his testimony, which was underscored at one
point during the proceedings below when counsel advised the court that
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The district court reversed the order and in doing so, specifically
addressed the issue that the defense expert's use of government conducted
crash tests rendered him a conduit for inadmissible hearsay evidence.1 26 The
district court first pointed out that no objection was made to the use of the
governmental data during the testimony. 27 The district court went on to find
that the defense expert used the crash data to determine the speed of the
vehicles involved in this accident.128 Naturally, the government crash test
data does not in and of itself have to be admissible for the expert's opinion
to be admissible. 29 "The court concluded that the testimony aided the jury in
understanding the defense expert's opinion, and was not a conduit for
inadmissible evidence.
30
Id. at D1070 (emphasis added). The trial court order went on to find that there was no
plausible basis for the jury finding that ninety percent of plaintiff Bond's injuries were caused
by his failure to wear an available seatbelt. The district court naturally disagreed with this
finding, and stated, '"he record contains more than ample evidence to support this finding
quite apart from Benedict's apportionment testimony." Id. (emphasis added). This district
court went on to state:
Given the appealed order's reliance on Bond's counsel's personal opinions
regarding Dr. Benedict's "demeanor", "custom" and "habit" to support striking
the seatbelt defense, we have carefully plumbed the record to find support for
what have becomefindings by a stroke of the judicial pen. Our independent re-
search has failed to turn up the "testimony necessary to support the court's order"
as promised by Bond's counsel, which seems to us a reasonably predictable re-
sult when counsel for one of the parties to a holly contested lawsuit requests and
is permitted to prepare a dispositive order in that litigation without judicial
guidance of record and counsel's work product is uncritically accepted and en-
tered as submitted. If, for example, as the order finds, Dr. Benedict's
"performance on the stand" was more a debate with counsel than a proper at-
tempt to answer the questions posed by bond's counsel, such was due in no
small measure to the tenor of counsel's often argumentative and sarcastic ques-
tioning of the witness.
Id. (emphasis added).
126. Houghton, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1070.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Section 90.704 of the Florida Statutes provides:
The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be
those perceived by, or made know to, him at or before the trial. If the facts or
data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject to support the
opinion expressed, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FLA. STAT, § 90.704 (emphasis added). See also EHRHARDT, supra note 11, § 704.1; Barber v.
State, 576 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
130. The district court also found that whether a defendant is obliged at all to present
expert testimony in support of a seatbelt defense appears to depend upon the nature of the
plaintiff's injuries. Houghton, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1071. The rule appears to be that in
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Occasionally, a poor argument in the trial court and a cold transcript
read by the district court leads to a poor opinion. In Aneiro v. State,13 1 this is
apparently what happened. The defendant, Aneiro, was convicted of
trafficking in cocaine.132 The issue for appeal was whether the trial court
improperly admitted hearsay testimony of a taped telephone conversation
between the confidential informant ("CI") and the defendant. 133  The
defendant argued entrapment at trial and testified that the CI induced him to
deliver cocaine in return for $200 and the use of the CI's car for fifteen days.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the defendant's convic-
tion.134 The exact sixteen word conversation that caused this reversal is as
follows:
[CI]: What kind of car will you be in?
[Appellant]: A Nissan.
[CI]: A Lincoln?
[Appellant]: Gray. A gray Nissan. 135
The district court found this to be inadmissible hearsay because it was
offered to prove that the CI did not know what kind of a car appellant would
use to transport the cocaine.' 36 The prosecution used this conversation in
closing argument to demonstrate that the CI had no knowledge of the type of
certain cases, such as those involving non-impact sprain/strain or orthopedic injuries (e.g., a
herniated disc), the party offering a seatbelt defense is required to present expert testimony,
because the precise cause of the plaintiffs injury (i.e. whether the injury would have occurred
had the plaintiff worn his seatbelt) is not within the province of the jury. Id. at D1 071.
131. 674 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
132. Id. at 913.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Please pay close attention to the punctuation used by the district court and re-
printed in the opinion, as this will offer a clue as to the correct analysis of this matter.
136. Aneiro, 674 So. 2d at 913. From the meager facts presented, the best that can be
discerned is that the defendant was claiming that the CI entrapped him and, accordingly,
wanted to show that the CI did know what type of car the defendant would bring the cocaine
in, in order to prove that the CI gave him the car as an inducement to bring the cocaine. The
prosecution used this taped telephone conversation to argue, in closing, that the CI had no
knowledge of the type of car the defendant would be in and this would thus demonstrate to the
jury that the defendant's argument, that the loan of the car was an inducement for the drug
transaction, was untrue. This is, of course, a guess based on what few facts were given.
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car the defendant was in, and in turn, used this to demonstrate that the
defendant's argument that the deal was induced, in part, by the loan of a car,
was untrue. 137 If the defendant was not induced into the deal, in part, by the
loan of the car, then there may be no entrapment. Arguably, if the CI had to
ask what kind of car the defendant would be in, this would rebut the defense
that he lent the defendant the car, and therefore, entrapped him.
The district court of appeal rejected the State's argument that this
conversation constituted "verbal acts" and was not hearsay.138  This was
probably due to two separate things. First, the prosecution made no argu-
ment in the trial court that the hearsay was merely verbal acts. 3 9 It was
argued for the first time on appeal. Second, the conversation was used by
the prosecution to demonstrate the truth of the statements.
The district court rejected the plethora of case law which held that
verbal acts evidence is admissible in these types of cases because the
statements serve to prove the nature of the act.14° The dissent written by
Judge Shahood is the better analysis;14 1 however, the opinion can also be
upheld on two different analyses. First, reciprocal conversations between
two individuals, one of whom is an opposing party in a case, is generally not
hearsay. All the statements made by the party against whom the statement is
being offered is simply admissible as a statement of a party opponent under
section 90.803(18) of the evidence code.142 Questions by the other individu-
137. Apparently, at the trial, the prosecution failed to make any arguments that this state-
ment was simply not hearsay, as the district court pointed out that this was argued for the first
time on appeal. Id. at 914. Additionally, no objection was made and no limiting instruction
for the hearsay statement was requested by the defense when the prosecution argued about the
type of car the defendant would be in. This was a nice job of finding error, when there was no
objection to the use of this closing argument by the defense, no limiting instruction was
requested, and there was no finding that the error was fundamental.
138. Id.
139. However, this could be of no real importance, because evidence admitted by the trial
judge for the wrong reasons will not cause a reversal if there were proper grounds to admit the
evidence. Irving v. State, 627 So. 2d 92, 94 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that an
appellate court will not reverse when the trial court reaches the right result for the wrong
reason); see also Belvin v. State, 585 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991). Additionally,
a conviction should not be reversed unless the admittance of the evidence deprived the
defendant of a fair trial.
140. Aneiro, 674 So. 2d at 914. See Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 882 (1982); Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1957); Decile v. State, 516 So. 2d
1139 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v. McPhadder, 452 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1984), quashed, 475 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1985).
141. Aneiro, 674 So. 2d at 915-16 (Shahood, J., dissenting).
142. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(18)(a) (1995).
1996]
173
: Nova Law Review 21, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
als are simply not hearsay because they are not within the definition of
hearsay. Generally, only a "declaratory" statement can be considered
hearsay. Interrogatory, imperative, or exclamatory statements are not within
the definition of hearsay because they are not statements of opinions or facts
similar to a declaratory statement.1 43 Therefore, the questions by the CI,
asking what kind of car the defendant would be in, should not be considered
hearsay, since they are not declarations of opinion or fact.'
44
The statement could also be considered nonhearsay because it was not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but was relevant for the following
reasons: 1) to demonstrate that the defendant engaged in the conversation
with the CI and took part in plans to supply illegal drugs; 2) to demonstrate
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the CI; and 3) to rebut the defen-
dant's entrapment claim. 45 The statement is not needed to prove that the
143. See United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that while
an "assertion" is not defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the term has the connotation of
a positive declaration); Lark v. State, 617 So. 2d 782, 789 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that the defendant's statement to police investigator, "Who shot Wes Butler?" was
not hearsay. "We find that Lark's query was not an oral assertion."). See also Olin G.
Wellborn III, The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 TEx. L. REV. 49,
73 (1982), which provides: "[A] verbal expression is hearsay only if it is (1) a declarative
sentence (2) the terms of which 'affirm positively, assuredly, plainly or strongly,' the matter
that it is offered to prove." Id. Since generally, only declarative statements can be considered
hearsay, a question to someone should not fall within the definition of hearsay.
144. Whenever a statement is entered into evidence as nonhearsay and therefore, not for
the truth of the matter asserted, a limiting instruction can be requested that the truth of the
matter not be argued to the jury. That limiting instruction was apparently not requested at the
time of the entry of the statement, nor was an objection or a limiting instruction requested at
the time the statements were used in closing argument. A contemporaneous objection is
needed to preserve an issue for review. FLA. STAT. § 90.104. There was none here.
Therefore, this issue should not have been heard, let alone used to reverse a conviction.
145. See Warner v. Walker, 500 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
hearsay statements concerning purported drug use by custodial parent's new husband was
admissible for limited purpose of showing child's knowledge of drugs); City of Miami v.
Fletcher, 167 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (holding that proof that a statement was
made was relevant to show knowledge of dangerous condition). Although the defendant
allegedly borrowed the car from the CI, it was unusual that the defendant did not make some
inquiry when the CI asked what type of car the defendant would be driving. One would think
that the defendant would say, "Hey, what do you mean, what kind of car am I in, I'm in your
car." Therefore, maybe it could also be argued that the failure to correct this inconsistency or
the defendant's silence demonstrates the defendant's knowledge of the ownership of the car
and rebuts his assertion of entrapment. The defendant's silence in the face of this unusual
question might be considered an adoptive admission under section 90.803(18)(b). Under
limited circumstances, a party's failure to deny a statement made by a third party will give rise
to the inference that the party's silence is an admission of the truth of such statement (i.e. that
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defendant was really in a gray Nissan, but to prove the lack of knowledge of
the type of car that defendant was driving (i.e. it is not proving the truth of
the matter asserted, that defendant drove a gray Nissan, but the fact was
relevant to prove the lack of knowledge on the CI's part and used to rebut
the defendant's entrapment argument). Therefore, the statements were
properly admitted; the dissent was correct, and this case was improperly
reversed.
B. Prior Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence
In a very important hearsay case for prosecutors and defense attorneys,
the Supreme Court of Florida used some fancy footwork and circuitous
reasoning to conclude that a prior inconsistent statement' 46 that is taken as
part of a discovery deposition, pursuant to rule 3.220147 is not admissible
under section 90.801(2)(a), as substantive evidence. This case will, unfortu-
nately, only add to the complexity and problems associated with criminal
depositions, as the high court obfuscates the true meaning of a trial as a
"search for the truth."
In State v. Green,148 the defendant appealed from a trial court's convic-
tion of sexual battery and lewd, lascivious, and indecent assault on a child.'
49
The fourteen-year-old child was also mildly retarded. In a defense deposi-
tion, the child victim implicated the defendant with statements about specific
sexual offenses he had committed upon her. At trial, however, she recanted
these earlier accusations. During the trial, she accused another man as the
person who forced her to have sex. The prosecution used section
90.801(2)(a),150 the victim's prior deposition testimony taken under oath, to
the CI did not know what type of car the defendant would be in because the CI did not lend
him his car). See Daughtery v. State, 269 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Johnson
v. State, 249 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
146. Section 90.801(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes, provides in part:
(2) A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement
is:
(a) Inconsistent with the declarant's testimony and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a
deposition.
FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(a) (1989) (emphasis added).
147. FLA. R. CPdM. P. 3.220(h).
148. 667 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1995).
149. Id. at 757.
150. The prosecution also utilized section 90.803(23), the child hearsay exception, to
elicit from the victim's sister and sister-in-law the accusations the victim had related to them
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A very divided First District Court of Appeal reversed the defendant's
conviction.1 52 The district court found that the deposition statements were
admissible as substantive evidence, pursuant to section 90.801(2)(a). 153
However, that evidence standing alone was insufficient to convict the
defendant, because the only evidence that the defendant had committed a
crime was that single out-of-court statement.
54
The Supreme Court of Florida began its analysis with the interpretation
and use of section 90.801(2)(a).155 Prior to the adoption of the Florida
Evidence Code,t56 prior inconsistent statements could never be admitted as
substantive evidence. The adoption of the Florida Evidence Code allowed,
for the first time, the use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive
evidence.
In Moore v. State, 57 the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted the words
"other proceedings" found in section 90.801(2)(a) to mean Florida grand
jury proceedings. 58 The supreme court found that since section 90.801(2)(a)
was patterned after Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,159 and the
federal rules were interpreted to include grand jury proceedings, prior
inconsistent statements made in a Florida grand jury proceeding came within
the confines of section 90.801(2)(a).1t The Supreme Court of Florida in
concerning the defendant. These statements were allowed after extensive findings of
reliability by the trial judge.
151. Statements taken pursuant to section 90.801(2)(a) can be used for impeachment and
for substantive evidence. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(a). See EHRHARDT, supra note 48, § 801.7;
Bruschi, supra note 70, at 1162.
152. Green, 667 So. 2d at 758.
153. Id.
154. Id. See State v. Moore, 485 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1986) (holding that prior inconsistent
statements standing alone are insufficient for a criminal conviction).
155. Green, 667 So. 2d at 758 (analyzing FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(a)).
156. The effective date of the Florida Evidence Code was July 1, 1979 for criminal ac-
tions and was applicable to all civil actions pending on or brought after October 1, 1981.
157. 452 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1984).
158. lad at 562.
159. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1).
160. Moore, 452 So. 2d at 562. Florida and federal grand jury proceedings rarely have
opposing counsel available to cross-examine or ask any questions of the witnesses. It is
generally the prosecution presenting the evidence to the grand jury and questioning the
witnesses without any questions from an opposing viewpoint. The grand jurors can ask
questions; however, they are not in an adversarial position. It seems incomprehensible how a
grand jury proceeding, which includes only one side, the prosecution, could produce more
trustworthy and reliable evidence than a criminal deposition with both sides, the defense and
[Vol. 21:149
176
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss1/1
Bruschi
Green concluded that federal interpretations of the rule could not be utilized
in this instance because Florida discovery rules regarding depositions are
much broader than Federal discovery rules 61 regarding depositions.
162
Therefore, no meaningful interpretation of a federal precedent could be used.
In Green, the Supreme Court of Florida recognized that the Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure have two types of depositions available in
criminal cases. First, depositions which are taken to perpetuate testimony
brought under rule 3.1900) and second, depositions which are taken for the
purpose of discovery brought under rule 3.220(h).163
Depositions under rule 3.1900) are taken for the specific purpose of
entering the deposition at trial in a criminal case for substantive evidence.
This is similar to Rule 1.330 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.164 The
key here being that under either situation, subject to objections, the deposi-
tion can be read to a jury as substantive evidence. 165 The Supreme Court of
Florida found that depositions taken pursuant to rule 3.220 are for discovery
purposes only and:
How a lawyer prepares for and asks questions of a deposition wit-
ness whose testimony may be admissible at trial as substantive evi-
dence under rule 3.190 is entirely different from how a lawyer pre-
pares for and asks questions of a witness being deposed for discov-
ery purposes under rule 3.220. In effect, the knowledge that a
deposition witness's testimony can be used substantively at trial
may have a chilling effect on a lawyer's questioning of such a wit-
ness.
166
the prosecution, in attendance and asking questions. The supreme court's ruling that criminal
depositions under rule 3.220 were not intended to qualify as substantive evidence under
section 90.801(2)(a) flies in the face of logic and reason. What raises testimony given in a
grand jury proceeding to the level of being trustworthy and reliable, with only one side present
and asking questions, above a criminal deposition with both sides present and the witness
answering both sides' questions under oath? This is illogical, at best, and unsound and
inconsistent reasoning, at worst.
161. Federal criminal discovery rules generally do not allow depositions of witnesses,
unlike Florida's discovery rules, which allow depositions in criminal felony cases, and for
good cause, in criminal misdemeanor cases.
162. Green, 667 So. 2d at 759.
163. Id.
164. FLA. R. Civ. P. § 1.330.
165. Green, 667 So. 2d at 759.
166. Id. It seems what the Supreme Court of Florida is saying between the lines is that
since 90% of depositions in criminal cases are taken by the defense, the defense attorney
would not ask a question that would incriminate his client, for fear that this could be used as
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The only use of rule 3.1900) is to perpetuate testimony. It is generally
used by the prosecution, when securing the witness at trial would be impos-
sible. The most common use is when the witness will not be alive for the
trial. The prosecution moves to perpetuate the testimony and then the whole
deposition can be read to the jury. The cross-examination by the defense
attorney can also be read to the jury and all testimony is subject to objec-
tions. In reality, this section operates similarly to Rule 1.330 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure. The prosecution does not perpetuate testimony in
anticipation of a deposed witness changing his testimony and neither does
the defense. 67 Nevertheless, based on this court's ruling, it would be wise
substantive evidence at trial, if the witness recanted his or her testimony. This is absolutely
absurd and flies in the face of the main tenet of what a trial is all about, a "Search For The
Truth." This search is aided by the evidence code, which assists the court and attorneys in
presenting only trustworthy and reliable information to the trier of fact. Testimony given
before a grand jury with only one side present is simply not more trustworthy than evidence
given before two adversarial opponents. It is illogical and irrational to believe otherwise. We
devised an adversarial system of justice, and that wonderful engine called cross-examination,
to seek out and find the truth. It is the common belief of many jurors and lay people alike that
the courts and attorneys do not present them with all the evidence. This is probably a true
statement when cases such as this fly in the face of logic and reason.
The logic which the supreme court uses is that an attorney in a discovery deposition would
be less likely to ask certain questions because of the chilling effect on the lawyer's questioning
of the witness, if the testimony could be used substantively at trial. This is absolutely absurd
and if you apply this logic to a grand jury proceeding, you are faced with the unpleasant
conclusion that the prosecutor will only ask the witnesses questions which would be favorable
to getting an indictment. This clearly does not bolster the trustworthiness or reliability of the
statements made at a grand jury proceeding. Therefore, it is fallacious reasoning at best to
assume that a grand jury proceeding falls under the ambit of section 90.801(2)(a), and is
therefore considered reliable and trustworthy evidence, but a criminal deposition taken under
oath and with two adversarial opponents questioning the witness, is not sufficiently reliable
and trustworthy.
The witness is under oath and is subject to perjury; why are these safeguards included in a
discovery deposition? Why not just take an unsworn statement? It makes no sense. If the
statement falls within the evidence code, it should come in at the trial.
167. However, it is apparent that in child molestation and rape cases, the prosecution
should move to perpetuate testimony under rule 3.1900). Rule 3.190(j)(2) specifically allows
for a deposition of this sort:
If the defendant or the state desires to perpetuate the testimony of a witness
living in or out of the state whose testimony is material and necessary to the
case, the same proceedings shall be followed as provided in the preceding subdi-
vision, but the testimony of the witness may be taken before an official court re-
porter, transcribed by the reporter, and filed in the trial court.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.1900)(2) (emphasis added). Additionally, rule 3.1900)(1) states that
perpetuation is desirable if the witness is outside the jurisdiction of the court or may not be
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for both the defense and prosecution to only take depositions under rule
3.190 of material witnesses, for fear that if the witness changes his or her
testimony at trial, the advocate will not be able to impeach the witness and
argue the statement as substantive evidence.
In criminal cases, discovery depositions cannot be read to a jury as
substantive evidence, as in civil cases.168 However, a deposition, whether
taken in a civil or criminal case, should be allowed in evidence if the
testimony falls within the ambit of the Florida Evidence Code. The purpose
of the evidence code in the search for the truth is to filter out unreliable and
untrustworthy evidence and to only allow that testimony which is trustwor-
thy and reliable to go to the trier of fact. There is no logical basis for
disallowing evidence, which clearly falls within the ambit of the evidence
code, based on whether the deposition is offered in a criminal or civil case.
Professor Ehrhardt, in his treatise on Florida evidence, points out that:
the only depositions that are admissible [in criminal cases] are
those taken to perpetuate testimony in compliance with Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.1900). Thus the admissibility of a discovery
deposition under the Evidence Code differs depending on whether
the deposition is offered in a criminal or civil case. There appears
to be no logical reason to draw the distinction.
69
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that "all present rules
of evidence established by case law or express rules of court are hereby
superseded to the extent they are in conflict with the code."'170 The rules of
criminal procedure determine the admissibility of deposition testimony and
were established by an express rule of the court. When the evidence code
able to attend trial and "the witness's testimony is material, and that it is necessary to take the
deposition to prevent afailure ofjustice." FLA. R. ChuM. P. 3.190(j)(1) (emphasis added).
168. In civil cases, it is important to remember that a discovery deposition can be read to
the jury under two circumstances: 1) the deposition falls within the guidelines of Rule 1.330
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; or 2) the deposition is admissible under the Florida
Evidence Code (i.e. it is relevant and an admission of a party opponent). It is important to
keep in mind that under either scenario, the deposition still cannot be read if it does not meet
the prerequisites of the evidence code. For example, simply because the deposition fits within
rule 1.330, it does not mean it can all be read to the jury. Only the relevant and material parts
can be read. Likewise, simply because parts of the deposition can be read under the evidence
code, it does not mean that double hearsay given in the deposition can be read to the jury,
unless each part of the hearsay has an exception.
169. EHRHaRDT, supra note 11, § 804.1.
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was adopted, it superseded any case law, or rules of court, which were in
conflict with the code. 17 1 If the criminal rules of procedure limit the use of
depositions as evidence, thereby operating as a rule of evidence, they have
been superseded by the Florida Evidence Code to the extent the criminal
rule of procedure conflicts with the evidence code. Therefore, section
90.801(2)(a) controls, and that part of the deposition which was inconsistent
with the victim's trial testimony should have been admissible as substantive
evidence.
The supreme court's statement in Green that, "[tlo permit the use of
rule 3.220 depositions as substantive evidence would discourage and chill
the use of discovery depositions and would limit the criminal pre-trial
discovery process"' 172 is unreasonable and illogical. The simple and limited
use of inconsistent statements in a criminal discovery deposition as substan-
tive evidence will in no way limit or chill the criminal pre-trial discovery
process. The reliability and trustworthiness of testimony gathered in a
criminal discovery deposition and the way a criminal discovery deposition is
taken and utilized by both sides will not change in any manner. Any
contention otherwise simply demonstrates the lack of understanding between
our appellate judiciary and the day-to-day work of those trial attorneys for
the prosecution and the defense who toil in the criminal justice system.1 73 A
trial is a search for the truth. The evidence code should perpetuate that goal
and not subvert it in an attempt to place form over substance.
C. Child Hearsay Statements
In A.E. v. State,'74 the defendant appealed an adjudication which
declared the defendant delinquent, for committing a sexual battery upon a
171. Id.
172. Green, 667 So. 2d at 759.
173. Green is another tough case making bad law. The supreme court was clearly con-
cemed that the victim was retarded, had accused other individuals of the crime, and that a
conviction based solely on the prior inconsistent statements of the victim would create too
great a risk of convicting an innocent accused. These sentiments are significant in the court's
determination of this case. However, the admission of the statements under section
90.801(2)(a) as substantive evidence would not have changed the outcome of the court's
ruling, since inconsistent statements standing alone are insufficient as a matter of law to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Moore, 485 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1986). Therefore,
the district court of appeal's finding, that the testimony from the deposition was admissible as
substantive evidence under section 90.801(2)(a), should have been upheld by the supreme
court.
174. 668 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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five-year-old girl. 175 The defendant had a non-jury trial and the State called
three witnesses to testify regarding out of court statements made by the child
victim. The victim's statements to each witness included specific allegations
of the sexual battery and an identification of the defendant as the perpetrator.
The State introduced the statements pursuant to the applicable section
90.803(23) of the Florida Statutes.176 This section authorized the introduc-
tion of hearsay statements of the child victim, if the statements are shown to
be trustworthy and reliable. 177 The defense objected to the admission of the
statements under the child hearsay exception, since the trial court did not
make specific findings of fact on the record as to the basis for its ruling. At
the conclusion of the trial, the defendant was found guilty and adjudicated
delinquent.
178
On appeal, the defendant maintained that the trial court erred by not
making the requisite findings of facts as required by section 90.803(23)(c). 179
The State conceded that the trial court did not comply with the statutory
prerequisites, but argued that there was no reversible error because the
requirement of the statute pertains only to jury trials.180  However, no
authority for this proposition was cited by the State or found by the appellate
court. In fact, contrary to the State's assertion, if the trial court intends to
use the hearsay evidence as a basis for its ruling in a nonjury trial, then it
must support the use of the hearsay statements, by demonstrating that the
prerequisites for the hearsay evidence have been complied with.18 1 In this
way, the reliability and trustworthiness of the evidence will be met.
175. Id at 705.
176. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1993).
177. Id. Section 90.803(23) provides that out of court statements made by a child victim
with a physical, mental, emotional, or developmental age of eleven or less, describing any act
of sexual abuse, are admissible if the source of information or the method or circumstances by
which the statement is reported indicate trustworthiness, and if the court finds that the time,
content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. Id.
Subsection (c) of the statute directs the trial court to make specific findings of fact on the
record as to the basis for a ruling under this subsection. Id. § 90.803(23)(c).
178. A.E., 668 So. 2d at 705.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. This proposition is probably easier to understand by viewing another hearsay excep-
tion. If the court used an excited utterance, under section 90.803(2), as a basis for its ruling,
yet the prerequisites for an excited utterance were not met, i.e. the statement was not made in
relation to a startling event, while the declarant was under the stress of excitement, then the
statement may not be trustworthy, because there is room for reflective thought and fabrication.
If the trial judge used a hearsay statement, which may have been a fabrication, and therefore
untrustworthy, as the basis for his ruling, without other substantiating evidence, the ruling
1996]
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If there is other evidence, notwithstanding the hearsay evidence, then
the trial court's ruling might be sustained. However, the appellate court
noted that "[t]he child never testified concerning penile penetration, and
therefore, in an effort to establish the elements of the offense, the state
necessarily relied upon the hearsay evidence regarding the child victim's
out-of-court statements. '182 If the trial court relied on the hearsay state-
ments, and the prerequisites were not met, the conviction could be based on
unreliable and untrustworthy evidence. This is insufficient for a conviction.
The district court concluded that based on the evidence presented at trial, the
lower court must have relied on the hearsay evidence in finding the defen-
dant guilty as charged.183 Therefore, the district court vacated the defen-
dant's conviction.
1 84
D. Statements Against Penal Interest
In Jones v. State,18 5 the Supreme Court of Florida examined the use of
hearsay statements against penal interest,186 in denying a convicted killer's
motion for post conviction relief.187 On May 23, 1981, a police officer was
shot in his squad car in Jacksonville, Florida. Officers investigating the
scene learned that the shots had been fired from a nearby apartment com-
plex. Upon investigating the complex, the police came upon the defendant
and his cousin in their apartment. During a cursory search of the apartment,
the officers found several high-powered rifles in plain view. Later, the
could be in error. It could be based on unreliable, untrustworthy, and essentially, inadmissible
evidence.
182. A.E., 668 So. 2d at 706.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 678 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1996).
186. Section 90.804(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes provides in part:
(2) HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS.-The following are not excluded under s.
90.802, provided that the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(c) Statement against interest.-A statement which, at the time of its making,
was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest or tended
to subject the declarant to liability or to render invalid a claim by the declarant
against another, so that a person in the declarant's position would not have made
the statement unless he or she believed it to be true. A statement tending to ex-
pose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is in-
admissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the
statement.
FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(c) (1995) (emphasis added).
187. Jones, 678 So. 2d at 315.
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defendant confessed and signed a statement incriminating himself and
exonerating his cousin. The defendant was convicted after a jury trial and
sentenced to death.188
The defendant filed numerous motions for post-conviction relief,
claiming newly discovered evidence. During an evidentiary hearing on his
last motion for post-conviction relief, the defendant claimed that another
individual, Glen Schofield, confessed to the murder of the police officer.
The trial court excluded the confession of Schofield at the hearing. The
defendant argued that Schofield's confession was admissible, and the trial
court erred because the alleged confessions were declarations against penal
interest.
The supreme court began its analysis by stating that for a statement
against penal interest to be admissible, section 90.804(2) requires a showing
that the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 18 9 The party seeking to
introduce a statement against penal interest, in this case, the defendant, has
the burden of establishing the unavailability of the declarant. 190 The su-
preme court determined that the defendant did not carry this burden. 191
At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution stated that Schofield was
available to testify. However, the defense refused to call him and instead,
stated to the court that Schofield would merely take the stand and deny that
he confessed to the murder of the police officer. 92 The supreme court aptly
stated that:
Contrary to Jones' attorney's position, we do not know what
Schofield would have said had he been called as a witness. The
burden was on Jones to establish that Schofield was unavailable
and Jones failed to meet that burden. Consequently, we find that
Schofield's alleged confessions are not admissible under the decla-
ration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule.193
188. Id. at 310.
189. Id. at 313.
190. Id. at 314.
191. Id.
192. Apparently, the defense attorney handling the post-conviction hearing spent much
time in preparation and in finding witnesses and newly discovered evidence. It is a shame the
same attorney did not spend the time to learn that merely stating that someone will change his
or her testimony is insufficient. It is also a shame that the attorney did not read the evidentiary
rule regarding the unavailability of witnesses, especially when the party is the proponent of the
evidence.
193. Jones, 678 So. 2d at 314.
1996]
183
: Nova Law Review 21, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
The supreme court went on to find that the defendant also had the
burden of presenting corroborating circumstances demonstrating the trust-
worthiness of Schofield's confessions.' 94 The supreme court did not reach
the determination of whether the defendant carried this burden, since the
defendant did not demonstrate that Schofield was unavailable.
95
This case is a good reminder that attorneys who attempt to use any
hearsay exception in section 90.804 must carry the burden of demonstrating
that the declarant is unavailable. Otherwise, the evidence will be inadmissi-
ble. Additionally, for statements against penal interest, attorneys have the
burden of presenting corroborating circumstances that demonstrate the
trustworthiness of the statements they wish to admit under this exception.
t96
The Supreme Court of Florida again addressed the admissibility of the
declaration against penal interest hearsay exception in Farina v. State.197 In
Farina, two brothers were convicted of the fatal shooting of a seventeen-
year-old employee of a Taco Bell restaurant and sentenced to death.' 98 On
appeal, Anthony Farina argued that he was denied a fair trial when incrimi-
nating statements of his co-defendant brother were offered against him at
trial. 199 The State contended that the co-defendant's taped conversations
194. Id.; see also United States v. Seabolt, 958 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 971 (1993) (holding that statements by one criminal to another is more likely to be
jailhouse bragging than a statement against penal interest). The holding in Seabolt is a strong
reason why other corroborating circumstances must be present before a statement against
penal interest will be considered trustworthy enough to be admitted into evidence.
195. Jones, 678 So. 2d at 314.
196. The supreme court also went on to examine this case from the perspective of
whether the statements were admissible under due process principles enunciated in Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Jones, 678 So. 2d at 314. The supreme court in Jones
distinguished Chambers, finding that at the time Chambers was decided, Mississippi did not
have a hearsay exception for declarations against penal interest; however, Florida did have
such a rule in place at the time of Jones' trial. Id. Additionally, the court found that the
alleged confessions in the present case did not have the persuasive assurances of trustworthi-
ness that was present in Chambers. Id. Therefore, Chambers is distinguishable and the
statements are not admissible under due process principles. Id.
197. 21 Fla. L. Weekly S176 (April 18, 1996).
198. Id. at S176.
199. Id. at S177. This occurs when there is a joint trial of two defendants. The co-
defendants cannot be called to the stand by one another. This would violate their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, the statements entered by the
State against one defendant and admissible under the evidence code against that defendant
may not be admissible against the other co-defendant. This is especially true when the
statement or confession incriminates the other co-defendant. This would violate the co-
defendant's right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. This is generally
called a "Bruton violation" after Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), cert. denied,
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were properly admitted as statements against penal interest pursuant to
section 90.804(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes.20
Although the statement may be properly admissible as a statement
against penal interest, 201 the problem occurs when the co-defendant's
statement or confession incriminates or implicates another defendant and is
admitted during their joint trial.202 However, the United States Supreme
397 U.S. 1014 (1970). In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is violated when a co-defendant's confession is
admitted at the joint trial, despite the fact that the jury is instructed that the confession is
admissible only against the co-defendant. If the statement is independently admissible against
the co-defendant, then he cannot complain that his confrontation rights were violated.
Hearsay falling within "a firmly rooted hearsay exception" is presumptively reliable and bears
sufficient indicia of reliability. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). However, even if
hearsay evidence does not fall within "a firmly rooted hearsay exception" and is thus
presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes, it may
nonetheless meet Confrontation Clause reliability standards if it is supported by a showing of
particularized guaranties of trustworthiness. Id. at 66.
200. Farina, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at S177 (citing FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(c) (1991)).
201. The State argued this as a statement against the declarant, Jeffery Farina's, penal
interest under section 90.804(2)(c). However, the statement implicated his brother and co-
defendant, Anthony Farina. The statement, in and of itself, against Jeffery Farina would
clearly be an admission of a party opponent, since Jeffery Farina was a party. See FLA. STAT. §
90.803(18) (1995). Therefore, the statement would be admissible against Jeffery as an
admission under section 90.803(18). The State apparently argued for entry of the statement
against Anthony under section 90.804(2)(c), in an attempt to avoid a violation of the
Confrontation Clause. A firmly rooted hearsay exception generally does not violate Confron-
tation Clause principles. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. A declaration against penal interest (with
facts similar to the Farina case) which fits within the hearsay exception should be considered
firmly rooted. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 551 (1986) (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
However, the United States Supreme Court has stated that these statements are less reliable
than ordinary hearsay because of a co-defendant's strong motivation to implicate the other
defendant and to exonerate himself. Id. at 541. The Supreme Court of Florida followed this
dictate and indicated that confrontation issues will arise when a co-defendant's statement
against penal interest incriminates another defendant in a joint trial. Farina, 21 Fla. L.
Weekly at S177. Statements and confessions made by co-defendants which implicate the
other defendants in a joint trial are considered presumptively unreliable because of the strong
incentive to throw the blame on the accomplice.
202. Generally, section 90.804 is used when the declarant is an unavailable non-party
witness. Here, the declarant was a party. It is uncertain if the State felt that admission under
section 90.804(2)(c) would automatically resolve the confrontation problem against the
defendant, Anthony Farina, since the statement here was inherently reliable, given the facts of
this case and, therefore, no further showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
would be needed.
Prior to 1990, the Florida Evidence Code contained the following language: "A statement
or confession which is offered against the accused in a criminal action, and which is made by a
co-defendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused, is not within this
1996]
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Court has ruled that the presumption of unreliability that attaches to a co-
defendant's confession or statement may be rebutted where there is a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.2 °3
The supreme court, in examining the facts of Farina, found that the
"indicia of reliability" existed to rebut the presumption of unreliability.
204
The supreme court found that neither brother had an incentive to shift the
blame during the conversations, as these were not statements or confessions
to the police. 20 5 Both brothers were calmly discussing the crime in the back
of the police car. Unbeknownst to them, they were being taped. Since
neither was aware that the conversations were being taped, it was unlikely
that the motivation for fabrication was present. The court felt that Anthony
was present and confronting his brother face-to-face throughout the conver-
sations. 206 Anthony could have taken issue with what was said during this
conversation; however, this did not occur. The brothers tacitly agreed on
what was being said and discussed details of the crime. This is different
from the situation where a confession from one co-defendant has been taken
by the police. The other co-defendant in this situation is not confronting the
confessor and the confessing defendant has an incentive to shift the blame to
his partner in crime. The supreme court determined that the taped conversa-
tions were admissible, since there was a showing of particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness. 207 Therefore, the court held that a confrontation
violation did not exist and the statement was properly admitted under section
90.804(2)(c).2 8
IX. AUTHENTICATION
Mills v. Barker2°9 was one of the only cases during the survey period to
discuss authentication and self-authentication under the Florida Evidence
exception." The import of this language was to clearly remove section 90.804(2)(c) from
being the possible entry point of hearsay evidence against a codefendant in a joint trial. This
was in an apparent attempt to codify Bruton. However, this language was deleted in 1990
because it was felt that this sentence may have broadened the impact of Bruton, by excluding
evidence not specified by that decision.
203. Lee, 476 U.S. at 543.





209. 664 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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Code.2 10  The issue in Mills was whether a modification agreement, 211
signed and notarized, was properly authenticated for admission during a
replevin action in a Florida circuit court.2 t2 The circuit court excluded the
agreement on the grounds that the document could not be properly authenti-
cated. The district court reversed and held that although the document could
not be authenticated by extrinsic evidence, the document was self-
authenticating and therefore, admissible. 3
Before evidence can be admitted at a trial or at a hearing, it must first be
identified or authenticated.21 4 Section 90.901 of the Florida Statutes
provides that "[a]uthentication or identification of evidence is required as a
condition precedent to its admissibility. The requirements of this section are
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims. 215
Evidence may be authenticated by the testimony of a witness who has
personal knowledge of facts which are sufficient to authenticate the evi-
dence. It has long been held that a witness may testify about having seen the
writer sign his or her name on several occasions and is able to identify the
writer's signature.216 This is what happened in Mills. The proponent of the
agreement, Mr. Mills, testified regarding the authentication of the modifica-
tion agreement. Although Mr. Mills identified two of the signatures on the
agreement, he could not properly identify the third signature purporting to be
that of a Mr. Orland. Mr. Mills had never seen Mr. Orland affix his signa-
ture to any document, even though he had seen a signature which was
purported to be Mr. Orland's on more than one occasion. Therefore, the
district court ruled that Mr. Mills testimony was insufficient to authenticate
the modification agreement under section 90.901.217
Although extrinsic testimony may not be sufficient to authenticate a
document, the document may be admissible if is self-authenticating under
210. Id. at 1057.
211. The agreement was acknowledged by all parties to be governed by the law of Cali-
fornia. Id. at 1056.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1057.
214. Even if the evidence has been authenticated, it is not automatically admitted into
evidence. If an exclusionary rule excludes the evidence, the evidence is inadmissible. See
United States v. One 1968 Piper Navajo Twin Engine Aircraft, 594 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding that a certain authenticated document should be excluded as hearsay).
215. FLA. STAT. § 90.901 (1995).
216. See Pittman v. State, 41 So. 385, 393 (Fla. 1906).
217. Mills, 664 So. 2d at 1057.
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section 90.902.218 There are a number of exceptions to the requirement of
using extrinsic evidence to prove a document is authentic.219 When there is
sufficient information contained in the document to meet one of these
exceptions, the document is self-authenticating. The document proves itself
and is admissible without further proof of extrinsic evidence.
In Mills, the district court found that the document was self-
authenticating and admissible.220  The district court determined that the
modification agreement was self-authenticating under section 90.902(9).221
The district court read this in conjunction with section 92.50(2), which
provides that a notary public and certain judicial officers may administer
oaths and acknowledgments.22  The certificate of the notary public is
presumptive evidence that the person appeared before the notary and
acknowledged the execution of the document.223 In the Mills case, the
signatures were acknowledged by a notary public, who signed the modifica-
tion agreement and attached his seal. Since the signatures were acknowl-
edged by a notary public, and the legislature has declared that a document
that is acknowledged by a notary public is presumptively authentic and
genuine, the modification agreement was self-authenticating and should have
been admitted into evidence.
224
The district court also examined the necessity of proving that the notary
public who signed the agreement was, in fact, a notary.225 The district court
dismissed this by explaining that unless a statute specifically requires
evidence of official character to accompany the official act which it author-
izes, no additional proof is needed.226 In fact, extrinsic proof of the fact that
218. FLA. STAT. § 90.902 (1995). This section states that extrinsic evidence of authentic-
ity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required for documents falling under any of
the ten enumerated exceptions listed in this rule. Id.
219. Id. § 90.902(1)-(10).
220. Mills, 664 So. 2d at 1057.
221. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 90.902(9). This section reads in part: "Extrinsic evidence of
authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required for ... [a]ny signature,
document, or other matter declared by the Legislature to be presumptively or prima facie
genuine or authentic." Id.
222. Mills, 664 So. 2d at 1057 (citing FLA. STAT. § 92.50(2) (1995)).
223. Id. See also Mills v. Hamilton, 163 So. 857 (Fla. 1935).
224. The side opposing the admission of a self-authenticating document can still attack
the genuineness of the document; however, the document is admissible subject to the weight
the jury intends to give it. See Sunnyvale Maritime Co. v. Gomez, 546 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1989).
225. Mills, 664 So. 2d at 1057-58.
226. Id. at 1058.
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the notary was, in fact, a notary would destroy the whole premise behind
self-authenticating documents, which is that no other extrinsic proof is
needed to prove that the document is genuine. Since the document itself
provides sufficient information to be admitted without further proof of its
genuineness, any additional extrinsic evidence is redundant and unnecessary.
X. ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE
During the survey period, the Florida Legislature made very few
changes to the Florida Evidence Code. Although the new code sections bear
directly on the admissibility of evidence at trial, no major changes were
forthcoming this year.
A. Admissibility of Paternity Determinations in Certain Criminal
Prosecutions
During the survey period, the Florida Legislature created section
90.4025 of the Florida Statutes, which deals with the admissibility of
paternity evidence in a criminal prosecution.227 In criminal prosecutions for
sexual battery and child abuse, evidence of the paternity of the child will be
admissible under this section. This new evidence section will facilitate the
prosecution in establishing the identity of the offender.
B. Prohibition Against a Prisoner Submitting Nondocumentary
Physical Evidence Without Authorization of the Court
During the survey period, the Florida Legislature created section 92.351
of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits prisoners from submitting nondocu-
mentary evidence to the trial court without its authorization.228
227. Ch. 96-215, § 8, 1996 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 575, 579 (West) (creating FLA. STAT. §
90.4025 (1996)). This section reads as follows: "If a person less than 18 years of age gives
birth to a child and the paternity of that child is established under chapter 742, such evidence
of paternity is admissible in a criminal prosecution under s. 794.011, s. 794.05, s. 800.04, and
s. 827.04(4)." Id.
228. Ch. 96-106, § 3, 1996 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 72, 74 (West) (creating FLA. STAT. §
92.351 (1996)). This section provides:
(1) No prisoner as defined by s. 57.085 who is a party to a judicial proceed-
ing may submit evidence or any other item that is not in paper document form to
a court or clerk of court without first obtaining authorization from the court.
This prohibition includes, but is not limited to, all nondocumentary evidence or
items offered in support of a motion, pleading, or other document filed with the
court. This prohibition does not preclude a prisoner who is appearing in person
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XI. CONCLUSION
A trial is a search for the truth. The evidence code facilitates that
search by allowing only trustworthy and reliable evidence to be presented to
the fact finder for a resolution of the case. The Supreme Court of Florida's
guidelines regarding the admissibility of DNA evidence will promote that
search for the truth, by allowing only DNA evidence that has met certain
guidelines into evidence. This will be especially beneficial to prosecutors
and defense attorneys who prepare for DNA evidentiary issues. In contrast,
the Supreme Court of Florida's ruling on prior inconsistent statements used
in criminal cases may invariably obscure that search. Although this ruling
will not affect how the attorneys will question witnesses during discovery
depositions, it may well affect how prosecutors and defense attorneys
approach discovery depositions, if they feel there is a chance a witness may
later change his or her story. Finally, the question of the admissibility of
child abuse profiles is sure to reach the Supreme Court of Florida during the
coming year. Hopefully, the court's analysis will facilitate trial attorneys in
their never-ending search for truth and justice in our complex legal system.
or through counsel before a court at a trial or hearing from submitting physical
evidence to the court at the appropriate time.
(2) A corrections or detention facility for prisoner may conduct a cursory ex-
amination of the outside of any package or other mailing from a prisoner to a
court or clerk of court of this state to determine whether the package or mailing
contains materials other than paper documents. If such package or mailing ap-
pears to contain materials other than paper documents, the facility shall refuse to
forward it until the sender presents a court order authorizing the mailing of such
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I. INTRODUCTION
For the second year running, the Florida Legislature has not made
significant changes in its juvenile justice and child welfare systems and
juvenile code, with limited exceptions highlighted in this article. However,
the intermediate appellate courts have been very busy interpreting legislative
changes made in the 1993 and 1994 sessions, as well as continuing a long
standing practice of repeated corrections of simple, regular, and fundamental
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. B.A., 1967, Colgate University; J.D., 1970, Boston College. The author
thanks Geri Mankoff and Gregory McMahon for their assistance in the preparation of this
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errors made by the trial courts. The intermediate appellate courts have been
most active in the areas of delinquency dispositions and terminations of
parental rights. The Supreme Court of Florida was also active this past year,
albeit in interpreting statutory matters more than constitutional questions.
II. DELINQUENCY
A. Detention Issues
Florida's legislative approach to juvenile detention has varied dramati-
cally over the past two decades. Earlier survey articles in this law review
have discussed the state's fluctuating approach to this issue.' Under Florida
law, as it now stands, an intake counselor or case manager employed by the
Department of Juvenile Justice2 ("DJJ") makes the decision whether or not
to detain a child.3 The decision is based upon a risk assessment instrument
("RAI") which is a device developed by the DJJ.4 The RAI is developed
from statutory detention guidelines which are based most significantly upon
the charge against the juvenile.5 The court has discretion to detain a child in
a placement more restrictive than indicated by the results of the risk assess-
ment instrument, but the court must state, in writing, clear and convincing
reasons for such placement.
6
The trial courts have had difficulty interpreting the detention require-
ments. For example, in S.W. v. Woolsey,7 the trial court securely detained a
youngster after an adjudicatory hearing, despite the fact that the RAI
reflected a score which would not allow for secure detention.8 The court
based the post-adjudication secure detention upon the argument that the
finding of adjudication was a change in circumstances and an aggravating
factor which would allow the court to change the level of detention. 9 First,
1. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REV.
191, 191 n.1 (1995) (citing prior articles that address juvenile detention issues).
2. Effective October 1, 1994, the legislature removed authority from the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services and placed it in a new agency, the Department of Juvenile
Justice. See ch. 94-209, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 1183, 1192 (creating FLA. STAT. § 20.316).
3. FLA. STAT. § 39.044(1)(b) (1995).
4. Id. § 39.042(2)(b) (1995).
5. Id. § 39.042(2)(b)1.
6. See id. § 39.044(2)(f).
7. 673 So. 2d 152 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
8. Id. at 153.
9. Id. Section 39.044(9) of the Florida Statutes provides:
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the appellate court held that the trial court failed to prepare a new RAI,
rescored in compliance with the statute and prior case law.' ° The trial court
had added three points to the original RAI because at trial the child was
found to have committed the charged delinquent act, which the trial court
held was a change of circumstances and an aggravating factor. The appellate
court noted, as a technical matter, that the trial court does not prepare the
RAI, but rather the case manager, an employee of DJJ, does." However,
more importantly, the fact that the child was found to have committed the
delinquent act with which she was charged was not a changed circumstance
as contemplated by the law.1 2 Changed circumstances, by definition, are
circumstances not taken into account in the preparation of the original RAI.'3
Obviously, the delinquent act with which the child was charged had been
taken into account in the preparation of the original RAT.' 4 In fact, the
appellate court explained that the RAI compilation presumes that the act
charged was committed and the points are accordingly assigned. 5 To allow
additional points to be assigned for an act, after the finding had been made
that the act was committed, would result in a double score for the same
event. The court rejected this interpretation and reversed. 16
M.L.F. v. State17 is an example of a case in which the trial court sought
to use post-adjudication secure detention, although it lacked the authority to
hold the child in secure detention, because neither the RAI nor any other
statutory criteria supported the placement. 8  When the child's attorney
objected to the secure detention, which was based upon an RAI score of only
two points, resulting from several second degree misdemeanor adjudications,
but had no other statutory basis, the trial court cavalierly commented as
follows:
If a child is on release status and not detained pursuant to this section, the
child may be placed into secure, nonsecure, or home detention care only pursu-
ant to a court hearing in which the original risk assessment instrument, rescored
based on newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances with the results
recommending detention, is introduced into evidence.
FLA. STAT. § 39.044(9).
10. S.W., 673 So. 2d at 154-55 (citing C.M.T. v. Soud, 662 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1995)); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.044(9).





16. S.W., 673 So. 2d at 155.
17. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1224 (1st Dist. Ct. App. May 20, 1996).
18. Id. at D1224.
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Well, we're going to give the legislature something to think
about and chew on and so forth, some of these edicts and so forth.
They might just feel that's an inherent power of the court to do that
and think it's wonderful legislation. I think what the state and [the
Department of Juvenile Justice representative] said makes a lot of
sense. I wish I could do it even longer. [Appellant], you will be in
secure[] detention for fifteen working days and the Court will
waive the RAI assessment that has been found to have some sig-
nificance by some other courts and [you] will be in secure deten-
tion for fifteen working days for the reasons that were outlined by
[the Department of Juvenile Justice representative], and then home
detention with a monitor after the fifteen working days. 19
The appellate court held that continued detention after adjudication is
only premised upon a finding that it was initially permissible. 20 The child's
RAI did not support placement in secure detention, and none of the statutory
requirements in the Florida Statutes which would permit a court to order
placement more restrictive than that indicated by the RAI, existed.2' Finally,
the court's statement, that the fact that the appellant child had no home to go
to was grounds for detention, is explicitly prohibited by the Florida law.22
Because there are fewer detention facilities in Florida than there are
judicial circuits, occasionally a youngster will be placed in a secure deten-
tion facility located in one judicial circuit, by a court sitting in another
circuit. The issue that arose in T.O. v. Alachua Regional Juvenile Detention
23Center, was whether it was proper for the child to bring a writ of habeas
corpus, challenging the legality of his pre-trial detention within the jurisdic-
tion of the appellate court where he was held in a detention center but where
the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over the trial court that ordered
the detention. 24 The appellate court held that the writ of habeas corpus was
appropriate, given its purpose of determining the legality of the restraint
under which the person is held.2 In such a proceeding, the person named
respondent is the individual holding custody and the one in a position to
physically produce the petitioner. The judge entering the detention order
19. Id. at D1224-25 (alteration in original).
20. Id. at D1225.
21. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(2)(a)-(f).
22. M.L.F., 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1225. See FLA. STAT. § 39.043(l)(d) (1995).
23. 668 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 676 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1996).
24. Id. at 244.
25. Id. at 245.
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was not a proper respondent. More significantly, a court only has authority
to issue a writ of habeas corpus directed to a person within its judicial
jurisdiction.27 The court therefore ruled that the Fifth District Court of
Appeal did not have jurisdiction and found a violation of the detention
statute by the trial court, entitling the juvenile to relief.2 The court recog-
nized that the use of regional detention centers in Florida might result in the
jurisdictional issue being presented again, and for that reason, the court
certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida.
29
In 1994, the legislature amended the juvenile code to allow for post-
adjudication punishment using detention as an alternative. 30  The statute
provides a mandatory period of detention of five days in a secure detention
facility as well as the performance of 100 hours of community service if
there has been a finding of a commission of a first offense that involves the
use or possession of a firearm.3 In T.A. v. Wimberly,32 the child filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the court's order detaining the
child without awaiting the scheduling of a formal disposition hearing or the
preparation of a pre-disposition report. 33 While the statute itself does not
provide explicit guidance, the appellate court nonetheless construed the law
to provide that the imposition of the mandatory five day detention punish-
ment must occur after a formal disposition hearing with a pre-disposition
report.34 Significantly, the court also recognized that, given the time frame
in which the punishment is served, this is the kind of case that is capable of
repetition and likely to evade review.35 The result would be that if the court
were to allow the full period of the penalty to be served before an appeal
could be perfected, this would reasonably be seen as effectively eliminating
the right of appellate review.36 The court, thus, decided the issue.
26. Id. at 244.
27. Id.
28. T.O., 668 So. 2d at 244-45.
29. Id. at 245.
30. See FLA. STAT. § 790.22(9) (1995).
31. See id. § 790.22(9)(a) (providing "[flor a first offense, that the minor serve a manda-
tory period of detention of 5 days in a secure detention facility and perform 100 hours of
community service"); see also Dale, supra note 1, at 203.
32. 660 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
33. Id. at 1131.
34. Id.
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B. Trial Issues
Children, like adults, sometimes come before the juvenile court and a
claim is made that they are incompetent to stand trial for the charge of
juvenile delinquency. The question before the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in T.L. v. State,37 was whether the DJJ may be ordered by the court to
provide treatment in restoring a juvenile's competency so that the child may
stand trial in delinquency proceedings. 38 In T.L., the parties agreed that the
child did not meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization although the
court also found that the child was not competent to proceed to trial. 39 The
trial court concluded that it lacked the authority to mandate either the DJJ or
the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") to provide
services to the child.4° First, the trial court held that the DJJ had no authority
to provide the services because there was no statute or rule obligating the
DJJ to look after a child until the youngster had been adjudicated delin-
quent.41 The trial court also declined to order HRS to provide the treatment
because the Florida law governing involuntary commitment of defendants
who are adjudicated incompetent to stand trial or incompetent for sentenc-
ing42 did not apply to juveniles as juvenile proceedings were governed solely
by the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure and chapter 39.43 Therefore, the
trial court ordered the two agencies to "work together," 44 whatever that
might mean. Then, as reported by the appellate court, the DJJ made a
referral to HRS, and it appeared that HRS would not provide the services
recommended without a court order.45 The child appealed.46
37. 670 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
38. Id. at 172.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 173.
41. Id.
42. See FLA. STAT. § 916.13 (1995).
43. T.L., 670 So. 2d at 173 (citing Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v.
A.E., 667 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)). The court in A.E. held that section 916 of
the Florida Statutes is inapplicable to juvenile proceedings and the juvenile court cannot order
an involuntary commitment of juveniles. A.E., 667 So. 2d at 429. The A.E. court further held
that proceedings should be commenced under sections 39.046, 394.467, and 393.11, and if the
child does not meet the involuntary commitment standards, the appropriate relief should be
ordered pursuant to Rule 8.095 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. Id. at 429-30.
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The appellate court did not do much to resolve the matter. It did find
that the DJJ, by statute after 199447 was responsible for matters involving
juvenile crime before, during, and after formal proceedings are initiated.48 It
further found that the DJJ's budget included costs for contracting with HRS
to provide evaluations, therapy services, and other services for juveniles
charged with felonies who are found to be mentally incompetent to proceed
through the adjudicatory process.49 Furthermore, the court found that HRS
is responsible for administering mental health provisions under chapter 394
of the Florida Statutes, and this includes children who have not yet been
found delinquent.50 Indeed, the juvenile code does provide that if it is
necessary to place a child in a residential facility for services the procedures
and criteria established in chapter 394 are to be used.5 1 The appellate court
found that the statutory scheme requires "interplay between the agencies.'
52
The appellate court remanded the case back to the trial court because the
trial court failed to comply with Rule 8.095 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure, which provides that if a child is incompetent to stand trial but
does not meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization, the trial court shall
order the "'appropriate nondelinquent treatment for the child in order to
restore the child's competence to proceed with an adjudicatory hearing."' 5 3
Because HRS was not a party to the proceedings, the appellate court did not
resolve the dispute between the two agencies as a matter of law.54 Rather, it
ordered the trial court to bring both agencies before it for resolution. 55 The
opinion does nothing to clarify what should happen when both agencies are
before the trial court.
It seems quite clear that the trial court has the power to order the
agencies to resolve their administrative differences and work out an agree-
ment to care for this category of children. Unfortunately, however, it is
common in Florida that the state agencies are unable to administratively
resolve their differences. As a result, the agencies appear before the trial
47. See FLA. STAT. § 39.0206 (1995).
48. T.L., 670 So. 2d at 173. See generally FLA. STAT. § 20.316(1)(b) (1995).
49. T.L., 670 So. 2d at 173.
50. Id. at 173-74.
51. Id. at 174 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.046(2) (1995)). Section 39.046(2) provides that the
"procedures and criteria established in chapter 393, chapter 394, or chapter 397, whichever is
applicable, shall be used." FLA. STAT. § 39.046(2).
52. T.L, 670 So. 2d at 174.
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courts, and ultimately the appellate courts, for failure to carry out statutory
mandates based upon the agencies' belief that the statutory mandates do not
apply to them. This is a long standing problem that has been before the
appellate courts on a number of occasions. 6
C. Adjudicatory Issues
The problem of violence in the schools has received substantial cover-
age in the media and academic circles. 7 Students who commit violent acts
are subject to school disciplinary action 58 and charges of juvenile delin-
quency. In addition, fully independent of chapter 39 and its juvenile delin-
quency provisions, the State of Florida has enacted a statutory civil cause of
action for a protective injunction in cases of repeat violence.59  Alleged
victims of violence may obtain a protective injunction to stop further acts of
violence if they prove the existence of two incidents of violence or stalking
committed by the respondent, one of which must have been within six
months of the filing of the petition, which were directed toward the peti-
tioner or the petitioner's immediate family. 6° In H.K. v. Vocelle,61 a fifteen-
year-old high school student filed a petition for an injunction against
repeated violence seeking protection from a seventeen-year-old classmate
who had physically attacked her on school grounds. 62  The trial court
dismissed the petition on the grounds that chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes
had preempted the repeat violence injunction statute.63 The appellate court
concluded that the civil provisions of the injunction statute applied both to
adult and juvenile respondents.64 The court found that the injunctive action
56. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. State, 655 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Kahn, 639 So. 2d 689
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Sometimes the agency is correct that there is no authority to
obligate them to act. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Jones, 631 So. 2d
348 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Ortiz,
627 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
57. See Jonathan Wren, Alternative Schools for Disruptive Youths: A Cure For What Ails
School Districts Plagued by Violence?, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 307 (1995); Allison C.
Gregory, Officers to Patrol Schools, THE HERALD, June 20, 1996, at Al; Violence in the
Schools, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 25, 1996, at 24.
58. See MICHAEL J. DALE, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CuENT 6-32 (1996).
59. See FLA. STAT. § 784.046(1)(b) (1995).
60. Id.
61. 667 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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was not penal in nature.65 Furthermore, the injunction statute was not
limited to adults and was drafted with the recognition that such relief could
be sought whether or not any other petition, complaint, or cause of action
was currently available or pending between the parties.66 Finally, the
appellate court concluded that even had the trial court been correct that such
relief was only available in a delinquency proceeding in juvenile court, there
was no lack of jurisdiction because the juvenile court was simply a different
administrative division of the circuit court. 67 The appellate court reversed on
the merits, allowing the cause of action to proceed. 68
D. Dispositional Issues
Florida, like all other states, employs a two-part procedure in juvenile
delinquency cases: the adjudicatory stage, discussed earlier, and the dispo-
sitional stage.69 Dispositional hearings are governed by section 39.052(4) of
the Florida Statutes which, at first glance, does not appear to be a compli-
cated law.70 Among the variety of dispositional alternatives provided in
chapter 39 are restitution, community control, and commitment to various
facilities which, in major part, are based upon increasing deprivation of
liberty.71 However, the law has generated a plethora of reported opinions
over the past decade. Among the issues regularly before the appellate
courts, have been whether and if so, how much discretion the court has in
making dispositional decisions, whether the court may change its disposi-
tional decision, and how the adult court chooses to treat a child before that
court for dispositional purposes.
As part of the juvenile delinquency dispositional process, Florida law
requires the court to consider a pre-disposition report.72  The juvenile may
65. Id. at 893.
66. H.K., 667 So. 2d at 893. A new federal statute available to challenge general vio-
lence, as well as school violence, is the 1994 Violence Against Women Act. See 42 U.S.C. §
13981 (1994).
67. H.K., 667 So. 2d at 893.
68. Id.
69. See generally MARK SOLER ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 5-54 to -90
(1996).
70. See FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4) (1995).
71. See id. § 39.054(1)(a) (1995).
72. Section 39.052(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides that the report:
shall indicate and report the child's priority needs, recommendations as to a clas-
sification of risk for the child in the context of his or her program and supervi-
sion needs, and a plan for treatment that recommends the most appropriate
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waive the report requirement, but by supreme court decision, the trial court
must advise the child of his or her rights under the statute and confirm that
the juvenile understands the significance of the waiver of the right to the pre-
disposition report.73 In Lunn v. State,74 the Second District Court of Appeal
held that, while a child may execute a written waiver of the right to a pre-
disposition report, the trial court must question the child personally to
explain his or her rights under chapter 39.75 Failure to do so is reversible
error.
76
Florida law also provides that the court shall provide the reasons for
adjudicating the child delinquent and committing him in writing. The court
must also consider the Department's placement and restrictiveness level
recommendation for the child which, if the court disregards it, the court shall
state its reasons on the record.78 In J.E.W. v. State,79 a child appealed an
adjudication of delinquency after pleading no contest to charges of petty and
grand theft.80 The DJJ subsequently recommended that the disposition be
continued until the child underwent a psychiatric evaluation so that the
agency could complete a pre-disposition report which would contain place-
ment and other recommendations and a treatment plan. Despite the fact that
the DJJ advised the court that the psychiatric evaluation was pending, and
despite the further fact that the Department had not completed the pre-
disposition report, the trial court, incredibly, adjudicated the child delinquent
and then sentenced him to a moderate risk residential level placement
without reducing its order to writing.8' The appellate court held that the
failure to comply with the statutory provisions was reversible error.82 In so
doing, the court referred to a virtual litany of prior appellate court opinions
placement setting to meet the child's needs with the minimum program security
that reasonably ensures public safety.
Id. § 39.052(4)(a).
73. See State v. Berry, 647 So. 2d 830, 832 (Fla. 1994).
74. 675 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
75. Id. at 648.
76. Id.
77. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(e)1; see also Lunn, 675 So. 2d at 648; Thomas v. State, 662
So. 2d 1334, 1335-36 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
78. See FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(e)2-3.
79. 672 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
80. Id. at 73.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 73-74.
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and stated that strict statutory compliance in dispositional hearings is
required under Florida law.
8 3
In Nation v. State,84 the First District Court of Appeal was also faced
with the lack of entry of a written order.85 In that case, the court provided
the trial court with guidance on how to solve the problem of a failure to
make a written report, holding that a written nunc pro tunc sentencing order
86would satisfy the statutory requirements. The court found that a new
sentencing hearing was not required and that is was not necessary that the
child be physically present in court for the ministerial act of entering a
written order conforming to the oral pronouncement of the court.8 7
A juvenile respondent's right to maintain innocence, even at the
dispositional stage of a juvenile delinquency case, was before the Third
District Court of Appeal recently in A.S. v. State.88 In A.S., the child was
charged with the commission of an aggravated battery with a deadly weapon
upon another juvenile.89 The respondent denied the charges and an adjudi-
catory hearing followed in which the child was ultimately adjudicated by the
court to be delinquent as charged. At the dispositional hearing, HRS
recommended that the child not be committed but that he receive a with-
holding of adjudication and be ordered to perform twenty hours of commu-
nity service. The State objected, urging that the juvenile be adjudicated and
committed to a level six facility. A level six facility is a moderate risk
residential facility involving twenty-four hour awake supervision for
youngsters who do not need placement in facilities which are physically
secure.90 The trial court committed the child to a level four juvenile group
treatment home to be followed by fifty hours of community service and
reserved jurisdiction on the issue of restitution to the victim.91 The appellate
court found that the trial court made it clear on the record that its disposition
was significantly influenced by the child's continued protestation of inno-
83. Id. at 73 (citing B.B. v. State, 647 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); M.H. v.
State, 621 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); R.G.S. v. State, 597 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); H.L.L. v. State, 595 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); T.S.J. v.
State, 439 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
84. 668 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
85. Id. at 285.
86. Id. at 286.
87. Id.; see also Bridgewater v. State, 21 Fla. L. Weekly D584 (1st Dist. Ct. App. March
5, 1996).
88. 667 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
89. Id. at 995.
90. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(59)(c) (1995).
91. A.S., 667 So. 2d at 995.
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cence to the charge.92 The appellate court reversed on the basis of the 1968
United States Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Jackson,93 which
held that a judicially imposed penalty which needlessly discourages the
articulation of one's Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty, and which
deters exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial, is
patently unconstitutional.94 The court also relied upon Holton v. State,95 a
Supreme Court of Florida case which held that a trial court violated a
defendant's due process rights by using the protestation of innocence against
the defendant at the trial, as well as during the penalty phase of a criminal
proceeding.96 The appellate court in A.S. reversed, finding that the choice of
plea should never have been a factor in the dispositional decision.97
Of course, the trial court has the power to enter a dispositional order
which is at odds with the predisposition report prepared by DJJ.9 8 The issue
before the Third District Court of Appeal in J.M. v. State,99 was first,
whether a child had a right to appeal from a disposition committing him to
the DJJ's custody and second, what is the standard of review of a court's
departure from an agency recommendation."'0 On the first question, despite
a long dissent by Judge Cope, 01 the majority held that both on the basis of
statutory construction and constitutional interpretation, the child had a right
of appeal.102 The problem which gave rise to the dissent was language in the
dispositional statute which stated that it was the intent of the legislature that
the criteria set forth in the general guideline section are to be followed at the
discretion of the court and are not mandatory procedural requirements in a
dispositional hearing.10 3 The majority read the section narrowly to the effect
that the legislature had not intended to create an appealable issue out of the
fact that the trial court considered only certain criteria and not others in the
list of the factors to be used to determine suitability or non-suitability for
92. Il
93. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
94. 1& at 581.
95. 573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Holton v. Florida, 500 U.S. 960
(1991).
96. Id. at 292.
97. A.S., 667 So. 2d at 996.
98. See FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(e)3.
99. 677 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
100. Id. at 891-92.
101. Id. at 893-903 (Cope, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 892.
103. Id. at 891 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(k) (1993)). This subsection was later
renumbered as (4)(k). See FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(k).
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adjudication and commitment of the child to the DJJ.1°4 More significantly,
the court held that if the child did not have a right to appeal the disposition,
serious state and federal constitutional rights would be implicated. 05 The
court quite properly noted that "[tihe commitment of a child to HRS is a
deprivation of liberty which triggers significant due process protection under
both the federal and Florida constitutions. '' 106 The court concluded that if
juveniles had no right to appeal dispositions then the child in this case would
have been forced to serve an increased sentence as a result of the exercise of
a fundamental constitutional right. 10 7  The court concluded this was
"unfathomable."
10
Another dispositional area that has given the trial courts a great deal of
trouble has been the procedure by which the criminal court decides whether
to treat a juvenile convicted as an adult, a juvenile, or a youthful offender for
purposes of imposition of sanctions.1°9 Prior survey articles have discussed
the case law in this area in depth." 0
In Ritchie v. State,' the Supreme Court of Florida was asked to decide
the following certified question:
WHETHER A CHILD, CHARGED WITH AN OFFENSE PUN-
ISHABLE BY DEATH OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT, BUT
FOUND GUILTY OF A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE,
PUNISHABLE BY A TERM OF YEARS NOT EXCEEDING
LIFE, MUST BE SENTENCED AS AN ADULT WITHOUT THE
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS AFFORDED BY SECTION
39.059(7)(c), FLORIDA STATUTES?" 2
The court held that under the facts of the case the child was indicted for one
offense but convicted of a lesser included offense, which was also punish-
104. J.M., 677 So. 2d at 891-92; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(d).
105. J.M., 677 So. 2d at 892.
106. Id. (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(a) (1995). Thejuvenile may waive the right to challenge the
trial court's decision to sentence him as an adult. See Norris v. State, 659 So. 2d 1352, 1354
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
110. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 1.
I 11. 670 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1996).
112. Id. at 925.
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able by death or life imprisonment, and therefore, the child was properly
sentenced as an adult without the procedures afforded in chapter 39. '3
Justice Anstead dissented as a matter of statutory construction.' 4 The
controversy concerned the interpretation of the then existing section
39.022(5)(c)3 of the Florida Statutes.115 This statute provides that:
If the child is found to have committed the offense punishable
by death or life imprisonment, the child shall be sentenced as an
adult. If the child is not found to have committed the indictable of-
fense but is found to have committed a lesser included offense or
any other offense for which he was indicated as a part of the crimi-
nal episode, the court may sentence [the child as a juvenile.]" 6
Justice Anstead argued that the statute must be read as written and that the
word "the" in the statute does not mean "an."'" 7 Thus, "[t]he statute clearly
states that a child is not to be automatically sentenced as an adult when the
child is not found to have committed the indictable offense," according to
Justice Anstead. 8 He concluded that, while there is a disparity in treatment
possible by providing greater procedural protections to a person indicted for
a more severe offense and convicted of a lesser charge than a person indicted
and convicted of a less severe offense, the court is not in a position to
rewrite the statute "as the majority has done here."' 9
By statute, effective October 1, 1994, the Florida Legislature relieved
the trial courts of the burden of making specific written findings for the
imposition of an adult sentence as opposed to a juvenile sentence when the
juvenile is tried as an adult. 20 Prior to that date, the courts were required to
make detailed specific written findings justifying the imposition of the adult
sentence.' 21 Under the new law, the court does not need to articulate specific
findings or enumerate criteria. 22 In two recent cases, the Florida appellate
113. Id. at 928; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7).
114. Ritchie, 670 So. 2d at 928-29 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
115. FLA. STAT. § 39.022(5)(c)3 (1993).
116. Id.
117. Ritchie, 670 So. 2d at 928 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d).
121. See Dale, supra note 1, at 201-02 (discussing the changes in the law).
122. See id. at 202 (criticizing this change).
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courts were asked to decide whether post-October 1994 orders complied
with the new statute.12
In Grayson v. State,124 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a
juvenile's sentence as an adult because the trial court did not comply with
the recently amended section 39.059(7)(d).1 5 In that case, a sixteen-year-
old at the time of the crime, was tried as an adult and found guilty of
manslaughter with a firearm and sentenced as an adult to twenty years of
incarceration. 26 Before the sentence, the amendment to section 39.059(7)
went into effect. Based upon decisions in Lutz v. State127 and Thomas v.
State,128 the trial court was correct to retroactively apply the amended
statute. However, the State conceded that the trial court did not sentence the
youngster in accordance with the amended statute. The amended statute
retains most of the provisions of earlier law including the receipt and
consideration of a pre-sentence investigation report from the DJJ which
evaluates the suitability of the youngster for disposition as an adult, a
juvenile, or a youthful offender, 129 and a written order. 30 The appellate
court held that, while the current statute does not require the trial court to
make specific findings in writing, the trial court must nonetheless consider
the statutory criteria to determine what kind of sanctions should be im-
posed. 3' While the statute contains a presumption that the court's decision
to sentence a juvenile as an adult is appropriate, 32 there must be a writing
imposing the adult sanctions. Here there was none. The court reversed. 33
In Roberts v. State,134 the appellate court reversed the lower court's
decision on the grounds that no order of any kind was prepared or filed
under the new statute. 35 Judge Sharp concurred, agreeing that the absence
of any written order imposing adult sanctions required reversal and re-
123. Roberts v. State, 677 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Grayson v. State, 671
So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
124. 671 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
125. Id. at 856.
126. Id. at 855.
127. 664 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
128. 662 So. 2d 1334, 1336 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
129. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(a).
130. See Collins v. State, 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1400 (2d Dist. Ct. App. June 12, 1996).
131. Grayson, 671 So. 2d at 856.
132. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d).
133. Grayson, 671 So. 2d at 856.
134. 677 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
135. Id. at 2.
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mand.136  He also raised the important issue of whether the court was
obligated to consider a pre-sentence report. 37 Agreeing with the court in
Grayson, he would have found that the imposition of adult sanctions none-
theless obligates the trial court to consider the relevant statutory criteria even
if it is not written into the order.138 Further, in Sharp's view, an order
incorporating at least some of the considerations under the statute and the
recommendations is reviewable by the appellate court. 139 Finally, Judge
Sharp addressed the trial court's primary complaint which dealt with the
"inefficacy" of the juvenile justice system, wherein the trial court apparently
decided on adult sanctions because of its view that the juvenile system was
bankrupt.140 Judge Sharp responded by stating:
Query whether the inadequacy of the juvenile justice system is an
appropriate reason to impose adult sanctions on a fourteen-year-
old, and query whether society will be made safer by having Rob-
erts locked up in an adult prison, only to be released, untreated and
uncounseled, but older and wiser, in less than (probably) four
years. It is a scary thought.'
4
'
Under Florida law, once a juvenile has been transferred for adult
prosecution by means of voluntary waiver, involuntary waiver, or criminal
information in the adult court and after the child has been found to have
committed the adult offense, the child is to be treated as an adult for any
subsequent offenses. 42 In T.L.P. v. State,'43 the appellate court ruled that a
juvenile, who had committed the acts upon which the juvenile charges were
based before she was found to have committed unrelated offenses for which
she was tried as an adult, could not be sentenced under the adult sentencing
statute, and therefore, the court reversed. 44 The juvenile offenses were not
subsequent violations for the purposes of the statute.1
45
Another requirement of section 39.059 governing juveniles who are
before adult court is the provision that juveniles must be notified that they
136. Id. (Sharp, J., concurring).
137. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(a).
138. Roberts, 677 So. 2d at 2 (Sharp, J., concurring).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 3.
142. Thomas v. State, 657 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
143. 657 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
144. Id. at 50.
145. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.022(5)(d) (1993)).
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have the right to a trial court determination of the suitability of imposing
adult sanctions by considering the criteria enumerated in this section.146 In
Figueroa v. State,147 a child appealed his conviction after the trial court
accepted his plea without informing him of his rights under section
39.059(7). 148 By failing to advise the child of the rights that were waived by
the plea, the youngster did not have a full understanding of the plea, and the
waiver of the rights was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. 49 The
appellate court therefore reversed, granting the child's subsequent motions to
withdraw his pleas. 50
Interpreting the rules by which the courts may change dispositional
orders in delinquency cases has also proved difficult for the courts. An
opinion by the Supreme Court of Florida has recently clarified matters. The
issue in State v. M.C.,15 1 was whether Rule 3.800(b)(2) of the Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure which provides the trial court with authority to
modify a sentence within sixty days of its imposition applies in juvenile
delinquency cases. 52 The supreme court held that it did not. 53 The court
found that the purpose of the juvenile and adult rules were different. 54
However, the court held that although a juvenile in Florida is not considered
a criminal defendant, and thus, the Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply
to juveniles, juveniles ought to be accorded the same basic rights to finality
and certainty in sentencing as adults.155 Therefore, the court upheld the
proposition that a modification to a sentence, including the imposition of
restitution, should occur within sixty days of sentencing as provided by the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.'5 6
More recently in T.R. v. State,'57 the supreme court was presented with
a similar question of the authority to modify juvenile sentences. 58 In T.R.,
the trial court committed the juvenile to HRS' low risk residential program.
The State subsequently moved to modify the commitment, stating that the
146. See Dunnavant v. State, 665 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
147. 657 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
148. Id. at 1226.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 666 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1995).
152. Id. at 878; see also FLA. R. CmiM. P. 3.800(b).
153. M.C., 666 So. 2d at 878.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. See also L.N.H. v. State, 670 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
157. 677 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1996).
158. Id. at 270-71.
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low risk level was not available for juveniles convicted of aggravated
battery. The juvenile claimed on appeal that the court was without jurisdic-
tion to modify the order, relying on a 1981 case, D.W.J. v. State.159 The
supreme court held that the statutory provision at issue' 60 allowed trial courts
to modify or set aside orders without reference to any time limit. 16' The
juvenile claimed that a separate section of the Florida Statutes set a sixty-
day window after an order was entered within which to suspend a commit-
ment order and place a child on probation or in community control and that
the applicable section of the Florida Statutes should apply to this case.
62
The court distinguished M.C., holding that in M.C., the issue was whether a
trial court could enter an order more than sixty days after the sentence was
imposed which, for the first time would require the juvenile to pay restitu-
tion. 1 63 In T.R., the supreme court recognized that the trial court was not
imposing a sentence for the first time, but was modifying a sentence already
imposed.' 64 Therefore, the court disapproved the holding in D.W.J. and
upheld the modification of the commitment order.
65
In W.E. V. State,166 a child challenged a trial court amendment of an
original sentence to include community control in the form of restitution. 67
Initially, the trial court withheld adjudication and ordered counseling,
enrollment in a particular school program, all costs, and a public defender
lien.168 There was no order regarding restitution. Twenty days later a
hearing was held on the State's motion to amend the sentence. The trial
court granted the motion amending the sentence to include community
control so that the victim's seventy-five dollars unreimbursed medical bill
could be ordered as part of community control. 69 The appellate court ruled
explicitly that the trial court had no authority to amend the sentence to
include additional sanctions when the original sentence was a legal one.170
159. 397 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
160. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1), (3).
161. T.R., 677 So. 2d at 271.
162. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 39.054(3).
163. T.R., 677 So. 2d at 272.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 658 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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C.M. v. State171 is a similar case. Here, a trial court ordered an increase
in the original sentence from a juvenile service program to community
control. 72 The appellate court held that the trial court could not increase an
otherwise legal sentence.173 In C.M., the court withheld adjudication and
ordered the child to enter and successfully complete the Juvenile Alternative
Services Program ("JASP") and to pay reasonable restitution. 174 Several
days later the State filed a motion for re-determination of sentence arguing
that the sentence was illegal because restitution could only be ordered when
the child was committed to HRS or placed on community control. The trial
court agreed, increasing the sentence and the child appealed. 175 The appel-
late court held that under Florida law the trial court has the authority to
impose restitution as a part of a community based sanction when adjudica-
tion has been withheld. 76 Thus, the original disposition made by the court
ordering completion of community-based JASP and restitution was proper.
177
Because the original sentence was legal, the court did not have authority to
increase that legal sentence.
178
Another possible condition of community control is the imposition of a
curfew. In A.B.C. v. State,179 a juvenile appealed from an order imposing a
7:00 p.m. curfew on the technical grounds that the curfew was contained in
the written order but was not orally pronounced at the adjudicatory hear-
ing.180 There is a conflict in the case law between the A.B.C. decision and
the decision in S.W. v. State.18' In the latter case, the appellate court struck
down the condition of a juvenile's community control which required sixty
hours of community service because that general condition was not orally
pronounced although the community service is an allowable condition by
statute.
8 2
Many municipalities around the country have recently enacted juvenile
curfew ordinances in an effort to control juvenile behavior and reduce
171. 658 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).




176. C.M., 658 So. 2d at 1179.
177. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3) (1993)).
178. IdL
179. 673 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
180. Id. at 966.
181. 666 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
182. Id at 600.
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crime.183 In January 1994, the Dade County Commission enacted a juvenile
curfew ordinance. 184 In Metropolitan Dade County v. Pred,185 the appellate
court heard an appeal from a circuit court decision which found the ordi-
nance unconstitutional in violation of the Florida Constitution.186  The
appellate court reversed, finding none of the challenges to the ordinance
meritorious. 187 The court found that juveniles are always subject to some
form of custody and the state has the constitutional power to regulate matters
for the well being of children. 88 The appellate court, without any detailed
discussion, concluded that because children due to their special nature and
vulnerabilities "do not enjoy the same quantum or quality of rights as
adults," the ordinance did not violate any of their rights under the Florida
Constitution.
189
A child and his parent have the right to speak at a dispositional hearing.
In A.P. v. State,'90 the Second District Court of Appeal analyzed the trial
court's refusal to allow the child or his mother to address the court and the
lower court's placement of the youngster on community control.' 9' The
appellate court recognized that given the serious nature of the charges,
nothing either the parent or the child would have said would have affected
the disposition. 92  However, the Florida Statutes provide that prior to
determining and announcing the disposition the trial court shall give the
parties an opportunity to comment on the issue of disposition and rehabilita-
tion. 193 The court further recognized that the proceeding may be one which
will "create a lasting impression of fair and impartial justice" and that this
may be best effectuated by allowing the parties to be heard.'
9 4
183. See SOLERET AL., supra note 69, at 3-41.
184. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 94-1 (Jan. 18, 1994).
185. 665 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
186. Id. at 253.
187. Id.
188. Id. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); Griffin v. State, 396 So. 2d 152,
155 (Fla. 1981).
189. Metropolitan Dade County, 665 So. 2d at 253. See also Qutb v. Strauss, I1 F.3d
488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Qutb v. Bartlett, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994); In re
Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JT9065297, 887 P.2d 599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
(containing detailed analysis).
190. 666 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
191. Id. at 211.
192. Id.
193. See FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(c)4 (1993).
194. A.P., 666 So. 2d at 211.
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The Florida Juvenile Code allows the trial courts to use contempt as a
means of enforcing disposition orders. In A.L.B. v. State,195 a child appealed
from a contempt finding which was based upon the trial court's issuance of
an order to show cause, sua sponte, as to why the child should not be held in
contempt for faliure to abide by a court order placing him on community
control. 96 Among the issues raised on appeal was whether the court had
authority to enter the order to show cause, sua sponte, under the facts of the
case.' 97 Rule 8.150(b)(1) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure
provides that the court on its own motion or upon affidavit of any person
having knowledge of the facts may issue and sign an order to show cause in
a contempt proceeding.198 Without any analysis, the court simply concluded
that the record in the case reflected the statement of the trial judge that the
basis of the order to show cause was upon his own motion and the sworn
petition alleging violation of community control. 199 Judge Webster dis-
sented.200 He concluded that the record showed that the order to show cause
was issued at the request of the child's community control counselor.201
Judge Webster could find nothing in the Florida Rules of Juvenile Proce-
dure to explain what it meant for a judge on his or her own motion to issue
the order to show cause.202 Therefore, Judge Webster looked to the analo-
gous rules of criminal procedure and case law and concluded that the order
to show cause was based upon statements by a person who was not under
oath who lacked personal knowledge of the matters about which he was
20commenting, and thus, were hearsay statements. 03 In Judge Webster's view,
the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure require an affidavit from a person
having knowledge of the facts, and here there was none.204 Nor did he see
how the order to show cause could have been issued on the court's own
motion.20 5 Although research disclosed no case on point, research on the
language of the analogous criminal procedure rule disclosed that a judge
195. 675 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
196. Id. at 669.
197. Id.
198. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.150(b)(1).
199. A.L.B., 675 So. 2d at 670.
200. Id. (Webster, J., dissenting).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 671.
203. Id.
204. A.L.B., 675 So. 2d at 671.
205. Id. at 672.
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may issue an order to show cause on the judge's own motion provided that
he or she has heard sworn testimony which, if true, would support an
adjudication of indirect criminal contempt. 2°6 Here the alleged contempt
occurred outside the presence of the judge, and the judge had no independent
knowledge regarding the facts. Finally, to allow the court on its own motion
to issue an order to show cause for a criminal contempt without supporting
evidence under oath would "permit the courts to engage in star chamber
proceedings, in complete disregard of the due process requirements impli-
cated by such serious charges. 2 °7
An interesting question of how much restitution may be ordered in light
of the order of adjudication was before the First District Court of Appeal in
J.O.S. v. State.208 In that case, a child was ordered to pay restitution of
$1,092 after an adjudication that he committed what would have been an
offense of second degree misdemeanor criminal mischief for which as an
adult the maximum amount of restitution was $200. The State had filed a
petition alleging a first degree misdemeanor where the damage of the
property was greater than $200 but less than $1,000. At the adjudicatory
hearing, the State offered no evidence regarding the dollar value of the
damage and as a result the court made a finding of criminal mischief, a
second degree misdemeanor.20 9 At the restitution hearing, the court heard
testimony and issued an order in the amount of $1,092 from which the child
appealed.210 The appellate court held that the purpose of the restitution
hearing is to restore to the victims of crime the value of what they lost rather
than to punish the wrongdoer.2 11 The evidentiary standard is the greater
weight of the evidence rather than the exclusion of all reasonable doubt.212
There is no requirement that the amount of the loss first be proven in the
criminal case at the misdemeanor level. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of
Florida held in Hebert v. State,213 that when an individual entered into a plea
agreement which left the trial court discretion as to the amount of restitution
the defendant waived any objection to the amount of the restitution absent
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 668 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 677 So. 2d 840 (Fla.
1996).
209. Id. at 1083.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1085.
212. Id.
213. 614 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1993).
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abuse of discretion.214 The court in J.O.S. recognized that the issue before
the court was unanswered in Hebert, and therefore, it certified the question
to the Supreme Court of Florida.215
The technical question of whether an order of adjudication is a final
order in a juvenile delinquency case and thus appealable was recently before
the Third District Court of Appeal in A.N. v. State.216 In that case, the child
sought to appeal from an adjudication of delinquency in the circuit court in
Dade County when the case was transferred for disposition to Broward
County.217 The third district held that the adjudication order was a non-
appealable, non-final order, and that there was no appealable final order in a
delinquency case until a disposition order was entered.218 The appellate
court recognized that the right of the child to appeal a final order in a
delinquency case was created by statute but that the statute did not itself
define a final order.219 The court in A.N. relied upon an earlier appellate
opinion of T.L.W. v. Soud,220 which held that judicial "labor" ends upon
entry of an order of disposition in a delinquency case and that this point in
time establishes the test of finality for purposes of determining an appealable
final order.221 The appeal in A.N. was thus dismissed.2 2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal has ruled in a very brief opinion on
the limit of the ability of the State to appeal from a dispositional order. In
State v. C. W.2 23 the court held that the State may not appeal from a juvenile
court order denying restitution.224 Under the Florida Juvenile Code, there is
no provision comparable to that existing in the adult criminal code, which
allows the State to appeal.2m Thus, the failure to order restitution is not on a
list of orders from which the State may appeal in a juvenile proceeding, and
the failure to order restitution does not constitute an illegal sentence.226
214. Id. at 494.
215. J.O.S., 668 So. 2d at 1085.
216. 666 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
217. Id. at 929.
218. Iaat 930.
219. Id.
220. 645 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
221. Id. at 1104-05.
222. A.N., 666 So. 2d at 930.
223. 662 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
224. Id. at 769.
225. Id. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.069(1)(b), 39.0711, 775.09, 924.07(1)(k) (1995).
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Therefore, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to consider the appeal by
the State.227
F. Legislation and Rule Changes
The Florida Legislature did not make many changes in the juvenile code
this year relating to juvenile justice. However, one important change is in
the area of the transfer of a child for prosecution as an adult at section
39.052.28 A new subsection (f) requires the State Attorney to file an
information if a child, regardless of age at the time of the alleged offense, is
alleged to have committed a theft of a motor vehicle which, while the child
is in possession of the stolen vehicle, causes serious bodily injury or death to
a person who is not involved in the underlying offense.22 9 In other words,
the legislature has decided that a child of any age shall be treated as an adult
for criminal trial purposes whenever there is a vehicular theft resulting in
serious bodily injury or death. This continues the clear trend in the Florida
Legislature to deal with juveniles as adults rejecting either the medical
model or the restorative justice model of the juvenile court. The statute
became law without the Governor's approval on May 25, 1996, to become
effective on October 1, 1996.230
A second change in the criminal law makes it unlawful for any student
under eighteen in any school to smoke tobacco in, on, or within 1000 feet of
school property between 6:00 a.m. and midnight.2 31 The maximum penalty
is twenty-five dollars or fifty hours of community service or completion of
232an anti-tobacco program.
In Amendment to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a),33 the
Supreme Court of Florida recently ruled on a proposed amendment to the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.234 The amendment was to allow a pilot
project, which would utilize electronic audio-visual devices during juvenile
detention hearings, as is done in adult criminal cases.235 Over the dissents of
227. Id.
228. Ch. 96-234, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 627, 627 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)).
229. Id. § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws at 629 (creating FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(a)5f).
230. Id §§ 1, 2, 1996 FIa. Laws at 630.
231. Ch. 96-217, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 588, 588 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
386.212(1)).
232. Id. § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws at 588 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 386.212(3)).
233. 667 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1996).
234. Id at 197.
235. Id at 196.
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Justices Anstead and Kogan,2 6 the court approved a one year pilot program
to allow juveniles to attend detention hearings via audio-video devices
authorized by the chief judge in each of the petitioning circuits.2 7 Justice
Anstead objected, explaining that the juvenile court's role is unique in that
the focus is on helping children and not on the adversarial system's usual
fixation on winning.23 Justice Anstead also cited to the comments and
recommendations of the Florida Bar Juvenile Court Rules Committee which
opposed the change in the rule on grounds of due process and evidentiary
entitlements.239 In sum, Justice Anstead argued in favor of in-person
hearings contending that both good public policy and constitutional and
statutory protections mitigated against audio-visual detention hearings.240
III. DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Criminal Child Abuse and Neglect
In 1993, the Florida Legislature introduced section 827.05 which
created a misdemeanor criminal offense proscribing negligent treatment of
children.241 In State v. Mincey,242 the Supreme Court of Florida held that.the
statute was unconstitutional. 243 The court relied upon its 1977 decision in
State v. Winters,244 in which it had ruled that a similar negligent treatment of
children statute was unconstitutionally vague, indefinite, and overbroad. 245
The Mincey court found that the new statute made several changes by adding
some language to the old law but that it did not clarify the kind of conduct to
246be prohibited. As a result, the changes did not correct the vagueness
problem recognized in the Winters decision which was the failure to give
parents and others susceptible to child abuse charges fair notice of the type
of behavior which would subject them to criminal sanctions.247
236. Id. at 197-98 (Anstead & Kogan, JJ., dissenting).
237. Id. at 197.
238. Amendment, 667 So. 2d at 198 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 197 n.3.
240. Id. at 197-98 nn. 3-4.
241. FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1993).
242. 672 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1996).
243. Id. at 526.
244. 346 So. 2d 991 (Ma. 1977).
245. Id. at 994.
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B. Dependency Issues
The Florida courts have held that a finding of dependency can be made
against one parent and not the other. The question before the appellate court
in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. P.H.,248 was whether
a finding of dependency can be predicated upon proof of neglect by only one
parent.249 The court of appeal held that it could 250 although the opinion is
unclear in several respects. The trial court had found that a prima facie case
of present neglect had been proved as to the mother but not as to the fa-
ther.2'5 The trial court then decided that an adjudication of dependency
required proof of current or prospective abuse, neglect, or abandonment, as
25225to both parents. Thus, the court dismissed the petition for dependency.2 3
The appellate court quite properly said that this was error.254 The Florida
Statutes can be read to allow a finding of dependency by one parent. For
example, the juvenile code provides six different grounds for a finding of
dependency including: 1) abandonment, abuse, or neglect; 2) surrender for
adoption; 3) voluntary placement and failure to comply with a case plan; 4)
voluntary placement for the purpose of subsequent adoption; 5) lack of a
parent, legal custodian, or responsible adult relative to provide supervision
and care; and 6) a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect by the
parent, parents, or custodian.255 The statute speaks in the singular and plural.
At several points in the section of the law defining dependent children,
reference is made to parents in the plural. Furthermore, at another section of
chapter 39 regarding the filing of petitions for dependency, the statute
currently provides that the petition need not contain allegations of acts or
omissions by both parents.256 However, what seems to have happened in the
P.H. case is that the non-custodial father failed to accept responsibility for
the protection, maintenance, and care of his children and failed to request
custody of the children despite being apprised of the mother's neglect. Thus,
the appellate court concluded that HRS presented a prima facie case with
248. 659 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
249. Id. at 1377.
250. Id. at 1379.
251. Id. at 1377.
252. Id.
253. P.H., 659 So. 2d at 1377.
254. Id. at 1379.
255. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(14).
256. See id. § 39.404(3)(c) (1995).
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respect to the father's neglect and prospective neglect of the children. s7
Thus, there appears to have been neglect by both parents in the opinion of
the appellate court.~ Then and it is unclear why, the court concluded that a
finding of dependency as to a second parent can be predicated upon proof of
neglect by one parent.2 9 If all the appellate court meant by this statement is
that there can be a finding of dependency as to one parent and there need not
be a finding of dependency as to both parents, then the opinion makes sense.
The prior case law cited in the P.H. opinion supports the proposition that a
finding of neglect can be made against one parent but not the other.260 But
what if the court is saying that a finding of dependency as to one parent can
be transferred to a second parent without an independent basis of depend-
ency being found as to the second parent. Then, clearly, such a holding
constitutes a denial of due process. Here the dependency petition alleged
that the father was unable to protect the children, and neither parent provided
emotionally or financially for the children. This would give adequate notice
to the father and could allow the trial court, as well as the appellate court, to
conclude that there was a prima facie case with respect to the father's
neglect and prospective neglect of the children.
In an analogous situation, a mother brought a writ of certiorari chal-
lenging a circuit court order approving a performance agreement which
included tasks related to a child who had not been adjudicated dependent.
The appellate court in J.V. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services,26 1 held that it was error to include obligations related to a new baby
who had not been the subject of the dependency proceeding in a perform-
ance agreement.262 The court noted that the Florida Statutes require that the
problems or conditions which are the basis for the adjudication of depend-
ency are to be included in the performance agreement 263 referred to as a plan
under current law. The court further noted that the agreement must be
designed to address the facts and circumstances upon which the court based
257. P.H., 659 So. 2d at 1379.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See C.F. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 649 So. 2d 295, 296
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that dependency can be found as to independent acts by
each parent); In re L.S., 592 So. 2d 802, 802 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that a
dependency adjudication can be against one parent based upon the amendment to section
39.01(10) of the Florida Statutes in 1990 to include the single parent).
261. 661 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
262. Id. at 1265.
263. Id. at 1264 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.451(3)(d) (1993)).
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the finding of dependency in involuntary placements. 64 In J. V., the appel-
late court concluded that the problems which gave rise to the dependency
were in no way related to the new baby.265 In addition, the court appears to
have concluded that the new baby had not been declared dependent. Thus,
Padgett v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,266 the Supreme
Court of Florida case which held that proof of abuse or neglect as to one
child may form the basis for an adjudication as to the parents' rights to
267
another child, was inapposite. In J.V., there had been no effort to declare
the new baby dependent. Thus, for both reasons, the appellate court quashed
the order approving the performance agreement in part to the extent that the
tasks included those related solely to the unadjudicated child.268
Since the Supreme Court of Florida opinion in Padgett, cases have
regularly come to the appellate courts on the issue of the proper interpreta-
tion of the doctrine of "prospective neglect." 269 The test for prospective
neglect was recently employed by the appellate court in Denson v. Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services2 70 over a dissent demonstrating
the factual difficulties inherent in the test.271 In Denson, the father had been
adjudicated as having sexually abused a child. Based on that finding, a
dependency adjudication was made as to three other stepchildren. The
appellate court in Denson held that under Padgett there must be a two-part
finding that first, there was proof of neglect or abuse of another child and
second, the child who was the subject of the current proceeding is at
"substantial risk" of suffering imminent abuse or neglect if left in the
custody of the parent.272 The showing is based on proof that the parent
suffers from a condition that makes the prospect of future abuse or neglect of
the other child highly probable. 3 The dissent simply stated that the respon-
264. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.451(6)(b)5).
265. Id. at 1265.
266. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
267. J. V., 661 So. 2d at 1265 (explaining why Padgett does not apply).
268. Id.
269. See Dale, supra note 1, at 211-12; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of
Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REv. 333, 368-73 (1991).
270. 661 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
271. IeL at 936 (Dauksch, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 935.
273. Id. See also Richmond v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 658 So.
2d 176 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Palmer v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
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dent father was a proven molester and the evidence was sufficient to support
the determination of the trial court.
27 4
The Florida courts have held on a number of occasions that the trial
court's ability to order HRS to pay for various services in dependency
proceedings is quite limited. The issue came up again this year in Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Platt.275 In Platt, as part of a
dependency proceeding the court on its own motion ordered each of the
parents to submit to a psychological evaluation within thirty days but failed
to articulate who was to pay for such evaluations. 276 When the psycholo-
gist's bill remained unpaid the court ordered HRS to make payment.
Relying upon earlier case law which appeared to have been on point,277 and
its further findings of an absence of specific statutory authority, and a
constitutional right on the part of the parent to such services, the court held
that the parent, and not HRS, is responsible for the payment of the serv-
ices. 278 The court did not answer the question of whether HRS is responsible
for the obligation if a parent is found to be indigent following a hearing on
that issue.
Another dependency related issue going to the limits of authority of the
court involves the question of whether the court may require a mother who
had given birth to three cocaine dependent children to undergo bi-monthly
pregnancy testing. In T.H. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services,279 the appellate court held that, while it shared the concern of the
trial court about the impact of drug use during pregnancy, and that, while it
agreed that exposure to drugs is of great public and legal concern, the court
could find nothing in chapter 39 giving the court the authority to enter such
an order.28°
An interesting issue of the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the
circuit court in dependency matters came up recently in Friedland v. De-
274. Denson, 661 So. 2d at 936 (Dauksch, J., dissenting). For a detailed analysis of the
doctrine of prospective neglect, as applied in Padgett, and the two-part test that has been
developed by the trial court subsequent thereto, see Smith v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Servs., 665 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Sharp, J., dissenting).
275. 675 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
276. Id. at 141.
277. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Ortiz, 627 So. 2d 124 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). See also In re J.W., 591 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991);
Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law, 19 NOVA L. REv. 139, 143
(1994) (discussing Ortiz).
278. Platt, 675 So. 2d at 142.
279. 661 So. 2d 403 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
280. Id. at 404.
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partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services.281 In that case, upon the
dismissal of a dependency petition with prejudice, the trial court did not
order the children to be returned home. 82 One child traveled to Massachu-
setts to reside with his maternal aunt while the other returned home. The
parents brought a habeas corpus petition seeking enforcement of the dis-
missal and the trial court concluded it had no jurisdiction. HRS argued that
the court lacked jurisdiction to order return of the child because of the
dismissal. The appellate court held that the trial court had inherent jurisdic-
tion to impose its own orders, that the trial court failed to provide for
terminating its jurisdiction in the order, and that the order could have no
other purpose but to authorize return of the child to the parents.283 Accord-
ingly, the appellate court reversed.284
C. Right to Counsel Issues
In prior surveys, this author has urged that Florida's statute limiting the
right to counsel for parents in dependency proceedings be amended to
provide free counsel to indigent parents in all dependency proceedings as is
done in other states.285 The right to counsel section of the Florida Statutes
provides that a poor parent is not entitled to a lawyer free of cost in a
dependency case, although he or she must be notified of the right to counsel,
and if termination is likely, a lawyer at no cost shall then be appointed.286
Florida does provide an absolute right to counsel, including counsel for an
indigent parent in all termination of parental rights cases, by statute.287 This
non-absolute right to counsel system in dependency proceedings was
adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida in In re D.B.288 in 1980, when the
court held that counsel shall be provided in a dependency case only "where
permanent termination or child abuse charges might result. '289 For the past
281. 661 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
282. Id. at 1287.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See Dale, supra note 277, at 144.
286. See FLA. STAT. § 39.406 (1995); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.320; Davis v. Page, 714 F.2d 512,
515-18 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. Gladstone, 464 U.S. 1052 (1984); In
re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
287. See FLA. STAT. § 39.465(1)(a) (1995).
288. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
289. Id. at 91.
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fifteen years, the trial courts have had ongoing and repeated problems
complying with this imprecise test.y
Wofford v. Eid291 is a recent example of this problem. In that case, HRS
filed a petition for adjudication of dependency and several hearings were
held, culminating in a dispositional order adjudicating the child dependent.
At all these hearings, the court advised the mother of the right to seek
counsel. At a subsequent hearing approving a case plan, the court did not
advise the mother of her right to counsel. Nor did it do so at several subse-
quent hearings. Ultimately, HRS filed a petition for termination of parental
rights. At an initial hearing on termination, the trial court conducted the
hearing without appointing counsel and without advising the mother of her
right to counsel but thereafter did appoint counsel. The trial court subse-
quently became concerned that the mother had not received adequate notice
of her right to counsel at prior hearings and entered an order dismissing
IRS' petition for termination of parental rights on the basis of lack of advice
of her right to counsel.292 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
ruling that the mother had not been afforded an appropriate level of due
process protection regarding the right to counsel and on that basis affirmed
the dismissal of the petition.293 However, to the extent that the termination
of parental rights petition was premised upon grounds wholly independent of
the constitutionally flawed dependency proceeding, in which there was no
counsel, the appellate court reversed, thus allowing the proceeding to
continue.2
94
The appellate court's discussion of the failure to appoint counsel in
Wofford is significant. The court held that whenever a dependency petition
states a ground for a finding of dependency contained in section
39.464(1)(d) involving "egregious" conduct by the parent that endangers the
life, health, or safety of the child or the child's sibling, such an allegation
generates potential for the ultimate termination of parental rights.295 There-
fore, counsel must be appointed and the failure to do so is reversible error.
296
Similarly, the court held that in a separate situation, where the act of a parent
entering into a case plan and then failing to substantially comply with the
290. See Dale, supra note 277, at 144.
291. 671 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
292. Id. at 861.
293. Id. at 863.
294. Id.
295. Maat 862.
296. Wofford, 671 So. 2d at 862.
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terms within twelve months generates a termination proceeding, the conse-
quences are the same as a dependency adjudication containing findings of
egregious abuse.297 Here, too, counsel must be appointed. Thus, the holding
in Wofford conveys that pursuant to two of the chapter 39 grounds for
termination of parental rights, counsel must be appointed at the dependency
stage.298 It remains to be seen whether other district courts of appeal or trial
courts will follow this holding. As noted previously, another simpler and
more expedient resolution of this entire matter is to have an absolute right to
counsel established statutorily in Florida. Asking the appellate courts to
parse the statute for entitlements and evaluate diverse cases on their facts at
a later date is hardly an efficient way to protect the constitutional rights of
parents.
Even when the court properly notifies the parent about the right to
counsel in a dependency proceeding the parents' waiver of counsel must be
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 299 The issue of how to
evaluate waiver of counsel came up recently in McKenzie v. Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services.300 In that case, at arraignment, the
mother initially consented to the petition. But when questioned by the court
to determine if she understood that she was giving up the right to an attor-
ney, she then requested an attorney. At the end of the arraignment, she
requested that an attorney be appointed and one indeed was appointed to
represent her at future hearings. The appellate court noted that the mother
displayed hesitation and confusion when entering her plea of consent.30' She
requested counsel twice during the arraignment because she did not under-
stand the nature of the dependency hearings, and specifically, she did not
understand the right that she was relinquishing. The court concluded that
once the mother stated that she did not understand the proceedings and that
she was confused, the inquiry as to consent should have stopped and an
attorney should have been appointed immediately to represent her.
302
An important question in termination cases is whether the parent ought
to have the right to counsel on appeal. Termination cases are civil in nature,
not criminal. Therefore, the right to counsel in a criminal appeal, as enunci-
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See Courtney v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 667 So. 2d 504
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
300. 663 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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ated by the United States Supreme Court in Anders v. California,0 3 would
not appear to apply. In Ostrum v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services,304 the attorney for an appellant father whose parental rights had
been terminated, filed a motion on appeal to withdraw accompanied by an
Anders brief.305 The father had been convicted of two counts of capital
sexual battery of his own minor children and sentenced to two life terms
with minimum mandatory terms of twenty-five years on each count to run
consecutively. Thus, he would not be released from prison until after his
children reached the age of majority. HRS brought a termination proceeding
and counsel was appointed for the father. The attorney presented no evi-
dence, and the appellant father declined an opportunity to be present at the
hearing. In ruling on the withdrawal motion, the appellate court held first
that while parents are entitled to appointed counsel at the public's expense in
termination cases, the right is generated by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and not the Sixth Amendment. 30 6 Therefore, Anders
does not apply because it only applies in criminal cases. 3° The court held
that on a practical level the Anders protection, which involved the filing of a
brief by counsel, detailing the proceedings below with a discussion of where
error might be suggested and why none actually appears, is unnecessary in
light of the need for the children to have finality as soon as possible.08
Thus, the court held that all that will be necessary in a termination case is for
appellant's counsel to file a motion seeking leave to withdraw as counsel for
the parent whose rights had been terminated.30 9 The appellant parent will
then be given time in which to argue the case without an attorney. 310 If the
parent then fails to file a brief in a timely fashion, the court will conclude
that the parent does not wish to prosecute the appeal and the court will
dismiss for failure to prosecute.31' If a brief is filed, the court will review it
and if it finds no preliminary basis for reversal, the court will summarily
303. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
304. 663 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).




309. Ostrum, 663 So. 2d at 1361.
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affirm pursuant to rule 9.315.312 Otherwise, the case will proceed as any
ordinary appeal.313
D. Guardian Ad Litem Issues
Previous surveys have discussed the fact that a child does not have an
absolute right to counsel in a dependency proceeding in Florida.31 4 How-
ever, because Florida participates in the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act of 1974 ("CAPT'A"), the State must provide a guardian ad
litem on behalf of children in dependency proceedings. 315 The precise role
of the guardian ad litem and the procedures under which one operates have
been the subject of substantial appellate court analysis in recent years.31 6
The duties of the guardian ad litem are governed by an amalgam of stat-
utes, 317 court rules,318 unpublished supreme court orders, 319 and case law.
In a significant and rather startling opinion, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal in Fisher v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,320
recently held that the trial court did not commit fundamental error when the
guardian ad litem appointed for the child failed to serve the entirety of the
case.321 The appellate court found that after the voluntary guardian resigned,
the trial court had entered repeated orders attempting to have a guardian ad
litem appointed by the Guardian Ad Litem Program; however, no guardian
was ever appointed.322 Furthermore, the court noted that the former guardian
312. l
313. Id.
314. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida, 17 NOVA L. REv. 335,
369-70 (1992).
315. See 42 U.S.C. § 5105 (1988).
316. See In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 91 (Fla. 1980); Simms v. State, 641 So. 2d 957 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); In re Adoption of T.G.L., 606 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1992); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Coskey, 599 So. 2d 153, 157 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Brevard County v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs.,
589 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Brevard County v. Lanford, 588 So. 2d 669
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Marion County v. Johnson, 586 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cole, 574 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
317. See FLA. STAT. § § 39.461, .465, 61.401, .403,415.508 (1995).
318. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215.
319. See Guardian Ad Litem Program Standards of Operation, Fla. S. Ct. Amended Ad-
min. Order (November 27, 1995); Guardian Ad Litem Program Minimal Standards of
Operation, Fla. S. Ct. Admin. Order (Feb. 7, 1995).
320. 674 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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ad litem did testify at the termination hearing between six and seven months
after resigning, and the court recommended that parental rights be termi-
nated.32 The court found no fundamental error.324 The court reasoned that
there was an absence of a showing that the child's rights were not adequately
protected by the court, HRS, or the foster parents, and that the guardian ad
litem had represented the interests of the child through a substantial portion
of the case.3 5 The appellate court concluded that the continued service of
the guardian would not have changed the outcome of the case.326
The court in Fisher relied heavily on a 1994 opinion from the Second
District Court of Appeal in In re E.F.,327 in which the court held that a trial
court does not commit fundamental error if it attempts but is unable to locate
a volunteer guardian ad litem.3  In E.F., a mother appealed from an order
terminating parental rights since the child never received the assistance of a
guardian ad litem.329 The appellate court upheld the termination in the
absence of a guardian ad litem because, as it explained:
Although both the legislature and the supreme court have mandated
the use of guardians ad litem in parental termination proceedings,
our state has never implemented a program to provide an adequate
supply of guardians. The program is primarily staffed by volun-
teers. At a time when the supply of [guardians] is exceeded by the
demands of children who would benefit from guardians, we cannot
hold that a trial court commits fundamental error if it attempts, but
is unable, to locate a volunteer guardian ad litem.
330
There are several problems with the holdings in Fisher and E.F. First,
the federal statute under which Florida is obligated to provide a Guardian Ad
Litem Program is not a discretionary statute.331 It requires appointment of
guardians ad litems. Furthermore, while the Florida courts have not held
that a child has a right to counsel in a dependency or termination proceeding,
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Fisher, 674 So. 2d at 208.
326. Id.
327. 639 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
328. a d at 640.
329. Id at 642.
330. Id. at 640.
331. See 42 U.S.C. § 5105 (1988).
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they have recognized the significance of advocacy on behalf of the child.332
In addition, the Florida Statutes do not render the appointment and involve-
ment of the guardian ad litem discretionary, but rather, they mandate
appointment.333  The court's rejection of federal and state mandatory
statutory provisions is without explanation other than that no harm resulted.
This rejection of the mandatory obligation does not square with other case
law, where mandatory obligations have been enforced even though their
enforcement would not affect the outcome of the case.334
In addition, the holding in Fisher is hard to apply in practice. The
opinion suggests that if the trial court concludes that a guardian ad litem will
not be of any benefit to the child and the result in all likelihood will be
appropriate in any event, it need not worry about a guardian ad litem
appointment. This is a very difficult test for the appellate court to evaluate,
after the fact, on appeal. There is no standard of review. Furthermore, the
absence of information in the record which the guardian ad litem would
generate cannot be opined by the appellate court because there will rarely be
anything in front of it in the record on appeal.
Finally, in Gordon v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
("Gordon I1'),335 the appellate court approved the trial court's entry of a
"cost judgment"336 in favor of the guardian ad litem as prevailing party and
against the parents in a dependency and termination of parental rights
case.337 The Third District Court of Appeal had previously held in the same
case in an earlier reported decision, Gordon v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services ("Gordon 6,), 338 that Florida law did not require the
court to assess costs in such cases against HRS. 339 The court held in Gordon
II that the trial court did have discretion to enter such an order against the
parents on the basis of the prior ruling in Gordon I, and that it had the
discretion to enter such an order against HRS. 340 The court noted that by
332. See In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980); Simms v. State, 641 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that the significance of the guardian ad litem's position may
differ from that of HRS).
333. See FLA. STAT. § 39.465(2)(a).
334. See discussion supra p. 208 (concerning A.P. v. State, 666 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1995)).
335. 674 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
336. FLA. STAT. § 57.031 (1995).
337. Gordon, 674 So. 2d at 841.
338. 637 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
339. Id. at 948-49 (citing FLA. STAT. § 57.041 (1993)).
340. Gordon, 674 So. 2d at 841 (citing Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v.
A.F., 528 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
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statute Florida provides that financially able parents shall pay the costs of
guardian ad litem services.341
E. Termination of Parental Rights
The Fifth District Court of Appeal recently ruled that adjudicatory
hearings, even in the context of termination of parental rights, must comply
with the rules of evidence applicable in civil cases. In Lewis v. Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services,342 the actions of the trial court were
startling. At the end of an evidentiary hearing for termination of parental
rights, the court, unbeknownst to the mother, ordered the guardian ad litem
and HRS to make unannounced visits to the home where the mother had
been staying.343 The mother led a nomadic life style, and the court was
concerned about her residence and employment. The guardian ad litem and
HRS made the visit, took photographs, and filed supplemental reports which
concluded that the home was not a good environment for the mother and
child. The reports were not provided to the mother or her attorney until the
day of the final adjudicatory hearing. Incredibly, the court did not allow the
mother to offer testimony to refute the contents of the report or to cross
examine the guardian ad litem or the HRS counselor because, as the appel-
late court described it, the trial court did not want to reopen the case. 344 The
trial court then entered a detailed order terminating parental rights, relying
upon the supplemental report.345
The mother appealed, arguing among other things that the adjudication
and disposition should be reversed because the trial court took into consid-
eration supplemental reports and photographs and did not allow her an
opportunity to cross examine.346 The appellate court reversed first on the
basis of the statute which requires a written guardian ad litem report to be
provided to all parties and the court at least forty-eight hours before the
dispositional hearing.347 The appellate court noted the obvious purpose is to
allow the parents to contest the report.348 Second, the use of hearsay evi-
dence to terminate parental rights denied the mother due process.349 Under
341. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 415.508(2) (1995).
342. 670 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).




347. Lewis, 670 So. 2d at 1193; see FLA. STAT. § 39.465(2)(b)(1).
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Florida law during the adjudicatory hearing, a trial court is required to apply
the "'rules of evidence used in civil cases.' ,350 The evidence has to be
admissible.35 1 This evidence was rank hearsay.352 Furthermore, it is a denial
of due process to prohibit the right to cross examine.353 The mother's second
argument on appeal, which the appellate court did not have to reach, was the
denial of the right to counsel.354 It turns out that at the dispositional hearing
the mother's lawyer telephoned the court to say she was unavoidably
detained and asked that the hearing be continued until she could arrive. The
trial court had conducted the hearing without the mother's attorney and
entered an order of disposition.355 Enough said.
In a recent opinion from the Second District Court of Appeal, the
question was whether the Florida Statutes allow for termination of parental
rights of either parent where only one of the parents commits abuse.356
Conceptually, the issue is the same as that raised in Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services v. P.H.357 In In re A. C.,358 a termination pro-
ceeding against two parents was based upon allegations that the mother had
shaken the child and caused significant head injuries to the youngster.359
The trial court found that the father was at work at the time and thus, the
termination petition as to him was denied. The trial court then held that it
could not terminate parental rights when the severe and continuing abuse or
neglect and/or egregious abuse or neglect was found to be committed by
only one parent. 360 The appellate court held that chapter 39 does not
preclude institution of a termination proceeding against one parent where the
other parent would be a satisfactory replacement. 361 The language of the
statute provides for termination where "[t]he parent or parents" have
engaged in severe or continuing abuse or neglect or egregious abuse.362 The
court therefore reversed.363
350. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.467(5) (1993)).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Lewis, 670 So. 2d at 1194.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. In re A.C., 660 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
357. 659 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995). See discussion supra pp. 214-19.
358. 660 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
359. Id. at 331.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 332.
362. Id. at 331 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.464(3) (Supp. 1992)).
363. A.C., 660 So. 2d at 332.
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The Florida termination of parental rights statute contains five items
which must be established by clear and convincing evidence before there can
be an adjudication that parental rights should be terminated. 364 These items
are: 1) the child was adjudicated dependent; 2) a dispositional order was
entered; 3) the parent was informed of his right to counsel in the dependency
proceeding; 4) the best interests of the child would be served by granting the
petition; and 5) at least one of the grounds in section 39.464 of the Florida
Statutes has been met.365
The issue before the court in Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services v. N.T.,366 was whether the failure to incorporate findings of fact in
the dependency adjudication requires the court to dismiss the subsequent
termination proceeding. 367  The appellate court held that the technical
insufficiency of a dependency order to set forth findings of fact is not
reversible error in a termination case.368 The court held that the adjudication
369of dependency requirement is satisfied by the mere fact of adjudication.
There is nothing in the statutory language that precludes termination of
parental rights when the dependency order fails to set forth factual findings
as to the basis for dependency.370
F. Appellate Issues
The Florida courts have held that an adjudicatory order in a dependency
proceeding is not appealable. It is premature, and an appeal in a dependency
case must come from a dispositional order.37 1 In a recent decision from the
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Moore v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services,372 the court held that because the statutory scheme
for termination of parental rights contemplates entry of two orders, the
second or dispositional order is the final order for purposes of appeal.
373
364. FLA. STAT. § 39.4611 (1995).
365. Id.
366. 670 So. 2d 1147 (Fa. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).




371. See In re T.M., 622 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 630 So. 2d
1103 (Fla. 1993); see also In re T.M., 614 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
372. 664 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
373. Id. at 1139.
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G. Legislation and Rule Changes
The Supreme Court of Florida amended the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure in the fall of 1995 to make changes that comply with language in
the statutes governing performance agreements in dependency cases. The
statute, and now the court rules, provide for the development and imple-
mentation of "case plans" previously known as "performance agree-
ments."374 The court also changed the procedure for initiating petitions for
termination of parental rights so that they may be filed in time and that the
guardian ad litem is listed among the entities and persons who may file a
petition.375 The court rules also contain a new provision providing that in
termination of parental rights cases, the parties may stipulate, or the court
may order that parties or relatives of the parent whose rights have been
terminated may maintain contact with the child.376
IV. CONCLUSION
Extensive changes to the Florida Juvenile Code in both the juvenile
delinquency and child dependency areas, which have been the norm in the
Florida Legislature until last year, did not take place this year. Thus, the
courts will have an opportunity to analyze statutes which have been on the
books for two years without dramatic change. This should be helpful.
Unfortunately, the appellate courts have had to spend much of their
time correcting simple, yet repeated errors by the trial courts. However, the
appellate courts have also rendered valuable services interpreting sections of
chapter 39 with specific emphasis on the dispositional stage of delinquency
cases and termination of parental rights. A particularly difficult area, as yet
not fully developed by the appellate courts, involves questions of the right
to counsel for parents in dependency and termination proceedings and the
role of the guardian ad litem in the same proceedings.
Finally, although the Florida Legislature was busy restructuring Part IV
of chapter 39 dealing with families in need of services and children in need
374. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.400-.410.
375. Id. at 8.500(b)(1).
376. Id. at 8.530(d).
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of services, 3 " there has been virtually no reported appellate case law in the
field. Indeed, there was nothing to report this past year.
377. See 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-369 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.426(2)); 1996 Fla. Laws
ch. 96-398 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.42(1), (5), (7)). The changes in chapter 96-369 of the
Laws of Florida deals with subsection two of section 39.426 of the Florida Statutes entitled
"Case staffing; services and treatment to a family in need of services." The changes amended
the composition of the case staffing committee and provided that the committee may include a
supervisor of the Department's contracted provider, a representative from the area of
substance abuse, the alternative sanctions coordinator, and a representative from the child's
school. See ch. 96-369, § 4, 1996 Fla. Laws 2128, 2133.
Additionally, chapter 96-398 of the Laws of Florida restructured the children in need of
services and families in need of services section of chapter 39 by identifying the roles of the
DJJ and HRS (effective January 1997, the Department of Children and Family Services) as
they apply to preserving the unity and integrity of the family and in serving this country's
youth population. See ch. 96-398, §§ 19-34, 1996 Fla. Laws 2505, 2539-53.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The prudent practitioner will note a number of changes, some of them
quite substantial, to Florida's professional responsibility landscape in 1996.1
Courts and ethics committees rendered decisions affecting obligations that
Florida lawyers assume as they interact with prospective clients, clients,
judges, other lawyers, nonlawyer assistants, third parties, and disciplinary
authorities. This article examines significant cases and ethics opinions in the
* Florida Bar Ethics Director. B.S., Florida State University, 1977; J.D., University of
Texas at Austin, 1984; M.L.S., Florida State University, 1996. The author gratefully
acknowledges the valuable research assistance of Kelly J. Wright.
1. This article surveys professional responsibility developments in Florida from July 15,
1995, through July 14, 1996.
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context of the different roles which lawyers assume during the course of
their relationships with these individuals and entities.2
Part II explores the traditional role of the lawyer as a zealous advocate
for the client. This section reviews developments of the past year as they
relate to: 1) formation of a lawyer-client relationship; 2) conflicts of interest
and other grounds for a lawyer's disqualification from a matter; 3) restric-
tions on a lawyer's ability to communicate with represented parties; 4) trial
conduct, including the permissible scope of argument; and 5) proper termi-
nation of a lawyer-client relationship. Part III addresses the lawyer's role as
fiduciary, especially with regard to safekeeping of client property. Part IV
looks at decisions affecting the lawyer's role as an officer of the court. Part
V explores various aspects of a lawyer's role as a businessperson. Included
in this section are developments concerning attorney's fees, organization and
operation 6f law firms, a lawyer's relationship with nonlawyers who assist
the lawyer in the practice of law, and law firm marketing activities. Finally,
Part VI considers the lawyer's role as a member of The Florida Bar, and
surveys disciplinary actions taken against Florida lawyers for widely varying
conduct.
3
II. THE LAWYER AS AN ADVOCATE
Probably the most important role played by a lawyer in our adversary
system of justice is that of an advocate who diligently4 and competently, S-
in a word zealously 6-- advances the client's cause. Because of the many
roles and responsibilities of a lawyer, there are limits placed on the extent of
2. Cases and ethics opinions are discussed in the section to which they have the most
significant connection, rather than in every section where they might apply.
3. Important disciplinary cases are analyzed where appropriate throughout the article, but
most are collected in Part VI for the convenience of the reader.
4. FLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (hereinafter "RPC") Rule 4-1.3 provides: "A
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." RPC 4-
1.3 (1987). The RPC are found in chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
5. Rule 4-1.1 provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation." RPC 4-1.1 (1987).
6. Canon 7 of the former Florida Code of Professional Responsibility ("CPR") provided
that a lawyer "is to represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law." Effective
January 1, 1987, the CPR was superseded by the current RPC. See Florida Bar re Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977 (Fla.), opinion corrected by 507 So. 2d 1366 (Fla.
1986). The RPC mention "zealous" advocacy only in the Preamble.
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a lawyer's advocacy.7 Sometimes it is difficult to discern the exact point at
which one crosses from proper and zealous advocacy, to unethical and over-
zealous, advocacy. The Supreme Court of Florida had no such difficulty
deciding this issue in Florida Bar v. Charnock. There a lawyer represented
a Dutch client who owned real property in Florida.9 A $3,000 mechanic's
lien was filed against one of the client's parcels, which was valued at over
$100,000.0 The lien holder brought a foreclosure action against the prop-
erty, but neither the lawyer nor his client were aware of this action because
service was effected using the "long arm statute."" Judgment was rendered
for the lien holder and the property was auctioned at judicial sale. 12 When
the lawyer inadvertently learned of this, he filed several motions in an
attempt to have the sale set aside. 13 The court denied the motions and issued
a writ of possession.'
4
Refusing to give up, the lawyer hastily procured a tenant for the
property through an oral agreement.15 He then had the tenant complete an
affidavit averring that the tenant was entitled to have possession of the
property, despite the fact that the "tenant" never took possession of the
property.' 6 The lawyer did this in an effort to take advantage of the protec-
tions afforded tenants under Rule 1.580 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure.'7 The supreme court viewed the lawyer's delaying tactics as an
7. For example, one of the most obvious limits on zealous advocacy is the prohibition
against knowingly using false evidence. Included in this prohibition is perjured testimony,
even when such evidence would be extremely helpful to the client's case. See RPC 4-3.3(a)
(1987).
8. 661 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1995).
9. Id. at 1207.
10. Id. at 1210.
11. Id. at 1208. See also FLA. STAT. § 48.181 (1991). This section is entitled "Service
on nonresident engaging in business in state."
12. Charnock, 661 So. 2d at 1208.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1210.
15. lML at 1208.
16. Id.
17. Charnock, 661 So. 2d at 1208. The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide, in
relevant part:
Third Party Claims. If a person other than the party against whom the writ of
possession is issued is in possession of the property, that person may retain pos-
session of the property by filing with the sheriff an affidavit that the person is en-
titled to possession of the property, specifying the nature of the claim. There-
upon the sheriff shall desist from enforcing the writ and shall serve a copy of the
affidavit on the party causing issuance of the writ of possession. The party
causing issuance of the writ may apply to the court for an order directing the
1996]
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unethical "fraud on the court in an effort to frustrate the transfer of posses-
sion of the property" and found that they "went beyond the boundaries of
zealous advocacy."18 The court suspended the lawyer from the practice of
law for thirty days.
19
A. Conflicts of Interest and Disqualification
Although disputes in both the disciplinary and disqualification arenas
can turn on the nature of the lawyer's conduct, quite often the determining
factor is whether a lawyer-client relationship existed between the lawyer and
the allegedly aggrieved party. This issue can be crucial, especially where the
facts are otherwise uncontested. For example, in Florida Bar v. King20 the
lawyer defended himself against charges of neglect by asserting that a
lawyer-client relationship did not exist.21 He based this on the fact that he
was not paid a retainer by the complainant.22 Rejecting this argument, the
supreme court flatly stated that "[a] fee is not necessary to form an attorney-
client relationship. 23
Sometimes actions not taken by a lawyer can lead to the conclusion that
a lawyer-client relationship exists. In Florida Bar v. Flowers,24 a lawyer
who shared office space with a nonlawyer immigration consultant was
disciplined for allowing conditions to exist such that persons consulting with
the nonlawyer "could reasonably expect and believe that they were receiving
legal representation" from the lawyer.25 It appeared that the lawyer made no
effort to distinguish his offices from those of his nonlawyer tenant. This
conclusion was supported by the fact that the sign for the office building
contained the name and telephone number of only the lawyer.26
sheriff to complete execution of the writ. The court shall determine the right of
possession in the property and shall order the sheriff to continue to execute the
writ or shall stay execution of the writ, if appropriate.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.580(b).
18. Charnock, 661 So. 2d at 1209.
19. Id. at 1210.
20. 664 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1995).
21. Id. at 926.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 927 (citing Dean v. Dean, 607 So. 2d 494, 500 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
24. 672 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1996).
25. Id. at 528.
26. Id. at 527. Several opinions have been issued for situations where lawyers and non-
lawyers share office space. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 88-15
(1988); Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 78-14 (1978).
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The Third District Court of Appeal, in Garner v. Somberg,27 recently
decided a highly relevant case concerning the establishment of the lawyer-
client relationship. This decision will likely result in changes to the proce-
dures lawyers use to screen potential clients. After Gamer's wife was
injured in an auto accident, Garner contacted several lawyers about pursuing
a personal injury action, and eventually retained a South Florida law firm.28
The mother of Garner's injured wife, however, hired attorney Somberg.29
Mr. Somberg then filed a petition to have the wife's competency determined
and to have the mother appointed emergency temporary guardian of the
wife.30 Garner moved to disqualify Somberg, alleging that he had previously
communicated with Somberg regarding the personal injury action.3 As a
result of these communications, Garner claimed to have given Somberg
relevant confidential information. 32 Responding to the motion, sole practi-
tioner Somberg asserted that neither he nor anyone in his office had ever
spoken to Garner.33 Garner, however, produced telephone records showing
that he had made three telephone calls to Somberg's office, one lasting
thirteen minutes.34
Faced with these facts, the trial court denied the motion to disqualify,
because Garner failed to demonstrate that he gave confidential information
to Somberg during the calls.35 The appellate court reversed on certiorari
review, ruling that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of
the law.36 Citing the supreme court's decision in State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. v. K.A. W.,37 the court stated, "[i]n conflict-of-interest
cases, once an attorney-client relationship is shown to have existed, that
relationship gives 'rise to an irrefutable presumption that confidences were
disclosed during that relationship ....,38 This statement of law is correct,
provided an attorney-client relationship has been shown. The problem in
this case was that the court simply assumed, without analysis, the existence
27. 672 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1996).




32. Garner, 672 So. 2d at 853.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 853-54.
36. Id. at 854.
37. 575 So. 2d 630, 633 (Fla. 1991).
38. Garner, 672 So. 2d at 854.
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of an attorney-client relationship. The court based its decision on telephone
records of three apparently short telephone calls. The court's assumption
should be disturbing to practicing lawyers. Its holding seems to suggest that
anyone who calls a lawyer's office, even if the caller does not speak to a
lawyer, or just listens to music while on hold for thirteen minutes, will later
be able to disqualify that lawyer. This disqualification will be based on the
claim that an attorney-client relationship was formed. Lawyers may be able
to guard against disqualification by establishing and following written office
procedures for initial client contacts. This can be especially important in
areas of law, such as domestic relations, where lawyer-shopping is common.
A model procedure would provide that a prospective client first speaks with
a nonlawyer, which is usually a secretary or receptionist. Generally, this
person takes enough information to run a check for conflicts, but does not
discuss details of the matter that would be considered confidences under the
ethics rules. Only after the new matter has been cleared by the conflicts
check would the lawyer engage in a discussion with the prospective client.
If attorney Somberg had been able to show that he routinely followed this
type of procedure, perhaps disqualification would have been avoided. While
some may consider this type of procedure unduly burdensome, it appears,
after Garner, that practitioners are left with little or no alternative if they
want to avoid being disqualified for a "confidential" conversation that may
or may not have taken place.39
Turning to more typical matters involving conflicts of interest, the
events in Florida Bar v. Sofo4 provide an example of how conflict problems
can arise when a lawyer becomes involved in a business transaction with his
client.41 The lawyer was both a shareholder in, and general counsel for
Micro Environmental, Inc.42 The company was subsequently bought by
another company.43 The lawyer then became general counsel for the buyer."
The buyer later failed to perform as required under the purchase agreement.45
39. Id. Another troubling prospect is the heightened risk of malpractice liability that
lawyers face when it becomes so easy for a would-be client to establish the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship and its attendant legal duties. See, e.g., Blackhawk Tennessee, L.P.
v. Waltemyer, 900 F. Supp. 414 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
40. 673 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1996).
41. Id. at 1. See cases cited infra notes 317 and 322 and accompanying text (providing
other disciplinary cases in which conflicts of interest rules were violated).
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Consequently, Mr. Sofo sent a demand letter to the principals of the buyer,
on the buyer's letterhead, and signed as general counsel.46 After receiving
an unsatisfactory response, the lawyer wrote to the principals purporting to
terminate the purchase agreement.47 The supreme court suspended the
lawyer from practice for ninety-one days, concluding that he violated several
conflict rules. 48 The lawyer's simultaneous representation of buyer and
seller violated Rule 4-7.1(b) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.49
This conflict infraction "was exacerbated by [the lawyer's] ownership of
stock in both companies.' 50 Also violated were rule 4-1.9(a),51 concerning a
lawyer's duty of loyalty to a former client, as well as rules 4-1.9(b), 52 and 4-
1.8(b),53 regarding a lawyer's duty not to misuse client confidences. 4
46. Id.
47. Sofo, 673 So. 2d at 1.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Rule 4-1.7(b)(1) provides:
(b) Duty to Avoid Limitation on Independent Professional Judgment. A
lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer's exercise of independent profes-
sional judgment in the representation of that client may be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the law-
yer's own interest, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
RPC 4-1.7(b)(1) (1993).
50. Sofo, 673 So. 2d at 2.
51. Rule 4-1.9(a), (b) provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when
the information has become generally known.
RPC 4-1.9(a)(b) (1993).
52. Sofo, 673 So. 2d at 2.
53. Id. Rule 4-1.8 (b) provides:
(b) Using Information to Disadvantage of Client. A lawyer shall not use in-
formation relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client
unless the client consents after consultation, except as permitted or required by
rule 4-1.6.
RPC 4-1.8(b) (1987).
54. Sofo, 673 So. 2d at 2.
19,961
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Lane v. Sarfati55 was a case in which a lawyer was disqualified from
representation because he violated the duty of loyalty owed to his former
client. The lawyer met with an individual who was in the theatrical man-
agement business.5 6 The lawyer reviewed the standard form contract used by
the client and provided her with an addendum to be appended to the standard
contract. 57 Sometime later, the lawyer's former client was embroiled in a
suit filed against her by one of her actor clients. 8 The suit involved con-
struction of the former client's contract, including the addendum. 59 The
lawyer attempted to appear as counsel for the actor in the suit.60 The trial
court denied the former client's motion to disqualify the lawyer, but the
appellate court reversed and disqualified the lawyer for breaching rule 4-
1.9.61 The court was of the view that the comment to rule 4-1.9 squarely
addressed the situation presented: "[A] lawyer could not properly seek to
rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former
client. 62
An interesting issue concerning disqualification of the co-counsel of a
client's former law firm was addressed in Zarco Supply Co. v. Bonnell.
63
Zarco was the latest case to rely on the supreme court's decision in State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. K.A. W.64 to decide the question of
standing to raise a lawyer's disqualification motion. 65 In Zarco, Stephen
Bonnell was involved in an automobile accident. 66 As an employee of the
company, he hired a law firm ("Firm I") to pursue a personal injury action
against the employer company for himself and several of his family mem-
bers.67 Firm I later withdrew from representing all of the family members,
55. 676 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
56. Id. at 475.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 476.
59. Id.
60. Lane, 676 So. 2d at 476.
61. Id.; see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
62. Lane, 676 So. 2d at 476 (quoting RPC 4-1.9 (1993)).
63. 658 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
64. 575 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1991).
65. Zarco, 658 So. 2d at 153. See also Kenn Air Corp. v. Gainesville-Alachua County
Regional Airport Auth., 593 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992). In Kenn Air, the
court relied on K.A.W. in ruling that the successor in interest of a lawyer's former corporate
client had standing to raise a motion to disqualify on grounds that the lawyer switched sides in
a substantially related matter. Id. at 1222.
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except the employee's niece, because the employee decided not to sue the
employer. Later, Firm I joined as co-counsel with Firm II to pursue the
case, with the employer and the employee named as defendants. 69 After the
employer filed a motion to disqualify both firms, the employee was dis-
missed as a party, but expressly consented to Firm I's continued representa-
tion, and use of confidences, in the matter.70  The trial court denied the
disqualification motion.71 Reversing this ruling, the First District Court of
Appeal concluded: 1) that the employer had standing to seek disqualifica-
tion, as a party against whom the confidences could be used; 2) that an unfair
informational disadvantage to the detriment of the employer persisted even
though Firm I's former client (the employee) was no longer a named party,
and thus Firm I was disqualified; and 3) that Firm II was disqualified
because the confidential information possessed by Firm I was imputed to
Firm II as a result of their co-counsel relationship.72 Florida case law now
clearly indicates that real parties in interest, such as insurers,73 successors in
interest,74 and civil litigation co-parties," and not just a lawyer's clients,
have standing to assert conflict issues in motions to disqualify counsel from
a civil suit.
In contrast, standing seems to be more narrowly construed in the




71. Zarco, 658 So. 2d at 153.
72. Id. Although the court cited subdivision (b) of RPC 4-1.10 as support for this third
conclusion, it really seemed to be treating the two firms as a single "firm" under subdivision
(a) of the rule. Rule 4-1.10(a) and (b) provide:
(a) Imputed Disqualification of All Lawyers in Firm. While lawyers are as-
sociated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any I of
them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by rule 4-1.7, 4-1.8(c),
4-1.9, or 4-2.2.
(b) Former Clients of Newly Associated Lawyer. When a lawyer becomes
associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the
same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which
the lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are
materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired in-
formation protected by rules 4-1.6 and 4-1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
RPC 4-1.10(a), (b) (1987).
73. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1991).
74. See Kenn Air, 593 So. 2d at 1219.
75. See Zarco, 658 So. 2d at 151.
76. 668 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1996).
1996]
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concerned the appellant's claim that he had standing to raise a conflict of
interest on behalf of his co-defendant.77 Noting that the putative conflict was
between the co-defendant and the public defender's office, the Supreme
Court of Florida rejected this claim, stating that "[n]o authority supports
appellant's position that a third party has standing to raise a conflict of
interest argument with regard to a codefendant."
78
Another conflict decision in the criminal law area was Colton v. State,79
which dealt with issues that arose after a lawyer changed employers. The
lawyer was employed in the trial section of the public defender's office
when a defendant was tried and convicted. 80 The lawyer, however, did not
work on the case.81 The lawyer then moved to the criminal appeals division
of the attorney general's office, where he filed an answer brief in the
defendant's appeal.82 Not surprisingly, the defendant moved to disqualify
the lawyer, alleging that the lawyer had access to confidential information.
8 3
The First District Court of Appeal denied the motion to disqualify, stating:
We note that there is no Rule of Professional Conduct which ap-
plies to this fact situation. Rule 4-1.10 applies to lawyers moving
from one firm to another. Rule 4-1.11 covers successive govern-
ment and private employment. There is no rule which specifically
addresses successive government to government employment when
those interests are adverse, as is the case here.
s4
The court reached the correct conclusion, but its statement above is not
entirely correct. Although the rules cited by the court do not directly address
the matter, the comment to rule 4-1.11 specifically notes that rule 4-1.11 is to
77. Id. at 961. Interestingly, the appellant contended that, in multiple defendant capital
cases, it was the policy of the public defender's office to allow the state attorney's office to
determine which of the defendants would be represented by the public defender and which
would be represented by outside conflict counsel. Id. at 961 n.7.
78. Id. at 961. The supreme court expressly rejected appellant's reliance on the comment
to RPC 4-1.7 (1993). "In a criminal case ... [w]here the conflict is such as clearly to call in
question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the
question." I&a t 961 n.8.
79. 667 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).




84. Colton, 667 So. 2d at 342-43.
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govern this type of situation.8 5 The court then concluded that there was no
appearance of impropriety in the situation presented because the defendant
merely alleged access to confidential information, rather than possession of
it.86 The lawyer had never represented the defendant and trial and appellate
representation are of a significantly different nature.87
Reasons other than the usual conflict of interest violations were cited as
grounds for disqualification in the civil arena. In Christensen v. Correa,
88
the Fifth District Court of Appeal appeared to assume the existence of a
fiduciary relationship between a suspended lawyer and a lawyer who was
appointed to act as "inventory attorney" pursuant to rule 1-3.8.89 The
inventory attorney was appointed to inventory the files of the suspended
lawyer, who had misappropriated trust account funds.90 The suspended
lawyer had practiced in a law firm with his brother.91 The brother later sued
a firm client for fees allegedly owed to the firm, and the client engaged the
inventory attorney's law firm as defense counsel.92 Defense counsel asserted
counterclaims of negligence and professional malpractice. 93 The plaintiff
moved to disqualify defense counsel, arguing that a conflict of interest was
present on the grounds that the inventory attorney owed a fiduciary duty to
85. The comment to rule 4-1.11 provides: "When the client is an agency of one govern-
ment, the agency should be treated as a private client for purposes of this rule if the lawyer
thereafter represents an agency of another government, as when a lawyer represents a city and
subsequently is employed by a federal agency." RPC 4-1.11 cmt. (1987)
86. Colton, 667 So. 2d at 343.
87. Id.
88. 673 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
89. Id. at 146. Rule 1-3.8 provides, in part:
(a) Appointment; Grounds; Authority. Whenever an attorney is suspended,
disbarred, becomes a delinquent member, abandons a practice, disappears, or
dies, and no partner, personal representative, or other responsible party capable
of conducting the attorney's affairs is known to exist, the appropriate circuit
court, upon proper proof of the fact, may appoint an attorney or attorneys to in-
ventory the files of the subject attorney and to take such action as seems indi-
cated to protect the interests of clients of the subject attorney, as well as the inter-
est of that attorney.
(b) Maintenance of Attorney-Client Confidences. Any attorney so ap-
pointed shall not disclose any information contained in files so inventories with-
out the consent of the client to whom such file relates except as necessary to
carry out the order of the court that appointed the attorney to make the inventory.
RPC 1-3.8 (a)-(b) (1995).
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the suspended attorney.9" The trial court granted the motion and the appel-
late court affirmed per curium.95  A cogent dissent disagreed with the
majority's decision, maintaining that the suspended lawyer was not the
inventory attorney's "client" and thus, there was no conflict of interest.
96
The dissenting judge opined that, although an inventory attorney "is in a
position of trust as to both the suspended attorney and his former clients, the
primary fiduciary duty is owed to the former clients who choose to retain the
inventory attorney since that is an attorney-client relationship."
97
Discovery violations have also resulted in disqualification. In Henri-
quez v. Temple,98 a law firm was disqualified after "one of its attorneys
deliberately and surreptitiously obtained documents ... [that] the trial court
had previously ordered were not to be produced." 99
Finally, over-zealous lawyers who persisted in their attempts to con-
tinue representing clients, even after the entry of disqualification orders,
faced disciplinary problems.' ° In Birdsong, the lawyer was disqualified
from representing a client in a civil case for conflict of interest reasons.' °I
Notwithstanding the court's order, the lawyer continued to assist the client in
that matter behind the scenes by such actions as discussing the case with the
client and preparing pleadings.102  A thirty-day suspension was the end
result. 10 3 In Florida Bar v. Canto,1°4 more egregious misconduct, by a
lawyer who blatantly continued to litigate a case from which he was dis-
qualified several years prior to the disciplinary action, netted the lawyer a
two-year suspension. 15
B. Communication With Represented Opponents
Florida law concerning the permissible scope of a lawyer's contacts
with represented persons continued to develop in 1996. For several years it
has been increasingly difficult to definitively determine whether opposing
94. Id
95. Christensen, 673 So. 2d at 145.
96. Id. at 146 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
97. Christensen, 673 So. 2d at 146.
98. 668 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
99. Id. at 638.
100. Florida Bar v. Birdsong, 661 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1995).
101. Id. at 1200.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1201.
104. 668 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1996).
105. Id. at 584.
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counsel may contact former employees of a represented corporation and, if
so, exactly which former employees are subject to such contact. Rule 4-4.2
precludes a lawyer from contacting someone who is represented by counsel
without that counsel's consent. 1' 6 The rule, however, does not expressly
define exactly who within the corporate structure is considered to be
represented by a corporation's lawvyer.107 The comment to rule 4-4.2 offers
guidance concerning ex parte communication with current officers and
employees, but does not answer the former employee question.'08 In 1989,
the Florida Bar Board of Governors approved an advisory ethics opinion,
which concluded that it was permissible for a lawyer to contact any former
officer or employee of a represented corporation without the consent of the
106. Rule 4-4.2 provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another law-
yer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer. Notwith-
standing the foregoing, an attorney may, without such prior consent, communi-
cate with another's client in order to meet the requirements of any statute or con-
tract requiring notice or service of process directly on an adverse party, in which
event the communication shall be strictly restricted to that required by statute or
contract, and a copy shall be provided to the adverse party's attorney.
RPC 4-4.2 (1995).
107. Id.
108. The comment to rule 4-4.2 provides:
This rule does not prohibit communication with a party, or an employee or
agent of a party, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the
existence of a controversy between a government agency and a private party, or
between two (2) organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from com-
municating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate
matter. Also, parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other and a
lawyer having independent justification for communicating with the other party
is permitted to do so. Communications authorized by law include, for example,
the right of a party to a controversy with a government agency to speak with
government officials about the matter.
In the case of an organization, this rule prohibits communications by a law-
yer for one party concerning the matter in representation with persons having a
managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization and with any other person
whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the or-
ganization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may con-
stitute an admission on the part of the organization. If an agent or employee of
the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the con-
sent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this
rule. Compare rule 4-3.4(f). This rule also covers any person, whether or not a
party to a formal proceeding, who is represented by counsel concerning the mat-
ter in question.
RPC 4-4.2 cmt. (1987).
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corporation's counsel, unless the person contacted was in fact represented by
the corporation's counse.1. 9 Opinion 88-14 cautioned that the communi-
cating lawyer was forbidden to inquire into any attorney-client privileged
matters. 110
Throughout the intervening years, courts have given varying degrees of
acceptance to the reasoning articulated in Opinion 88-14."' While earlier
decisions by both Florida and federal courts tended to question the opinion,
in 1996 the pendulum seemed to swing the other way. The Third District
Court of Appeal heartily endorsed Opinion 88-14 in Reynoso v. Greynolds
Park Manor, Inc.112 Granting plaintiffs petition for a writ of certiorari to
quash a trial court order forbidding plaintiff's counsel from conducting ex
parte interviews of the defendant nursing home's former employees, the
court held that "the proscription of Rule 4-4.2 does not extend to former
corporate employees."" 3  The court relied on both Opinion 88-14 and
American Bar Association Formal Opinion 91-359, and noted that its
decision was in accord with "the great majority of the courts to have consid-
ered this issue."' 1 4 The court certified that its decision was in direct conflict
with a prior second district decision" 5 in hope that the matter would be
finally resolved by the Supreme Court of Florida.16
In another case involving ex parte communication with a nursing
home's former employees, the Fourth District Court of Appeal aligned itself
109. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 88-14 (1989).
110. Id. Although not mentioned in the opinion, the communicating lawyer "shall not
state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested" and, when appropriate, must take reasonable
efforts to correct any misunderstanding of the lawyer's role. RPC 4-4.3 (1987).
111. See, e.g., Rentclub v. Transamerica Rental Finance Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651 (M.D.
Fla. 1992), aft'd, 43 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir. 1995); Lang v. Reedy Creek Improvement Dist.,
888 F. Supp. 1143 (M.D. Fla. 1995); United States v. Florida Cities Water Co., No. 93-281-
CIV-FTM-21, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7507 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 1995); Browning v. AT&T
Paradyne, 838 F. Supp. 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp. of Am., 656 So.
2d 486 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Manor Care of Dunedin, Inc. v. Keiser, 611 So. 2d 1305
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
112. 659 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
113. Id. at 1157.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 158. See Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp. of Am., 656 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1995).
116. Reynoso, 659 So. 2d at 1158. The supreme court's conflict jurisdiction, however,
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with Reynoso and approvingly cited Opinion 88-14.117 The appellate court
held that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in
entering an order prohibiting such contacts and requiring the communicating
attorney to disclose any notes and statements taken as a result of the con-
tacts. 118 The court's decision was also certified by the appellate court as
directly conflicting with the Second District's decision1 19 Thus, the stage is
now set for a supreme court opinion providing guidance in this problematic
area.
Reynoso and Schwartz were not the only Florida cases facing the issue
of contacts with former corporate employees. The First District Court of
Appeal had the chance to squarely address the question, but managed to
avoid doing so. Once again, Boyd v. Pheo, Inc.120 involved contacts with a
nursing home's current and former employees. The trial court's protective
order barred plaintiff's counsel from contacting certain current and former
employees of the defendant nursing home.12 1 While acknowledging the
certiorari jurisdiction that had been granted by the Third District Court of
Appeal to decide the question, the First District Court of Appeal concluded
that the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction was not warranted because the
likelihood of irreparable harm arising from the trial court's order had not
been demonstrated.122 The court reasoned:
[T]he order in this case does not prevent petitioner from en-
gaging in discovery. Rather, it merely precludes her use of
investigative techniques less formal than those called for in
the rules governing discovery. Nothing in the order pre-
cludes petitioner from utilizing common discovery tech-
niques to identify respondents' current and former employ-
ees (as it appears she has already done), and petitioner is not
117. Estate of Schwartz v. H.B.A. Management, Inc., 673 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
118. Id at 118.
119. Id at 119.
120. 664 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
121. The order prohibited ex parte contact with "present and former employees who
directly participated in the care of the decedent," but did not bar such contact with "former
employees who did not directly participate in such care." Id. at 295.
122. Id. at 295-96.
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precluded from then deposing any witnesses she so identi-
fies.' 23
Failure to honor the proscriptions of rule 4-4.2 can lead to adverse
disciplinary consequences. Many lawyers do not realize that this rule
prohibits them from even copying opposing counsel's client on correspon-
dence directed to opposing counsel.' 24 A lawyer who knowingly communi-
cated with opposing counsel's client in this fashion was suspended from
practice for ten days in Florida Bar v. Nunes. 1
5
C. Trial Conduct
The arena in which a lawyer most vigorously acts as an advocate for the
client is in the courtroom during trial. A number of 1996 authorities ad-
dressed aspects of a lawyer's trial conduct, with particular attention placed
on the proper bounds of jury argument.
Attempting to "judge shop" by hiring co-counsel in order to force a
judge's recusal from the case was disapproved in Robinson v. Boeing Co. 126
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided that, in order to avoid
unnecessary delay in an active case, a federal district court may deny a
litigant's request to hire additional counsel that would likely cause the trial
judge's recusal.127 The court noted that the apparent motivation of the party
to create disqualification of the trial judge may be considered in ruling on
motions to add or substitute counsel.
128
All lawyers know that rule 4-3.1 prohibits the filing of frivolous claims
or defenses. 129 Yet cases citing or discussing this rule are rare, especially
123. Id.
124. The Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee has long considered such conduct to
be improper. See Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 76-21 (1977).
125. 661 So. 2d 1202, 1204 (Fla. 1995).
126. 79 F.3d 1053, 1056 (11th Cir. 1996). Accord Town Centre of Islamorada, Inc. v.
Overby, 592 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "[o]rdinarily, a party
may not bring an attorney into a case after it has been assigned to a judge, and then move to
disqualify the judge on grounds that the judge has a bias against the attorney.").
127. Robinson, 79 F.3d at 1056.
128. Id. at 1055.
129. Rule 4-3.1 provides:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a pro-
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outside of the disciplinary context. P.T.S. Trading Corp. v. Habie130 con-
cerned a lawyer who, ironically, filed what was determined to be a baseless
abuse of process claim. A husband and wife were engaged in an apparently
rancorous dissolution of marriage case.131  The parties were living in
Guatemala when his wife moved to Florida and began dissolution proceed-
ings. 32 The wife obtained an ex parte injunction freezing assets of a
company allegedly controlled by husband. 33 The dissolution action subse-
quently was settled, and the freeze order was lifted. 34
Despite the husband's failure to honor the settlement agreement, his
counsel filed an abuse of process suit against the wife and all lawyers who
had worked for her in connection with the dissolution matter.'35 The suit
alleged that the freeze order had been improperly secured for the unlawful
purpose of forcing the husband to settle. 36 The trial court granted the wife's
motion for summary judgment. 137  The Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed, denouncing the conduct of the husband and his lawyers and
awarding attorney's fees to the wife under section 57.105(1) of the Florida
Statutes.138 The court stated that "this lawsuit is utterly without any basis in
law or fact and was filed in bad faith."'3 9 Quoting rule 4-3.1, the court
ceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the pro-
ceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.
RPC 4-3.1 (1987).





135. Habie, 673 So. 2d at 500.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (applying FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1993)). Section 57.105(1) currently provides:
(1) The court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid to the prevailing
party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party's attorney in any
civil action in which the court finds that there was a complete absence of a justi-
ciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint or defense of the losing
party; provided, however, that the losing party's attorney is not personally re-
sponsible if he or she as acted in good faith, based on the representations of his
or her client. If the court finds that there was a complete absence of a justiciable
issue of either law or fact raised by the defense, the court shall also award pre-
judgment interest.
FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1995).
139. Habie, 673 So. 2d at 499.
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concluded its opinion by calling the lawyer's actions to the attention of The
Florida Bar. 140
The use of improper jury arguments was addressed in a number of
appellate decisions, with trial court judgments being reversed in several
cases. The improper arguments ordinarily violate rule 4-3.4(e), 141 but
whether reversal is required depends on a variety of factors, including: 1)
the severity of the offending remarks; 2) whether objections were made by
opposing counsel; and 3) the law of the district in which the remarks
occurred.
In Muhammad v. Toys "R" Us, 42 the First District Court of Appeal
determined that defense counsel's argument violated RPC 4-3.4(e) where
counsel: 1) suggested that plaintiff may have already settled with a non-
party; 2) gave personal opinions regarding evidence and damages sought; 3)
suggested that plaintiff's expert did not testify at trial because his deposition
testimony was "ludicrous;" and 4) in attacking plaintiff's credibility, related
a personal story about a family incident. 43 Despite the fact that the trial
court had sustained some of plaintiff's objections and issued curative
instruction, a new trial was ordered since "the collective import of counsel's
personal injections, and irrelevant and inflammatory remarks, was so
extensive as to have prejudicially pervaded the entire trial .... 144 This case
is noteworthy because the first district urged trial courts to police these
matters closely in order to avoid having judgments reversed and to curtail
"unseemly conduct that lowers the professional reputation of the Bar and
brings disrepute to our judicial system .... 145
Baptist Hospital v. Rawson'46 was another reversal by the First District
Court of Appeal. The improper arguments in this case so affected the
fairness of the proceeding that a new trial was required even in the absence
140. Id. at 500.
141. Rule 4-3.4(e) provides that a lawyer shall not:
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe
is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a per-
sonal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpa-
bility of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
RPC 4-3.4(e) (1993).
142. 668 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
143. Id. at 258.
144. Id. at 259.
145. Id. at259 n.1.
146. 674 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
[Vol. 21:231
249
: Nova Law Review 21, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Chinaris
of objections by defense counsel. 47 Comments by plaintiff's counsel
concerning: 1) his personal views of the defendant hospital's actions 148 and
the validity of its legal defenses; 149 2) his perception of the jury's mission; 150
and 3) his personal reaction to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, s l were
deemed to violate rule 4-3.4(e). 5 2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also reversed a case due to im-
proper argument despite the lack of objections. In Norman v. Gloria
Farms,153 the court concluded that the offending remarks constituted funda-
mental error because of "the nature of the remarks, their collective import
and their pervasiveness throughout closing argument .... ,,154 Defense
counsel repeatedly made statements that the court believed improperly
appealed to the "passions and prejudices of this jury on the critical issues of
liability and financial responsibility."' 15  Counsel "went far beyond the
traditionally impermissible golden rule arguments" by urging the jury to act,
in effect, as "the conscience of the community."'5 6 Specifically, the argu-
ments appealed to the prejudices and self-interest of the jurors by imploring
them to make their decision based on how it would affect them personally
and others in their community. 5 7 These arguments, in the court's opinion,
went beyond the mere violation of rule 4-3.4(e) due to "their potential
impact on the integrity of the fact-finding process .... Norman is useful
for two reasons. First, it describes the fourth district's view on the issue of
whether arguments that are improper, but not objected to, can be the basis of
a reversal. Second, the opinion reviews the positions taken on this issue by
other district courts.159
147. Id. at 779.
148. Plaintiffs counsel stated that the defendant's decision not to take the injured plain-
tiff to the hospital emergency room "was the most ridiculous decision that anybody has ever
made in history." Id. at 778.
149. Comments included statements that the hospital's defenses were "unbelievable" and
"insulting." Id. at 779.
150. "If ydu let them get away with irresponsible medicine, then you breed irresponsible
medicine." Id.
151. Counsel stated that he woke up with nightmares after viewing his client's day-in-the-
life video. Rawson, 674 So. 2d at 779.
152. Id.
153. 668 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
154. Id. at 1024.
155. Id. at 1021.
156. 1l
157. Id.
158. Norman, 668 So. 2d at 1024.
159. Id. at 1023 n.7.
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The scope of Norman was explained by the concurring opinion in
another Fourth District Court of Appeal case, Donahue v. FPA Corp.16 In
Donahue, defense counsel referred to matters not in evidence and offered a
personal attack on the credibility of plaintiffs expert.' 6' No objections,
however, were made regarding these comments.1 62 The concurring opinion
stated that these remarks violated rule 4-3.4(e), but viewed Norman as
requiring reversal only in extreme cases.163 Accordingly, the opinion warned
lawyers practicing in the fourth district that "if counsel intend to appeal to
this court, they would be well-advised to object" to improper argument at
trial."6
A similar result was reached by the First District Court of Appeal in
Rockman v. Barnes. 65 At trial, plaintiffs counsel violated rule 4-3.4(e) by
expressing his personal beliefs concerning the evidence presented.
66
Defense counsel objected, the objections were sustained, and the judge
issued curative instructions.' 67 Nevertheless, on appeal the defendant argued
that reversal of the judgment in favor of plaintiff was warranted because the
improper arguments constituted reversible error. 68 While noting that it
"definitely [did] not condone the injection of the personal opinion of
plaintiff's counsel into argument before the jury[,]" the appellate court
believed that a "fair trial was conducted despite the improprieties of coun-
sel" and declined to reverse the judgment. 69 As in Norman, one judge
concurred specially to state his view that precedent in the first district did
not require reversal merely because arguments violated rule 4-3.4(e), but that
the determinative question was whether "the conduct was so egregious as to
affect the fairness of [the] proceedings."'' 70
Yet another judge, this time from the Second District Court of Appeal,
concurred specially to comment on the proper standards to be used by
appellate courts in determining whether improper arguments warrant the
160. 677 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Klein, J., concurring specially).
161. Id. at 883.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 884.
164. Id.
165. 672 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).




170. Rockman, 672 So. 2d at 892 (Wolf, J., concurring specially).
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granting of a new trial. In D'Auria v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' 7 1 the concur-
ring judge expressed the opinion that defense counsel's remarks to the jury
violated rule 4-3.4(e). 172 The remarks in question included the injection of
counsel's personal opinions, appeals to the jurors as the community's
conscience, and "character assassinations" on the plaintiff, her counsel, and
her witnesses. 73 No objections or motions for mistrial, however, were
lodged by plaintiffs counsel and the appellate court affirmed the judg-
ment. 74 The concurring opinion cites approvingly to another second district
decision, Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Florida.175 Hagan contains a detailed
analysis of the relationship between improper argument and reversible error
that will be useful to both attorneys and judges in the second district. 176
The Third District Court of Appeal found a debatable argument to be
permissible in Forman v. Wallshein. 7 In this case, the court decided that, in
a closing argument in a civil case, it was not improper argument for counsel
to call opposing party a "liar" where there was a basis in the evidence to do
so.'78 Additionally, the court noted that using the phrase "I think" or "I
believe" in closing argument does not always constitute a prohibited expres-
sion of personal opinion. 179 Such phraseology is permissible where it is
evident from the context that counsel is merely employing a figure of
speech.18
0
Interestingly, although a significant number of appellate opinions
condemned improper jury arguments as an ethical infraction, only one
reported disciplinary case dealt with this issue.'8 ' In Kelner, a lawyer
violated both rule 4-3.4(e) and the court's order by repeatedly referring in
trial to matters that he did not reasonably believe to be relevant or supported
by admissible evidence. 182 The lawyer's improper argument resulted in a
171. 673 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
172. Id. at 147 (Antoon, J., concurring specially).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 147-48 (referring to Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Florida, 666 So. 2d 580 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
176. Hagan, 666 So. 2d at 587. Although the court in Hagan indicated that the argu-
ments in question there were unprofessional, it made no statements regarding whether they
violated the RPC. IaL
177. 671 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
178. Id. at 874.
179. Id. at 875.
180. Id.
181. Florida Bar v. Kelner, 670 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1996).
182. Id. at 63.
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mistrial. 83 The supreme court, in publicly reprimanding the lawyer, com-
mented that, while the lawyer "has a duty to zealously represent his client,
this duty does not require that he violate a court order and produce a mis-
trial. , '1
84
D. Termination of Representation
The point at which an attorney-client relationship may or must be
terminated is often not clear to counsel. 85 Nor is it always clear to the
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Rule 4-1.16 provides:
(a) When Lawyer Must Decline or Terminate Representation. Except as
stated in subdivision (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where represen-
tation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct or law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the law-
yer's ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
(b) When Withdrawal Is Allowed. Except as stated in subdivision (c), a
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accom-
plished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:
(I) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services
that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers re-
pugnant or imprudent;
(4) the client fals substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer re-
garding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the
lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on
the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) Compliance With Order of Tribunal. When ordered to do so by a tribu-
nal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for termi-
nating the representation.
(d) Protection of Client's Interest. Upon termination of representation, a
lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's
interest, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for em-
ployment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client
is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.
The lawyer may retain papers and other property relating to or belonging to the
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courts, when court approval is required.18 6 This uncertainty is exacerbated
when counsel is court-appointed. Roberts v. State187 set forth the Fourth
District Court of Appeal's helpful analysis of how a court should respond to
motions to withdraw. In particular, motions that are filed by court-appointed
criminal defense counsel in various factual circumstances.188 Appointed
counsel in Roberts represented a criminal defendant on several felony
charges.189 A plea agreement was reached after a jury was selected. 90 Just
prior to sentencing, defense counsel moved to withdraw, citing an irretrieva-
bly broken attorney-client relationship.' 9' The motion, however, did not
include a request for a hearing on the withdrawal issue prior to the sentenc-
ing hearing. 92 At the sentencing hearing, the lawyer informed the court that
his client wished to withdraw the guilty plea on the ground that the lawyer
misled or coerced the client into agreeing to the plea bargain. 93 Despite
defense counsel's request that the court grant his withdrawal and appoint a
special public defender to argue the motion to withdraw the plea for the
defendant, the court conducted an inquiry of the defendant regarding the plea
withdrawal issue. 194 It then denied both counsel's motion to withdraw from
the case and defendant's motion to withdraw the plea. 95
On appeal the fourth district reversed, concluding that the trial court
had erred in not hearing, and granting, counsel's motion to withdraw before
moving on to the matter of defendant's motion to withdraw the plea. 96 The
court's opinion pointed out that "[tihere is a spectrum of reasons for a public
defender or court-appointed counsel to file a motion to withdraw, with
differing responses required by the trial courts."197 At one extreme, the trial
court is required to grant a motion to withdraw when a public defender
certifies to the court that the interests of two clients are so adverse or hostile
186. Court approval is required before counsel may withdraw from a case in litigation.
See FLA. R. JUD. ADMiN. 2.060(i).
187. 670 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The fourth district followed its
decision in Martin v. State, 675 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
188. Roberts, 670 So. 2d at 1044.




193. Roberts, 670 So. 2d at 1043.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1045.
197. d at 1043.
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that the attorney faces an irreconcilable conflict of interest.198 At the other
extreme, the court is not required to permit withdrawal on the basis of a
general loss of confidence by the client in the attorney, standing alone.' 99 In
between these two extremes are the difficult situations where the client
alleges some degree of incompetence on the part of the attorney.
2W
The Roberts court found that an actual conflict of interest was present
because the very basis for the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was the
alleged misconduct of the defense lawyer.20 1 Yet, the trial court's refusal to
permit the lawyer to withdraw from the representation placed the lawyer "in
the impossible position of attempting to argue the motion to withdraw the
plea .... ,,2 This conflict between the personal interests of defense counsel
and his obligations to his client was a violation of rule 4-1.7(b). 203 Thus, the
trial court erred in not permitting counsel to withdraw.
Additionally, as an ethical matter the steps prescribed in rule 4-1.16204
must be followed when terminating representation of a client--even one who
has not paid his or her bill. In Florida Bar v. King,20 5 the Supreme Court of
Florida stated that, "while lawyers are entitled to charge for their services,
they cannot simply abandon a case once they have provided services without
compensation." 2 6 For this and other transgressions, the lawyer was sus-
pended for three years.
207
JI. THE LAWYER AS A FIDUCIARY
Regrettably, each year lawyers are disciplined for violating their
fiduciary duties as holders of funds that belong to others, such as partners,
third parties, and especially clients.20 8 A case that involved several of these
198. Roberts, 670 So. 2d at 1043 (citing Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla.
1994)).
199. Id. at 1044 (citing Johnson v. State, 497 So. 2d 863, 868 (Fla. 1986)).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1045.
202. Id.
203. See supra note 49.
204. See supra note 185.
205. 664 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1995). See also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
206. Id. at 924 (citing Atilus v. United States, 406 F.2d 694, 696 (5th Cir. 1969)).
207. Id.; accord Florida Bar v. Hooper, 509 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1987).
208. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, other cases involving a lawyer's
failure to fulfill his or her fiduciary responsibilities are also addressed in this article. See cases
cited supra p. 234. See also cases cited infra pp. 275-81.
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aspects was Florida Bar v. Benchimo. 2 9 While working for a law firm, the
lawyer diverted client fee payments intended for the firm to his own use.
210
The lawyer's conduct was viewed all the more harshly because of the
circumstances surrounding two affected clients: one client resided in Italy
and was not conversant in English; the other was imprisoned in another
state.211 Disbarment was ordered.212
An interesting civil case in which the nature of a lawyer's trust fund
obligations were discussed is Kenet v. Bailey.213 A lawyer and his law firm
represented a client in litigation and recovered funds, which were deposited
into the firm's trust account pending resolution of related disputes through
arbitration. The litigation concerned a business venture in which the lawyer
and the client, among others, participated. Various agreements and releases
were executed. A few years later, the firm disbursed the trust account funds
to itself without notifying the client. At around the same time, the lawyer
had the client execute another release. When the client learned that the trust
funds had been removed by the firm, he sued the lawyer and the firm.
Raising a rather novel defense, the firm asserted that the language of the
release freed it from all "debts" owed to the client-including the trust
funds. The trial court agreed and rendered summary judgment for the firm.
Completely rejecting this defense, the appellate court reversed the judgment.
The court colorfully stated that "the characterization of a client's funds held
by an attorney in his trust account as constituting a 'debt' is woefully
inadequate, akin to describing Dadeland Mall as a shoe store."214 Citing
Judge Cardozo's famous description of a fiduciary relationship,1 5 the court
went on to note that such a relationship is created when a lawyer receives
trust funds to be used for a client's purposes and that misuse of such funds
"is one of the most serious offenses a lawyer can commit."
216
Some decisions by the Supreme Court of Florida in response to peti-
tions seeking amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar directly
related to the lawyer's role as fiduciary. In a decision that received little
notice but could affect the way many lawyers handle real estate closings, the
court amended rule 5-1.1(g) to broaden the list of limited-risk trust account
209. 21 Fla. L. Weekly S226 (May 23, 1996).
210. Id. at S226.
211. Id
212. Id. at S227.
213. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D982 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1996).
214. Id. at D983.
215. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
216. Kenet, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D983.
1996]
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deposits against which a lawyer may disburse before the funds are actually
collected to include checks written by title agencies authorized to do busi-
ness in Florida.217
In contrast, other supreme court decisions regarding rules received
much greater publicity.218 A petition was filed by fifty Florida Bar members,
who are also members of the Florida Chapter of the American Academy of
Matrimonial Attorneys, seeking to create a new rule that would impose
specific regulations and restrictions upon Florida lawyers practicing in
"family law matters.' 219 Proposed rule 4-1.18 would have required written
fee agreements and a statement of client's rights, strictly prohibited attorney-
client sexual relations, and addressed several controversial matters such as
nonrefundable retainers and attorney's liens. The supreme court declined to
adopt the proposed rule, citing two reasons. First, the court agreed with the
position taken by the Florida Bar Board of Governors that no justification
was shown to warrant treating family law practitioners differently than other
bar members.220 Second, the court noted that its recent adoption of a rule
governing a lawyer's sexual relationships with clients221 addressed some of
the concerns raised by the petitioners.222
Finally, in Bankers Trust Realty, Inc. v. Kluger2 23 the Third District
Court of Appeal addressed the proper pleading of a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty against a lawyer. Affirming the trial court's dismissal for
217. Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 658 So. 2d 930,
951 (Fla. 1995). Prior to the amendment to rule 5-1.1(g), a lawyer could disburse against
checks written by licensed title insurance agencies, but not "title agencies."
218. See, e.g., Mark D. Killian, Court Okays New Bar Rules, FLA. B. NEWS, Aug. 15,
1995, at 1; Mark D. Killian, Petition Draws Fire, FLA. B. NEws, Sept. 1, 1995, at 1.
219. Amendment to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar -- Rule 4-1.18, Client-Lawyer
Relationships in Family Law Matters, 662 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 1995).
220. 111 at 1247.
221. Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 658 So. 2d 930
(Fla. 1995). Subdivision (i) of rule 4-8.4, "Misconduct," provides that a lawyer shall not
"engage in sexual conduct with a client that exploits the lawyer-client relationship." RPC 4-
8.4(i) (1987). Rule 4-8.4 appears to be somewhat less restrictive than proposed rule 4-1.18,
which was rejected by the court. Proposed rule 4-1.18 would have flatly prohibited the
commencement of an attorney-client sexual relationship, while rule 4-8.4(i) seems to permit
attorney-client sexual conduct unless it "exploits" the attorney-client relationship. Addition-
ally, the comment to rule 4-8.4(i) further restricts the reach of the rule: "For purposes of this
subdivision, client means an individual, not a corporate or other nonpersonal entity, and
lawyer refers only to the lawyer(s) engaged in the legal representation and not other members
of the law firm." RPC 4-4.8(i) cmt.
222. Id.
223. 672 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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failure to state a cause of action, the appeal's court held that the specifics of
the alleged breach must be pleaded. It is not sufficient for a plaintiff to
simply allege a legal conclusion such as failure to timely act; rather, the
plaintiff must allege facts showing not only the damages allegedly suffered,
but the causal relationship between the attorney's allegedly deficient acts
and the damages. 24
IV. THE LAWYER AS AN OFFICER OF THE COURT
Lawyers are commonly referred to as "officers of the court."5 In our
three-branch system of government, a lawyer is more than just a client's
agent. The Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as case law,7 impose
upon a lawyer obligations to the court (or the "justice system") that some-
times limit-or even conflict with-the lawyer's duties to the client. For
example, in an ex parte proceeding a lawyer must inform the court of all
relevant facts, even when the facts are adverse to the lawyer's client. 2
7
Although the tension between the lawyer's duties to both the client and the
court can create ambiguities regarding a lawyer's proper role in a particular
situation, it is clear that a professionally responsible lawyer simply must
have a sense of the scope of his or her duties as an officer of the court. 2
224. Id. at 898.
225. For example, the very first sentence of the preamble to the Rules of Professional
Conduct provides: "A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and
a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice." RPC Preamble (1987)
(emphasis added). The preamble mentions this role several other times as well. RPC
Preamble (1987). "A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the
legal system, and a public citizen are usually harmonious.... Lawyers are officers of the
court and they are responsible to the judiciary for the propriety of their professional activi-
ties." Id. Additionally, the Comment to rule 4-6.1, which is titled "Pro Bono Public Service,"
states in part: "As an officer of the court, each member of The Florida Bar in good standing
has a professional responsibility to provide pro bono legal service to the poor." RPC 4-6.1
(1995).
226. See, e.g., 84 Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 656 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that a lawyer has ethical obligation, as an officer of the court, to immediately
raise before a trial court the fundamental issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, after it
becomes apparent, in order to prevent an unnecessary expenditure of precious client and
judicial resources).
227. RPC 4-3.3(d) (1987).
228. Awareness of this role as "officer of the court" becomes even more critical when one
considers the new "professionalism" initiatives that are springing up. See, e.g., Gary
Blankenship, Bar Panel Seeks Okay For a Center for Professionalism, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 1,
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The lawyer appeared to lack this sense in Florida Bar v. Tobin229 and,
consequently, was suspended from practice for forty-five days. The lawyer
represented a company in an action against an insurer. Judgment was
rendered for the company, and the insurer deposited funds into the court
registry in satisfaction of the judgment. Some of the funds were disbursed
pursuant to court order. The lawyer's associate then hand-delivered a
motion to the court requesting release of the remaining funds; the insurer
was not timely noticed. In an ex parte proceeding, the associate represented
to the court that the motion was unopposed. The court granted the motion.
The funds were released and given to the president of the lawyer's corporate
client. Needless to say, when the insurer learned of these actions it immedi-
ately attempted to recover the improperly withdrawn funds. The court
ordered the lawyer and the client to return the funds, but the lawyer never
did so.2 ° In the subsequent disciplinary proceeding, the supreme court
agreed with the referee231 that the lawyer's conduct violated his duty of
candor to the court under rule 4-3.3(d) 232 by not providing the court with all
of the necessary material facts in the ex parte proceeding. 233 The lawyer also
violated rule 4-3.4(c) 234 by disobeying an obligation under the court's
rules.235
A lawyer was disciplined for what amounted to a lack of professional-
ism in Florida Bar v. Uhrig.236 While representing a client in a child support
matter, the lawyer mailed an "insulting and highly unprofessional" 237 five-
page letter to the client's ex-husband. The lawyer acknowledged that the
letter caused the recipient to feel "disparaged, humiliated, offended, disap-
229. 674 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1996).
230. Id. at 128.
231. The Supreme Court of Florida appoints a county or circuit judge to preside as
"referee" over the trial of disciplinary cases. RPC 3-7.6(a) (1987).
232. Rule 4-3.3(d) provides:
Ex Parte Proceedings. In an ex parte proceeding a lawyer shall inform the tribu-
nal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make
an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
RPC 4-3.3(d) (1995).
233. Tobin, 674 So. 2d at 128.
234. Rule 4-3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not "[k]nowingly disobey an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid
obligation exists." RPC 4-3.4(c) (1987).
235. Tobin, 674 So. 2d at 129.
236. 666 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1996).
237. Id. at 887. Among other things, the letter included "an inflammatory simile com-
paring [the recipient]'s opinions to body odor .... Id. at 888.
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pointed, and angry."3 8 Noting that rule 4-8.4(d)239 prohibits lawyers from
knowingly humiliating litigants on any basis, the supreme court publicly
reprimanded the lawyer for violating this rule. Uhrig is especially signifi-
cant because it appears to be the first case in which a lawyer was disciplined
solely for violating the anti-disparagement provisions of RPC 4-8.4 since
their adoption in 19 93 .240
As mentioned above, the lawyer's unique role as an "officer of the
court" arises from our three-branch governmental system. The Supreme
Court of Florida had occasion in TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak24' to explain
the different roles that the judicial branch and the legislative branch play in
our legal system. In upholding the constitutionality of the offer of judgment
statute242 and its attorney's fee provision, the court stated:
Article V, section 2(a), of the Florida Constitution provides this
Court with exclusive authority to adopt rules for practice and pro-
cedure in the courts of this State. The Legislature, on the other
hand, is entrusted with the task of enacting substantive law. In
Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1992), we noted that the
judiciary and legislature must work together to give effect to laws
that combine substantive and procedural provisions in such a man-
ner that neither branch encroaches on the other's constitutional
243powers.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal ventured into an area that has
rarely been mentioned in recent judicial decisions-the common law
doctrines of champerty and maintenance. In Kraft v. Mason,244 the court
238. Id.
239. Rule 4-8.4 (d) provides that a lawyer shall not "'engage in conduct' in connection
with the practice of law 'that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,' including to
knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against
litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not
limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, marital
status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, employment, or physical characteristic."
RPC 4-8.4(d) (1987).
240. Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 624 So. 2d 720
(Fla. 1993).
241. 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995).
242. FLA. STAT § 768.79 (1987).
243. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d at 611.
244. 668 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
19961
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offered modem definitions of these concepts.245 These doctrines are not
terribly relevant to most practitioners, but they may become more so in the
wake of the renewed interest in lawyer advertising and solicitation that has
followed the United States Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc.
246
V. THE LAWYER AS A BUSINESSPERSON
Decisions connected with the business aspects of practicing law were
plentiful during the survey period. Cases, ethics opinions, and rule amend-
ments were handed down in business-related areas such as attorney's fees,
the organization and operation of law firms, a lawyer's relationship with
nonlawyers who might assist the lawyer in the practice of law, and marketing
activities undertaken by lawyers and law firms.
A. Attorneys' Fees
An extremely important decision addressing attorney's fee agreements
in light of public policy was rendered by the Supreme Court of Florida in
Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis.2 47 Chandris should be a wake-up call for those
Florida lawyers who have not paid sufficient attention to the details of the
rules governing contingent fee contracts and referral fees. The supreme
court has served notice that strict compliance with these rules is required in
order for these agreements to be enforceable.
Chandris was rendered in response to certified questions of law posed
by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The federal case concerned a
claim of tortious interference with contracts for legal representation.248 An
injured foreign seaman was treated in a Florida hospital. There he met with
a Florida resident who was licensed to practice law in Massachusetts, but not
in Florida. The seaman signed a contingent fee representation agreement
245. Id. at 682. The court considered the "modem view" of "maintenance" to be "'the act
of one improperly, and for the purpose of stirring up litigation and strife, encouraging others
either to bring [an] action[] or to... [defend a suit] which they have no right to make ... '
Id. at 682 (quoting 9 FLA. JUR. 2D Champerty and Maintenance § 1 (1979)). The court
approved the definition of "champerty" as "a form of maintenance wherein one will carry on a
suit in which he has no subject matter interest at his own expense or will aid in doing so in
consideration of receiving, if successful, some part of the benefits recovered." Id. (citations
omitted). "'[O]fficious intermeddling is a necessary element of champerty."' Id.
246. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
247. 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1996).
248. Id. at 181.
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with the Massachusetts attorney. The Massachusetts attorney then contacted
a local Florida law firm, and the seaman subsequently signed a contingent
fee agreement with the Massachusetts attorney and the Florida firm.
Although signed by the seaman and the Massachusetts attorney, this second
fee agreement was not signed by the Florida law firm and was silent as to
any division of fee between the lawyers involved. The seaman ultimately
settled his case directly with the defendants and discharged the Massachu-
setts attorney and the Florida firm, who then sued the defendants for tortious
interference. 249
The supreme court concluded that, by entering into a contingent fee
agreement in Florida with a putative client, an out-of-state lawyer who
resides in Florida, but is not admitted to practice in this state, engages in a
professional activity without proper authority and thus engages in the
unauthorized practice of law as proscribed by Florida Bar v. Savitt. 25
Consequently, the fee contract executed by the Massachusetts attorney was
held to be void as against public policy.251 The second fee contract did
involve a Florida law firm but did not comply with the applicable require-
ments of rule 4-1.5.*52 Regarding this second fee agreement, the court
249. IdM at 181-82.
250. Id. at 184 (citing Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1978)).
251. Id. at 186. The fee contract was not signed by all participating attorneys; it did not
spell out the division of fee between those attorneys; it did not provide that each participating
attorney would have joint legal responsibility for the case and that the attorney should be
available for consultation with the client. Chandris, 668 So. 2d 186.
252. Rule 4-1.5(f) provides:
(f) Contingent Fees. As to contingent fees:
(1) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the
service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by
paragraph (f(3) or by law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and
shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the per-
centage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement,
trial, or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery,
and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee
is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall pro-
vide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if
there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its
determination.
(2) Every lawyer who accepts a retainer or enters into an agreement, ex-
press or implied, for compensation for services rendered or to be rendered in any
action, claim, or proceeding whereby the lawyer's compensation is to be depend-
ent or contingent in whole or in part upon the successful prosecution or settle-
ment thereof shall do so only where such fee arrangement is reduced to a written
contract, signed by the client, and by a lawyer for the lawyer or for the law firm
representing the client. No lawyer or firm may participate in the fee without the
1996]
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consent of the client in writing. Each participating lawyer or law firm shall sign
the contract with the client and shall agree to assume joint legal responsibility to
the client for the performance of the services in question as if each were partners
of the other lawyer or law firm involved. The client shall be furnished with a
copy of the signed contract and any subsequent notices or consents. All provi-
sions of this rule shall apply to such fee contracts.
(3) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(A) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is
contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or sup-
port, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(B) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
(4) A lawyer who enters into an arrangement for, charges, or collects any fee
in an action or claim for personal injury or for property damages or for death or
loss of services resulting from personal injuries based upon tortious conduct of
another, including products liability claims, whereby the compensation is to be
dependent or contingent in whole or in part upon the successful prosecution or
settlement thereof shall do so only under the following requirements:
(A) The contract shall contain the following provisions:
(i) 'The undersigned client has, before signing this contract, received and
read the statement of client's rights and understands each of the rights set forth
therein. The undersigned client has signed the statement and received a signed
copy to refer to while being represented by the undersigned attorney(s)."
(ii) "This contract may be cancelled by written notification to the attorney at
any time within 3 business days of the date the contract was signed, as shown
below, and if cancelled the client shall not be obligated to pay any fees to the at-
torney for the work performed during that time. If the attorney has advanced
funds to others in representation of the client, the attorney is entitled to be reim-
bursed for such amounts as the attorney has reasonably advanced on behalf of the
client."
(B) The contract for representation of a client in a matter set forth in subdi-
vision (f)(4) may provide for a contingent fee arrangement as agreed upon by the
client and the lawyer, except as limited by the following provisions:
(i) Without prior court approval as specified below, any contingent fee that
exceeds the following standards shall be presumed, unless rebutted, to be clearly
excessive:
a. Before the filing of an answer or the demand for appointment of arbitra-
tors or, if no answer is filed or no demand for appointment of arbitrators is made,
the expiration of the time period provided for such action:
1. 33-1/3% of any recovery up to $1 million; plus
2. 30% of any portion of the recovery between $1 million and $2 million;
plus
3. 20% of any portion of the recovery exceeding $2 million.
b. After the filing of an answer or the demand for appointment of arbitrators
or, if no answer is filed or no demand for appointment of arbitrators is made, the
expiration of the time period provided for such action, through the entry of
judgment:
1. 40% of any recovery up to $1 million; plus
2. 30% of any portion of the recovery between $1 million and $2 million;
plus
3. 20% of any portion of the recovery exceeding $2 million,
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c. If all defendants admit liability at the time of filing their answers and re-
quest a trial only on damages:
1. 33-1/3% of any recovery up to $1 million; plus
2. 20% of any portion of the recovery between $1 million and $2 million;
plus
3. 15% of any portion of the recovery exceeding $2 million.
d. An additional 5% of any recovery after notice of appeal is filed or post-
judgment relief or action is required for recovery on the judgment.
(ii) If any client is unable to obtain an attorney of the client's choice because
of the limitations set forth in (f)(4)(B)(i), the client may petition the circuit court
for approval of any fee contract between the client and an attorney of the client's
choosing. Such authorization shall be given if the court determines the client has
a complete understanding of the client's rights and the terms of the proposed
contract. The application for authorization of such a contract can be filed as a
separate proceeding before suit or simultaneously with the filing of a complaint.
Proceedings thereon may occur before service on the defendant and this aspect of
the file may be sealed. Authorization of such a contract shall not bar subsequent
inquiry as to whether the fee actually claimed or charged is clearly excessive un-
der subdivisions (a) and (b).
(iii) In cases where the client is to receive a recovery that will be paid to the
client on a future structured or periodic basis, the contingent fee percentage shall
only be calculated on the cost of the structured verdict or settlement or, if the cost
is unknown, on the present money value of the structured verdict or settlement,
whichever is less. If the damages and the fee are to be paid out over the long
term future schedule, then this limitation does not apply. No attorney may sepa-
rately negotiate with the defendant for that attorney's fee in a structured verdict
or settlement where such separate negotiations would place the attorney in a po-
sition of conflict.
(C) Before a lawyer enters into a contingent fee contract for representation
of a client in a matter set forth in this rule, the lawyer shall provide the client with
a copy of the statement of client's rights and shall afford the client a full and
complete opportunity to understand each of the rights as set forth therein. A
copy of the statement, signed by both the client and the lawyer, shall be given to
the client to retain and the lawyer shall keep a copy in the client's file. The
statement shall be retained by the lawyer with the written fee contract and closing
statement under the same conditions and requirements as subdivision (f)(5).
(D) As to lawyers not in the same firm, a division of any fee within subdivi-
sion (0(4) shall be on the following basis:
(i) To the lawyer assuming primary responsibility for the legal services on
behalf of the client, a minimum of 75% of the total fee.
(ii) To the lawyer assuming secondary responsibility for the legal services
on behalf of the client, a maximum of 25% of the total fee. Any fee in excess of
25% shall be presumed to be clearly excessive.
(iii) The 25% limitation shall not apply to those cases in which 2 or more
lawyers or firms accept substantially equal active participation in the providing
of legal services. In such circumstances counsel shall apply for circuit court
authorization of the fee division in excess of 25%, based upon a sworn petition
signed by all counsel that shall disclose in detail those services to be performed.
The application for authorization of such a contract may be filed as a separate
proceeding before suit or simultaneously with the filing of a complaint. Pro-
ceedings thereon may occur before service of process on any party and this as-
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stated: "[W]e hold that a contingent fee contract entered into by a member
of The Florida Bar must comply with the rule governing contingent fees in
order to be enforceable. ' 23 The court clearly declared its intent to adopt a
bright line rule and appeared to reject any kind of "substantial compliance"
standard. The court expressly rejected an existing line of district court of
appeal cases "to the extent they may be read to hold that a contingent fee
contract which does not comply with the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity or the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar is enforceable by an attorney
who claims fees based upon a noncomplying agreement. ' 54 A lawyer whose
pect of the file may be sealed. Authorization of such contract shall not bar sub-
sequent inquiry as to whether the fee actually claimed or charged is clearly ex-
cessive. An application under this subdivision shall contain a certificate showing
service on the client and The Florida Bar. Counsel may proceed with represen-
tation of the client pending court approval.
(iv) The percentages required by this subdivision shall be applicable after
deduction of any fee payable to separate counsel retained especially for appellate
purposes.
(5) In the event there is a recovery, upon the conclusion of the representa-
tion, the lawyer shall prepare a closing statement reflecting an itemization of all
costs and expenses, together with the amount of fee received by each participat-
ing lawyer or law firm. A copy of the closing statement shall be executed by all
participating lawyers, as well as the client, and each shall receive a copy. Each
participating lawyer shall retain a copy of the written fee contract and closing
statement for 6 years after execution of the closing statement. Any contingent fee
contract and closing statement shall be available for inspection at reasonable
times by the client, by any other person upon judicial order, or by the appropriate
disciplinary agency.
RPC 4-1.5 (f) (1995).
Regarding the division of fees between lawyers in different firms (which includes referral
fee situations), rule 4-1.5(g) provides:
(g) Division of Fees Between Lawyers in Different Firms. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(D), a division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer; or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the representation and
agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
(B) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be made and the
basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
RPC 4-1.5(g) (1995).
253. Chandris, 668 So. 2d at 185-86.
254. Id. at 185. Cases mentioned in the court's opinion were: Fernandes v. Barrs, 641
So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) and Harvard Farms, Inc. v. National Casualty Co.,
617 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). Similar cases whose holdings would appear to
be affected by Chandris include Ganson v. Department of Admin., 554 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 566 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1990), and Weaver v.
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contingent fee agreement does not comply with applicable rules is not
completely foreclosed from collecting a fee; in a footnote, the court pointed
out that such a lawyer "would still be entitled to the reasonable value of his
or her services on the basis of quantum meruit."5
The exact parameters of the Chandris decision remain to be determined.
The case undoubtedly will spawn litigation, as clients seek to evade contin-
gent fee obligations to their lawyers and lawyers attempt to avoid payment of
referral fees to one another. In fact, the First District Court of Appeal has
already indicated its uncertainty about the scope of the decision by certifying
to the supreme court the question of whether the rule established in Chandris
gives a private party standing to seek an injunction based on a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct.2 6
Another bright line fee rule previously announced by the supreme court
was relied upon by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Kocha & Jones,
P.A. v. Greenwald.27 The appellate court reversed a judgment in favor of a
law firm that had withdrawn from a contingent fee case and subsequently
sued the client for attorney's fees.~ The court followed Faro v. Romani,2s9
which held that a lawyer who withdraws from representation prior to
occurrence of the contingency upon his or own volition forfeits all rights to
compensation (unless the client's conduct made the lawyer's continued
representation either legally impossible or ethically improper).260
Another case that could be relevant to lawyers handling contingent fee
cases was Doremus v. Florida Energy Systems of South Florida, Inc. 261 This
case concerned the responsibility for attorney's fees in a case in which a
client had employed two or more lawyers in succession. When a client
changes lawyers in a contingent fee case, the lawyers involved (i.e., the
successor lawyer and the discharged lawyer(s)) often work out an arrange-
ment whereby they agree on a split of the attorney's fee called for in the
client's contract with the successor lawyer. For example, if the client signed
a forty percent contingent fee agreement in a personal injury case with one
lawyer, then subsequently discharged that lawyer and signed a similar
School Board of Leon County, 624 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied,
634 So. 2d 629 (Fla.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 119 (1994).
255. Id. at 186 n.4.
256. See Smith v. Bateman Graham, P.A., 21 Fla. L. Weekly D947, D948 (1st Dist. Ct.
App. Apr. 19, 1996). See discussion infra p. 273.
257. 660 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
258. Il at 1075.
259. 641 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1994).
260. Id. at 71 (citations omitted).
261. 676 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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contract with another lawyer, the two lawyers would agree?62 on an accept-
able division of the forty percent fee amount that, per the contract, was due
the second lawyer. This practice seems to be common, and some attorneys
believe that it is required-especially in cases to which the maximum
contingent fee schedule applies, such as personal injury matters.263
A 1980 First District Court of Appeal case, however, decided that a
discharged attorney's quantum meruit fee in a contingent case is to be paid
from the client's share of recovery, rather than as a portion of the successor
counsel's fee. However, the first district case, Adams v. Fisher,2 4 was
decided prior to the supreme court's imposition of a maximum contingent
fee schedule in 1986.265 The question occasionally raised is whether the
adoption of the fee schedule changes the result reached in Adams. Stated
another way, the question is whether, in adopting the fee schedule, the
supreme court intended to cap the amount that one client would pay in one
case or whether the schedule was intended to limit the amount of fee that one
attorney (perhaps one of several employed in succession) could charge one
client in one case. Although no cases directly address this question, the
decisions in Doremus and other cases 266 indicate that Adams remains
unaffected by the existence of the fee schedule. This means that the client,
rather than the successor counsel, can be called upon to pay any quantum
meruit fee267 owed to a discharged lawyer in a contingent fee case.268
262. Presumably with the client's written consent, as required by rule 4-1.5(g)(5). See
supra note 252 and accompanying text.
263. Id.
264. 390 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
265. Florida Bar re Amendment to the Code of Professional Responsibility (Contingent
Fees), 494 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1986).
266. See, e.g., Law Offices of Theodore Goldberg v. Fazio, Dawson, DiSalvo, Cannon,
Abers & Podrecca, 659 So. 2d 1200 (Fla 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Stabinski, Funt & De
Oliveira, P.A. v. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d 159, 160 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
267. See Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982).
268. A successor attorney who enters into a contingent fee agreement at the maximum
allowed rate and concludes the case with a minimum of work, or primarily as a result of
discharged counsel's efforts, could be considered to have acted unethically by charging a
clearly excessive fee in violation of rule 4-1.5(a). This rule provides:
(a) Illegal, Prohibited, or Clearly Excessive Fees. An attorney shall not en-
ter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly ex-
cessive fee or a fee generated by employment that was obtained through adver-
tising or solicitation not in compliance with the Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar. A fee is clearly excessive when:
(1) after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left
with a definite and firm conviction that the fee exceeds a reasonable fee for
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A novel argument concerning entitlement to fees was made-and
rejected-in Life Care Centers of America, Inc. v. Chiles.2 69 A law firm
represented a client in a class action against the state on contingent fee basis.
The client withdrew from the class action and received no recovery in that
suit. At about the same time, the client settled a preexisting dispute with the
state. The trial court found that the preexisting dispute was not related to the
class action and that it was not resolved on the strength of the class action,
but nevertheless awarded a quantum meruit to the firm. The firm had argued
that its efforts in the class action led to resolution of the other dispute. The
first district reversed the fee award, ruling that as a matter of law the firm
was entitled to no fee under Rosenberg v. Levin270 because the contingency
(i.e., recovery in the class action initiated by the firm) never occurred. 27'
B. Organization and Operation of Law Firms
The key development in this area was the supreme court's approval of
rule changes that permit Florida lawyers to practice law in the form of a
professional limited liability company or a registered limited liability
partnership.272 These forms now join the professional service corporation as
corporate forms of practice that have been approved by the court.273
services provided to such a degree as to constitute clear overreaching or an un-
conscionable demand by the attorney; or
(2) the fee is sought or secured by the attorney by means of intentional mis-
representation or fraud upon the client, a nonclient party, or any court, as to ei-
ther entitlement to, or amount of, the fee.
RPC 4-1.5(a) (1987).
269. 674 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
270. Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1016.
271. Chiles, 674 So. 2d at 874.
272. Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 677 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1996). As
amended, rule 4-8.6 provides:
(a) Authorized business entities. Lawyers may practice law in the form of
professional service corporations, professional limited liability companies, or
registered limited liability partnerships organized or qualified under applicable
law. A professional service corporation, a professional limited liability company,
or a registered limited liability partnership is an authorized business entity under
these rules.
(b) Practice of Law Limited to Members of The Florida Bar. No authorized
business entity may engage in the practice of law in the state of Florida or render
advice under or interpretations of Florida law except through officers, directors,
partners, managers, agents, or employees who are qualified to render legal serv-
ices in this state.
(c) Qualifications of Managers, Directors and Officers. No person shall
serve as a partner, manager, director or executive officer of an authorized busi-
ness entity and engaged in the practice of law in Florida unless such person is le-
1996]
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gaily qualified to render legal services in this state. For purposes of this rule the
term "executive officer" shall include the president, vice-president, or any other
officer who performs a policy-making function.
(d) Violation of Statute or Rule. A lawyer who, while acting as a share-
holder, member, officer, director, partner, manager, agent, or employee of an
authorized business entity and engaged in the practice of law in Florida, violates
or sanctions the violation of the authorized business entity statutes or the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar shall be subject to disciplinary action.
(e) Disqualification of Shareholder, Member, or Partner; Severance of Fi-
nancial Interests. Whenever a shareholder of a professional service corporation,
a member of a professional limited liability company or partner in a registered
limited liability partnership becomes legally disqualified to render legal services
in this state, said shareholder, member, or partner shall sever all employment
with and financial interests in such authorized business entity immediately. For
purposes of this rule the term "legally disqualified" shall not include suspension
from the practice of law for a period of time less than 91 days. Severance of em-
ployment and financial interests required by this rule shall not preclude the
shareholder, member, or partner from receiving compensation based on legal fees
generated for legal services performed during the time when the shareholder,
member, or partner was legally qualified to render legal services in this state.
This provision shall not prohibit employment of a legally disqualified share-
holder, member, or partner in a position that does not render legal service nor
payment to an existing profit sharing or pension plan to the extent permitted in
rule 4-5.4(a)(3), or as required by applicable law.
(f) Cessation of Legal Services. Whenever all shareholders of a professional
service corporation, or all members of a professional limited liability company,
or all partners in a registered limited liability partnership become legally dis-
qualified to render legal services in this state, the authorized business entity shall
cease the rendition of legal services in Florida.
(g) Application of Statutory Provisions. Unless otherwise provided in this
rule, each shareholder, member, or partner of an authorized business entity shall
possess all rights and benefits and shall be subject to all duties applicable to such
shareholder, member, or partner provided by the statutes pursuant to which the
authorized business entity was organized or qualified.
RPC 4-8.6 (1987).
Rule 4-5.4(e) was amended to conform with the changes to rule 4-8.6 and currently pro-
vides:
(e) Nonlawyer Ownership of Authorized Business Entity. A lawyer shall
not practice with or in the form of a business entity authorized to practice law for
a profit if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary represen-
tative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a
reasonable time during administration; or
(2) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment
of a lawyer.
RPC 4-5.4(e) (1987).
273. See In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961).
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C. Lawyer's Relationship With Nonlawyer Personnel
Several cases explored the permissible parameters of the relationship
that a lawyer has with nonlawyers who may assist or participate with the
lawyer in the practice of law. In State v. Foster,274 a criminal law case
concerning the unlicensed practice of law, the First District Court of Appeal
emphasized that a nonlawyer may not, on behalf of another person, question
witnesses in depositions even under the immediate guidance and supervision
of a licensed attorney. The only exceptions to this broad prohibition are
"those instances in which the Supreme Court of Florida has expressly
authorized nonlawyers to engage in practice under the immediate supervi-
sion of a licensed attorney," such as the law school third-year practice
program.2 5
In Florida Bar v. Beach, a lawyer was disciplined because his
working relationship with a paralegal firm overstepped permissible bounds.
The lawyer purported to act as the paralegals' "supervising attorney" on an
independent contractor basis. The lawyer discussed the legal needs of the
paralegal firm's customers with the firm, reviewed documents prepared by
the paralegal firm for its customers, and offered thirty minute consultations
with those customers. The lawyer was paid seventy-five dollars per case by
the paralegal firm.277
One of the firm's customers complained to the bar about services that
the paralegal rendered to her as a direct result of the lawyer's advice. The
supreme court suspended the lawyer from practice for ninety days for
violating two Rules of Professional Conduct. First, the lawyer assisted
nonlawyers in the unlicensed practice of law. 7  The court noted that the
274. 674 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
275. Id. at 754 (Joanos & Lawrence, JJ., concurring). See, e.g., Chapter 11, R.
REGuLATING FLA. BAR (law school practice program); Chapter 12, R. REGULATiNG FLA. BAR
(emeritus attorneys pro bono participation program); Chapter 13, R. REGULATING FLA. BAR
(authorized legal aid practitioners rule).
276. 675 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1996).
277. Id. at 107.
278. Rule 4-5.4(a) provides:
(a) Sharing Fees with Nonlawyers. A lawyer or law fim shall not share legal
fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate
may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the
lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to 1 or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a de-
ceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the
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lawyer "improperly allowed [one of the paralegal firm's owners] to act as his
conduit for giving legal advice by obtaining and relaying, without supervi-
sion, case-specific information to persons whom [the lawyer] never actually
met or consulted." 279 Essentially, this arrangement put the cart before the
horse, with the lawyer working for the paralegal instead of vice versa. The
court also agreed with the referee's finding that the lawyer improperly
shared legal fees with nonlawyers.2 80 Finally, despite the existence of "a
close question," the court found support in the record for the referee's
conclusion that no attorney-client relationship was formed between the
lawyer and the complaining customer.281 The court, however, took care to
"caution lawyers that they should be very careful in placing themselves in
such difficult positions.' ' 2
Other working arrangements between lawyers and nonlawyers were
condemned as unethical by the Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee.
In Florida Ethics Opinion 95-1, the Committee concluded that a Florida Bar
member who maintains a law practice or otherwise holds himself or herself
out as a lawyer may not ethically enter into a business arrangement with a
nonlawyer to represent claimants in social security disability matters. Fees
claimed by or paid to the bar member for such representation would be
total compensation that fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased
lawyer,
(3) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disap-
peared lawyer may, in accordance with the provisions of rule 4-1.17, pay to the
estate or other legally authorized representative of that lawyer the agreed upon
purchase price; and
(4) bonuses may be paid to nonlawyer employees based on their extraordi-
nary efforts on a particular case or over a specified time period, provided that the
payment in not based on the generation of clients or business and is not calcu-
lated as a percentage of legal fees received by the lawyer or law firm.
RPC 4-5.4(a) (1987).
279. Beach, 675 So. 2d at 109.
280. Rule 4-5.5(b) provides that a lawyer shall not "assist a person who is not a member
of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unlicensed practice of law." RPC
4-5.5(b) (1987).
281. Beach, 675 So. 2d at 109. The conclusion that the lawyer did not have an attorney-
client relationship with the customer was important, because it had been alleged that the
lawyer represented conflicting interests. The referee cited the following factors in concluding
that an attorney-client relationship had not been established: The customer specifically sought
assistance from the paralegal rather than the lawyer; the customer entered into contract with
the paralegal, not the lawyer; the contract specifically disclaimed representation by the lawyer;
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considered legal fees, and thus this type of arrangement violates rule 4-5.4,
which prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer.
283
Similarly, in Florida Ethics Opinion 95-2 the Committee criticized a
lawyer's proposed involvement with a corporation that represents clients in
securities arbitration matters. The plan presented to the committee called for
the corporation to somehow obtain clients and pay the inquiring attorney to
represent those clients in negotiation and arbitration (if necessary). The
corporation would pay the attorney in the form of a retainer and a percentage
of the company's contingent fee. The Professional Ethics Committee
pointed to problems concerning conflicts of interest, solicitation, fee-
splitting, and assisting the unauthorized practice of law.
In the more traditional vein of lawyers' relationships with nonlawyers
was Florida Bar v. Burkich-Burrell.284 The lawyer represented her husband
in a claim arising from an auto accident. The client-husband's response to
interrogatories failed to disclose a prior accident and related medical
treatment, of which the lawyer-wife had personal knowledge. 2s5 When
charged with misrepresentation, the lawyer defended by asserting that the
interrogatory answers had been prepared by her paralegal and that she had
not reviewed them. Rejecting this defense, the supreme court stated that "an
attorney has a duty to review a client's sworn answers to interrogatories for
correctness, even when the answers have been prepared by the client and a
paralegal.
'1 6
Even when an attorney merely shares space with a nonlawyer, the
attorney must be careful to adhere to the guidelines set out in Florida Ethics
Opinion 88-15. Failing to do so could result in the attorney being held
ethically responsible for the nonlawyer's actions, as happened in Florida
Bar v. Flowers.
77
D. Marketing Activities of Lawyers
Rules regulating marketing activities by lawyers and law firms have
changed greatly over the years, but one thing has remained constant: in-
person solicitation of prospective clients with whom the lawyer has no prior
professional relationship is strictly prohibited.28 Following the tragic crash
283. See supra note 278.
284. 659 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1995).
285. Id. at 1083.
286. Id. at 1084.
287. See discussion supra p. 234.
288. Rule 4-7.4(a) provides:
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of a ValuJet airplane in the Florida Everglades, The Florida Bar asked the
supreme court to impose emergency suspensions on two lawyers who were
accused of engaging in prohibited solicitation of victims' family members.
Although the court declined to suspend the lawyers, it enjoined the lawyers
from any further contact with family or friends of the crash victims as well
as from entering into employment agreements regarding the crash.289
Additionally, the court appointed a senior judge to scrutinize, in light of
Chandris,29° any ValuJet crash employment agreements already entered into
by either of the lawyers.
On the advertising side, the supreme court amended several rules
affecting how lawyers may market themselves through direct mail communi-
cations and ads in the public media. Three changes were made to rules
governing the filing of lawyer ads for review by the Florida Bar's Standing
Committee on Advertising:29' lawyers who advertise via direct mail are no
longer required to file with the bar the names and addresses of persons to
whom direct mail letters are sent;292 a more specific definition was provided
for "public services announcements," which can be exempt from the filing
and review requirement; 293 lawyers who fail to timely submit their ads for
(a) Solicitation. A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional rela-
tionship, in person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing
so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. A lawyer shall not permit employees or agents
of the lawyer to solicit in the lawyer's behalf. A lawyer shall not enter into an
agreement for, charge, or collect a fee for professional employment obtained in
violation of this rule. The term "solicit" includes contact in person, by tele-
phone, telegraph, or facsimile, or by other communication directed to a specific
recipient and includes any written form of communication directed to a specific
recipient and not meeting the requirements of subdivision (b) of this rule.
RPC 4-7.4(a) (1987).
The long-standing, bright line rule against in-person solicitation could be in jeopardy. In
1993 the United States Supreme Court invalidated a rule barring Florida certified public
accountants from in-person solicitation of accounting business. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761 (1993). Although the Edenfield court clearly distinguished lawyers from accountants, a
federal judge in the Northern District of Georgia recently relied on Edenfield in striking down
the State Bar of Georgia's ethics rule proscribing in-person solicitation of prospective clients.
See Falanga v. State Bar of Georgia, No. l:95-cv-2160-GET (N.D. Ga. Jul. 18, 1996).
289. See Florida Bar v. Perez, 676 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1996); Florida Bar v. Hernandez, 676
So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1996).
290. See supra pp. 260-69.
291. See generally RPC 4-7.5.
292. Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 658 So. 2d 930,
943 (Fla. 1995) (amending RPC 4-7.4(b)(2)(B)).
293. Id. at 945.
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review as required are now subject to a "late fee" of $250 per ad rather than
the usual rate of $50 per ad.294
One notable change was made to the substantive rules governing lawyer
advertising. A new rule provides that all required disclosure statements295
must appear in each language used in the particular ad.296
Although a lawyer's marketing efforts are usually aimed at acquiring
new clients, ethics issues can arise when lawyers leave firms and attempt to
take existing firm clients with them. In Smith v. Bateman Graham, P.A.,297 a
lawyer who was leaving a firm mailed letters urging certain firm clients to
come with him to his new practice. Attempting to stop what it viewed as
improper solicitation, the firm sought to enjoin the lawyer from further
contacts with firm clients on the ground that the lawyer had violated the
ethics rules governing direct mail communications to prospective clients.
298
The circuit court entered the injunction. On appeal, the first district dis-
solved the injunction on the grounds that the firm lacked standing to seek
private enforcement of a bar ethics rule.299 Without addressing the merits of
the firm's allegations, the court held that violation of the RPC or of a
294. Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 677 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1996)
(amending RPC 4-7.5(d)(4)).
295. The Rules of Professional Conduct mandate that certain disclosure statements or
information appear in various lawyer advertisements. For example, many ads must include
these sentences: "The hiring of a lawyer is an important decision that should not be based
solely on advertisements. Before you decide, ask us to send you free written information
about our qualifications and experience." RPC 4-7.2(d). Also, the first sentence of all direct
mail communications concerning a specific matter must be: "If you have already retained a
lawyer for this matter, please disregard this letter." RPC 4-7.4(b)(2)(G).
296. Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 677 So. 2d 272, 283 (Fla. 1996)
(adding RPC 4-7.2(r)).
297. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D947 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1996).
298. The firm alleged that the letters violated subdivision (b)(1)(B) of rule 4-7.4, which
provides:
(b) Written Communication.
(1) A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on the lawyer's
behalf or on behalf of the lawyer's firm or partner, an associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communication to
a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:
() the written communication concerns a specific matter and the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the person to whom the communication is
directed is represented by a lawyer in the matter[.]
RPC 4-7.4(b)(1)(B) (1987).
299. Smith, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D947.
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Professional Ethics Committee advisory opinions does not provide an
adequate basis for instituting a private cause of action.300
VI. THE LAWYER AS A FLORIDA BAR MEMBER
Lawyers move in and out of various roles during their practice, but their
role as a member of The Florida Bar remains constant. Membership in the
bar carries with it a number of duties as spelled out in the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. Lawyers who fail to fulfill these ethical obligations,
especially when their actions cause harm to clients or others, face discipli-
nary sanctions ranging from admonishment to disbarment.301
One of the most common allegations appearing in grievance complaints
filed with Florida Bar is that a lawyer neglected the client or the client's
case. In Florida Bar v. Rolle, 30 2 a lawyer with serious problems in these
areas received a ninety-one day suspension from the practice of law.
Similarly, in Florida Bar v. Morrison,303 a lawyer who neglected client
matters and who failed to timely respond to investigative inquiries from the
bar304 was suspended for twelve months and thereafter until required
restitution was made to an affected client.30 5 Another case in which restitu-
tion was ordered in connection with a disciplinary suspension was Florida
Bar v. Schramm.306 Here, a lawyer neglected client matters and made false
statements to a court in connection with a motion to disqualify a judge.
300. Id. at D948. The firm argued that the supreme court's decision in Chandris sup-
ported its position. See discussion supra pp. 260-69. The First District Court of Appeal
disagreed, but nevertheless certified the following question to the supreme court as a question
of great public importance:
UNDER THE RULE OF LAW ESTABLISHED IN CHANDRIS, S.A. V.
YANAKAKIS, DOES A PRIVATE PARTY HAVE STANDING TO SEEK AN
INJUNCTION BASED UPON AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE RULES
REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR?
Smith, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D948 (citations omitted).
301. See generally Chapter 3, R. REGULATING FLA. BAR (addressing "Rules of Disci-
pline").
302. 661 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1995).
303. 669 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1996).
304. Rule 4-8.4(g) provides that a lawyer shall not "fail to respond, in writing, to any
inquiry by a disciplinary agency when such agency is conducting an investigation into the
lawyer's conduct." RPC 4-8.4(g) (1987).
305. Morrison, 669 So. 2d at 1042.
306. 668 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1996).
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Other lawyers had disciplinary problems because they made misrepre-
sentations to courts or while under oath. In Florida Bar v. Inglis,3°7 a lawyer
was found guilty of, among other things, incompetent representation and
lying under oath. This lawyer was subsequently disbarred.08 The misrepre-
sentations at issue in Florida Bar v. Walker3°9 included both overt false
statements and omissions. The supreme court rejected the lawyer's defense
that confidentiality obligations precluded him from disclosing information in
order to correct the misleading impressions under which both the bar and a
third party were operating, stating that "[a]n attorney cannot hide behind
attorney-client privilege in order to mislead with impunity." 310 Moreover,
the court noted that the attorney-client confidentiality rule contains excep-
tions permitting the necessary disclosures. 31' A thirty-day suspension was
imposed.312
False statements filed with the court in a probate matter netted the
lawyer a three-year suspension in Florida Bar v. Segal.313  This case is
especially interesting because the lawyer attempted to resign from the bar by
sending a "resignation" letter to the clerk of the supreme court shortly before
the disciplinary hearing on sanctions. The lawyer's resignation letter, of
course, was not accepted by the court. In its opinion, the supreme court
reminded Florida lawyers that the only method of resignation available to
lawyers who are the subjects of pending grievance complaints is a
"disciplinary resignation" in compliance with rule 3-7.12.f 6
307. 660 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1995).
308. Id. at 701.
309. 672 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1996).
310. Id. at 23.
311. Id. Rule 4-1.6 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Consent Required to Reveal Information. A lawyer shall not reveal in-
formation relating to representation of a client except as stated in subdivisions
(b), (c), and (d), unless the client consents after disclosure to the client.
(c) When Lawyer May Reveal Information. A lawyer may reveal such in-
formation to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
i4i to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's rep-
resentation of the client; or
(5) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
RPC 4-1.6 (a), (c)(4)-(5) (1987).
312. Walker, 672 So. 2d at 23.
313. 663 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1995).
314. Id. at 621.
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False statements to a court and other deceitful conduct helped earn
disbarment for a lawyer in Florida Bar v. Maynard.315 In addition to the
various misrepresentations, the lawyer violated conflict of interest rules by
improperly engaging in business transactions with clients.
316
A related form of conflict of interest led to a thirty-day suspension in
Florida Bar v. Marke.317 In this case, the attorney allowed his personal
interest-which grew out of a business transaction with clients-to affect his
representation of clients in related matters. Over time, the lawyer had
represented a married couple in forming a corporation and in personal
matters. The lawyer prepared an agreement for immediate sale of the
corporation, as well as an employment contract between the husband-client
and the company (under its new ownership). Later, the lawyer assisted the
new owner of the corporation in drafting a letter terminating employment of
the husband-client. After formally terminating his professional relationship
with the original clients (husband and wife), the lawyer then represented the
corporation in disputes arising over agreements that the lawyer had prepared
and opposed the original clients in their claims for unemployment compen-
sation.3
18
Lawyers who engage in criminal conduct can expect to receive discipli-
nary sanctions. This happened to several lawyers in 1996. Disbarment was
imposed in cases including Florida Bar v. Bustamante319 and Florida Bar v.
Kushner.320 Disbarment without leave to reapply for ten years was imposed
315. 672 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1996).
316. Rule 4-1.8(a) provides:
(a) Business Transactions With or Acquiring Interest Adverse to Client. A
lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly ac-
quire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a
client, except a lien granted by law to secure a lawyer's fee or expenses, unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are
fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing
to the client in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of inde-
pendent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
RPC 4-1.8(a) (1987).
317. 669 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1996).
318. Id. at 248-49. Other cases in which a lawyer's business transactions with clients led
to disciplinary problems included Florida Bar v. Sofo. See discussion supra pp. 236-41, and
Florida Bar v. Clement. See discussion infra p. 277.
319. 662 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1995).
320. 666 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1996).
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in Florida Bar v. Lechtner,321 a case arising out of the "Operation Court-
broom" judicial corruption investigation in Dade County.
Other noteworthy cases related to a lawyer's role as bar member
included Florida Bar v. Clement,322 in which the supreme court addressed a
lawyer's contention that the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
precluded the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in his case. The court
concluded that, while the ADA does apply to The Florida Bar, it does not
necessarily bar the Supreme Court of Florida from imposing disciplinary
sanctions on a bar member with a disability. A case-by-case analysis of the
disabled person and the jobs or benefits he or she seeks is required. 3
Florida Bar v. Poe324 was interesting because of the supreme court's deci-
sion not to discipline the lawyer. The lawyer had been sanctioned by a
bankruptcy court, and the bar instituted grievance proceedings against him.
The supreme court stated that not every court-imposed sanction is the result
of an ethical violation.3 s In a concurrence filed in Landry v. State,326 a
criminal case, two justices of the Supreme Court of Florida called for
increased imposition of professional discipline against lawyers and judges
whose lack of sufficient competence causes harm to the judicial system (e.g,
through incompetence that results in costly delays in the rendering of
justice).
Finally, it was clear that persistence does not always pay. In Florida
Bar v. McAtee, 327 a lawyer who continued to practice law despite being
suspended from practice by the supreme court was disbarred. A lawyer who
persisted in practicing after being disbarred was ordered permanently
disbarred in Florida Bar v. Neely.328
321. 666 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1996).
322. 662 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1995).
323. Id. at 700.
324. 662 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1995).
325. The supreme court stated:
[wle disagree with the Bar's claim that because [the lawyer] was sanctioned in
federal bankruptcy court he must have violated the Bar's disciplinary rules. The
sanction is minor [the lawyer] and [the lawyer's client] must pay [the client's
ex-wife]'s fees and costs in defending against the petition. Courts commonly
award fees and costs in actions arising from a dissolution of marriage [footnote
omitted], but this does not mean that the other party is automatically guilty of
committing ethical violations.
Id. at 704.
326. 666 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1995) (Wells, J., concurring).
327. 674 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1996).
328. 675 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1996).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Florida lawyers fill many roles as they engage in their daily practice of
law. Lawyers act as advocates, fiduciaries, officers of the court, and
businesspersons, all within the framework of membership in The Florida
Bar. It is imperative that lawyers be aware of the specific ethical obligations
that they assume when they step into each of these roles. Failure to under-
stand and honor these professional responsibilities can lead to disciplinary
exposure and malpractice liability. This article has summarized important
1996 professional responsibility developments that may affect lawyers as
their carry out their diverse duties in an ever-changing legal landscape.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers the decisions of the Florida courts and Florida
legislation produced during the period from July 1, 1995 through June 30,
1996, especially selected for this article as being of potential interest to the real
estate practitioner.
II. ATTORNEYS' FEES
Jakobi v. Kings Creek Village Townhouse Ass'n.1 The Third District
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of Jakobi's motion for
attorneys' fees as prevailing party in a suit against his townhouse association
under section 57.105(2) of the Florida Statutes.2 The dispute arose from the
Association's Architectural Control Committee's denial of Jakobi's request for
permission to install screening on the front of his unit. Jakobi filed suit for an
injunction against the Association and the parties stipulated to an agreement
allowing Jakobi to build the enclosure. Jakobi then moved for attorney's fees,
noting that the Association's bylaws contained a provision allowing attorneys'
fees to the Association in any litigation with an owner, and arguing that the
reciprocity mandated by section 57.105(2) entitled him to fees as the prevailing
party.
1. 665 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
2. 1L at 328. The court also held that the 1992 townhouse deed, through which Jakobi had
received title to the townhouse, constituted a novation of the bylaws and declaration of covenants
and restriction as between the Kings Creek Village Association, Inc. ("Master Association"), the
Kings Creek Village Townhouse Association, Inc. ("Association"), and the owner. Such a
finding was crucial to Jakobi's case for fees because of the provision in the section declaring that
"[tlhis act shall take effect October 1, 1988, and shall apply to contracts entered into on said date
or thereafter," while the bylaws and original declaration of restrictions and covenants came into
existence prior to 1988. Id. at 327.
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The appellate court determined "[t]his was an action 'with respect to the
contract' as contemplated by Section 57.105(2),' 3 and cited Ryan v. Town of
Manalapan4 for the proposition that the declaration and bylaws are contrac-
tual. In holding that the 1992 townhouse deed, through which Jakobi was
conveyed title, constituted a novation, 5 the appellate court noted that the
essential elements were present,6 since this requirement may be implied from
the circumstances of the transaction and conduct of the parties.7 Based on the
finding of a novation, the appellate court determined Jakobi was entitled to
claim the reciprocity benefits of section 57.105(2).s Thus, Jakobi was entitled
to the fee award. 9
Seminole County v. Clayton.10 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded an attorneys' fee award in this eminent domain action.
Seminole County took a 2.8 acre tract of land owned by Pauline Amdt, which,
at the inception of the action, had no direct access to a public road. Resolution
of the case depended on the availability of feasible access. The County
obtained three appraisals and based its first offer on the lowest. Arndt's
appraiser assumed availability of access to a highway interchange and, as
might be expected, arrived at a higher appraisal. The parties settled without a
trial, leaving the attorneys' fees to Arndt's attorneys to be decided by the court,
which applied section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes and found a reasonable
fee based on hourly rates to be $25,425." In addition, in what the Fifth
District Court of Appeal labeled a "double decker" application of the statute,
the trial court added a twenty percent "benefit" fee for the difference between
the County's initial offer and the eventual settlement yield which amounted to
$133,836, bringing the total fee to $159,261, or $1,276.64 an hour.12
3. Id.
4. 414 So. 2d 193, 196 (Fla. 1982).
5. Jakobi, 665 So. 2d at 327.
6. Id. It decided so, in part because "[w]hen the current owner took title with record notice
of [the provisions of the bylaws and declaration] he assumed a new personal contractual
obligation with the master and townhouse associations and his seller was discharged of his
personal contractual obligations," thus meeting the requirements of mutual consent to the
novation. Id. at 328 (citing Prucha v.,Guarantee Reserve Life Ins. Co. of Hammond, 358 So. 2d
1155, 1157 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1979)).
7. Id. (citing Sans Souci v. Division of Fla. Land Sales and Condominiums, 448 So. 2d
1116,1121 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
8. Id. at 327.
9. Jakobi, 665 So. 2d at 327.
10. 665 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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In rejecting the trial court's fee computation, the appellate court opined
that "[w]hatever section 73.092 may mean, and it admittedly is lacking in
specificity, it cannot reasonably have been intended by the Florida Legislature
to produce this result."' 3 The appellate court, in assessing attorneys' fees, is
not required to abandon its own expertise or common sense, and it should
closely scrutinize awards to ensure reasonableness.' 4 Here it appeared that the
fee had been intended as punishment for perceived low-balling by the County
in its initial offer which, even if true, would not warrant "the imposition of
exorbitant attorney fees.'
II. BouNDARIEs
Jones v. Rives.16 For lack of competent substantial evidence, the First
District Court of Appeal reversed the jury finding of a boundary agreement
between adjacent property owners.' 7 Appellees purchased land adjacent to
appellant's and had timber cut from a section south of an old fence on the land.
The survey performed by both parties showed that appellant's property ran
nearly 100 feet south of the old fence. Appellant filed suit for cutting the
timber, alleging damages and trespass. Appellees counterclaimed, asserting
several claims of title to the relevant land. Appellant prevailed on a motion for
summary judgment on the issue of ownership and right to possession.' 8 As to
the purported boundary agreement, the jury accepted appellee's claim that the
old fence marked the true boundary between the properties.' 9
The appellate court reiterated the essential elements of a boundary by
agreement:
(1) an uncertainty or dispute as to the true boundary; (2) an agree-
ment, either oral or implied, between the adjacent landowners that
a certain line will be treated by them as the true line; and (3) subse-
quent occupation by the parties in accordance with that agreement
13. Id. at 364.
14. Id.
15. Clayton, 665 So. 2d at 365. The court also rejected County arguments that section
73.092 of the Florida Statutes is an unconstitutional "offensive encroachment" upon the judicial
function of regulating attorneys' fees. Id.
16. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D236 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1996).
17. Id. at D237.




: Nova Law Review 21, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Brown / Grohman
for a period of time sufficient to show a settled recognition of the
line as a permanent boundary."
20
The court found the first element lacking because no testimony had been given
that there was uncertainty or a dispute between the parties as to the true
boundary until the appellant had the property surveyed.2' In addition, the
evidence of there being three conversations, only one of which involved the
record landowners, regarding an agreement was legally insufficient.22 As to
the third element, although there is no set amount of time to show settled
recognition of the agreed boundary,2 evidence here was legally insufficient.24
IV. BROKERS
Schwey v. Vara.2 A piece of land was subject to a right of first refusal
when the broker contacted the owners with a possible buyer. The owners
accepted an offer and signed a contract of sale that provided for a cash sale and
the payment of a commission to the broker. However, the contract also
provided that it would be void and that the broker would not receive a commis-
sion if the right of first refusal was exercised. The right of first refusal was
exercised by submitting a contract for exactly the same cash price, but it did
not contain a provision for a broker's commission. The broker's potential
buyer did not question the validity of the right of first refusal or that it had
been validly exercised, but the broker did. She sued for a commission. The
trial court ruled in favor of the seller and the district court agreed.26
Apparently, there was no listing agreement with this broker. The only
brokerage agreement was the provision for the payment of a commission in the
first contract of sale. The district court stated that "[t]he broker has cited no
authority to support its argument that it is entitled to complain about the terms
or that it is entitled to a commission under these circumstances."27 What is
meant by "under these circumstances" is not completely clear. Perhaps it
20. Id. at D237 (citations omitted).
21. Jones, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D237.
22. Id-
23. Id. (citing Campbell v. Noel, 490 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
24. Id. In making this determination, the appellate court noted the appellees had purchased
the land in 1988, appellant had a survey made in June 1989, and appellant filed suit in January of
1990. Id
25. 674 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Klein wrote the opinion in which
Judges Dell and Stevenson concurred.
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means that if neither the seller nor the broker's possible buyer challenged the
exercise of the right of first refusal, then the broker had no standing to do so
either. This seems unlikely. Certainly the broker was either a party to the
contract of sale or an intended third party beneficiary of that contract and, as
such, had enforceable rights. On the other hand, perhaps the court meant that
the broker was in no position to claim that the right of first refusal had not been
validly exercised when it obviously had been. This seems more likely since
the court pointed out that "[a] right of first refusal exercise need only be
identical to the offer terms which are essential. 28 Under this interpretation it
is apparent that the court thought that the brokerage term was not "essential."
Neither interpretation feels entirely satisfying to this author.29
A better justification for the decision would be that this broker produced
an unsolicited offer to buy the property. The broker's commission term in that
offer was drafted by the broker. Under the general rules of contract interpreta-
tion, any ambiguity in a contract should be interpreted against the one who
drafted it and in favor of the other party. Applying that rule, a reasonable
person would interpret the provision to require the seller to pay a commission
only if the broker's prospect purchased the property or was prevented from
doing so by the breaching seller, not if the right of first refusal was exercised.
If the broker wanted a commission regardless of who was the ultimate pur-
chaser, she should have unambiguously provided for that in the contract.30 The
seller might not have accepted an offer with that unambiguous provision.
South Pacific Enterprises, L.P. v. Cornerstone Realty, Inc.31 A hospital
enlisted a real estate broker to help it look for a site on which to develop a
medical facility. The broker showed the hospital's agent the land in question.
At the request of the hospital, the broker even submitted a development plan
for that land, and they entered into a client registration letter that provided the
broker would get a commission if any of certain entities bought or leased the
land. However, another developer heard about the hospital's interest in this
land and submitted its own development to the hospital. They excluded the
broker from the negotiations that followed. After reaching agreement, the
28. Id.
29. Professor Brown.
30. See City Nat'l Bank of Miami Beach v. Lundgren, 307 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 316 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1975) (explaining in dicta that a landowner could be
required to pay a commission to a broker who had found a prospective purchaser who was ready,
willing, and able even though another exercised a right of first refusal because that was what the
brokerage agreement provided).
31. 672 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Shahood wrote the opinion. Judge
Warner and Associate Judge Speiser concurred.
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hospital and the developer created a limited partnership that acquired and
developed the land. The broker sued for its commission, but the hospital
defended on the grounds that the broker had neither introduced the eventual
buyer to the seller nor participated in the negotiations that led to the sale. The
broker prevailed in the trial court and the district court affirmed on this issue.32
The district court agreed that the broker was not entitled to recover its
commission based upon the client registration letter.33 Construing the letter
against its drafter, the broker, the letter did not provide for a commission upon
the sale to this buyer. The court, however, recognized that this was not the
only theory under which this broker could recover. A broker who shows
properties to a prospective buyer is entitled to a commission when the broker is
the procuring cause of the sale. 4
The term "procuring cause" has been defined as "one who initiates
negotiations by doing any affirmative act to bring buyer and seller together
such as placing signs on the property, promoting calls from prospective buyers,
or showing the property to prospective purchasers. 35 No one specific act is
essential. So, this broker's failure to introduce the buyer to the seller or
participate in the negotiations did not preclude the court from finding that it
was the procuring cause. Moreover, the seller could not rely on the broker's
failure to participate in the sales negotiations because the buyer and seller had
prevented the broker from participating. The court found ample evidence in
the record to support the conclusion that the broker had played a significant
role in bringing the parties together.
36
The contract of sale had also contained certification by both parties that
they had not employed or dealt with a real estate broker. It also provided an
indemnity provision regarding any brokerage commission that might arise.
The trial court had denied all cross claims for indemnification. On this issue,
the district court reversed.37 Under this contract provision, the developer and
the buyer were entitled to indemnification from the hospital that had dealt with
the broker.
38
32. Id. at 571. However, the case was reversed and remanded for the proper calculation of
damages and on the issue of indemnification.
33. IdM at 570.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Ehringer v. Brookfield & Assocs., 415 So. 2d 774, 775-76 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982)).









Martin County v. Indiantown Enterprises, Inc. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed a judgment against Martin County.4° Martin County
inspectors found the building in this case to be out of compliance with the
building code, and it gave notice to the owner that the building would be
demolished by the County if the owner failed to bring the premises into
compliance with the provisions of the code. Then, the owner sold the building
to a buyer who knew he had only thirty days to obtain a permit and keep the
County from demolishing the building.
4
'
Rather than complying with the County regulations providing for an
extension of the time,42 the owner had his architect contact County officials by
telephone. The County's Building Administrator told the architect that an
extension could be obtained by contacting the department and satisfying it
"that the renovations would be accomplished within a short period. 43 The
owner's architect showed a set of renovation plans to a technician at the
Building Department, and, later, the owner's attorney was told by a code
enforcement officer that "'the status on this file is it's on hold." '44 However,
after placing a temporary hold on demolition, the County Administrator told
the code enforcement officer to proceed with the demolition since the owner
made no progress on the property's renovations and "[t]he buyer made no
attempt to appeal to the Board for an extension of the demolition order."45 For
the County's demolishing the building, the buyer recovered $32,000 in
damages on theories of negligence and promissory estoppel. Although the jury
found the buyer thirty-five percent comparatively negligent, the trial court
judge refused to reduce the award proportionately.46
The appellate court reversed, holding that Martin County was entitled to a
directed verdict on both the negligence and promissory estoppel theories. 41
The court first noted that the buyer's negligence theory was based on his
39. 658 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
40. Id. at 1146.
41. Id. at 1145.
42. The court noted that § 6-54 of the County regulations provides for such an extension
only 'for cause by appeal to the board of building adjustments and appeals."' Id. at 1145
(quoting MARTIN COUNTY, FLA., REGULATIONS § 6-54 (1995)).
43. Id.
44. Indiantown, 658 So. 2d at 1145.
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contention that the County's employees supplied him with incorrect informa-
tion regarding the extension of the demolition deadline.48 The court apparently
felt that the County was immune from liability for this conduct because the
employees' acts were "'discretionary functions peculiar to government and
there can be no liability imposed upon ... [the County] because of the manner
of performance of those functions.' 49 Furthermore, the buyer's reliance on
the oral communications with the County employees was misplaced because
"[t]he code of regulations plainly set out the exclusive method for seeking such
extensions."50
The court also rejected the promissory estoppel theory, relying on
Alachua County v. Cheshire,5 1 stating that such a theory "requires 'affirmative
conduct' by the governmental entity, not merely negligence. ' 2  Apparently,
the County's employees' conduct failed to rise to that level, but the opinion
failed to offer any explanation why. The appellate court also determined that
the buyer's promissory estoppel theory was untenable because he could not
reasonably rely on the actions of the County officials.5 3  In light of the
County's regulations regarding extensions, the court concluded that "[c]ourts
usually shrink from finding an estoppel against a government entity where the
actions of the official are unauthorized or unlawful.
5 4
VI. BUTLER ACT
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Key West
Conch Harbor, Inc.55 Beginning in 1942, Key West Conch Harbor's ("Key
West") predecessor in title obtained several permits from the Army Corps of
48. Id.
49. Indiantown, 658 So. 2d at 1145 (quoting City of Tarpon Springs v. Garrigan, 510 So. 2d
1198, 1199-200 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
50. Id. The court went on to declare that the failure of the "informal remedy" which the
buyer had sought could not "create any enforceable duties to make out a cause of action in
negligence." Id. No legal authority was cited by the court for this proposition of law, and it was
not clear whether the court was fashioning its own proposition or basing this conclusion as an
implication of the proposition quoted earlier in the City of Tarpon Springs opinion. See City of
Tarpon Springs, 510 So. 2d at 1200.
51. 603 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
52. Indiantown, 658 So. 2d at 1145 (quoting Cheshire, 603 So. 2d at 1334).
53. Id. at 1145-46.
54. Id. at 1146. See, e.g., Corona Properties of Fla. v. Monroe County, 485 So. 2d 1314
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Enderby v. City of Sunrise, 376 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1979)).
55. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1430 (3d Dist. Ct. App. June 28, 1996).
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Engineers for dredging and improving offshore submerged lands in Garrison
Bight. The predecessor bulkheaded and filled a parcel ("Parcel B" of the
exhibits), later receiving a 1951 Butler Act56 deed. The Act allowed upland
riparian owners to obtain title land "'bulkheaded or filled in or permanently
improved."' 57 The question before the third district was whether the predeces-
sor sufficiently improved another parcel ("Parcel A") contiguous and seaward
of Parcel B "and should therefore have obtained title to that land as well.
58
The predecessor had constructed a 373 foot pier on Parcel A prior to the
effective date of the repeal of the Butler Act, May 29, 1951. A 138 foot
extension was also added to the pier prior to that critical date. The Trustees
produced no evidence to substantiate their claim that the improvements
occurred after the date. The trial court held that the dredging of the entire dock
was completed before May 29, 1951 .59 The trial court concluded fee simple
title to Parcel A vested in Key West by virtue of those improvements. 60 The
court entered judgment that Key West held fee simple title in the submerged
lands within 500 feet of its concrete bulkhead.6'
Affirming, the appellate court noted that "the dredged area is adjacent to
the parcel of land that was filled. 62 The Butler Act would not have transferred
title had the landowner dredged submerged lands out of the bight for the sole
purpose of filling another parcel of land.63 Noting that what constitutes an
improvement under the Butler Act must be determined on a case-by-case basis,
the court added that Key West's title was subject to a public navigational
easement. 64
Judge Gersten wrote a lengthy, provocative dissent highly critical of the
majority, noting at the outset that he did not feel that the Butler Act confers
65Florida coastline to a private party. Gersten eventually characterized the
majority's holding as "this Great Land Giveaway. 66
56. 1921 Fla. Laws ch. 8537.





62. Key West Conch Harbor, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1430.
63. Id.
64. d. at D1431.
65. Id. (Gersten, J., dissenting).
66. Ma. at D1432.
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VII. CONDOMINIUMS
Oakland East Manors Condominium Ass'n v. La Roza.67 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of a condominium
association's claim for foreclosure.68 In doing so, the appellate court relied on
the acceptance of benefits doctrine because, since entry of final judgment, the
appellee paid the amount.69 However, the court reversed the circuit court's
refusal to award prejudgment interest of eighteen percent and attorneys' fees
since the bylaws provided for unpaid assessments to bear interest at the highest
rate permitted under Florida's usury laws, as well as for attorneys' fees.70 The
trial court simply lacked discretion to refuse these awards.
71
Scudder v. Greenbrier C Condominium Ass'n.72 In this case, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal took a more current look at condominium associa-
tions' assessments for off-site transportation costs.73 The Associations in these
consolidated cases began assessing the unit owners for these services on
January 1, 1988. The owners objected, claiming the assessment was improper
under the court's decision in Rothenberg v. Plymouth A Condominium Ass'n 74
and a 1988 amendment to section 718.115(1) of the Florida Statutes, which
provided that reasonable transportation services could be billed as a common
expense if the services had been provided from the date control of the board of
association was transferred from the developer to the unit owners or if the
condominium documents or bylaws contained provisions stating as much.75
Another point of dispute was the "one-rider rule" under which only one pass
67. 669 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
68. Id. at 1139.
69. Id.
70. Il at 1139-40 (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.303 (1993); Sybert v. Combs, 555 So. 2d 1313,
1314 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Brickell v. Bay Club Condominium Ass'n v. Forte, 397 So.
2d 959, 960 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 408 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1981)).
71. Id.
72. 663 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). In this case, the court withdrew its prior
opinion at 20 Fla. L. Weekly D2278 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1995) in order to correct a
misstatement made at page 19 of the earlier slip opinion. This case consisted of two consolidated
appeals from the Circuit Court for Palm Beach County. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1634. The two
appellee condominium associations are situated in Century Village in West Palm Beach. Id at
1364. The appellants are unit owners in the communities who objected to the disputed off-site
transportation assessments. Id.
73. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1364.
74. 511 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App.), review denied, 518 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1987).
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for use of the transportation was issued to unit owners so that only one resident
per unit could use the system.76
From an earlier decision, the court remanded the case for the trial court
77
to determine:
(1) whether the transportation services had been continuously pro-
vided by the Associations from the date control was turned over to
the Unit Owners; (2) whether the transportation service had to have
been continuously paid for as a common expense; (3) whether the
Associations [sic] "one-rider rule" was valid; and (4) whether
Florida Statutes Chapter 88-148 was constitutional.78
On remand, the trial court found that the services had been continuously
provided by the Associations; that the Associations were not required to prove
that the system was specifically paid for as a common expense continuously
during the relevant period; that limited seating provided a reasonable basis for
the "one-rider rule;" and that chapter 88-148 was not constitutionally vague.
79
The Fourth District Court of Appeal first addressed the issue of whether,
as the unit owners contended, the services must have been provided "by the
Associations" during the relevant period, and if so, whether the trial court's
determination was supported by competent substantial evidence.80 After
conceding that, on its face, section 718.115(1) contained no identification of a
required provider of services, the court suggested that such an interpretation of
the statute would produce an unreasonable or absurd result.81 The court felt
that if services were assessed by associations but provided by an independent
entity, condominium associations would somehow receive a windfall.8 2 The
court's interpretation was consistent in light of the 1988 amendment which
was passed "in response to this court's opinion in Rothenberg."83 The court
submitted that the amendment was intended "to benefit those associations that
76. Id. at 1368.
77. Id. at 1364 (citing Scudder v. Greenbrier C Condominium Ass'n, 566 So. 2d 359, 361
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
78. Id.
79. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1364.
80. Id. at 1365.
81. Id. See State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973); City of St. Petersburg v. Seibold, 48 So.
2d 291 (Fla. 1950).
82. Id.
83. Id. In Rothenberg, the court held that transportation services were not assessable be-
cause they did not directly relate to operation, maintenance, repair or replacement of condomin-
ium property. 511 So. 2d at 652.
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may have provided transportation services to their unit owners in the good
faith belief that they were authorized to do so." 84 Therefore, it is reasonable to
require the Association to be the provider of services.85 The appellate court
ultimately concluded that the trial court's finding that the services had been
continuously provided by the Associations during the relevant period was
supported by substantial competent evidence, and affirmed its decision on this
86issue.
Next, it declared that section 718.115 does not require that the transporta-
tion costs had been continuously assessed as a common expense prior to the
1988 amendment.87 The court based this conclusion on the distinction made in
the amendment to that section between transportation services continuously
provided by the Association and those provided for in the condominium
documents or bylaws, noting that prior to 1988, these costs could only be
assessed if provided for in the documents or bylaws.88 Contrary to its prior
interpretation in which the court abandoned a plain and obvious meaning of
the statute, the court felt that, on this issue, the distinction required such an
interpretation, 9 and it decided that an interpretation including such a require-
ment would "obliterate the legislature's use of the word 'or' in the amendment
to section 718.115(1)(a)." 9
The next issue that the appellate court addressed was the constitutionality
of section 718.115(1)(a), a portion of which the unit owners contended was
unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. 91 The court opined that any doubts
will be resolved in favor of constitutionality;92 that the statute provides people
84. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1366 (citing Scudder v. Greenbrier C Condominium Ass'n, 566




88. Id. at 1367.
89. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1367 (citing Koplowitz v. Imperial Towers Condominium, Inc.,
478 So. 2d 504, 505 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Martin v. Ocean Reef Villas Ass'n, 547 So.
2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 557 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1990)).
90. Id.
91. Id. The unit owners objected to the following language:
However, such common expenses must either have been services or items pro-
vided from the date the control of the board of administration of the association
was transferred from the developer to the unit owners or must be services or
items provided for in the condominium documents or bylaws.
Il
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of common understanding and intelligence with fair warning of its require-
ments; and that, although it has been subject to conflicting interpretations, it
was not unconstitutionally vague.93 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial
court's determination of constitutionality. 94
As to the "one-rider rule," the court noted that the rule permitted only one
rider per unit be permitted to ride pursuant to the common assessment charged
to that respective unit. Any additional rider from that unit was required to pay
the Associations a surcharge. Section 718.115(2) explicitly requires that the
share of common expenses be in the same proportion as their ownership
interest in the common elements. 95 The court felt it was improper that the
system was funded in two distinct methods, the common assessment per unit,
which was proportional to the ownership interest in the common elements, and
the per rider surcharge, which bore no relation to the ownership interest in the
common elements.96 This method of collection was held contrary to section
718.115(2), and the rule also failed under the reasonableness test provided in
Juno by the Sea North Condominium Ass'n v. Manfredonia,97 because its effect
was unreasonable and discriminatory. 98 Under the rule, multiple resident unit
owners were being penalized and were subsidizing the system for the benefit
of single resident unit owners, and this was improper as a limited common
expense under section 718.103(17). 99 Thus, the appellate court reversed on
this issue.1t° It also ordered a remand on the attorneys' fees issue.1°
Winkelman v. Toll.10 2 The Fourth District Court of Appeal interpreted
section 718.104(2) of the Florida Statutes in this quiet title action to determine
when the property in question became subject to the declaration of condomin-
ium and its amendments. 0 3 Mission Lakes Condominium was created in 1980
by the recording of its declaration of condominium pursuant to the 1979
version of chapter 718 of the Florida Statutes. The declaration contemplated
93. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1368 (citing Department of Ins. v. Southeast Volusia Hosp. Dist.,
438 So. 2d 815, 820 (Fla. 1983)).
94. Id
95. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 718.115(2) (1993)).
96. Id
97. 397 So. 2d 297, 303 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), review denied, 402 So. 2d 611 (Fla.
1981) (citing Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1975)).
98. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1369.
99. Id
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1370.
102. 661 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
103. See FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2) (1979).
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nine phases, each to be submitted to condominium by amendment to the
declaration.104 Phase II was submitted to condominium upon the recordation
of the original declaration. Phases I and III through VII were submitted by the
recording of an amendment to the declaration eleven days after the original
declaration had been recorded. The amendment stated that construction was
not substantially completed and that upon substantial completion of each
phase, a certificate of a registered land surveyor would be recorded as an
amendment to the declaration in accordance with section 718.104(e).'0 5
Additional amendments were later recorded, which attached land sur-
veyor certificates evidencing completion of Phases I and II. However, the
remaining proposed phases were never completed by the August 30, 1985
deadline contemplated in the declaration. Mission Lakes Condominium
Association was involuntarily dissolved on November 1, 1985 by the Secretary
of State.I°6
Appellant Winkelman purchased Phases I and II in 1985 and 1986,
respectively, from the institutional mortgagee on the project, which also
conveyed all of Phases IH through VII to appellee ICON Development
Corporation ("ICON"). The warranty deed through which ICON took title
described the property by the description contained in the amendment to the
declaration, and the deed was specifically subject to the declaration and
amendments. The parties operated their respective units as separate entities.
Two years after ICON purchased the remaining phases, Winkelman filed suit
to reinstate the condominium association and, thereafter, filed an amended
complaint seeking recovery from ICON for its share of the common condo-
minium expenses which Winkelman had been paying. ICON counterclaimed
to quiet title and to declare that it received title in fee simple and not subject to
the condominium. ICON also raised laches, estoppel, and running of the
statute of limitations as affirmative defenses to the Winkelman complaint. The
trial court found that ICON took in fee simple, reasoning substantial comple-
104. The court supplied language from the 1979 version of section 718A03. Subsection (1)
of that section provides that a developer may develop a condominium in phases, provided that the
initial declaration submitting the initial phase provides for and describes in detail the other
contemplated phases, any impact which completion of those phases would have upon the initial
phase, and the time period within which each phase must be completed. Id. at 104 (citing FLA.
STAT. § 718.403(1) (1979)). Subsection (4) provides that "[i]f one or more phases are not built,
the units which are built are entitled to 100 percent ownership of all common elements within the
phases actually developed and added as a part of the condominium." Id. (quoting FLA . STAT. §
718.403(4) (1979)).
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tion of the phases was a condition precedent to the phases becoming subject to
condominium.107
The Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected this interpretation.'08 The
court noted that, under section 718.104(2), "[i]t is the recording of the declara-
tion in the public records that subjects the property to condominium owner-
ship."' 9  The court also noted that prior to 1978 the statute required the
surveyor's certificate to be filed "'in order to have a validly created condo-
minium for conveyancing purposes,"' 0 and that this provision had been
deleted. On this reasoning, the court held that completion of construction was
not a condition precedent to the creation of a valid condominium."' Moreo-
ver,
[j]ust as the failure to complete the construction prior to recording
the declaration does not prevent the formation of the condominium
on the subject property, the failure to complete the construction in
a phase prior to recording the amendment does not prevent the in-
clusion of the land in the condominium, because the amendment is
effective when recorded." 12
Finally, the court noted that its decision made sense in light of the fact that
Florida has a notice type recording statute, and that in the present case, an
amendment submitting the property to condominium had been recorded, giving
notice to the world that the property is subject to the declaration and amend-
ments.'
1 3
107. Winkelnan, 661 So. 2d at 105.
108. Id.
109. Id. The court reasoned that although a requirement of a declaration of condominium is
that it contain a certificate of substantial completion of improvements, where the property is
subject to condominium prior to substantial completion of the construction, the developer may
submit the required surveyor's certificate by amendments to the declaration. Id. (citing FLA.
STAT. §§ 718.104(4)(e), .105 (1979)).
110. Id. at 106 (quoting FLA. STAT. §718.104(4)(e) (1977)).
111. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 106.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 107.
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VIII. CONSTRUCTION
Miracle Center Development Corp. v. M.A.D. Construction, Inc."4 A
tenant named Theme leased space in a shopping center for use as a nightclub.
Theme hired M.A.D., a contractor, for renovations that were permitted by the
lease. However, before the renovations could be completed, the electricity was
turned off because Theme failed to pay the electricity bill. Theme vacated the
premises. The landlord leased to a new tenant who made only cosmetic
improvements before opening the nightclub for business.'' 5
M.A.D. sued Theme for breach of the construction contract and sued the
landlord based on quantum meruit.1 6 The trial court held in favor of the
contractor and awarded damages against both defendants, but the district court
reversed.' 7 The court's logic began with the proposition that a plaintiff cannot
seek both contract damages and quantum meruit damages against the same
defendant because quantum meruit would apply only where no express
contract existed."18 The court then reasoned that the principle should also
apply to prevent simultaneous actions on these inconsistent theories against
these different defendants because that might give M.A.D. a double recov-
ery.119 That result would be unjust enrichment rather than the prevention of
unjust enrichment, the proper role of quantum meruit. In addition, the court
points out that M.A.D. had already received an adequate remedy at law, its
judgment for damages against the tenant.12t Probably the unstated point is that
quantum meruit is an equitable remedy and an equitable remedy should be
available only where the injured party has no adequate remedy at law. But,
quantum meruit is a legal remedy, not an equitable one.'
2
'
114. 662 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judges Hubbart, Gersten, and Goderich
concurred in the per curiam opinion.
115. Id. at 1290.
116. M.A.D. also claimed a construction lien but that was denied by the trial court. The
denial was affirmed by the district court because, under section 713.10 of the Florida Statutes,
the lease prohibited construction liens against the landlord's property and the lease neither
required the improvements nor were the improvements the 'pith of the lease."' Id. at 1291
(relying on FLA. STAT. § 713.10 (1993)).
117. Id at 1290.
118. Id.
119. Miracle Center Dev. Corp., 662 So. 2d at 1290.
120. Id.
121. The proper common law action to recover in quantum meruit was indebitatus assunp-
sit. Furthermore, quantum meruit was one of the "common counts" pled in a traditional common
law complaint alleging money due based upon a transaction. See JOSEPH H. KoFFtER & AusON
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The result may make logical sense, but it has the potential to produce
unnecessary injustice. That the electricity was turned off suggests that the
tenant was in financial trouble making the judgment against it worthless.
Would the contractor have prevailed on the theory of quantum meruit if it had
sued only the landlord? If so, then the contractor was harshly penalized for a
tactical error by its lawyer. If the landlord reaped a windfall by getting its
property so substantially enhanced that a higher rent could be charged without
spending any money, there would be an unjust result. Conversely, the rent
increase, if one existed, might not have been enough to offset what the tenant
owed the landlord. Those are issues of fact that could have been determined
on remand rather than adopting an absolute no-recovery rule. There is no
justification for a rule that gives one party a windfall while another is left
uncompensated for work done unless the court intends to punish the contractor
for not getting a construction lien. That remote possibility could have easily
been avoided by ruling that any recovery from the landlord would decrease the
amount that the contractor could recover from the tenant on the contract
judgment.
Stinson-Head, Inc. v. City of Sanibel.12 2  The parties entered into a
construction contract that contained an arbitration clause requiring the demand
for arbitration be made within a reasonable time after the claim arose but, "in
no event shall it be made after the date when institution of legal or equitable
proceedings based on such claim ... would be barred by the applicable statute
of limitations."' 23 Subsequently, a dispute arose about alleged defects in the
roof. When the City sought arbitration, the contractor responded that the
statute of limitations had run out so arbitration was time barred. The trial court
referred the timeliness issue to arbitration, 24 and the contractor appealed.
The district court affirmed ordering the case to arbitration, but certified
that its decision created a conflict among the districts. 125 The court based its
decision on the fact that the arbitration clause was very broad. Prior cases
under the federal arbitration act had interpreted similar language to place the
REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING §§ 172-76 (1969). See also JOHN D. CALAMARI
& JOSEPH M. PERiLLo, THE LAw OF CONTRACS §§ 1-11 (1987).
122. 661 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. of App. 1995). Judge Blue wrote the opinion in
which Chief Judge Threadgill and Judge Whatley concurred.
123. IM at 120.
124. Id.
125. See Anstis Omstein Assocs., Architects & Planners, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 554
So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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question of whether the arbitration was time barred before the arbitrator(s) . 26
This court followed that lead, reasoning that the timeliness issue is very fact-
oriented and requires an evidentiary hearing. 27 Requiring that the court hear
these facts to determine this issue and then the arbitrator hear the same facts
again to determine other issues would defeat the purpose of an arbitration
agreement. Generally, issues are presumed to be the subject of arbitration. It
would make no sense to interpret such a broadly worded arbitration clause not
to assign this issue to arbitration.
IX. CONTRACTS OF PURCHASE AND SALE
Taines v. Berenson.12  Dahlia Taines, the seller, appealed from the
Amended Final Judgment awarding Dr. Scott Berenson, the buyer, specific
performance and damages totalling $371,635. The Fourth District Court of
Appeal held that, under the terms of the contract, Berenson could not recover
both specific performance and damages and reversed the trial court accord-
ingly.129 The parties entered into a contract for the sale of the property. Due to
a gap in the chain of title and liens against the property, Taines would be
unable to provide clear title. The parties nevertheless entered into a second
contract in which the sale price was reduced from $215,000 to $190,000. This
contract also provided a ninety-day defective title cure provision. Berenson
then offered Taines an addendum to the second contract which contained
additional terms. Taines, viewing the addendum as an unfavorable modifica-
tion, declined. Berenson filed a three count complaint alleging breach of
contract, misrepresentation, and specific performance.
30
The appellate court reasoned that "Berenson's remedies were limited by
the terms of the contract itself."'13 Either of the remedies contained in Provi-
126. Wylie v. Investment Management & Research, Inc. 629 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993); Marschel v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 609 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1992), review denied, 617 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1993).
127. Stinson-Head, 661 So. 2d at 121.
128. 659 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
129. Id at 1278.
130. Id. at 1277.
131. Id. The court quoted the following "pertinent" provision in the contract:
A. EVIDENCE OF TITLE... buyer shall have ten (10) days from the date of
receiving the evidence [February 15,1991] to examine same. If tite is found to
be defective, the buyer shall within said period notify the seller in writing speci-
fying the defects. If the said defects render the title unmarketable, the seller shall
have ninety (90) days from the receipt of such notice [February 19, 1991] to cure
the defects and if after said period seller shall not have cured the defects, buyer
19961
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sion A of the contract were available to Berenson. However, Berenson
exercised neither remedy. "He neither agreed to accept a deed for title as it
existed, nor did he request a refund and cancellation of the contract."
' 32
Instead, Berenson relied upon another paragraph of the contract which
provided that if the seller failed to perform any of the contract's covenants, the
deposit paid by the buyer, at the buyer's option, would be returned to the buyer
or the buyer would have the right to specific performance.133 This paragraph
was inapplicable because Berenson filed suit before the expiration of the
curative period provided in the contract.1 34 Therefore, the seller did not default
by not curing title because the contract already contemplated the seller's
inability to cure title and the buyer's remedies for such. Therefore, the trial
court erred by awarding Berenson both Provision A remedies. 135  So, the
appellate court remanded the case "for a final determination as to which of the
two provisions shall be applied."
136
X. DEEDS
Jakobi v. Kings Creek Village Townhouse Ass'n.' 37 For rationale that a
deed constituted a novation of the association's bylaws and the restrictive
covenants binding the community, please see the discussion of this case at
page 280 of this article.
Sargent v. Baxter.138 The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial
court's judgment declaring two quitclaim deeds void. 139 One deed was from
John Smith, now deceased, in favor of his daughter, Connie Sargent. Smith
executed the deed but instructed his attorney not to record the deed, saying he
would give further instructions later. There was testimony that Smith asked
his nephew, Gerald Buscemi, to have the attorney record the deed, but Bus-
shall have the option of(1) accepting title as it then is or (2) demand a refund of
all monies paid hereunder which shall forthwith be returned to the buyer, and
thereupon the buyer and seller shall be released of all further obligations under
this contract.
Id.
132. Taines, 659 So. 2d at 1277.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1277-78.
135. Id. at 1278.
136. Id. The court instructed that in making this determination, the trial court could rely on
the existing record unless in his discretion determines that further evidence is necessary. Taines,
659 So. 2d at 1278.
137. 665 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
138. 673 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
139. Id. at 981.
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cemi never complied before Smith's death. After Smith's death, the attorney
mailed the unrecorded deed to Sargent who recorded it. Later, Smith's
personal representative executed a quitclaim deed to the same property to
himself, individually, and recorded it. The trial court found, after a non-jury
trial, that the Sargent deed failed for lack of delivery, and it ultimately found
both deeds void. 140
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's finding of
failure of the Sargent deed for lack of delivery, since Smith, by instructing his
attorney not to record, had retained the "locus poenitentiae," or opportunity to
change his mind. 14' The court did not consider whether delivery would have
occurred had Buscemi advised the attorney of Smith's desire that the deed
should be recorded because that had not occurred, and, further, because




Brewer v. Flankey.143 The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's judgment for a prescriptive easement because the plaintiffs failed
to produce any evidence that they or their predecessors had made actual,
continuous, and uninterrupted use of the contested land for the full twenty-year
prescriptive period."44 Evidence that members of the general public had used
the land during the 1970s did not suffice because it did not establish that
plaintiffs' predecessors used the land. 45 Thus, the plaintiffs could not make a
prima facie case as they had only used defendants' land for nine years.
Farley v. Hiers.14 6 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court's determination that the appellee had a prescriptive easement to continue
the use of a well, pump, and pump house on appellant's property.147 In 1954,
the Blounts subdivided this property, installed a well, pump, and pump house
on the southeastern comer of Lot 23, and they began providing water service
for profit to seventy-three customers, including the various owners of Lot 23,
140. Id. at 980.
141. Id. at 981 (quoting Smith v. Owens, 108 So. 891, 893 (1926)).
142. Id.
143. 660 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
144. Id. at 762 (citing Supal v. Miller, 455 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
145. Id.
146. 668 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Appellee Annie B. Hiers was named in
the suit in the capacity of Guardian for Lottie M. Blount. Id.
147. Id. at 249.
1996]
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operating the pumping system openly and continuously under lock and key. In
1993, Farley, the current owner of Lot 23, dissatisfied with the quality of water
service, sought to obtain a consumptive use permit from the Northwest Florida
Water Management District to build a well for his own use. He could not
obtain that permit due to the presence of the Blount well on the lot. After
obtaining the lot in 1974, Farley fenced in his property except for the comer on
which the fifteen by twenty foot pump house was located. 1
48
The appellate court noted that the elements of continuous use and
knowledge were undisputed, but three issues required closer scrutiny: 1)
whether the use of the well was adverse rather than permissive; 2) whether the
operation of the water service for profit precludes a finding of easement; and
3) whether the exclusiveness of the appellee's use of the southeastern comer
precluded finding an easement.1 49 Concerning the first issue, the court found
that use of the system had been adverse. 150 The appellee continuously main-
tained the pump house under lock and key, and Farley and his predecessors
had, for the same period, paid the Blounts for water service.1 51 The court
rejected the argument that operating the system for profit resulted in a "profit a
prendre" and precluded finding an easement.152 The court noted that a "profit
a prendre" is distinguishable from an easement, "since one of the features of an
easement is the absence of all rights to participate in the profits of the soil
charged with it."1  In rejecting Farley's contention, the court merely com-
mented that "[i]t appears, however, that water is not considered a product of
the soil in this context."' 54 Finally, the court concluded "'[c]omplete dominion
is inconsistent with a claim of easement, ' ""55 but the Blounts' use did not
completely exclude the Farley from any use of his lot, noting "rather, appellee
uses only so much of Lot 23 (a comer 15' x 25' in size) as is required to use
the well."' 56
Holloway v. Gargano.157 The First District Court of Appeal, in a de-
claratory decree action, reversed the trial court's conclusion that the appel-
148. Id.
149. Id. at 250.
150. Farley, 668 So. 2d at 250.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 250-51.
153. Id. at 250 (quoting 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses § 7 (1966)).
154. Il
155. Farley, 668 So. 2d at 251 (quoting Platt v. Pietras, 382 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1980)).
156. Farley, 668 So. 2d at 251.
157. 657 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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lants/plaintiffs, two property owners, were entitled to access to their waterfront
mobile home properties in Monroe County through an easement by necessity
over the property owned by the appellees, and that reasonable ingress and
egress had been provided by way of a road over the appellees' property.
58
The road had been used by appellants and their predecessors in interest since
1962. In 1992, the appellees erected a fence which narrowed the road to a
width of eleven feet. The appellate court found that such a width, contrary to
the trial court's finding, does not comply with the Monroe County Fire Code
which requires a twenty-foot minimum access way. 59 Thus, it precluded
access by fire and rescue equipment to plaintiffs' properties.
Further, the court noted access easements created by necessity "must be
capable of accommodating traffic incident to the normal requirements of the
property served by the easement 'consistent with the [reasonable] needs of the
owners of the lands that are hemmed in."" 6 In this case,
it is uncontradicted that whenever a car is parked in front of one
plaintiffs's property, access to the other plaintiff's property is to-
tally blocked due to the narrow width of the road.... [Tjhe three
decade use of the road by mail carriers, garbage collectors, meter
readers and others has been either severely curtailed or pre-
vented.'6'
The appellate court held the subject road legally insufficient under the above
rule and reversed and remanded to the trial court.'
62
Richardson v. Jackson.63 The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court's award of summary judgment and a mandatory injunction against
158. Id. at 1231.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1232 (quoting Hayes v. Reynolds, 132 So. 2d 781, 782 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1961)).
161. Id. at 1231-32.
162. Holloway, 657 So. 2d at 1232.
163. 667 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). In affirming, the fifth district considered
its decisions in Diefenderfer v. Forest Park Servs., 599 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 613 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1992), and Hoff v. Scott, 453 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984), to be controlling. In Diefenderfer, it was determined that in these types of cases, the
initial inquiry is whether the grant of easement is for the width described or for the description of
the property over which there is a right of ingress and egress, "[o]r put another way, is the right of
ingress and egress coterminous with the area set aside for the easement or something less than the
area." Richardson, 667 So. 2d at 929 (quoting Diefenderfer, 599 So. 2d at 1312). If cotermi-
nous, then there can be no encroachments. The 1986 final judgment contained language found to
be consistent with Diefenderfer.
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appellants to require them to remove improvements constructed on property
subject to an easement by prescription which had been confirmed in a 1986
final judgment.164 The appellants argued that as long as they left an eight foot
path for a vehicle to enter and leave the appellee's property, improvements
were permissible on the remainder of the property subject to the easement.
Trammell v. Ward.165 The Trammells brought three counts in the trial
court seeking access to the Wards' lands in order to obtain access to a land-
locked forty acre parcel owned by the Trammells: 1) a prescriptive easement;
2) a statutory way of necessity; and 3) injunctive relief prohibiting the Wards
from barring Trammells' use of an unpaved roadway. The Wards counter-
claimed for a statutory way of necessity over the Trammells' lands for which
the Wards were willing to pay reasonable compensation as determined by the
court. The Wards acknowledged the Trammells' need for access to the parcel,
but objected to a route through the middle of the Wards' lands, proposing
instead an easement across a comer of the Ward property as determined by the
court. This was objectionable to the Trammells because "much of the area was
wet."
, 166
The trial court indicated that upon finding a prescriptive easement, it
would require that the Trammells hire a registered surveyor to survey the
easement claimed.' 67 In an effort to avoid survey costs, the Trammells told the
trial court they would settle for a route of access proposed by the Wards. The
trial court directed, in its final judgment, that the Trammells were to have an
easement along the roadways marked E-1, E-2, and E-3, and the parties were
directed to negotiate in good faith for another roadway marked E-4.168 The
Trammells moved for rehearing because "the access which the judgment
purported to grant [them was] nonexistent, in that item 'E-I' ... does not
grant... access to their 40-acre parcel.' ' 169 The trial court denied rehearing,
and the First District Court of Appeal reversed on this issue.
170
The district court noted that the Wards' counsel stipulated that, pursuant
to section 704.01(2) of the Florida Statutes, the Trammells were indeed
In Hoff, the language in the grant of easement contained clear language that the entire area
had been granted for ingress and egress, and thus no obstructions could be placed in the
easement. The final judgment in Richardson which confirmed the easement was deemed to be
also consistent with the language in Hoff. Richardson, 667 So. 2d at 929.
164. ld.
165. 667 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
166. Id. at 224.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 225.
169. Id.
170. Trammell, 667 So. 2d at 225.
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entitled to a statutory way of necessity.171 This section requires a "practicable
route of egress or ingress."'172 According to Walkup v. Becker,173 "[a] roadway
which is impassable after the rainy periods of the year is not practicably usable
for egress or ingress within the contemplation of section 704.03."' 74 The only
evidence presented on the practicability of E-1 was Mr. Trammell's uncontra-
dicted statement that the route was sometimes impassable.175 Finding that on
this basis the Trammells raised an appropriate ground for rehearing on the
access question, the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to grant rehearing, and it reversed "that portion of the final judgment




Brevard County v. Ramsey.177 The County filed an action to condemn a
portion of property whose owners of record were the Ramseys. They were
also the owner of a business, Ramsey Enterprises ("Enterprises"), that operated
a business on the property. The Ramseys had signed, but had not acknowl-
edged, witnessed, or recorded a declaration of trust that declared that they held
the land in trust for Enterprises. They filed a motion to join Enterprises as an
indispensable party so that Enterprises could recover business damages.1
78
The district court concluded that the trust declaration was valid.179 The
lack of witnesses was not fatal. Since the grantors were to be the trustees, it
did not involve the transfer of title to the property.180 Furthermore, the trust
was not executed by the Statute of Uses even though it appeared to be a
passive trust. To so rule would have the effect of vesting legal title in the
beneficiary. Although that would be the traditional rule, it would defeat the
171. Id.
172. FLA. STAT. § 704.01(2) (1995). Section 704.03 of the Florida Statutes defines
"practicable" as used in section 704.01. FLA. STAT. § 704.03 (1995).
173. 161 So. 2d 893, 895 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
174. Trammell, 667 So. 2d at 225 (citing Walkup, 161 So. 2d at 895).
175. Id
176. Id. at 226.
177. 658 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Chief Judge Peterson wrote the opin-
ion. Judge Dauksch concurred. Judge W. Sharp dissented with a written opinion.
178. Id. at 1192.
179. Id.
180. See FLA. STAT. §§ 689.05-.06 (1993).
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statutory scheme which now requires two subscribing witnesses to any inter
vivos transfer of title.
Since the trust document did not specify the trustee's powers, the powers
were supplied by statute, 18' which provided the trustee with all management
power. Consequently, the trustee, not the beneficiary, would be the only
necessary and proper party to the condemnation. Thus, the court concluded
that this land belonged to the Ramseys, not Enterprises. 82 However, Enter-
prises was the owner of the business. A landowner may recover business
damages if a public body takes part of a landowner's land for a right of way
which in turn causes injury to that landowner's business located on the
adjoining land that is not taken. Consequently, business damages could not be
recovered unless Enterprises and the Ramseys were truly the same persons.
The Ramseys did not present any convincing reason to pierce the corporate
veil. The court reasoned that they chose the trust and the corporate entity for
their own reasons. 183 Thus, they have to accept the disadvantages as well as
the advantages of those forms.
Judge Sharp dissented. 8 4 The execution of passive trusts by the Statute
of Uses has long been recognized in Florida as well as other states. 85 The
legislature did not mean to subvert that traditional doctrine by requiring
witnesses for deeds. The Statute of Uses should execute the passive trust
vesting title in the beneficiary.' 86 Enterprises, as the owner of the land and the
business, should be able to recover business damages.
187
Broward County v. Conner.188 After the County filed an eminent domain
action to take the Connors' land, the parties explored the possibility of settling
the case by a real estate exchange. The parties met and reached an agreement
in principle. The Connors' lawyer sent a letter to the County's private attorney
which "confirmed the parameters" of the proposed settlement. The parties
subsequently had further meetings, exchanged letters, and exchanged unsigned
181. Id. § 737.401 (1993).
182. Ramsey, 658 So. 2d at 1197.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1197-99 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1199.
186. Id.
187. Ramsey, 658 So. 2d at 1199.
188. 660 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 669 So. 2d 250 (Fla.
1996). Judge Klein wrote the opinion in which Chief Judge Gunther concurred. Judge Farmer
wrote a special concurrence.
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drafts of the settlement. Despite these negotiations, the County decided not to
settle according to the proposed terms.
189
The landowners filed a motion in the eminent domain proceeding to
enforce the settlement. The trial court granted specific performance because it
found that "the agreement had been partly performed; that [the landowners]
had relied to their detriment based on the representation of the county's agents
and employees; and, that the county was estopped to deny the settlement."'
19
The district court reversed relying on two alternative grounds, the Statute of
Frauds and the Sunshine Law.191
First, the court held that the settlement was a contract for the sale of
land.' 92 Consequently, the Statute of Frauds' 93 requires that the contract be in
writing and signed by the party to be charged; however, the County had not
signed the settlement. 94 The landowners had not established sufficient part
performance to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds. The district court
summarily dismissed the landowners' estoppel claim, stating that the landown-
ers "cite[d] no authority which would support specific performance under
these circumstances."' 95 That really misses the point. If the County was
estopped from denying the validity of the contract and the Statute of Frauds
issue, then the landowners, who were to be the "buyers" of the exchanged
property, might have been entitled to specific performance even if there was no
precedent on all fours to that effect.
The court's alternative holding makes far more sense. There was no
contract. The provisions of the Sunshine Law require that formal governmen-
tal action must take place in open meeting unless some specific exception
applies. 96 There is an exception for settlement negotiations for pending
litigation, 197 but there was no suggestion that it was met here. Consequently,
this settlement could not have been entered except by action in an open
meeting and that never occurred.
Judge Farmer points out in his concurring opinion that this decision may
make the settlement of condemnation proceedings slower and more expen-
189. Id. at 289.
190. Id at 290.
191. Id at 289.
192. Id. at 290.
193. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1993).
194. The Statute of Frauds issue is discussed in part XXV of this survey. See discussion
infra p. 371.
195. Conner, 660 So. 2d at 290.
196. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1993).
197. Id § 286.011(8) (1993).
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sive.' 98 Perhaps so, but every lawyer should be wary of relying on a settlement
until it is actually signed by a person with clear authority to bind the other
party.
Caulk v. Orange County.199 Mrs. Caulk and her late husband owned land.
In 1978, they conveyed it to R. T. Hibbard by a deed which "reserves and
retains all rights, title, and interest in and to any and all proceeds arising out of
eminent domain, condemnation, or similar proceedings." 2°° Hibbard sold the
land to Hibbard Oil Company which in turn sold the land to Amoco Oil
Company, but neither of these deeds contained the covenant or anything
similar. When Mrs. Caulk learned that the County had filed a condemnation
action against Amoco, she intervened. The trial court denied her motion for
compensation on the theory that the clause was a personal covenant between
the Caulks and their immediate grantee. 1 The district court affirmed.2°2
The court did not explain how it concluded that the clause created a
covenant rather than an interest in the land. It jumps right into the discussion
of whether this covenant runs with the land, i.e., whether it would bind a
remote grantee. But this author20 3 agrees that it is a covenant. Nothing about
the language used suggests that the grantor intended to retain any interest in the
land.2°4
Not every covenant in a deed runs with the land. First, the covenant must
touch and concern the land. That means the covenant must have a relation to
the land. The court concluded that this covenant "has no effect whatever on
the land.' °5 What the covenant really concerned was the money, i.e., intangi-
ble personal property. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the covenant
was intended to run with the land and that is also a requirement. The language
that the parties used in the deed does not even suggest an intent for the
covenant to run. It does not state that the covenant would be binding on
grantees.2°6 It refers only to the "grantor" and to the "Grantee herein, ' 2°7 and
198. Conner, 660 So. 2d at 291 (Farmer, J., concurring specially).
199. 661 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Chief Judge Peterson wrote the opinion.
Judges Goshorn and Thompson concurred.




204. Caulk, 661 So. 2d at 934.
205. IdM
206. Traditionally that would be expressed by the use of words of limitation and inheritance,
e.g., heirs, successors, and assigns.
207. Caulk, 661 So. 2d at 933.
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the court finds that the language "sounds personal." 208 Finally, the court finds
that it would be "incongruous" that a subsequent purchaser would have to give
a remote grantor the condemnation proceeds. 209 Perhaps the court was
thinking that land burdened by such a covenant would almost certainly become
unmarketable and, in all probability, that courts would find such a covenant
void as it would violate the rule against restraints on alienation.
City of Dania v. Broward County.210 Broward County began condemna-
tion proceedings against several parcels of land for the purpose of airport
expansion. The City moved to intervene alleging, inter alia, that the condem-
nation would harm the City by removing the subject properties from its tax
base and depriving it of the benefits of money it had expended for infrastruc-
ture improvements. The trial court denied intervention and the district court
affirmed. 1 In order to intervene, the proceeding must have a direct legal
effect upon the intervenor. There was no statutory basis for a city to recover
from a county for these losses, so this indirect harm does not satisfy the
statutory requirement. Furthermore, the County's alleged failure to comply
with the procedural requirements for condemnation would not be a proper
basis for intervention.
City of Ocala v. Red Oak Farm, Inc.212 The landowners' parcels were
subject to a power company's 100-foot-wide easement for an electrical
transmission facility before this action was commenced. In this case, the City
took a fifty-foot-wide perpetual easement for a similar electrical transmission
facility adjacent to the power company's easement. The power company had a
formal written policy and permitting procedure by which landowners could get
permission to make certain uses of the property. The City had no written
policy but claimed to have a similar long-standing, unwritten policy. The City
wanted to introduce the easement documents on which the power company's
preexisting easement was based and the formal written policy into evidence.
The landowners objected and the trial court rejected the City's proffer.213 The
district court reversed. 4
208. Id. at 934.
209. Id.
210. 658 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judges Dell, Farmer, and Stevenson
concurred in the per curiam opinion.
211. ldMat 166.
212. 673 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, Gold Land Corp. v. City of
Xcala, No. 88,238, 1996 LEXIS 1752, at *1 (Fla. Sept. 27, 1996). Judge Griffin wrote the
)pinion in which Chief Judge Peterson concurred. Judge Thompson dissented.
213. Id. at 86.
214. Id. at 87.
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The court ruled that this evidence was relevant on the issues of valuation
of the property and severance damages.1 5 Surprisingly, the court based its
conclusion, in part, on the intensity of the landowners' counsel's efforts to
exclude this evidence. The rest of its logic is a little obscure. The court
concluded that the jury might have been confused and mislead by the fact that
they were not informed about the parallels in the City's unwritten policy and
the power company's written one.216
Judge Thompson's dissent provides some illumination.1 7 Apparently, the
jury was informed that the power company had an easement, that it had the
written policy, and that the City had an unwritten policy. Part of the power
company's written policy was read to the jury. The jurors viewed the land and
the power company's transmission facilities. This made introduction of the
easement documents and the written policy unnecessary, particularly in light of
the prejudicial effect the documents might have since they contained the price
the power company had paid for its easement thirty-five years earlier. Judge
Thompson pointed out that the trial court had "the superior vantage," and the
trial judge's decisions did not fail the reasonableness test. 218
Hartleb v. Department of Transportation.219 The Department of Trans-
portation ("DOT") brought this eminent domain action and made an offer of
judgment to the landowner for $60,000. The jury verdict was $60,971, but it
was apportioned between the landowner, who got $53,630, and his tenant. The
trial judge denied the landowner attorney's fees and costs incurred after the
offer of judgment based upon section 73.092(7) of the Florida Statutes220
because he had received less than the offer of judgment. 2 '
The district court disagreed for two reasons. First, the district court found
that the offer of judgment was ambiguous.2 2  It made no reference to appor-
tionment of the award or compensation of the tenant, nor did it indicate that it
215. Id.
216. let
217. Red Oak Farm, 673 So. 2d at 87-88.
218. Id. at 88 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
219. 677 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Stone wrote the opinion. Judge
Polen concurred. Judge Klein concurred specially.
220. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(7) (1987). The statute provides:
Where an offer of judgment made by the petitioner ... is either rejected or ex-
pires and the verdict or judgment is less than or equal to the offer of judgment,
no attorney's fees or costs shall be awarded for time spent by the attorney or
costs incurred after the time or rejection or expiration of the offer.
Id.
221. Hartleb, 677 So. 2d at 336.
222. Id. at 337.
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would be free of any claim by the tenant for compensation. 223 In fact, it
purported to be a "complete and total settlement."224 So, it is unclear if the
landlord's recovery was actually less than the offer of judgment.
Second, the DOT made substantial changes to its construction plans after
that offer of judgment had expired.23 These changes reduced the scope of the
taking.226  Consequently, the jury verdict concerned a taking of a lesser
magnitude than the earlier offer of judgment. If it was these subsequent
changes that caused the jury verdict to come in under the offer, then "simple
equity and the requirements of fair dealing 227 would prevent the DOT from
invoking this statute.
Judge Klein wrote a special concurrence to express his dismay with the
DOT's conduct in pursuing this appeal. 28 Although he did not use the word
"frivolous," it seems clear that was what he was thinking about the DOT's
position. Note that these merely compound the department's earlier errors in
making an ambiguous offer of judgment and failing to make an updated offer
of judgment following a substantial change in plans.
Morr v. Department of Transportation.229 Morr operated a salvage yard
on land leased from Kreider. Morr had an occupational license from DeSoto
County, but the salvage yard was not permitted by the County's land use
regulations. The DOT brought a condemnation action and obtained an order
taking the property. Subsequently, the County brought an action to prevent the
landlord and tenant from violating the land use regulations by operating the
salvage yard there. The stipulated settlement provided that Morr would
remove the salvage automobiles, but he could continue the salvage business on
adjacent land if he complied with certain conditions. 230
In the condemnation action, the trial judge decided that the above settle-
ment conclusively established that the salvage yard had been operating
illegally.231 Consequently, Morr was not entitled to business damages. The
district court disagreed and reversed. 232 The settlement had been entered after
223. Id. at 336.
224. Id.
225. ld. at 337.
226. Hartleb, 677 So. 2d at 337.
227. Id.
228. Id. (Klein, J., concurring specially).
229. 667 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Blue wrote the opinion. Acting
Chief Judge Patterson and Judge Altenbemd concurred.
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the DOT had already taken the land. At that time, Morr no longer had any
interest in the property that would enable him to continue operating the
business there. At the critical time, the time of the taking, Morr did have an
ongoing business. If Morr had a reasonable chance of continuing the business
by obtaining rezoning or a variance, then he would be entitled to compensation
for its loss. Whether he could have obtained a variance or rezoning would be a
jury question unless there was no credible evidence to the contrary. Since the
record does not establish that the county would have prevented its continuation
if the DOT had not taken the land, the trial court should not have granted
summary judgment that he could not recover business damages.233
Seminole County v. Clayton;234 Seminole County v. Delco Oil, Inc.; 235
Seminole County v. Butler;236 and Seminole County v. Rollingwood Apart-
ments, Ltd.237 Together, these four cases clarify the fifth district's approach
to attorneys' fees in eminent domain cases. The statute provided:
(1) In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceed-
ings, the court shall give greatest weight to the benefits resulting to
the client from the services rendered.
(a) As used in this section, the term "benefits" means the dif-
ference between the final judgment or settlement and the last writ-
ten offer made by the condemning authority before the defendant
hires an attorney....
(b) The court may also consider nonmonetary benefits which
the attorney obtains for the client.
(2) In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceed-
ings, the court shall also give secondary consideration to:
(a) The novelty, difficulty, and importance of the questions
involved.
(b) The skill employed by the attorney in conducting the
cause.
(c) The amount of money involved.
(d) The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney.
233. Id. at 890.
234. 665 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judge Cobb wrote the opinion in
which Chief Judge Peterson and Judge W. Sharp concurred.
235. 669 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (replacing the original opinion at 21
Fla. L. Weekly D254 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1996)). Judges Cobb, Harris, and Griffin
concurred in the per curiam opinion.
236. 676 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Antoon wrote the opinion.
Chief Judge Peterson and Judge Dauksch concurred.
237. 678 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge W. Sharp wrote the opinion in
which Chief Judge Peterson and Judge Harris concurred.
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(e) The attorney's time and labor reasonably required ade-
quately to represent the client in relation to the benefits resulting to
the client.
(4) In determining the amount of attorney's fees to be paid by
the petitioner, the court shall be guided by the fees the defendant
would ordinarily be expected to pay if the petitioner were not re-
sponsible for the payment of fees and costs.238
In Clayton, the compensation issue was settled without a trial.2 39 The only
issue before the circuit court was the amount of attorneys' fees. The court
used a two tier approach, first figuring out a reasonable fee based upon an
hourly rate and then adding twenty percent of the difference between the
final agreed compensation and the initial offer, i.e., the betterment accom-
plished by the attorney. That produced a total attorney's fee of $159,261.00,
which worked out to $1,276.64 per hour.240 The district court reversed. 241
First, the district court rejected the constitutional challenge to the
attorneys' fee statute, section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes.242 While the
court agreed that a statute that mandated an unreasonable attorneys' fee
would be unconstitutional, it concluded that the statute could be interpreted
to comport with the Florida Constitution.2 3 Furthermore, an excessive rate
could not be justified as a punishment for a condemning authority which had
made a bad faith initial offer as a bargaining ploy.244 The case was re-
manded with an order that the trial court consider the statutory criteria rather
than relying on a percentage approach.245
In Delco, the landowner had contracted to pay its attorney twenty-five
percent of the benefits obtained. The parties quickly reached an agreement on
the amount of compensation to be paid for the property, an amount $270,000
higher than the County's original offer. The landowner's attorney worked 29.3
hours settling the case, and the time increased to 46.2 hours by including the
238. FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1993).
239. Clayton, 665 So. 2d at 364.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 366.
242. Id. at 365 (citing FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1993)).
243. Id.
244. Clayton, 665 So. 2d at 365. Note, a low initial offer would already increase the
attorney's fees under the statute if the attorney was able to successfully negotiate a fair price
because it would increase the amount of "betterment" which the attorney could produce for his
or her client.
245. Id. at 366.
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time involved in recovering attorney's fees. The trial court awarded fees of
$67,500.24 The district court reversed.247
The appellate court reasoned that Florida decisions provided what a
reasonable attorneys' fee was and how it was to be calculated in most cases.
248
Condemnation is not a contingent fee case. Consequently, an attorneys' fee
based upon a percentage of the recovery would be inappropriate. In eminent
domain cases, the legislature has provided that the condemning authority pay a
reasonable fee except as provided by section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes.2 49
The district court interpreted that to mean that the fee reached by applying the
factors in section 73.092 must still fit within the general parameters for a
reasonable fee, i.e., the fee would be unreasonable if the effective hourly rate
would be excessive after taking into account all relevant factors.250 The fee
awarded in this case, over $2,000 per hour,251 was excessive by this standard.
Moreover, applying the factors in section 73.092 would have also led the
court to conclude that the attorney's fees had not been correctly calculated.
The statute directed courts to give the greatest weight to the benefits resulting
from the legal services and, secondarily, to consider a list of other factors.252
Those factors were the same as used in the lodestar approach of Florida
Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe.2 3  Thus, the place to begin that
calculation was with those statutory factors, using them to figure a lodestar
amount. Then, that amount could be adjusted up or down in light of the
benefits the attorney had obtained for this client, keeping in mind that the
statute provides that the benefits should be the primary factor in the calcula-
tion. The recovery should not be controlled by what the condemnee has agreed
to pay its attorney or what fees have become customary based upon a misun-
derstanding of the statutory criteria.
246. Delco, 669 So. 2d at 1164.
247. Id. at 1163.
248. Id. at 1166.
249. FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1993).
250. Delco, 669 So. 2d at 1166.
251. This $2,000 figure was figured using the 29.3 hours it took to settle the case.
252. The secondary factors are:
(a) The novelty, difficulty, and importance of the questions involved.
(b) The skill employed by the attorney in conducting the cause.
(c) The amount of money involved.
(d) The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney.
(e) The attorney's time and labor reasonably required adequately to repre-
sent the client in relation to the benefits resulting to the client.
FLA. STAT. § 73.092(2)(a)-(e) (1993).
253. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
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The trial court in Rollingwood Apartments also used an elaborate, but
incorrect formula. In essence, "the court awarded a top hourly rate plus a
generous percentage award, which resulted in a fee of over $630 per hour. '' 54
Because this was not consistent with the interpretations of section 73.092
above, the district court reversed.255 It may, however, be noteworthy, that the
district court did not say that $630 per hour was per se unreasonable.
In Butler, the court faced three similar attorneys' fees calculations and
disapproved of them for the same reasons.2 6 However, this case had an
additional wrinkle. The landowner owned two buildings. Each was leased to a
tenant. The land that the County was condemning did not include the two
buildings; however, because the County admitted that the condemnation would
make the buildings valueless, it agreed to compensate the condemnee for the
loss. The County also agreed to allow the tenants to stay in the buildings
during the eminent domain proceedings. The landowner informed the tenants
that he expected them to keep paying rent during that period. They responded
by filing successful motions with the court to abate their rent. The landowner
filed a motion to set that order aside, but the parties eventually settled the
matter. Under the settlement, the landowner received $139,475. In calculating
the attorney's fees in the eminent domain action, the judge included that
amount in the benefits that the attorney had obtained for his client.257 The
district court found that to be error.25
8
"Full compensation within the meaning of our constitution includes the
payment of attorney's fees necessary to enforce the property owner's rights,
including fees incurred in proceedings arising out of, and ancillary to, the
original condemnation proceeding."5 9 Disputes arising out of the proceeding
are such things as apportionment of the damages or enforcement of the
condemnation award. Even the statute only provides attorneys' fees incurred
in the defense of the condemnation action.260 That the landowner's dispute
with his tenants was triggered by the condemnation action does not make it a
proceeding arising out of the condemnation. It was a private dispute between a
landlord and his tenants, and there is no reason that the public should pay his
attorney's fees in resolving that dispute.
254. RollingwoodApartments, 678 So. 2d at 371.
255. Id.
256. Butler, 676 So. 2d at 455.
257. Id. at 454.
258. Id. at 455.
259. Id. at 454.
260. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (Supp. 1994).
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The County had also claimed the court erred in awarding attorneys' fees
for time spent litigating the issue of attorneys' fees. The established rule is
that attorneys' fees can be recovered for time spent litigating the issue of
whether an attorney is entitled to fees, but they cannot be recovered for time
spent litigating the amount of the attorney's fees. The record in this case was
silent as to which issue the attorney's time was spent on, so the appellant
cannot establish that an error occurred.26'
Department of Transportation v. Murray.262 The DOT was in the process
of condemning part of a restaurant parking lot. On the issue of severance
damages, DOT sought unsuccessfully to introduce expert testimony that the
injury could be partially cured, arguing that the thirteen parking spaces that
would be lost by the taking could be recovered if the landowner added spaces
to existing parking bays and striped over a paved area then being used only for
overflow parking. That ruling was made in an interlocutory order by the
original trial judge. 63 When that judge was removed, his successor felt bound
by the interlocutory order.264 The district court held that the proffered testi-
mony should have been excluded but for a different reason. 265
The fatal flaw with the expert testimony was that it did not consider the
effect the proposed cure would have on the value of the remaining property
and business. Converting the overflow parking into regular marked parking
would leave the landowner with the same number of striped parking spaces,
but it would not make the landowners whole because the landowner would still
have a smaller parking area. That would probably reduce the value of the
restaurant, a factor which the expert testimony did not address. Therefore, the
testimony was inadmissible as a matter of law.
266
In addition, the landowners' expert had testified regarding the calculation
of business damages. Business damages were, and still are, provided for by
statute267 rather than by constitutional authority, but the statute provides little
guidance regarding how they are to be calculated. The expert had described
his calculation as a "deprivation appraisal,' 268 but the court characterized it as
261. Butler, 676 So. 2d at 455.
262. 670 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 677 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1996).
This was a per curiam opinion in which Judges Ervin and Miner concurred. Judge Benton wrote
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
263. Id. at 978.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 980.
267. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3) (1991).
268. Murray, 670 So. 2d at 979.
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a lost profit analysis.269 The calculation of business damages should focus on
lost profits and lost ability to make profits, but it should also consider business
losses caused by the taking. This lost profit analysis must also include
consideration of any fixed expenses that will be incurred despite the taking. In
this case, the expert purposefully excluded fixed expenses such as advertising,
depreciation, insurance, utilities, and the landowners' salaries. Since the
expert's analysis here did not account for fixed expenses, it should not have
been admitted into evidence.
The district court certified two questions as being of great public impor-
tance.270 They are:
[1] IN AN EMINENT DOMAIN CASE IN WHICH AN ESTAB-
LISHED BUSINESS IS NOT TOTALLY DESTROYED BY A
TAKING, DOES SECTION 73.071(3)(b), FLORIDA STAT-
UTES, CONTEMPLATE CALCULATION OF BUSINESS
DAMAGES BY ANY MEANS OTHER THAN A LOST PROFIT
ANALYSIS? [2] IN THE INSTANT CASE IS THE EXPERT'S
BUSINESS DAMAGE CALCULATION A LOST PROFIT
ANALYSIS REQUIRING THE DEDUCTION OF FIXED EX-
PENSES, SUCH AS SALARIES, INTEREST, DEPRECIATION,
AND UTILITIES, OR AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS, COG-
NIZABLE UNDER SECTION 73.071(3)(b), BASED ON DE-
DUCTION OF CERTAIN VARIABLE EXPENSES AND THE
EXCLUSION OF FIXED EXPENSES FROM THE ANALY-
SIS?271
Judge Benton disagreed and, therefore, dissented in part.272 The calcula-
tion of business damages would be different if the business is forced to shut
down as a result of the taking rather than becomes less profitable. If the
business shuts down, then the deduction of fixed expenses is appropriate
because those expenses will cease. However, if the business continues, then
the expenses will also continue as they had before the taking. Judge Benton
argues that the majority applied the wrong standard to a business which would
269. Ma2
270. The same two questions were certified in Department of Transp. v. Coleman, 673 So.
2d 874 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996), a per curiam opinion involving the same three judges as in
Murray. The Supreme Court of Florida granted review of the certified questions on July 2, 1996.
See Murray v. Department of Transp., 677 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1996).
271. Murray, 670 So. 2d at 980.
272. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting in part).
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continue. 3 Moreover, the expert's testimony was sufficiently supported by
the facts so that it could be left to the jury to decide whether to accept it or not.
Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v. Casiano-Torres.2 74
The condemnee sought and won severance damages.275 Among the things it
apparently claimed was damage to its business, which it could recover if the
taking would "damage or destroy an established business of more than 5 years'
standing. ' 76 The government appealed, inter alia, the trial court's submitting
to the jury the question of whether the condemnee's business had been in
existence for five years. The government's theory was that court had ignored
the provision that: "[t]he jury shall determine solely the amount of compensa-
tion to be paid .... The district court held that the trial court had not erred,
stating that "[s]uch an interpretation ignores the remainder of the statute which
establishes what 'compensation' shall include and the requirements for
arriving at the proper amount of compensation. 278 Apparently, the court's
point was that whether the business was in existence for the requisite five years
was only an element in determining the amount of damages, not whether
damages should be paid.
Weese v. Pinellas County.279 The sole issue in the case was the amount of
business damages. The facts in the case were somewhat unusual. A used car
lot occupied the land. The order "taking" part of it was entered on July 2,
1991, but the construction project did not actually get to that vicinity until
September of 1993. Cars were displayed on the land until then. The project
was completed in February of 1994. The first expert witness testified that the
actual damage began in February of 1994, which is the date on which he began
calculating the damages. Because the statute280 provided that compensation
shall be based on the earlier of the date of the taking or the date of the trial, the
281trial judge excluded this testimony.
273. Id. at 981.
274. 659 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 666 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1995).
Acting Chief Judge Campbell wrote the opinion. Judges Patterson and Fulmer concurred.
275. Id. at 1125. See FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1991) (governing the award of severance
damages).
276. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1991).
277. Id. § 73.071(3).
278. Casiano-Torres, 659 So. 2d at 1126.
279. 668 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Acting Chief Judge Ryder wrote the
opinion in which Judges Altenbemd and Lazzara concurred.
280. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(2) (1991).
281. Weese, 668 So. 2d at 222.
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Then the trial court refused to allow the next witness to testify. He was
the prior owner of the car business; he had continued to help the current
owner; he was the owner of the underlying land; and he had the same last
name as the current owner. M Exactly what it was about this combination of
facts that led to the trial court's decision was not specified. Then, because of
the lack of testimony on the amount of damages, the court entered a direct
verdict in favor of the County.2 3 The district court reversed. 2 4
First, the court concluded that the first expert had complied with the
statute.285 He had begun his calculations at the correct date, the date of the
taking, but had clearly stated that there were no business damages between the
date of the taking in 1991 and the date when the project was complete in 1994.
He merely continued his calculations from that date. Furthermore, the second
expert was qualified to testify. "A witness may testify as an expert if he is
qualified to do so by reason of knowledge obtained in his occupation or
business."' 6 He had knowledge of the used car business in general and also of
the particular business that had been damaged. Implicit in the court's decision
is that there is nothing inherent in this witness' connection to the claimant to
disqualify him as an expert.
B. Inverse Condemnation
City of Riviera Beach v. Shillingsburg and Taylor v. City of North Palm
Beach 8 involve contiguous submerged land, although in different cities.
They involve similar facts and were decided by the same panel of judges from
the Fourth District Court of Appeal. In Shillingburg, the City amended its
comprehensive plan to include the following policy: "It is the expressed policy
objective of the City to preclude any development of submerged lands, includ-
ing but not limited to mangroves, wetlands... to the maximum extent permis-
sible by law. It is further the policy of the City to oppose any applications for
dredge and fill permits ..... ,'289 The landowners claimed this affected a taking
282. The exact relationship, if any, was not mentioned in the decision.
283. Weese, 668 So. 2d at 223.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 222.
286. Id. at 223 (relying upon Harvey v. State, 129 Fla. 289 (1937) and FIA. STAT. § 90.702
(1991)).
287. 659 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judge Pariente wrote the opinion in
which Judge Warner and Associate Judge Fredericka Smith concurred.
288. 659 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judge Pariente wrote the opinion in
which Judge Warner and Associate Judge Fredericka Smith concurred.
289. 659 So. 2d at 1177.
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of their land. The trial court initially rejected the claims as not being ripe
because there was no final decision as to what would be ultimately allowed,
but stayed the proceedings for four months pending developments.290 During
that time, the land use plan was amended to allow a viewing dock, and one
landowner's application for a permit to build a viewing dock was approved
subject to stringent conditions and limits. The trial court concluded that this
proved the highest level of development that would be allowed, but it was not
enough.29' It violated the landowner's reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions which constituted a taking.292  The district court disagreed and re-
versed.293
A land use ordinance that leaves open the possibility of reasonable use
should not be found on its face to violate the Takings Clause.294 This plan by
its express language contemplated viable uses consistent with the policy
objectives. The amendment to allow the viewing dock demonstrated that the
plan has some flexibility and that further amendments were possible. So the
facial challenge failed.295
The as applied challenge failed because it was not ripe.296 The doctrine is
intended to give the land use agency the chance to reach its own well-reasoned
conclusion before a court will consider the matter. Getting permission to build
a dock did not prove what the land use agency would ultimately allow or deny.
While the landowners here asserted that any further applications would be
futile, that was not conclusively established from the facts in the record.
In Taylor,297 the landowner's family had held title since 1971. Back then
the zoning was C-1A which permitted limited commercial uses and high
density, multifamily residential uses. That it was in the midst of an environ-
mentally sensitive area was gradually recognized by various levels of govern-
ment, culminating with the zoning being changed in 1989 to a conserva-
tion/open space classification, consistent w~h the City's comprehensive use
plan. Low density single family housing and passive recreation were permis-
sible uses. The landowner sued on the theory that this reclassification affected
290. Id. at 1178.
291. Id. at 1179.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1176.
294. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
295. Shillingsburg, 659 So. 2d at 1179.
296. Id. at 1180.
297. Taylor, 659 So. 2d at 1167.
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a taking of the property. The trial court rejected her claims and she ap-
pealed. 298
The landowner's first claim was that the zoning classification was a per se
taking of her property. Where a land use regulation leaves open the possibility
of reasonable uses, a claim of a facial taking will fail. The district court found
that the record did not preclude all reasonable uses of the land.299 Further-
more, the plan had a mechanism for seeking amendments. So it was possible
that the landowner could have gotten an amendment allowing a proposed use.
Any claim that the landowner would be deprived of all economically
viable uses would depend on an as applied challenge based upon the facts of
the case. However, that challenge failed because the landowner had failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies by seeking the amendment. 300 She also
had not submitted a development plan that had been rejected by the City.
Whether there has been a taking depends on the extent to which the landowner
will be deprived of her reasonable investment-backed expectations, but that
depends on what development the government will allow. Until the govern-
ment made a final determination, the takings issue could not be decided.
Therefore, this case was not yet ripe.
30 1
City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen.302 The landlord brought this action for
inverse condemnation after the City's Nuisance Abatement Board ordered his
apartment house closed for a period of one year.30 3 The landlord was not
accused of any wrongdoing. The order was based upon a finding that there
was drug use by tenants and other persons at the property. The trial court first
granted a motion to dismiss filed by the City.304 It ruled that the taking was
temporary and, at the time, it was the accepted law that an inverse condemna-
tion action could not be brought to recover for a temporary taking.305 Because
298. Id. at 1168.
299. Id. at 1171.
300. Id. at 1172-73.
301. Id. at 1174.
302. 675 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. 88,373, 1996 LEXIS 1563,
at *1 (Fla. Aug. 29, 1996). Acting Chief Judge Campbell wrote the opinion in which Judges
Frank and Blue concurred.
303. The order was based upon the authority of section 893.138 of the Florida Statutes and
sections 19-66 to 19-71 of the St. Petersburg, Florida, City Code. See FL4. STAT. § 893.138
(1991); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., Crry CODE §§ 19-66 to -71 (1989). There was no claim that the
order was invalid.




Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
the Supreme Court of Florida changed the law3°6 after the trial court's decision
307
was made, the district court reversed. The trial court then granted summary
judgment to the landlord.08 The district court affirmed, adopting the opinion
of Circuit Court Judge Horace A. Andrews which it found to be "complete,
concise, scholarly and well-grounded.
' 309
A regulation that denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
the land is compensable without inquiry into the public interest advanced in
support of the regulation. Ordering the apartment house closed for one year
did deny all economically beneficial or productive use. The taking claim is not
avoided by invoking the nuisance exception. The state may legitimately
prohibit conduct which would be a common law nuisance, e.g., the use or sale
of drugs. But the conduct prohibited goes far beyond that. This order prohib-
its the use of the premises for human habitation. In essence, the City is trying
to force this landowner to disproportionately bear the cost of its war on drugs.
Sarasota Welfare Home, Inc. v. City of Sarasota.310 The landowner's
property was subject to a public easement. When the City buried a sewer and
wastewater pipe in 1970, it extended beyond the public easement and en-
croached on the this landowner's land. The encroachment was discovered in
1988 when the landowner began a construction project. Due to the location of
the pipe, the City refused to allow the construction according to the proposed
plans. Just under four years after the discovery, the landowner filed this
inverse condemnation action against the City. The trial court granted the
City's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the action was barred by
the statute of limitations, but the district court reversed. 31
There is no specific inverse condemnation statute of limitations, but that
does not mean that the action is not subject to a time limit. The district court
ruled312 that it is subject to the four year statute of limitations applicable to real
property actions for which the legislature has not provided a specific limit.313
The critical question in this case is when the four year period began to run.
314
306. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla.
1994).
307. Bowen v. City of St. Petersburg, 642 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
308. Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 628.
309. Id. at 629.
310. 666 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Chief Judge Threadgill and Judges
Campbell and Fulmer concurred in this per curiam opinion.
311. Id. at 173.
312. On this point, the district court affirmed the trial court's ruling. Id.
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The trial court ruled that the four year period began in 1970 when the en-
croaching pipe was installed, but the district court concluded it was when the
City refused to approve the development plan because of location of its own
pipe.315 The court's logic is that "a 'taking' occurs when an owner is denied
substantially all economically beneficial or productive use of the owner's
land. 316 Whether a taking has occurred is determined by a factual inquiry
made on a case-by-case basis, so when it occurred must be determined the
same way. Here, the court concluded that the landowner was not deprived of
the use of the land taken until it was prevented from building according to its
plans. 3
17
The court also reversed the trial court's denial of the landowner's motion
for leave to amend the complaint.318 The landowner wanted to add a trespass
claim, apparently on the theories that the encroaching pipe was a continuing
trespass; damages for the preceding four years of encroachment would not be
barred by the statute of limitations; and an injunction should be awarded
against the encroachment's continuation. Such motions "shall be given freely
when justice so requires."31 9 Apparently nothing in the record justified the
trial court's denial of the motion.
Department of Environmental Protection v. Burgess.320 The landowner
owned approximately 166 acres in the wetlands. His application for a dredge
and fill permit was denied by the Department following an administrative
hearing. Rather than appeal the Department's final order, he brought this suit
in circuit court claiming that the denial constituted a taking for which compen-
sation must be paid. He filed a motion for partial summary judgment sup-
ported only by his own affidavit and the Department's final order denying the
permit. The Department responded by filing the landowner's deposition and
an affidavit from a county official that the proposed development would
require a county building permit. In his deposition, the landowner admitted
that the Department had offered to issue the dredge and fill permit if he would
give it a conservation easement, an offer he refused. The trial court granted the
landowner's motion for partial summary judgment and the Department
appealed.321
315. Sarasota Welfare, 666 So. 2d at 173.
316. Id. (citing Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth., 640 So. 2d at 58).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a).
320. 667 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judge Van Nortwick wrote the opinion.
Judges Ervin and Benton concurred.
321. Id at 268.
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The district court reversed.322 A regulatory taking occurs when the
landowner is deprived of substantially all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of the property. Could the landowner still use the land productively?
Would available uses be economically beneficial in light of his investment-
backed expectations? Finally, would the proposed use be a nuisance? No
compensation is required if the state prevents a landowner from engaging in
nuisance activity. These fact-based questions remained. "A summary judg-
ment should not be granted unless the facts are so crystallized that nothing
remains but questions of law."323 So the trial court erred in granting the
summary judgment.324
The district court noted that the case presents an interesting question. The
landowner never tested the validity of the Department's order by judicial
review.325 Does the Department's denial of the permit conclusively establish
in this case that the landowner could not get a permit? The court declined to




Department of Community Affairs v. Moorman.32 7  In this case, the
Supreme Court of Florida assessed the validity of a land use ordinance
affecting Big Pine Key, enacted to protect the endangered Florida Key deer.
The court noted, in an opinion authored by Justice Kogan,328 that human
development has "put the deer perilously close to extinction., 329 The respon-
dent property owners were prohibited under the ordinance from erecting
fences, 330 representing a threat to the Key deer which must roam freely in
322. Id. at 271.
323. Id. (citing Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Chiles, 656 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1995)).
324. Id.
325. Burgess, 667 So. 2d at 270.
326. Id. at 269-70.
327. 664 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, No. 95-2035, 1996 WL 337490, at *1 (U.S.
Oct. 7, 1996).
328. Justices Overton, Shaw, Harding and Anstead concurred, while Chief Justice Grimes
authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, with which opinion Justice Wells
concurred. Id.
329. Id. at 931.
330. Interestingly, Respondent Charles Moorman not only owned lands affected by the
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search of food and water. The ordinance, a blanket prohibition on fencing,
was intended as an interim effort which would "be replaced within a year by a
more comprehensive regulation that would better identify where fence restric-
tions would be proper and where they were unnecessary." 331 However, the
ordinance had been in place for five years before the relevant dates in this
litigation.
332
Notwithstanding the ordinance, Monroe County officials granted Moor-
man a permit to build a six-foot-high, 400-foot-long fence, and Justice Kogan
noted that "[t]he record contains evidence that Moorman's fence is in a
location that will adversely affect the Key deer."333  The Department of
Community Affairs ("DCA") appealed the County's decision under its
"authority over areas of critical state concern." 334 Moorman's lots are located
in an area which was designated as a critical state concern in 1979.335 Upon
referral, a Department of Administrative Hearings' hearing officer found the
permits improper, noting that the permits were issued as a matter of right.
336
The hearing officer recommended that the Cabinet (sitting as the Florida Land
& Water Adjudicatory Committee) rescind the permits, which it did.337
Moorman then appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal, which found the
ordinance facially unconstitutional.338
The Supreme Court of Florida held that such a finding of facial unconsti-
tutionality was improper because it promotes the valid public policy interests
in protecting the environment.339 Zoning ordinances are to be upheld unless
they bear no substantial relation to legitimate societal policies.340 Neverthe-
less, the court questioned whether any valid basis existed for denying the
331. Id. at 932.
332. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 932.
333. Id.
334. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 380.07(2) (1993)).
335. Id. Justice Kogan added in a footnote that this fact was "crucial to the result in this
case, because it identifies an environmental concern unique to Big Pine Key." Id. at 932 n.1.
336. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 932.
337. In a footnote, Justice Kogan noted that "the Cabinet sitting as the Florida Land & Water
Adjudicatory Commission may rescind land use permits in the Florida Keys or 'may attach
conditions and restrictions to its decisions."' Id. at 933 n.2 (citing FLA. STAT. § 380.07 (1993)).
Justice Kogan further noted that the record was unclear as to why the Cabinet had not attached
such conditions or restrictions, instead rescinding the permit altogether. Id.
338. Id. at 932.
339. Id. at 933.
340. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 933. For this proposition, the court cited Harrell's Candy
Kitchen v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 111 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959), one of the cases with
which the third district's opinion was thought to conflict with. Id. at 931.
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Moormans a permit.341 That the blanket prohibition was intended as an interim
measure meant that it was never regarded as an essential feature of public
policy.342 However, the DCA's expert testified that there were "good fences
and bad fences" and that the blanket prohibition extended beyond the expert's
"specific recommendations." 343 "[T]he uncontroverted expert evidence clearly
indicated that the Moormans' fence-the only one at issue here today-was
harmful to Key deer habitat. 344 On the basis of this testimony, the supreme
court quashed the third district's decision and remanded.345
Kaplan v. Peterson.346  The current landowner purchased the land in
1986. In 1989, an environmental site assessment report showed that a leaking
underground storage tank had contaminated the land. The current landowner
cleaned up the land and sued his seller to recover his costs and expenses.347
The parties agreed that the complaint did not make any claim based on a
recognized exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor. It only claimed that the
landowner can recover under a new cause of action impliedly created by
chapter 376 of the Florida Statutes (1989).348 The second district had already
decided that such a cause of action was not impliedly created, 349 but the fifth
district disagreed.350
The court found sufficient reasons to overcome a general judicial reluc-
tance to read a private cause of action into a statute.35 1 The statute requires
current owners to clean up a polluted site. If the current owner had failed to do
it, the state could have handled the clean up and then recovered from the prior
owner who caused the pollution. The state could not, however, have recovered
from the current owner who purchased without notice of the pollution.
341. ld. at 933.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 934.
345. Id. Justice Wells joined in Chief Justice Grimes' opinion, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, failing to agree that the ordinance "was necessarily constitutional as applied." Id.
These justices would have remanded for a determination of whether the ordinance was constitu-
tionally applied or, alternatively, whether modification of the permit would be proper. Id.
346. 674 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge W. Sharp wrote the majority
opinion. Judge Thompson concurred. Judge Griffin wrote an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
347. This action was consolidated with an action against his tenant, but that does not affect
the outcome of this decision.
348. See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
349. Mostoufi v. Presto Food Stores, Inc., 618 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 626 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1993).
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Neighbors injured by the pollution could recover from a prior owner who
caused it. A city could recover from a nearby landowner who had caused
contamination of its well field. Any person injured by the prior owner's
release of hazardous materials could recover for their injury. It would not
make sense to hold that the only one who could not recover was the current
owner who had obeyed the statute and cleaned up the mess caused by its seller.
Consequently, the court concluded that chapter 376 does create a private cause
of action against a prior owner who polluted.352
The court also recognized that the doctrine of caveat emptor had been
rejected in residential real estate sales.353 The Supreme Court of Florida had
not yet addressed the question of whether that holding should be expanded to
include commercial real estate transactions, and the third district had expressly
refused to do SO.354 However, this court simply ruled that caveat emptor was
not a bar to this cause of action.35 5 Apparently, the court felt it was clear
enough that the cause of action would have little applicability if it could be
barred by caveat emptor, so if the legislature had intended to give a buyer the
cause of action, it must have also intended to exempt it from the reaches of that
doctrine.
The court concluded by certifying the following question to the Supreme
Court of Florida:
DOES THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR BAR A CUR-
RENT LANDOWNER OF COMMERCIAL REAL PROPERTY
FROM SUING THE PRIOR LANDOWNER TO RECOVER THE
COST AND EXPENSES OF CLEAN UP OF THE PROPERTY,
WHICH WAS CAUSED BY THE PRIOR OWNERS UNLAW-
FUL DISCHARGE OF POLLUTANTS ON THE SITE, CON-
TRARY TO CHAPTER 376?356
Judge Griffin dissented from the finding that a private cause of action was
created for buyers by chapter 376. Applying the purpose approach to this
problem, the judge points out that "this legislation was not designed to protect
subsequent purchasers of polluted property." 358 What it was designed to do
352. Id. at 203.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Kaplan, 674 So. 2d at 205.
356. Id. at 205-06.
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was protect people who had been harmed by a discharge of pollutants, not
indirectly harmedby the purchase of polluted property.
XIV. EQUITY
Bauerle v. Weisman."9 Landowners sought to rescind the conveyance by
which they had acquired their title and the contract of sale which led to the
conveyance. Their theory was mutual mistake. Their action was triggered by
the failure of the Department of Environmental Resources ("DER") to approve
their application for construction of a house and access road. The trial court
granted the relief after concluding that the DER would prevent the property
from ever being used as a residence, as was contemplated by the parties to the
conveyance. 36° The grantors/sellers appealed.
In order to prevail on the merits, the party seeking rescission must prove
its right to relief by clear and convincing evidence.361 A surveyor had testified
that the location of the line established the DER's wetlands jurisdiction over
this land, but that testimony was based upon the surveyor's assumption that the
DER's jurisdiction had already been established. The uncontradicted testi-
mony of a former DER permit processor was that the DER had never made a
jurisdictional determination because the plaintiffs had failed..to provide certain
essential information. Consequently, there was not competent, substantial
evidence that DER had the power to prevent the plaintiffs from building a
residence on this property as planned.362
Metropolitan Dade County v. O'Brien.363  The O'Briens opened a
business knowing that they were violating some County ordinances and had
not secured the appropriate permits, so the County sued. The trial court denied
the County's motion for a preliminary injunction, allowing the O'Briens ninety
days to get a variance.364 When the time was up, the County again moved for a
temporary injunction, but the trial court again denied it, giving the O'Briens
359. 664 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judge Dauksch wrote the opinion.
Chief Judge Peterson and Judge Antoon concurred.
360. Id. at 364.
361. Id. at 365. See Rosique v. Windley Cove, Ltd., 542 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
362. Id.
363. 660 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judges Hubbart, Jorgenson, and Gersten
concurred in the per curiam opinion.
364. Id. at 365.
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another sixty days. 365 This time the County appealed and the Third District
Court of Appeal reversed.366
It has long been the settled rule that "[w]here the government seeks an
injunction in order to enforce its police power, any alternative legal remedy is
ignored and irreparable harm is presumed., 367  The O'Briens knowingly
violated the ordinances and continued to violate the ordinances. in these
"extreme circumstances," it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
deny the temporary injunctions.368
369Dorton v. Jensen. The sellers testified that under heavy rains, water
would rush from the street, into their yard, and hit the side of the house leaving
a water mark on the wall. On three or four occasions water had come under
the back door sill. To prevent that, they had caulked the bottom of the door sill
with silicone, a fix that had worked, but they never told the buyers about the
water problem. In fact, when the buyers asked if they should buy flood
insurance, the sellers had answered it was unnecessary as they had never
experienced a flooding problem.370
After moving in, the buyers experienced severe flooding after several
heavy rainfalls. The buyers eventually stopped making the purchase money
mortgage payments to the sellers. This suit followed with the buyers seeking
rescission and the sellers seeking foreclosure. After a non-jury trial, the circuit
court, applying the principle of Johnson v. Davis,371 ruled in favor of the
sellers because the buyers had experienced only "minor water damage.' 372
The district court reversed.373
Johnson required sellers to disclose any material fact that would materi-
ally affect the value of the property and that was not readily observable to the
buyers. 374 A latent flooding problem might be such a material fact, but the
court had not addressed that question. The court focused instead on the




368. O'Brien, 660 So. 2d at 365.
369. 676 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Lazzara wrote the opinion. Acting
Chief Judge Parker and Judge Blue concurred.
370. Id. at 438.
371. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
372. Dorton, 676 So. 2d at 439.
373. Id. at 440 (relying on Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 625).
374. Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 629.
375. Dorton, 676 So. 2d at 439.
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evidence that it was a material fact affecting the value in that the buyers had
testified that they would not have bought the house if they had known about
this flooding problem. Consequently, the case was remanded for a new trial.376
KCIN, Inc. v. Canpro Investments, Ltd.377 Canpro Investments filed an
action against KCIN for breach of a commercial lease. Canpro filed an answer
and a counterclaim. The trial court found all claims to be without merit and
refused to award attorney's fees to Canpro on the theory that there was no
prevailing party.378 Canpro appealed based on the argument that the trial court
is required to name a prevailing party, a position supported by other districts.
379
The district court affirmed on this issue, but noted the conflict with the other
circuits and certified the conflict to the Supreme Court of Florida. 
380
Wiborg v. Eisenberg.381  The buyers brought an action for specific
performance of a contract to buy land. The seller refused to convey the land.
At issue was whether there was a contract and, if so, whether it failed to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds. The trial judge awarded relief to the buyers because it
found that the seller had
demonstrated a lack of candor in his dealings with the BUYERS
and has testified untruthfully in the course of the trial. This court
can not and will not allow the utilization of the Statute of Frauds as
a shield to perpetuate unfair dealings, when the party invoking its
protection has perjured himself on multiple material points.382
However, the trial judge refused to award damages to the buyers.383
The district court affirmed the judgment of specific performance, al-
though on the grounds that there was a valid and enforceable contract under
376. Id. at440.
377. 675 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Blue wrote the opinion. Acting
Chief Judge Campbell and Judge Fulmer concurred.
378. Id. at 223.
379. Id. See also Green Cos. v. Kendall Racquetball Inv. Ltd., 658 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Lucite Ctr., Inc. v. Mercede, 606 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
380. The case was reversed on the issue of whether attorneys' fees should have been
awarded under section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes (1991) based upon Canpro's offer of
judgment. KCIN, 675 So. 2d at 223. The case was remanded so the trial court could reconsider
the issue in light of TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995), which was decided
after the trial court's decision in this case. Id.
381. 671 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Associate Judge Patti Englander Hen-
ning wrote the opinion. Chief Judge Gunther and Judge Shahood concurred.
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any of the three possible interpretations of the facts.384 However, the district
court reversed on the trial court's failure to award the damages to the buyer.385
It ruled a court of equity may award compensation to parties who have
succeeded in a specific performance action when that is necessary "to place
them in a position [the parties] would have occupied had the contract been
timely performed. 386 This is really an adjusting of the equities between the
parties rather than the award of damages for breach of contract.
387
XV. FORECLOSURE
Barnes v. Resolution Trust Corp.388 The Resolution Trust Corporation
("RTC"), as receiver for City Federal Savings Bank ("CFSB"), received a
favorable judgment of foreclosure, and the Barneses appealed. 389 The Barne-
ses sold the property to James and Florence Marsh who executed a promissory
note and first mortgage in favor of CFSB, as well as a second mortgage in
favor of the Bameses. After the Marshes defaulted on the second mortgage,
the Bameses continued making payments to CFSB and requested that CFSB
send appropriate paperwork for assumption of the mortgage by the Barneses.
CFSB accepted some payments (totalling about $15,000), but the RTC refused
to accept payments when it took over. Although the RTC returned their
payments, the Barneses made expenditures on the property for maintenance,
including roof upkeep and painting, as well as taxes and hazard insurance.
390
Moreover, the Barneses rented the property and retained income in contradic-
tion of a court order directing them to deposit such income into the court
registry. The CFSB loan went into default, and the RTC obtained judgment of
foreclosure.39'
The Barneses contended that, based on CFSB's acceptance of the
installment payments, the RTC is estopped from refusing payment and forcing
default of an otherwise current mortgage. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that the RTC had a contractual right to foreclose on the mortgage when
the Marshes defaulted, and it was not obligated to the Barneses as they were
384. Id.
385. Id. at 835.
386. Wiborg, 671 So. 2d at 835.
387. Id.
388. 664 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
389. Id. at 1172.
390. An RTC representative testified that CFSB records indicated that CFSB had responded
to the Bameses inquiry, but the Bameses claimed that the bank never responded.
391. Barnes, 664 So. 2d at 1172.
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not parties to the first mortgage and had never assumed that mortgage.' Also,
there was no evidence that either CFSB or the RTC had induced the Barneses
to make payments on the first mortgage.393 However, although the RTC was
not estopped from accelerating the mortgage according to the acceleration
clause, it was not entitled to retain the Barneses' earlier payments. 394 The
court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount
that the Barneses had paid in satisfaction of the first mortgage, which the
Barnses would be entitled to receive from the RTC, plus interest.
395
XVI. HOMESTEAD
Miskin v. City of Fort Lauderdale.39 6 In this case, the trial court granted
the City's motion for summary judgment, and the Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed.397 The City recorded a favorable final order issued by the
Code Enforcement Board as a lien against Miskin's homestead property
pursuant to section 162.09 of the Florida Statutes (1993). The Board had
found for the City for two code violations on the property and gave Miskin
until January 26, 1992 to comply; thereafter, he was subject to a $150.00 fine
for each day of noncompliance. Miskin filed for a declaratory judgment that
the order did not exist as a lien on the property.
398
The court quoted section 162.09(3) and explained that the order underly-
ing the lien was not a "judgment, decree or execution," as prohibited by Article
X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.? The court believed that section
162.09(3) demonstrates legislative recognition of this fact by declaring that
these orders not be deemed to be court judgments except for enforcement
purposes, and that no lien created under that part of the statute may be en-
forced against real homestead property.4°° Although unenforceable, the lien
392. IdM at 1173.
393. Id. See Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1981) (citing
Greenhut Constr. Co. v. Henry A. Knott, Inc., 247 So. 2d 517, 524 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971)
(stating that "to prevail under estoppel theory, movant must demonstrate that (1) defendant or an
agent made a representation with regard to a material fact; (2) movant relied on the representa-
tion; and (3) changed his position to his detriment in reliance on the representation.")).
394. Id.
395. Id.
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was not invalid.4° ' The court noted that "the prohibition of the constitutional
provision is a prohibition against the use of process to force the sale of
homestead property and does not invalidate the debt or lien.''4 2 Thus, if the
property lost homestead status in the future, the City would be able to enforce
the lien.4°3
XVII. LAND USE PLANNING
City of New Smyrna Beach v. Andover Development Corp.404 In 1970, the
City passed Ordinance 797 that created a special planned unit development
zoning classification. Under it, a developer could submit a plan for a large
development that had to satisfy large scale guidelines rather than the traditional
zoning rules for each lot or unit. The developer, the plaintiff in this case, did
submit such a plan and the City Commission approved it. Pursuant to the plan,
the City Commission rezoned the land to an R-R Pud zone that incorporated
the project plan into the zoning. The citizens of the City reacted by repealing
Ordinance 797 in a referendum vote. However, in earlier litigation, the district
court determined that the referendum did not revoke the ordinance as to this
development, the R-R Pud zone, or the developer's approval to develop this
land.405 It merely prevented the City Commission from approving any more
plans.
Eighteen years later, the developer sought to amend its project plans by
increasing the height of some buildings from twenty to twenty-nine stories and
relocating some buildings. The City Commission rejected the proposed
amendments, so the developer sued to enforce the earlier judgment on the
theory that Ordinance 797 did not have any fixed height limitations or location
limitations. The trial court granted relief, but the district court reversed. 4°
Although Ordinance 797 did not have these limitations, once the details
of the project plan were incorporated into the R-R Pud zone, its details became
the limits under the zoning classification of this land.4°7 The plan did specify
the location and heights of the buildings and provided that all except minor
401. Miskin, 661 So. 2d at 416.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. 672 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Harris wrote the opinion. Judges
Dauksch and Sharp concurred.
405. See Andover Development Corp. v. City of New Smyrna Beach, 328 So. 2d 231 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1976).
406. Andover, 672 So. 2d at 622.
407. d at 621.
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changes had to be approved by the City Commission. If the developer wanted
to modify the plan, it would have to follow the amendment procedures
provided by Ordinance 797.
408
DSA Marine Sales & Service, Inc. v. County of Manatee.4 9 DSA Marine
Sales & Services, Inc. ("DSA") wanted to build a marina and dry boat storage
facility. The County Commission approved the needed zoning change but
disapproved the construction proposal. DSA reacted by filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari in the circuit court. Simultaneous with the petition, it moved
to supplement the record as the documents became available. A short time
later, DSA filed an amended petition with an expanded appendix. Although
the appendix was still not complete, the circuit court summarily denied the
amended petition on the grounds that the petitioner failed to make a prima
facie case.410 Later, the circuit court also denied DSA's motion for rehear-
ing.41' On review, the district court determined that DSA had been denied
412procedural due process.
Procedural due process requires that the litigants have a reasonable
opportunity to be heard. To obtain review, DSA had to file its certiorari
petition within thirty days of the order's rendition, but the court noted that, in
such circumstances, "it is sometimes impossible to compile and contempora-
neously file the entire record as an appendix to the petition. 41 3 Consequently,
procedural due process required that DSA be afforded a reasonable opportu-
nity to complete the appendix. On the record, it did not appear that DSA had
been given that reasonable opportunity. The court also pointed out that the
circuit court order failed to explain in detail why the petition was dismissed.414
Such detail would have been helpful to the parties and the appellate court.415
Implicit is the suggestion that the court provide such details in the future.
Board of County Commissioners v. Karp.416 Pursuant to the County's
comprehensive plan, the Board of County Commissioners of Sarasota County
("Board") adopted a plan for the University Parkway Corridor. Under this
408. Id. at 621-22.
409. 661 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Acting Chief Judge Ryder and Judges
Frank and Parker concurred in the per curiam decision.
410. Id. at 908.
411. Id.
412. l at 909.
413. Id.
414. DSA Marine, 661 So. 2d at 908.
415. Id. at 909.
416. 662 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Acting Chief Judge Campbell wrote the
opinion. Judges Blue and Whatley concurred.
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plan, respondents' property was designated for "office" use despite respon-
dents' demands that their land be designated commercial so it could be used
more intensely. The circuit court's writ of certiorari ordered, inter alia, that
the property be designated commercial, but that was reversed by the district
court.
4 17
The critical issue was whether the Board's adoption of the corridor plan
was quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative. The circuit court, relying on Board of
County Commissioners v. Snyder,418 had concluded that the decision was
quasi-judicial, i.e., it involved the application of a general rule or policy to
specific facts.4 19 The plan applied to only forty-eight parcels of land covering
179 acres, and it conditioned development approvals on the reservation of a
waterline easement. The district court, however, pointed out that Snyder,
unlike this case, involved a rezoning request.420 Adopting the plan was a
quasi-legislative action, i.e., it involved the formulation of a general rule or
policy, because it involved a plan for a substantial, although finite, number or
parcels of land. Moreover, conditioning development approvals on the
reservation of a waterline easement did not convert this decision into a quasi-
judicial one because that condition was invalid.
A quasi-legislative decision that is "fairly debatable" should not be
disturbed by a reviewing court. The Board's decision here met that standard
given the evidence before it. The circuit court should not have, in essence,
ordered the property rezoned where there has never been a rezoning applica-
tion. Such a rezoning application would not necessarily be a futile act; even
though a property is designated "office" in the plan, rezoning (or a variance)
for a particular parcel may be obtainable.4 1
Metropolitan Dade County v. Blumenthal.422 The Third District Court of
Appeal, sitting en banc, revisited an earlier decision by a three judge panel 4 23
A landowner wanted his land rezoned to RU-4L (Residential Limited Apart-
417. Id. at 720.
418. 627 So. 2d469 (Fla. 1993).
419. Karp, 662 So. 2d at 719.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 720.
422. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D464 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1996), review dismissed, No.
88,405, 1996 LEXIS 1580 (Fla. Aug. 29, 1996). Chief Judge Schwartz and Judges Barkdull,
Nesbitt, Cope, Levy, and Gersten concurred in this per curiam opinion. Judge Hubbart wrote a
lengthy dissent.
423. Metropolitan Dade County v. Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
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ment House with a maximum of twenty-three units per acre) so he could
develop a 360-unit apartment complex. A neighboring federation of home-
owners' associations objected, claiming that a trend had begun to limit density
in the area. The only opposition testimony was from neighbors who did not
want the apartment complex there. The Dade County Commission denied the
rezoning application because the application was inconsistent with the trend.
The circuit court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari, finding that the
Commission's decision was arbitrary and not based on substantial competent
evidence.424
The petition to the district court for a writ of certiorari was denied by the
three judge panel which noted that the standard of review in such situations
was limited to whether procedural due process was afforded and whether the
circuit court applied the correct law.425 There was no claim of a denial of due
process. After concluding that the correct law was applied, the decision was
426affirmed. Judge Cope wrote a lengthy dissent stating that the circuit court
had applied incorrect law in that: 1) it should have determined whether the
commission's resolution was based upon substantial competent evidence rather
than whether the comments of an individual commissioner were based upon
such evidence; 427 2) the circuit court's inquiry should not have been whether it
would have made the same choice as the commission, but whether there was
sufficient evidence in the record to support the choice that the commission did
make;428 and 3) the circuit court should not have denigrated citizen testimony
because it was fact-based and the material facts were not in dispute.429 He
argued that the majority was applying the wrong scope of review, i.e., the
scope of review for administrative decisions, rather than the review a district
court should exercise over circuit court decisions. 430 The district court may
determine whether the law has been correctly applied to the facts in the record.
Upon reconsideration by the court en banc, Judge Cope's dissent was adopted
431
as the majority opinion.
Judge Hubbart, author of the original opinion, was the dissenter this
time.432 He emphasized that when the circuit court sits as an appellate court,
424. Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d at 600-01.
425. Id. at 601.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 604 (Cope, J., dissenting).
428. Id. at 605.
429. Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d at 607 (Cope, J., dissenting).
430. Id.
431. Blumenthal, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D464.
432. Id. (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
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review of its decisions should be more limited.433 A petitioner should not be
entitled to a second appeal once he has had one before the circuit court except
on the issues of denial of due process, lack of jurisdiction, or commission of an
error so fundamental as to render the decision a miscarriage of justice. From
the standpoint of judicial economy, he has a point, but then from the standpoint
of judicial economy, a second appeal to the district court makes no sense at all.
In total, the logic of having the circuit court have an appellate function has
always escaped this author.43 4 The mixture of trial and appellate jurisdiction in
one court seems certain to result in confusion, as this case proves.
Lee County v. Zemel.435 In 1990, the Lee County Comprehensive Plan
was amended to create a category called "Density Reduction/Groundwater
Resource." To their extreme displeasure, the plaintiffs' land was included in
that category. They claimed that their land did not fit the criteria for that
classification. They utilized their remedies under section 163.3213 of the
Florida Statutes436 which resulted in a hearing before the Division of Admin-
istrative Hearings, but the hearing officer concluded that there was adequate
data and analysis to support the decision. The Department of Community
Affairs adopted the hearing officer's ruling and that decision was affirmed by
the First District Court of Appeal.437
The landowners brought this action for a declaratory judgment and
injunction in circuit court on the theories that the classification of their land
violated their substantive due process rights, their procedural process rights,
and constituted a temporary or permanent taking without compensation. The
district court interpreted this as a claim that the ordinance had been unconsti-
tutionally applied to their land because their expert testified that land was
incorrectly classified.438 However, the proper forum for such a challenge was
the district court when it reviewed the agency's action. The circuit court was
presented with the same evidence that the hearing officer and the district court
had already reviewed. Having lost there, the landowner is not entitled to
relitigate the issue. The only proper claim before the circuit court was that the
classification had somehow worked a taking entitling this landowner to
433. Id.
434. Professor Brown.
435. 675 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Quince wrote the opinion. Act-
ing Chief Judge Parker and Judge Whately concurred.
436. FLA. STAT. § 163.3213 (1989).
437. Zemel v. Department of Community Affairs, 642 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
438. Zemel, 675 So. 2d at 1380.
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compensation, and the case was remanded to the circuit court to consider that
issue.439
Martin County v. Section 28 Partnership, Ltd.440 The landowner wanted
to develop its land as a mixed use golf course community, but that would first
require a zoning change. However, a zoning change was impossible without
first obtaining an amendment to the County's comprehensive land use plan so
that the adjoining county could provide utility services. Following a series of
hearings, the County refused to take the steps necessary to amend the plan.
Therefore, the landowner sued.44'
The developer claimed that the County's action was a violation of its
substantive due process rights. The trial court decided that the County's action
involved the application of an existing policy, i.e., that it was a quasi-judicial
decision.442 The court applied the strict scrutiny standard of review and
concluded that the County's action was arbitrary and capricious.443 It enjoined
the County for enforcing the development restrictions, ordered the County to
approve the application for the zoning change, and awarded damages to the
landowner.444 The district court reversed, reasoning that a decision not to
amend a comprehensive plan based upon the large size of the proposed
amendment, the pristine state of the land, and the possible impact of the
proposed development on the public because of the proximity to a state park
and a state preserve was quasi-legislative. 445 Since the correct standard of
review of a quasi-legislative decision is the fairly debatable test,446 the circuit
court erred. The case was remanded so the trial court could apply the correct
test.447 The trial court's award of damages and injunctive relief were accord-
ingly vacated, but the court stated that the opinion should not be read to
439. Id. at 1381-82.
440. 676 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Stevenson wrote the opinion in
which Chief Judge Gunther and Judge Dell concurred. This opinion replaced the original
opinion at 668 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) which was withdrawn after the district
court granted a motion for rehearing.




445. Id. at 536.
446. Section 28 Partnership, 676 So. 2d at 535. The district court relied upon its earlier
decision in Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. v. Martin, 642 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994), review denied, 654 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1995), which the court refers to as "Section 28
Partnership I," but pointed out that it was issued after the trial court decision in the case being
discussed. Section 28 Partnership, 676 So. 2d at 536.
447. Id. at 535-36.
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suggest that the trial court could not reach the same conclusion when it applies
the correct test.
448
Martin County v. Yusem. 4 9 A landowner's fifty-four acres were part of a
900-acre tract. Under the Martin County Comprehensive Land Use Plan, the
landowner was allowed up to two units per acre. However, under the future
land use map, the landowner was allowed only one unit per two acres, i.e., one
quarter the density allowed by the plan. The landowner filed an application for
an amendment to the map raising the use to match that allowed by the plan, but
the application was denied. The landowner sought relief by common law
certiorari, but the County moved to dismiss claiming that certiorari was the
wrong method of obtaining relief; it is the method for reviewing a quasi-
judicial decision and this decision was legislative. The landowner voluntarily
dismissed that petition. Then, the landowner filed this action seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief. Applying the strict judicial scrutiny standard of
review, the circuit court held in favor of the landowner, and the County
appealed, arguing that the court had applied the wrong standard of review, i.e.,
it should have used the fairly debatable standard because the decision was
legislative, not quasi-judicial. 450
The district court clearly framed the issue to be "whether Martin County
was making a legislative or quasi-judicial decision when it denied the
appellee/landowner's request to amend the county's future use map to allow
more residential units on his property." 45' It decided the decision was quasi-
judicial.452 Because it was quasi-judicial, the only way to get judicial review
was by common law certiorari.453 Consequently, the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction and this action should be dismissed 4 54 The landowner should
have stuck to his guns in his original certiorari action. To avoid injustice, the
court noted that the judgment would be without prejudice to the landowner,
once again beginning his quest for an amendment to the map.455
448. Id. at 537. This is the point on which the new opinion differs from the earlier one
which has been withdrawn. The earlier opinion concluded that the zoning did not violate
substantive due process requirements.
449. 664 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review granted, 678 So. 2d 339 (Fla.
1996). Judge Kelin wrote the opinion in which Judge Glickstein concurred. Judge Pariente
dissented in a written opinion.
450. Id. at 977.
451. Id. at 976.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 978.
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The court reached its conclusion by following the logic in Snyder.456
Amending the map to increase the density on this landowner's land was a
determination of the appropriate land use designation for a particular piece of
property that "will have a limited impact on the public. ' 457 Thus, this was not
a decision on what should be the policy but how to apply existing policy. Such
a decision is quasi-judicial.
Judge Pariente provided an extensive and well-reasoned dissent. Briefly,
she argued that amendments to a land use plan should, due to logic and
statutory mandate, receive the same careful consideration process as the
adoption of the plan received.a 8 Once that process has been followed, the
decision to amend or not should get the same judicial deference as the legisla-
tive decision to adopt the plan. That amending the plan may be legislative in
some cases and quasi-judicial in others creates confusion about what procedure
must be followed by a board in making the decision, what method must be
followed by a disgruntled applicant in seeking judicial review of the decision,
and what standard must be applied by the reviewing court. That confusion has
already wasted, and will continue to waste, the time and resources of the courts
and the parties. Judge Pariente is correct in arguing that this uncertainty
should be eliminated.
XVIII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen.459 The City's Nuisance Abatement
Board ordered an apartment house closed for a period of one year based upon a
finding that there was drug use by tenants and other persons at the property.46
The landlord was not accused of any wrongdoing. The landlord did not
contest the validity of the order, but brought this action seeking compensation
based upon the theory of inverse condemnation, i.e., that his property had been
taken for public use. The trial court first granted summary judgment for the
City, ruling that because the taking was temporary no recovery was allowed. 461
456. Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
457. Yusem, 664 So. 2d at 977.
458. Id. at 979 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
459. 675 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Acting Chief Judge Campbell wrote the
opinion in which Judges Frank and Blue concurred.
460. The order was based upon the authority of section 893.138 of the Florida Statutes and
sections 19-66 through 19-71 of the St. Petersburg, Florida, City Code. See FLA. STAT. §
893.138 (1991); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CrrY CODE §§ 19-66 to-71 (1989). There was no claim
that the order was invalid.
461. Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 628.
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Based on a Supreme Court of Florida decision rendered after the trial court's
decision,462 the district court reversed. 463 The trial court then granted summary
judgment to the landlord. The district court affirmed. 465
The court adopted the trial opinion of Circuit Judge Horace A. Andrews
which it found to be "complete, concise, scholarly and well-grounded." 6 A
regulation that denies all economically beneficial or productive use of the land
is compensable without inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of
the regulation. Ordering the apartment house closed for one year did deny all
economically beneficial or productive use. The taking claim could not be
avoided by invoking the nuisance exception. The state may legitimately
prohibit conduct that would be a common law nuisance, e.g., the illegal use or
sale of drugs, but this order prohibits conduct which is clearly not a nuisance,
e.g., the use of the premises for human habitation. In essence, the city was
trying to force this landowner to disproportionately bear a common expense,
the cost of its war on drugs. That is what the Takings Clause prohibits.
Coastal Fuels Marketing, Inc. v. Leasco Investments.467 In June 1977, the
tenant leased real property for an oil terminal. Under the terms of the twenty-
year lease, referred to as a "terminalling agreement," the fee for the first three
years would be $54,400 per month. After that, the base fee would be $30,000
per month, but that fee would be adjusted in the fifth, tenth, and fifteenth years
of the lease according to a formula based on the Consumer Price Index
("CPr'). The formula was:
[T]he monthly payment shall be adjusted upward or downward us-
ing the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index for urban
Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W)-U.S. City Average
and Selected Areas (Base Period 1967=100) for the previous five
(5) year period (for September 7, 1982 [the first adjustment], the
monthly payment shall be calculated by multiplying $30,000 times
the resultant of dividing the CPI-W for June 1982 by the Consumer
Price Index for June 1977).468
462. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla.
1994).
463. Bowen v. City of St. Petersburg, 642 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
464. Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 628.
465. Id. at 632.
466. Id. at 629.
467. 662 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judge Thompson wrote the opinion in
which Chief Judge Peterson and Judge Harris concurred.
468. Id. at 376.
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The dispute arose at the time of the second adjustment. The landlord
claimed that the denominator in the above fraction should be the CPI for June,
1977. The tenant claimed that the denominator should be the CPI for June,
1982. The trial court was convinced by the landlord's arguments and reformed
the contract accordingly, but the district court reversed.469 It held that refor-
mation could not be granted where the terms of the contract were clear and
unambiguous. 470 The contract here anticipated that the rent would be adjusted
every five years according to the changes in the CPI during that five-year
period, so the fraction should reflect that change. The adjustment in 1982
should have been based on the CPI for 1977, the adjustment for 1987 on the
CPI for 1982, and the adjustment for 1992 on the CPI for 1987.47 ,
Inglesia Bautista de "Renovacion Cristiana" v. Tamiami Baptist Church
of Miami, Inc.472  Plaintiff's suit for damages on the theory of wrongful
eviction included a claim for special damages. The circuit court granted
summary judgment to the landlord, ruling that special damages were non-
recoverable as a matter of law.473 The district court reversed, holding that if
the premature eviction necessitated the rental of a substitute church site, that
expense could be recovered as special damages. 74
Marquez-Gonzalez v. Perera.475 The commercial lease at issue in this
case provided that the tenant would take the premises "as is" and refurbish it.
After taking possession, the tenant learned that part of the structure was illegal
because it had been built without the necessary permits. When the landlord
did nothing to fix that problem, the tenant sued for rescission. The trial court
held for the landlord because the tenant had taken the premises "as is," but the
district court reversed. 76 The landlord had not disclosed that the permits were
lacking. There was no way that the tenant could have discovered it from an
inspection of the premises. There was nothing from which the tenant would
get inquiry notice, i.e., there was nothing to make a reasonably prudent person
469. Id. at 377.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. 678 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judges Jorgenson, Goderich, and Green
constituted the panel that issued this per curiam opinion.
473. Id. at 2. The circuit court also ruled in the alternative that the tenant had waived its
special damages claim, but the district court reversed on this point because the record lacked any
evidence of waiver. Id.
474. Id.
475. 673 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judges Jorgenson, Cope, and Gersten
concurred in this per curiam opinion.
476. Ud. at 503.
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suspicious that there was a permit problem. The permit problem was "a matter
which the landlord was obliged to correct, not the tenant.' '477 Under these
circumstances, rescission should have been granted.4 78
Sontag v. Department of Banking and Finance.479 Landlords prevailed in
an eviction action and were also awarded very substantial compensatory and
punitive damages. A Florida statute provided that the state is entitled to sixty
percent of any punitive damage award.480 Subsequently, the landlords and
tenant reached a settlement agreement which was structured without any
punitive damages. By cutting out the State, both the landlords and tenant
would come out ahead. The State did not give up this windfall so easily. It
sued and received a summary judgment in its favor.481 The district court
affirmed.482 Judge Baskin disagreed about the reading of the statute, conclud-
ing that since no punitive damages were paid, the State was not entitled to any
payment.483 The statute was amended in 1992484 to require that the parties
provide for the state's share in any settlement agreement, but that amendment
was too late to apply to this case. The case is included primarily to remind
parties seeking punitive damages, and their defendants, that the state has an
interest and a claim on the outcome.
Statutory Changes. The Florida landlord-tenant statutes were amended
during the survey period.485 Now, a real estate broker planning to disburse a
tenant's security deposit is not required to follow the notice requirements in
chapter 475,486 which regulates real estate brokers. He or she need only follow
the notice requirements in chapter 83487 which governs landlords and tenants.
The statute has been clarified to specify that the landlord's agent may remove
the personal property of the tenant after the writ of possession has been served
by the sheriff.488 Previously, the statute had only specified that the landlord
could remove the tenant's personal property at the time when the writ of
possession was served. Finally, the lease may now contain a provision that the
477. Id.
478. Id
479. 669 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judges Levy and Goderich concurred in
the per curiam opinion. Judge Baskin dissented.
480. FLA. STAT. § 768.73(2) (1991).
481. Sontag, 669 So. 2d at 284.
482. Id.
483. Id. (Baskin, J., dissenting).
484. FLA. STAT. § 768.73(4) (Supp. 1992).
485. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-146.
486. See FLA- STAT. § 475.25(1)(d) (1995).
487. Ch. 96-146, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws at 131 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.49).
488. Id § 2, 1996 Fla. Laws at 131 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.62(2)).
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landlord is not responsible for storing, or liable for disposing of, the tenant's
personal property where the tenant has surrendered or abandoned the prem-
ises. 489 Previously, such an agreement was permissible, but only if it appeared
in an agreement separate from the lease.
In addition, a change in the nuisance abatement statute is worth noting.
As of October 1, 1996,
[i]n a proceeding abating a public nuisance pursuant to s.
823.10 49°] or s. 823.05,14913 if a tenant has been convicted of an of-
fense under chapter 893 [492] or s. 796.07, the court may order
the tenant to vacate the property within 72 hours if the tenant and
owner of the premises are parties to the nuisance abatement action
and the order will lead to the abatement of the nuisance.4
94
Dealing with drugs and prostitution is a landlord's nightmare, but it is a very
hot topic between landlords and decent tenants. This act provides a landlord
an additional tool to deal with these troublesome tenants. The eviction process
may be too cumbersome, particularly if it requires relitigation of issues already
decided in a nuisance abatement action. Perhaps it will provide a better
alternative if it is interpreted to allow a court to order an offending tenant off
the premises while leaving the innocent family members in place. Whether
that will be possible under the cryptic words of this statute will have to be
determined in the future.
XIX. LIENS
BancFlorida v. Hayward.495 In this case, the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed a final summary judgment for the contract purchasers of new
homes496 and certified the following question as being of great public impor-
tance:
489. Id. § 3, 1996 Fla Laws at 131-32 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.67(3)).
490. "Place where controlled substances are illegally kept, sold, or used."
491. "Places declared a nuisance."
492. "Drug abuse prevention and control."
493. "Prohibiting prostitution."
494. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-237 (amending FLA. STAT. § 60.05).
495. 659 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). This per curiam opinion, upon granting
a motion for rehearing, revised and substituted the original panel opinion published at 20 Fla. L.
Weekly D761 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1995).
496. BancFlorida, 659 So. 2d at 1333.
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Where a lender requires a pre-qualified contract purchaser before it
will lend on the construction loan which creates a purchase money
mortgage, does the contract purchaser's prior equitable lien against
the purchase money mortgagor have priority over the lender's sub-
sequent purchase money mortgage?49
7
In this case the developer, Shores Contractors, Inc., held an interest in unde-
veloped lots, being an equitable owner under an option contract with American
Newlands in some lots and having bought others as inventory for future
development. BancFlorida extended Shores a line of credit for use in con-
struction loans. When developed, lots were sold to individual purchasers
under purchase and sale agreements, which contained express terms prohibit-
ing recordation. Once in their respective contracts, the purchasers would
obtain a mortgage commitment for the home to be built by Shores. Under the
contract, the purchasers paid deposits to Shores. On the lots owned by Shores
and secured by a mortgage from BancFlorida, each contract purchaser subse-
quently entered into a separate construction loan agreement with BancFlorida
under which the purchasers were required to make four progress payments
during construction, a portion being used to pay off BancFlorida's mortgage.
On the lots held under the option contract, monies from the construction loan
were used to pay the balance owed to American Newlands.49 s
"At some point the developments at issue failed."499 Shores and others
assigned fault for the failure to alleged breach of the construction loan agree-
ments committed by BancFlorida and filed suit. The contract purchasers
intervened as plaintiffs. The parties agreed to sell the properties and create a
fund from which damages could be paid, necessitating foreclosure on the lots
to extinguish all liens. Final summary judgment of foreclosure was stipulated
to by the parties, with the stipulation that "all liens or claims by each party
were directed solely to the entire fund and not solely to the specific sales price
of an individual lot."500 The contract purchasers then proceeded against
BancFlorida with motion for final summary judgment, asserting superior
equitable liens on their respective lots over BancFlorida's construction loans.
The trial court entered final summary judgment and.BancFlorida appealed.50'
The trial court, noting that the question of who was a purchase money
mortgagee was a question of law, held that BancFlorida could not be a pur-
497. Id.
498. Id. at 1330.
499. IM
500. Id. at 1331.
501. BancFlorida, 659 So. 2d at 1331.
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chase money mortgagee in this situation. 0 It found that, before it loaned any
money to Shores for construction, BancFlorida had actual notice of the
purchase and sale agreements and the deposits paid thereon.50 3 Such agree-
ments and deposits were prerequisites without which BancFlorida would not
make the construction loans.
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the orders of the trial court,
which it stated "was solely concerned with the equities of the case and, for the
trial court, the equities favored the contract purchasers as members of the
general public less knowledgeable in these matters over the sophisticated bank
and the sophisticated builder."5°4 These facts "set[] up a clash between two
competing theories of real property law. BancFlorida is a purchase money
mortgagee but it is also a subsequent creditor with notice of the contract
purchasers' equitable claims against the property." 505
According to the court,5° the "tension" between these theories is epito-
mized by Carteret Savings Bank v. Citibank Mortgage Corp.507 and Caribank
v. Frankel,508 which the court went on to compare. In Caribank, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that actual knowledge of a prior unrecorded
conveyance or mortgage is the equivalent to the recording of the instrument.5 9
In Carteret, the parties agreed that the purchase money mortgage held by
Carteret had priority, but disagreed over the portion of the construction loan
constituted the purchase money mortgage.510 The Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the district court's holding that "only the portion of the proceeds used
to acquire the land constituted a purchase money mortgage. The balance of the
loan proceeds were not protected by the purchase money mortgage.
' 51
'
BancFlorida relied on Carteret for the proposition that it was a purchase
money mortgagee and thus "automatically has priority under Carteret over the
contract purchasers. 51 2  The court first assigned error to the trial court,





506. See BancFlorida, 659 So. 2d at 1331.
507. 632 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1994).
508. 525 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
509. BancFlorida, 659 So. 2d at 1332 (citing Caribank, 525 So. 2d at 944).
510. Id. (citing Carteret, 632 So. 2d at 599).
511. Id.
512. Id. (relying on Carteret, 632 So. 2d at 599).
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lands which Shores held under the option with American Newlands 5 13 The
court determined that whether BancFlorida was a purchase money mortgagee
was not dispositive, and it distinguished Carteret as involving no dispute over
the priority of the liens.514 The court reasoned that, since 'Florida has adopted
a notice provision as the benchmark for assessing the priority of liens on real
property,' 515 "purchase money mortgage priorities may be subject to the
equities of the particular transaction." 516 The court adopted the reasoning of
Caribank and held that because BancFlorida had actual notice of the contract
purchasers' prior equitable liens against Shores, those equitable liens were
superior in interest to BancFlorida's purchase money mortgages.517 The court
affirmed the orders of final summary judgment in favor of the contract
purchasers.518
Beckham v. Rinker Materials Corp.519 The Third District Court of
Appeal reversed a summary judgment in favor of defendant Rinker in an action
brought by trustees in a two count action to quiet title and recover damages for
slander of title5 20 In 1985, land was conveyed to Michael Edelman and Aaron
Podhurst as trustees. Under the unrecorded trust agreement, the property was
held in trust for several beneficiaries, with Edelman holding a twenty percent
interest, which he assigned to the remaining beneficiaries after resigning. The
deed neither named the beneficiaries of the trust nor declared the nature and
purpose of the trust. The resignation and assignment were not recorded. In
1992, Rinker obtained two judgments against Edelman, unrelated to the
property, and had the judgments recorded as liens on the property. When
Beckham, another trustee, and Podhurst attempted to sell the property, they
discovered the judgment liens in a title search and brought the action.52 '
Rinker asserted that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because
Edelman owned a fee simple estate under section 689.07(1) of the Florida
Statutes.522 The court agreed that the statute was implicated because Edelman
513. Id.
514. BancFlorida, 659 So. 2d at 1332.
515. Id. The court went on to quote from section 695.01 of the Florida Statutes (1989).
516. Id. at 1333 (citing Van Eepoel Real Estate Co. v. Sarasota Milk Co., 129 So. 892 (Fla.
1930)).
517. Id. at 1333 (relying on Caribank v. Frankel, 525 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1988)).
518. Id.
519. 662 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
520. Id. at 762.
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took title "as trustee" through a deed that neither names the beneficiaries nor
set forth the nature and purpose of the trust, and because the declaration of
trust was not recorded.523 However, it disagreed with Rinker's assertion that
Edelman's trustee capacity was immaterial.524  The court relied on First
National Bank of Arcadia v. Savarese,525 from which it quoted the following
passage:
[I]t is also generally recognized that a judgment creditor cannot
have his debt satisfied out of property held by his judgment debtor
under a resulting trust for another, no matter how completely his
debtor has exercised apparent ownership over it, unless it is made
to appear that it was on the faith of such ownership that the credit
was given which resulted in the judgment sought to be satisfied.526
The contemplated exception did not apply in the present case because Rinker
extended the credit to Edelman on the basis of his personal guarantee, not
relying on the record title, having no specific knowledge of the property at
issue.527 Thus, the beneficiaries were not equitably estopped from asserting
their interests in the property against Rinker, and the judgment liens did not
attach to the property.52s Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of
Rinker was reversed, and the case was remanded.529
Beason-Simons v. Avion Technologies, Inc.530 The Fourth District Court
of Appeal reversed the circuit court's determination that an unpaid seller's
right to reclaim equipment was superior to a landlord's statutory lien.53'
Appellee sold and installed electronic equipment on premises leased to
appellee Avion by appellant landlord Beason-Simons, providing in the sales
contract that title to the goods would remain in the seller until full payment
was made. However, the seller did not record the purchase agreement or file a
UCC financing statement. When Avion abandoned the leased premises, the
landlord claimed it was entitled to the equipment on the basis of a statutory
landlord's lien under section 83.08(2) of the Florida Statutes, while the seller
claimed the same through a right of reclamation under section 672.507(2) of
523. Id.
524. Beckham, 662 So. 2d at 761.
525. 134 So. 501,504 (1931).
526. Beckham, 662 So. 2d at 761 (quoting Savarese, 134 So. at 504).
527. Id. at 761.
528. Id. at 762.
529. Id.
530. 662 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
531. Id. at 1318.
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the Florida Statutes.532 Section 83.08(2) expressly states that the statutory
landlord's lien "shall be superior to any lien acquired subsequent to the
bringing of the property on the premises leased. 533 The court noted that a
landlord's statutory lien need not be filed or recorded to be perfected; rather, it
attaches at the commencement of tenancy or as soon as the property is brought
onto the premises.
534
The appellate court then analyzed section 672.507(2) and found that
although that section gives an unpaid seller an interest superior to that of a
buyer, the statute does not determine priorities between an unpaid seller and a
third party such as the landlord.535 The seller could have perfected its security
interest in the equipment under the UCC before delivery,536 and failure to do so
rendered the landlord's statutory lien superior. The appellate court reversed
the circuit court.537
Gordon v. Ruvin.538 Robert Gordon appealed from an adverse summary
judgment of foreclosure which found an equitable lien on real property was
transferable to a bond under section 55.10(6) of the Florida Statutes.539 The
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. ° Gordon obtained a judgment
foreclosing his mortgage on property owned by appellee Flamingo Holding
Partnership ("Seller"). 541 The judgment provided that should the sale produce
insufficient funds to satisfy the amount due Gordon, an equitable lien of
$962,000 would be imposed upon the Seller's adjacent property. The property
was purchased in 1995 by appellee First Equitable Realty I, Ltd. ("Buyer")
for $24.1 million, which intended to convert the apartment complex into
condominiums. Apparently, pursuant to the contract of purchase and sale, the
532. Id.
533. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 83.08(2) (1993)).
534. Id. (citing Lovett v. Lee, 193 So. 538, 542 (Fla. 1940); Florida E. Coast Properties, Inc.
v. Best Contract Furnishings, Inc., 593 So. 2d 560,562 n.6 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
535. Beason-Simons, 662 So. 2d at 1318 (citing Florida E. Coast Properties, 593 So. 2d at
562; Suburbia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Bel-Air Conditioning Co., 385 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1980)). In Suburbia, the district court held that a construction mortgage on real
property was superior in priority to the claim of a seller of air conditioning equipment which had
been installed on the property, where the seller's claim was only by virtue of a retain title contract
and not by a perfected security interest. 385 So. 2d at 1153-54.
536. Beason-Simons, 662 So. 2d at 1318-19 (citing Florida E. Coast Properties, 593 So. 2d
at 562 n.8).
537. Id. at 1319.
538. 664 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
539. Id. at 1078.
540. Id. at 1080.
541. Id. at 1078.
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Seller was required to post a bond allowing the Buyer to take title unencum-
bered by Gordon's equitable lien. After the Seller obtained the bond for two
million dollars, appellee Harvey Ruvin, Clerk of the Circuit Court for the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit ("clerk"), issued a clerk's certificate transferring
Gordon's lien to the bond, after which the sale was closed with title passing to
the Buyer in February of 1995.542
Gordon sued the Buyer, the Seller, and the clerk. The Third District
Court of Appeal disagreed with Gordon's assertion that an equitable lien is a
constitutionally protected right which cannot be extinguished by substituting
security without the lienholder's consent.5 43 The court noted that the "transfer
to bond" provision of section 55.10(6) was added in 1977 and amended in
1987 to provide that any lien claimed under subsection (1) of that section may
be transferred from the real property to security. 5a The amendment, according
to the court, furthers an important public policy in favor of free alienability of
property.5 45 The statute, by specifically stating that the bond must be executed
by a surety licensed by the Florida Insurance Department to do business in
Florida, protects the valid substantive property rights of the lienholder while
also furthering the legislature's intent of providing for free transferability of
real estate.5 46 The court distinguished the present case from White v. White,
547
a case relied upon by Gordon, because of the change in statutory law in the
sixteen years since that decision, and because White, unlike the present case,
involved a transfer to government securities rather than a corporate surety
bond as required by the present statute.
548
Hanley v. Kajak.5 49 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the
circuit court's finding of a valid mechanic's lien in favor of the subcontractor,
Kajak, and the corresponding award of statutory attorneys' fees under section
713.29 of the Florida Statutes.550 The circuit court had concluded that
Hanley's commencement of an action pursuant to section 713.21(4) of the
Florida Statutes resulted in a waiver of the section 713.06(3)(d)(1) require-
ment that Kajak file a contractor's final affidavit.551 The Fourth District Court
542. Id. at 1079.




547. 129 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
548. Gordon, 664 So. 2d at 1079.
549. 661 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
550. Id. at 1249.
551. Id. at 1248.
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of Appeal disagreed, holding that the affidavit requirement is a condition
precedent to the maintenance of a lien foreclosure action under chapter 713,
and the fact that the foreclosure was filed as a counterclaim did not alter that
requirement. 5 2 The court felt that Kajak had not shown good cause or a
justifiable excuse for failure to comply with the statutory requirements and
held the lien invalid.5 3
Holly Lake Ass'n v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n. 54 The Supreme
Court of Florida, reviewing Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. McKesson,
555
asserted jurisdiction under Article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitu-
tion and answered the following certified question in the negative, approving
the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal:
WHETHER A CLAIM OF LIEN RECORDED PURSUANT TO
A DECLARATION OF COVENANTS BY A HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION HAS PRIORITY OVER AN INTERVENING
RECORDED MORTGAGE WHERE THE DECLARATION
AUTHORIZES THE ASSOCIATION TO IMPOSE A LIEN FOR
ASSESSMENTS BUT DOES NOT OTHERWISE INDICATE
THAT THE LIEN RELATES BACK OR TAKES PRIORITY
OVER AN INTERVENING MORTGAGE.
556
Holly Lakes is the homeowners' association ("Association") for a mobile
home park. The Association's predecessor recorded a declaration of covenants
covering the real property within the park in 1974, requiring residents to pay
monthly assessments for maintenance of their sites, and including the follow-
ing provision:
In the event the monthly mobile type home site charge is not paid
when due, Owner, or its designee, shall have the right to a lien
against said site and the improvements contained thereon for any
such unpaid charges; and shall have the right to enforce said lien in
any manner provided by law for the enforcement of mechanics' or
552. IL
553. Id. at 1249. See Timbercraft Enters., Inc. v. Adams, 563 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990). See also Holding Elec., Inc. v. Roberts, 530 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1988)).
554. 660 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1995).
555. 639 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 650 So. 2d 990 (Fla.
1995).
556. Holly Lake Ass'n, 660 So. 2d at 267.
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statutory liens, but Owner shall not be restricted to such procedure
in the collection of said overdue charges.
557
John and Denise McKesson became the owners of a Holly Lakes site and
executed a mortgage thereon, recorded in 1983, which was assigned to Federal
National Mortgage Association ("FNMA"), the respondent.
In 1991, the Association recorded a claim of lien against the McKessons'
site for failure to pay the monthly maintenance fee. Then in 1992, FNMA
commenced a foreclosure action against the McKessons for failure to pay the
promissory note secured by the mortgage, and the Association filed a counter-
claim against FNMA, asserting superiority of lien because its lien related back
to the 1974 declaration of covenants. FNMA answered that its mortgage lien,
having been recorded eight years before that of the Association, was superior,
but the trial court found for the Association and granted summary judgment in
its favor.558 The Fourth District Court of Appeal subsequently reversed,
reasoning that the 1974 declaration, rather than creating an ongoing automatic
lien, merely created a right to a lien and that because FNMA's mortgage lien
was recorded before the Association's maintenance fee lien, FNMA's lien had
priority.5
59
The Association relied on Bessemer v. Gersten560 for the proposition that
its lien related back to the date the declaration was recorded. The court found
Bessemer inapplicable.56' Unlike the present dispute between two creditors,
Bessemer involved a dispute over a creditor's lien and the property owner's
homestead right.562 Also, the language of the present declaration differed
significantly from that in Bessemer, which "put all parties on notice that an
ongoing, automatic lien had been created at the time that the property was
purchased, and that this lien would continue each month until the owner paid
the monthly assessment fee. 563 The court concluded that the present declara-
tion failed to put FNMA on such notice and that FNMA could not be charged
with constructive notice because the Association had not yet filed its lien when
FNMA's mortgage was recorded in 1983.564 After commenting on the similar
557. Id.
558. Id. at 268.
559. Id.
560. 381 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1980).
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factual situation and holding in the Illinois case of St. Paul Federal Bank for
Savings v. Wesby,565 the court also declared a general rule that:
in order for a claim of lien recorded pursuant to a declaration of
covenants to have priority over an intervening recorded mortgage,
the declaration must contain specific language indicating that the
lien relates back to the date of filing of the declaration or that it
otherwise takes priority over intervening mortgages.
566
Lamchick, Glucksman & Johnson, P.A. v. City National Bank of Flor-
ida.567 Appeal was taken from an adverse final summary judgment awarding
diligent creditors a priority lien over the appellants' prior recorded lien. The
Third District Court of Appeal, per curiam, reversed, ruling that unlike
personal property, the diligent creditor rule does not apply to liens on real
property.568 The court found that section 695.11 of the Florida Statutes
governs judgment liens on real property, as in this case, and further noted that
"because of the different concerns involved in the context of real property," the
diligent creditor rule did not apply.
569
Appellants obtained a judgment and filed it in the official records of Dade
County on June 28, 1988, creating a lien on the property. Pursuant to section
695.11, appellants' lien, recorded before appellee's, had priority. The court
noted further that appellants' "lien had neither expired nor been satisfied, and
there is no evidence in the record, and no allegation in the pleadings, that the
judgment lien was void or voidable."570  Thus, relying on Sharpe v.
Calabrese,571 the court held that appellant's lien "must be accorded its legal
effect. 5
72
Pappalardo v. Buck.573 Pappalardo, the principal on a preexisting lien
transfer bond, was ordered by the trial court to increase the face amount of that
bond to add coverage for attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the claimant in
565. 501 N.E.2d 707 (El. App. Ct. 1986).
566. Holly Lake Ass'n, 660 So. 2d at 269.
567. 659 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 670 So. 2d 937 (Fla.
1996).
568. Id. at 1119.
569. Id. at 1120.
570. Id. at 1119.
571. 528 So. 2d 947, 950 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
572. Lamchick, 659 So. 2d at 1119.
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excess of the original face amount.574 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
quashed this decision, holding that Pappalardo was not personally liable
because he was not made a party to the action.575
This case had already worked its way through the court system as Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co. v. Buck,57 6 in which the Supreme Court of Florida
determined that a surety's liability for attorneys' fees could not be imposed
above the face amount of the bond.577 Having thus been denied access to
Aetna's pocket by the supreme court, Buck apparently regrouped and directed
its efforts at Pappalardo personally. Buck had initially sued only Aetna and
Pappalardo's construction company and moved to add Pappalardo individually
after final judgment. That motion was denied by the trial court, and Buck did
not appeal the order.578 The court intimated that merely obtaining a transfer
bond is insufficient to find that the party has submitted to the court's jurisdic-
tion so as to expose him to liability in excess of the bond's face.
579
Robie v. Port Douglas (Florida), Inc.580  Upon default by the tenant,
Inverrary Cinema Corporation, the landlord, Port Douglas and chattel mortga-
gees, Kenneth L. and Barbara G. Robie, asserted liens to claim possession of
equipment in the theater. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's determination of superiority of the landlord's statutory lien
because the landlord and tenant terminated the original lease prior to the
tenant's default and entered into a new lease.58'
The tenant took possession of the theater pursuant to an assignment of
lease from R & R Cinemas, Inc., a company owned by the Robies. The Robies
filed a Form UCC-1 to secure the furnishings located in the theater. After
574. Id. at 423.
575. Id. at 424. The court cited Canam Sys., Inc. v. Lake Buchanan Dev. Corp., 375 So. 2d
582, 583 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1980) and Vic Tanny
of Fla., Inc. v. Fred McGilvray, Inc., 348 So. 2d 648, 651 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) for the
following proposition: "The principal on a bond to which there has been a transfer from lien
must be made a party to be held personally liable." Pappalardo, 659 So. 2d at 423.
576. 594 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1992).
577. Id. at 283. The Fourth District Court quoted the supreme court's opinion, which ex-
plained the powers and limits thereto conferred upon a trial court by section 713.24(3) of the
Florida Statutes, which "allows a trial court to order the party providing the bond to either
purchase an additional bond or increase the existing bond, or to otherwise provide increase
security, [but] the statute does not permit the trial court to increase the liability of the surety
beyond the amount of the bond." Pappalardo, 659 So. 2d at 423.
578. Pappalardo, 659 So. 2d at 423.
579. Id.
580. 662 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
581. Id. at 1391.
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perfection of the Robies' interest, Inverrary and Port Douglas entered into a
lease termination agreement and, thereafter, executed a new lease while the
tenant was still current under the old lease.
58 2
The court noted that under section 83.08 of the Florida Statutes, a
landlord's statutory lien, which is not required to be filed or recorded in order
to be perfected, attaches at the commencement of the tenancy or as soon as the
property is brought onto the premises.583 However, "[w]hen the commence-
ment of a tenancy, based upon a lease, creates a statutory landlord's lien,
pursuant to section 83.08, Florida Statutes, such lien is viable only as long as
the underlying lease exists."584 Although the chattel mortgage did not have
priority over the original lease, that mortgage gained priority when the original
lease was terminated and retained such priority over the subsequent lease.
5 5
That the second lease was neither an option nor a renewal of the first
lease was critical to a determination of priority of the Robies' lien.586 In the
appellate court's opinion, the trial court relied too heavily on the fact that the
new lease was between the same parties and involved the same premises as the
old lease, and neglected the "operative inquiry" of "whether landlord and
tenant continued their relationship under the initial lease either through an
extension, a renewal or an option. 58 7
Shawzin v. Sasser.58 8  Sasser represented Shawzin in a dissolution of
marriage action, having first obtained a representation agreement which
granted Sasser "all general, possessory and retaining liens and all equitable,
special and attorney's charging liens upon the client's interest in any and all
real and personal property ... for any balance due, owing and unpaid at the
conclusion of the case or the sooner termination of employment."589 The trial
court granted Sasser's December 1992 motion to withdraw as counsel. 59
Thereafter, Shawzin and his former wife entered into a settlement agreement
with Shawzin retaining title to the marital home. When the trial court entered
582. Id. at 1390.
583. Id. at 1391 (citing Lovett v. Lee, 193 So. 538, 542 (Fla. 1940); Beason-Simons Tech-
nologies, Inc. v. Avion Technologies, Inc., 662 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
584. Id. at 1391 (quoting Flowers v. Centrust Say. Bank, 556 So. 2d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
585. Robie, 662 So. 2d at 1390.
586. Id. at 1391.
587. Id.
588. 658 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 669 So. 2d 252 (Fla.
1996).
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final judgment which incorporated the settlement agreement, Sasser moved for
a charging lien, obtaining a money judgment of $52,337.37 and a charging lien
on the marital home.591 Shawzin appealed. Sasser cross appealed, assigning
error to the court's setting aside the proceeds of the sale of the marital home
under the homestead exemption.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the award of the lien,
outlining the four requirements for the imposition of such a lien, which the
court found present.592 The court, however, reversed the money judgment
because Sasser had moved for the lien only.593 Shawzin thus had insufficient
notice that such a judgment might be rendered against him.594
On Sasser's appeal of the homestead set aside, the court noted that, under
Orange Brevard Plumbing & Heating Co. v. La Croix,595 only proceeds
intended to be reinvested in another homestead qualify for homestead protec-
tion.596 In the present case, Sasser had demonstrated that "a significant portion
of the proceeds derived from the sale of the homestead [were used] for
purposes other than for reinvestment in another homestead.,,597 Thus, the court
also reversed the trial court's setting aside of all the townhouse proceeds under
the homestead exemption and remanded.598
Stunkel v. Gazebo Landscaping Design, Inc.59 9 In this case the Supreme
Court of Florida, noting jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the
591. Id. at 1150.
592. Il According to the court, these requirements include:
(1) In order for a charging lien to be imposed, there must first be a contract be-
tween the attorney and the client.
(2) There must also be an understanding, express or implied, between the parties
that the payment is either dependent upon recovery or that payment will come
from the recovery.
(3) The remedy is available where there has been an attempt to avoid the pay-
ment of fees or a dispute as to the amount involved.
(4) There are no requirements for perfecting a charging lien beyond timely no-
tice.
Shawzin, 658 So. 2d at 1150. For this proposition, the court cited Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath,
Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383, 1385 (Fla. 1983), among others.
593. Shawzin, 658 So. 2d at 1151.
594. Id.
595. 137 So. 2d 201, 207 (Fla. 1962).
596. Shawzin, 658 So. 2d at 1151.
597. Id. Shawzin apparently diverted funds from the $1,850,000 sale of the townhouse to
pay his former wife's $550,000 lump sum alimony and to pay his present counsel's fees and
costs.
598. Id.
599. 660 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1995).
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Florida Constitution, answered the following certified question from the
Fourth District Court of Appeal 6°° in the negative:
DOES A SUBCONTRACTOR BEGIN TO FURNISH SERV-
ICES, FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIMELY PROVIDING A NO-
TICE TO OWNER IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION
713.06(2)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES (1991), WHEN, WITHOUT
ANY BINDING CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO DO SO,
HE OR SHE BEGINS TO SELECT MATERIALS AT SOME
LOCATION OFF THE JOB SITE, FOR FUTURE INSTALLA-
TION ON THE JOB SITE?601
The Stunkels contracted with general contractor Bill Free Custom Homes for
the construction of a home on their property, who in turn orally contracted with
landscaping subcontractor Gazebo. The Stunkels flew on their private plane
with a Gazebo representative to a Tampa site to select trees on November 7,
1990. Gazebo began digging on the property on December 5, 1990 and
planted the selected trees two days later on December 7, 1990. On February
11, 1992, Gazebo filed suit against the Stunkels and Bill Free Custom Home
for breach of contract and to foreclose on its claim of lien.
602
After an unsuccessful attempt to notify the Stunkels of an impending
claim of lien on January 15, 1991, Gazebo posted a notice on the gate of the
residence. Because section 713.06(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes requires
posting of notice to the owner within forty-five days after a subcontractor
begins furnishing services or materials, the court needed to determine whether
commencement occurred, within the meaning of the statute, when the trees
were selected by the Stunkels or when Gazebo began working on the Stunkel
residence.60 3 The trial court entered an involuntary dismissal of Gazebo's
claim of lien after concluding Gazebo began furnishing services when the
Stunkels selected the trees and Gazebo failed to give notice within forty-five
days of commencement, as required by section 713.06(2)(a).(' 4 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's ruling, noting that there was
no authority on the timing question, and it "suggested that the trial court
600. Gazebo Landscaping Design, Inc. v. Bill Free Custom Homes, Inc., 638 So. 2d 87 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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consider all relevant factors 'based on the totality of the circumstances' in
determining when the subcontractor actually began to provide services." 60 5
The supreme court noted that a contract is essential to a mechanic's
lien,606 and when the selection of the trees was made, there was no binding
contractual obligation. 6 7 Therefore, the subcontractor could not have brought
a claim of lien against the owner.6°8 On this basis, the certified question was
answered in the negative.6°9 The supreme court rejected the district court's
suggested approach because it failed to provide certainty and would frustrate
one of the purposes of mechanic's lien law.610 The court believed that under
the suggested approach, "giving notice to owner would be determined on a
case-by-case basis, and subcontractors would never know for sure when they
had to give notice.'
611
In a separate issue, the trial court refused to enforce the claim of lien,
finding that Gazebo's president took no oath when signing the claim.612
Additionally, despite being signed on January 14, 1991, the claim included a
statement that the lien was hand-posted on January 18, 1991. After noting that
section 713.08(3) imposes an attestation by notary requirement for claims on
lien, the supreme court remanded for a determination by the trial court in
accordance with section 713.08(4)(a)613 on the question of whether the faulty
claim of lien adversely affects the Stunkels. 614 Finally, the court denied
attorneys' fees to both parties under section 713.29, which allows the prevail-
ing party in an action to enforce a construction lien to recover reasonable
attorneys' fees, until such time as the trial court determines a prevailing party
on remand and any subsequent appeals are finalized.615
605. Id. at 625 (quoting Gazebo Landscape Design, 638 So. 2d at 89).
606. Stunkel, 660 So. 2d at 625. The court cited Viking Communities Corp. v. Peeler Const.
Co., 367 So. 2d 737, 739 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) and section 713.06(1) of the Florida
Statutes (1991) for the proposition that "[a] subcontractor ... has a lien on the real property
improved for any money that is owed to him for labor, services, or materials furnished in
accordance with his contract."
607. Stunkel, 660 So. 2d at 625.
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id. at 625-26.
611. Id. at 626.
612. Stunkel, 660 So. 2d at 626.
613. Section 713.08(4)(a) provides: "The omission of any of the foregoing details or errors
in such claim of lien shall not, within the discretion of the trial court, prevent the enforcement of
such lien as against one who has not been adversely affected by such omission or error." FLA.
STAT. § 713.08(4)(a) (1991).
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Viyella Co. v. Gomes.616 Viyella Company appealed from an adverse
partial final summary judgment, assigning error to the trial court's deternina-
tion that no genuine issue of material fact existed concerning the value of work
performed by Viyella and Viyella's intent to willfully exaggerate the amount
of a mechanic's lien.6 17 Viyella and the Gomeses executed a contract contem-
plating Viyella's completion of a $76,900 contract for improvements to the
Gomeses' residential property. Viyella was terminated prior to completion of
the work and filed a claim of lien for the contract price above the twenty-five
percent deposit of $19,225 paid by the Gomeses at the time of execution of the
contract.618 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that no
genuine issue of material fact existed and that the lien was fraudulent under
section 713.31(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes.619 The Gomeses thus could
invoke the complete defense provided under section 713.31(2)(b) which
renders a fraudulent lien unenforceable.
62
Julio Viyella, president of Viyella Company, first filed a claim of lien for
$57,675, the remainder of the contract price, stating that he completely
performed the contract. He then filed a Contractor's Final Affidavit asserting
that the Gomeses owed a smaller amount, $51,883.95, acknowledging that he
in fact failed to complete a substantial portion of the work. Then, at deposi-
tion, he testified that he had failed to perform an amount of work worth no less
than $27,740. The district court noted that "[t]hese facts are undisputed by the
[Gomeses] and any contradictions stem completely from [Viyella's] own
statements." 621 On this basis, the district court agreed with the trial court's
616. 657 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
617. IdM at 84. The company also appealed the denial of its motion for rehearing and/or
clarification. Id.
618. Id. The Gomeses thereupon posted a $78,938 bond, transferring the lien from the
property to the bond. Id.
619. Viyella Company, 657 So. 2d at 84. The court quoted the following language from
sections 713.31 of the Florida Statutes:
(2)(a) Any lien asserted ... in which the lienor has willfully exaggerated the
amount for which such lien is claimed or in which the lienor has willfully in-
cluded a claim for work not performed upon or materials not furnished for the
property upon which he seeks to impress such lien... shall be deemed a fraudu-
lent lien.
(b) It is a complete defense to any action to enforce a lien.., that the lien is
a fraudulent lien; and the court so finding is empowered to and shall declare the
lien unenforceable, and the lienor thereupon forfeits his right to any lien on the
property upon which he sought to impress such fraudulent lien....
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.31(2)(a)-(b) (1993)).
620. Id.
621. Id. at 85.
19961
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finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the fraudu-
lent nature of the lien and affirmed the trial court's award of partial final
summary judgment in favor of the Gomeses. 622
Ward v. 3900 Condominium Ass'n.623  The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed, in part, this action to foreclose a $1,000 assessment lien. 624
The court held that the trial court erred "in not considering the condominium
association's decision not to deposit the unit owner's belated 1994 check
which was less than the full sum then owed by the unit owner."625 The check
should have been deposited and applied under section 718.116(3) of the
Florida Statutes (1993), which would have resulted in the amount in dispute
being halved "and the matter possibly resolved without all of the litigation."
626
The court also ordered that the attorneys' fee award of $13,100 "be reduced,




Lennar Florida Holdings, Inc. v. First Family Bank.628 Lennar sought
certiorari review from the trial court's order denying its motion to dissolve
First Family's notice of lis pendens on a Lake County property in which First
Family had acquired a substantial interest, and which Lennar had contracted to
sell at an amount which First Family alleged was below fair market value in
breach of a participation agreement by which Lennar is bound. 629 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal granted Lennar's petition for certiorari and quashed
the order of the trial court denying Lennar's motion to dissolve First Family's
notice of lis pendens.
630
In 1972 and 1973 First Family purchased an interest in two loans secured
by properties in Lake and Orange Counties made by American Federal Savings
and Loan Association of Orlando through contracts referred to as participation
622. Id. The district court commented that the trial court had applied the standard for deter-
mining the fraudulent nature and resultant unenforceability of such a lien set forth in section
713.31. Viyella Company, 657 So. 2d at 85.
623. 670 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).




628. 660 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
629. Id. at 1122.
630. Id. at 1124.
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agreements. Under these participation agreements, First Family was to share a
percentage of the accumulated principal and interest for contributing a per-
centage of the loan amount. American held the notes and mortgages for the
benefit of all participants, and the agreements provided that, although Ameri-
can was authorized to deal with the loans as absolute owner, it would act as a
prudent lender upon default. Upon breach or other failure to perform its
obligations by American, the other participants could demand repurchase of
their interest in the loans at par value. Successors and assigns were bound by
the terms of the original participation agreements.63'
After American Federal merged with AmeriFirst Federal Savings and
Loan Association, the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") took possession
of AmeriFirst's assets, including the participation agreements underlying the
present litigation. The loans went into default. The RTC filed separate
foreclosure actions on the Lake and Orange County mortgages, later obtaining
a final summary judgment in Lake County and a final judgment of foreclosure
in Orange County. First Family did not participate in the foreclosure pro-
ceedings. The RTC was the high bidder at an auction for the sale of the Lake
County property and obtained a certificate of sale.632
Lennar purchased a large portfolio from the RTC, obtained assignments
of the RTC's interest in the notes, mortgages, and judgments of foreclosure
relating to the properties, and it was later issued a certificate of title to the Lake
County property. On May 25, 1994, Lennar entered into a contract to sell the
Lake County property for $200,000, which First Family alleged was below fair
market value. First Family alleged further that Lennar, successor in interest to
American's obligations, breached its dut' to exercise judgment as a prudent
lender and refused to repurchase First Family's participation interest after its
breach. First Family sought money damages for unpaid principal and interest
and improperly charged maintenance costs, as well as a constructive trust and
judgment conveying to it a fee simple ownership interest in the property of
thirty-four percent, an amount proportional to its interest in the participation
agreement.633
The appellate court noted that one of the purposes of the doctrine of lis
pendens, aside from the protection of a plaintiff's interest, is to wam third
parties of a dispute concerning the property.634 Courts may discharge a notice
of lis pendens if the initial pleading fails to demonstrate that the action is
631. Id. at 1123.
632. Id.
633. Lennar, 660 So. 2d at 1123.
634. Id. See Chiusolo v. Kennedy, 614 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1993).
1996]
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founded on a duly recorded instrument or mechanic's lien.635  The court
framed the issue in the present litigation as "whether the proponent of the lis
pendens, First Family Bank, has shown that there is a sufficient nexus between
its action and the property in question. 636  The court, without explicitly
explaining its reasoning, held that First Family had not so shown.637
XXI. MOBILE HOMES
Sandpiper Homeowners Ass'n v. Lake Yale Corp.638 The residents of a
mobile home park purchased water and wastewater services from a utility
company owned by the park owner. Originally the charge for water and
wastewater was included in the rent. A dispute in 1990 led to a settlement
agreement that annual rent in 1992, 1993, and 1994 would be adjusted ac-
cording to the Consumer Price Index. After that agreement, the utility com-
pany applied for and received a new consumptive use permit from the Water
Management District. Pursuant to the permit, water meters were installed in
the homes in the park. Then, the utility company applied for and got approval
of a new rate structure from the Florida Public Service Commission ("PSC").
The homeowners' association ("Association") objected on the basis that the
rate structure would violate the settlement agreement and the park prospectus,
but the PSC ruled that those were contract disputes that belonged in circuit
court rather than before the PSC. Then, the park unilaterally notified the
residents that their rent was being reduced twenty dollars per month to reflect
the new separate billing for water and wastewater.
639
635. Id See FLA. STAT. § 48.23(3) (1993); Mohican Valley, Inc. v. MacDonald, 443 So. 2d
479 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
636. Id. at 1124.
637. Id. The only evidence of the court's reasoning were the several factual circumstances it
noted before announcing its judgment on the issue. The court noted that "[a]lthough First Family
had a 'participation' interest in the subject note and mortgage, that mortgage was foreclosed and
the collateral property sold pursuant to the judgment." Id. The court also took note of the fact
that First Family failed to intervene in the foreclosure action, but did not explain how or if First
Family's failure to do so would have made any significant difference in the court's present
decision. Another fact similarly treated by the court was that First Family never alleged that
Lennar fraudulently obtained title to the Lake County property. The court thus felt that First
Family's action did not sufficiently implicate the property itself to sustain its notice of lis
pendens. In so holding, the court did not directly address the fact that First Family had sought a
34% fee simple ownership interest in the subject property.
638. 667 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Goshom wrote the opinion.
Judges W. Sharp and Griffin concurred.
639. Id. at 922.
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The Association brought this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. The claim was that the rental reduction was inadequate and that the
park owner had violated the terms of the settlement agreement and the park
prospectus. The circuit court dismissed their claim on the basis that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over what was essentially a dispute over
utility rates.640 The district court reversed.64'
Judge Goshorn wrote a thorough and well-reasoned opinion. It boiled
down to this simple distinction. The PSC has exclusive jurisdiction over rate
disputes, but this was not a rate dispute. This was a dispute over rent. As the




Coral Springs Tower Club II Condominium Ass'n v. Dizefalo.63 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal granted the association's petition for writ of
mandamus, holding that the circuit court erroneously refused to exercise
jurisdiction over this action to foreclose a mortgage where the amount in
controversy was less than $15,000.644  Under Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon
Enterprises, Inc.,645 the circuit and county courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over foreclosure actions where the action falls within the county court's
monetary jurisdiction.646 After noting that the trial court transferred the case to
county court sua sponte, the court noted that "[wie are unaware of any statute,
rule of procedure or local administrative order which authorizes transfer
because a trial judge just does not want to hear the case." 647
Lakeside Regent, Inc. v. FDIC.648 Lakeside appealed the trial court's
award of summary judgment for the FDIC649 in a dispute over the proper
amount of setoff Lakeside was entitled to apply to FDIC's judgment in a
mortgage foreclosure deficiency action. Lakeside had commenced the action
640. Id. at 923.
641. Id. at 926.
642. Id. at 922.
643. 667 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
644. I. at 967.
645. 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994).
646. Il at 862.
647. Dizefalo, 667 So. 2d at 967.
648. 660 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
649. Id at 368. FDIC in this case was acting as receiver for First American Bank and Trust,
which was declared insolvent. Id
1996]
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on claims arising from a note, guaranty, and mortgage security agreement, and
FDIC counterclaimed for the amounts due on the note and for foreclosure.
Lakeside and two individuals, Carl A. Sax and Lanny Horowitz,650 were found
liable to FDIC for $6,694,017.651 The subject property was later sold to the
City of West Palm Beach for $1000, whereafter "FDIC noticed for a non-jury
trial the issue of the amount of the deficiency judgment."652 The FDIC moved
for summary judgment on this issue, contending that Lakeside, Sax, and
Horowitz were only entitled to a setoff in the amount of the $1000 paid by the
City. Although Lakeside contested the propriety of summary judgment on this
issue, and had sought discovery on several issues including the terms and
conditions of the foreclosure sale,653 the trial court granted FDIC's motion for
a protective order preventing this discovery, finding that these issues were not
relevant to the setoff issue.654 The FDIC was granted summary judgment by
the trial court.655
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with Lakeside, and re-
versed.65 6 The court noted that the trial court erroneously held that Lakeside's
affidavits, which were not formal appraisals, were insufficient to create an
issue of fact.657 The trial court "appear[ed] to have done so based on its
erroneous belief that the only valid evidence that could be presented by the
defendants to oppose a deficiency judgment was a formal appraisal of the
property by a qualified expert." 658 The trial court had a duty to consider
several factors in deciding whether a deficiency judgment is warranted,
including the adequacy of the sale price.659 The court held that the information
650. Carl A. Sax and Lanny Horowitz were found jointly and severally liable on the guar-
anty, while final judgment was entered against Lakeside on the note. Id. at 369 n.1.
651. This figure included principal, interest, and post-judgment interest. Id.
652. Lakeside, 660 So. 2d at 369.
653. The other issues mentioned in the opinion on which Lakeside sought discovery were
tax arrearages, asbestos removal, and the FDIC's meetings with the FDIC. Id.
654. d
655. Id.
656. Id. at 370.
657. Lakeside, 660 So. 2d at 369.
658. Id
659. Id. at 370. The court quoted the following language from R.K. Cooper Constr. Co. v.
Fulton, 216 So. 2d 11, 13 (Fla. 1968):
A shockingly inadequate sale price in the foreclosure proceeding can be asserted
as an equitable defense and the trial judge has the discretion and duty to inquire
into the reasonable and fair market value of the property sold, the adequacy of
the sale price, and the relationship, if any, between the foreclosing mortgagee and
the purchaser at the sale, before entering a judgment on the note.
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was discoverable and that "the debtor here ought not to be deprived of the
opportunity to make a showing of additional factors justifying his right to
challenge the deficiency judgment. ' 660 As a result of this "first" error regard-
ing the discoverability of this information, the court felt that it must conclude
that Lakeside had indeed raised material issues of fact such that summary
judgment was improper and, accordingly, reversed.661
Mellor v. Goldberg.662 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's dismissal with prejudice of appellant's complaint on a promissory
note.663 William and Patricia Mellor filed a complaint against Morton A.
Goldberg seeking $750,000 on a promissory note, attaching the note to the
complaint. The Mellors' complaint survived Goldberg's initial motion to
dismiss by filing a copy of a mortgage executed in conjunction therewith,
containing a clause reading "[t]he land subject to this mortgage shall be the
sole security for the indebtedness secured hereby, and a deficiency judgment
shall not be obtained against the mortgagor in the event of foreclosure. ' 664 The
court granted Goldberg's renewed motion, in which he argued that the two
documents reflected an agreement precluding a personal judgment against him,
and it dismissed the Mellors' complaint with prejudice, while ruling that the
Mellors were entitled to enforce the mortgage.
665
The appellate court disagreed with the trial court's dismissal with
prejudice.666 The court noted the sparsity of the record, which contained no
documents other than the note and mortgage, and espoused the "general rule
... [that] a holder of a promissory note secured by real property is permitted to
pursue both an action on the note and an action to foreclose the mortgage.
These remedies are not inconsistent and are each available to satisfy the
underlying obligation. 667 The court declared, "We cannot hold, as a matter of
law, that the limitation precluding a deficiency judgment was intended
unambiguously either to prohibit or permit a personal judgment.' 668 It agreed
Lakeside, 660 So. 2d at 369. Without expressly labeling the sale price at the foreclosure sale
of the property in the present case as "shockingly low," the court did note that the $1000
"represented less than .07% of its assessed value." Id. at 370.
660. Id. at 369 (citing Merrill v. Nuzum, 471 So. 2d 128, 129 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
661. Id. at 370.
662. 658 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
663. Id. at 1164.
664. Id. at 1163.
665. Id.
666. Id.
667. Mellor, 658 So. 2d at 1163 (citing Gottschamer v. August, Thompson, Sherr, Clark &
Shafer, P.C., 438 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
668. Id. at 1164.
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the note and mortgage should be construed together, but declared that
"evidence of intent is necessary to explain a latent ambiguity within the two
,,669documents. Such evidence was not apparent from the sparse record in the
present case.670 The court reversed the trial court's order dismissing the
Mellors' complaint with prejudice and remanded.671
Noonan-Judson v. Surrency. 672 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
determined that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of election of
remedies.6 73 Surrency held a second mortgage on the subject property, and
NationsBank foreclosed on its first mortgage. Surrency, seeking to save her
interest in the property, found another party, Noonan-Judson, who was also a
client of Surrency's attorney, William Dixon. The parties agreed to the
following terms: 1) Noonan-Judson would put up $97,000 to bid for the
property at the foreclosure sale; 2) the property would be placed on the market
and sold; 3) Noonan-Judson's initial investment of $97,000 would be repaid
from the sale proceeds; and (4) the amount remaining would be divided in half
between Noonan-Judson and Surrency. Noonan-Judson tendered a check for
$97,000 with a notation stating "investment" thereon.674
Dixon bid $97,000 at the judicial sale, in his name as trustee for Surrency,
and later prepared a mortgage deed and note for Noonan-Judson for the
$97,000, which provided for $1,500 monthly payments. Dixon "delayed
putting the trust terms in writing to give Surrency time to hammer out auxiliary
terms related to the marketing of the property." 675 Surrency failed to make the
payments.
Noonan-Judson filed a two-count claim for foreclosure on the mortgage,
asking the court to impose an express, resulting, or constructive trust on the
property. The trial court awarded Noonan-Judson partial summary judgment
669. Id.
670. Judge Altenbrand's statements raise interesting questions. How much more evidence of
such intent other than an unambiguous clause in such documents would be required? Can a party
to such a document ever ensure that the language is legally sufficient to serve the party's bona
fide intent to protect oneself from personal liability? Is not the legitimate purpose in using such
unambiguous language to avoid subsequent litigation? Can such a purpose ever be served by the
court's implication that such language does not preclude the admission of other sources of
evidence dispositive of the intent of the parties to such a document, which conceivably could be
many years old whenever such litigation arises? Is not the motivation in including such language
in these documents to avoid other problems of proof of the parties' intent?
671. Mellor, 658 So. 2d at 1164.
672. 669 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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on the mortgage claim, granting her a mortgage lien of $113,378.51, and
ordered sale, at which Surrency redeemed.676 Later, the court denied Noonan-
Judson's claim of trust, despite its finding that Surrency understood and
consented to the terms of the agreement.677 The court's reasoning was that
Noonan-Judson, in pursuing a mortgage foreclosure claim, had elected her
remedy, thus eliminating the preliminary agreement to enter into a written trust
agreement as a remedy.678
The Fifth District Court of Appeal offered two reasons in assigning error
to the court's application of the doctrine of election of remedies. 679 First,
Surrency failed to plead the doctrine as an affirmative defense, and the court's
inquiry was framed by the pleadings, noting that "[w]here an issue is not
presented by pleading or litigated by parties during a hearing, a judgment
based on that issue is voidable on appeal. 68 ° Second, the remedies were not
inconsistent, and thus the doctrine was simply inapplicable.
68 1
Pignato v. Great Western Bank.682 In 1993, the appellants defaulted on
their mortgage executed in 1991 in favor of Great Western. Great Western
filed suit to foreclose, and the appellants raised affirmative defenses, including
an allegation that Great Western violated the Federal Truth in Lending Act
("TJLA") 683 by failing to include as a finance charge the intangible tax which it
paid to the Clerk of the Court to record the mortgage, instead including the
figure in the amount financed. 684 A violation would, among other things,
permit the borrower to rescind the loan.685 The circuit court found that the
lender had complied with the TILA and ordered foreclosure.
686
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, interpreting an exception in
the definition of finance charge in Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z687 to
676. Id.
677. Noonan-Judson, 669 So. 2d at 1059.
678. Id.
679. Id. at 1060.
680. Id. (citing Cortina v. Cortina, 98 So. 2d 334, 337 (Fla. 1957)).
681. Id. (citing Barbe v. Villeneuve, 505 So. 2d 1331, 1333 (Fla. 1987); Goldstein v. Serio,
566 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 576 So. 2d 291 (Fla.
1991)).
682. 664 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 673 So. 2d 30 (Fla.
1996).
683. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
684. Pignato, 664 So. 2d at 1012-13.
685. Id. at 1013 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a) (West 1982)).
686. Id.
687. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1994).
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include the Florida intangible tax68 In so doing, the court rejected the federal
eleventh circuit's holding in Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 68 9 decided after the
circuit court entered the present judgment of foreclosure, that the TILA
required that the intangible tax be included as a finance charge.690 The court
did not feel bound by Rodash "because it construes Florida law, not federal
law. ,6
91
Actually, the court construed both Florida law and federal law in this
case. The court looked to Regulation Z for the definition and exceptions to
finance charge, and it looked at an exception for "'[t]axes and fees prescribed
by law that actually are or will be paid to public officials for... perfecting...
a security interest.' '' 692 The Rodash court had, according to the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, found the exception inapplicable because the purpose of the
tax was revenue enhancement, not perfecting a security interest.693 The court
looked to Florida law to clarify the nature of the Florida intangible tax, and it
decided that although revenue enhancement was the purpose of the tax, the
above exception fit because "[w]ithout payment, the mortgage will not be
recorded and the security interest will not be perfected. 694
In its reasoning, the appellate court disputed the notion that the tax's
purpose was relevant.695 All that was required, in the minds of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, was that the tax be prescribed by law, paid to a public
official, for perfecting a security interest, and the Florida intangible tax fit.6
96
Since the exception fit, there was no TILA violation, and the court affirmed.6 97
688. Pignato, 664 So. 2d at 1014.
689. 16F.3d 1142 (1lth Cir. 1994).
690. Pignato, 664 So. 2d at 1015.
691. Id. The court commented that "[o]nly decisions of the United States Supreme Court are
binding on the state courts of Florida." Id. (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Dexterhouse,
348 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), affd, 364 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1978), appeal
dismissed, 441 U.S. 918 (1979)).
692. Id. at 1014 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(e)(i) (1994)). Under TILA, finance charge is
generally defined as "the sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom
credit is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly as an incident to the extension of credit."
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a) (West Supp. 1995)); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (1994)).
693. Pignato, 664 So. 2d at 1014 (citing Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1148-49).
694. Id. at 1015. Here too, the court looked to federal sources when it submitted a 1995
revision to the Commentary to Regulation Z. Id. at 1016 (citing Reg. Z, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,771
(1995)).
695. Id. (noting that the Rodash court supplied no authority for the proposition).
696. Id. (citing Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(e)(1) (1994)).
697. Pignato, 664 So. 2d at 1016.
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Powers v. ITT Financial Services Corp.698 The Fifth District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's order granting relief from judgment of
foreclosure on account of excusable neglect.699 Powers executed a mortgage
and promissory note to Family First Mortgage Company for $50,700, which
was subsequently assigned to First Nationwide Bank, and another mortgage in
favor of IT for $22,560. Upon default by Powers, iT filed a foreclosure
action, listing Powers and Nationwide as defendants.7°
Plaintiff executed service of process on Nationwide through Suzanne
Podegraz, First Vice President of the human resources department of Nation-
wide in Sacramento, California. Podegraz accepted service because she
recognized the name "Gary Powers." A person by that name had been
employed at the bank and was involved in a divorce proceeding. Believing the
documents to be related to that divorce action, Podegraz failed to forward the
documents to the appropriate division in the company. As soon as the error
was discovered, the papers were duly forwarded. 0
A final judgment of foreclosure was issued upon =fr's motion for
summary judgment, which was followed by a judicial sale and issuance of a
certificate of sale from the clerk of the court.7 2 After learning of the Pode-
graz' mistake, Nationwide moved to vacate the judgment of foreclosure, IT's
certificate of title, and the foreclosure sale on grounds of excusable neglect
pursuant to Rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court
granted Nationwide relief, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed,
finding no error in the trial court's ruling.
70 3
Warehouses of Florida, Inc. v. Hensch.704 The issue in this mortgage
foreclosure action was whether it was error to enter a deficiency judgment in
favor of the mortgagees where the mortgagees bid the entire amount of the
final judgment of foreclosure at the foreclosure sale. The Fifth District Court
of Appeal held that it was error and, therefore, reversed.
705
The Hensches were second mortgagees who filed a foreclosure action
when Warehouses failed to make payments. The court entered a judgment of
698. 662 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).




703. Powers, 662 So. 2d at 1345. Powers argued that Nationwide's mortgage was extin-
guished by the judgment of foreclosure, but the Fifth District Court of Appeal disagreed, stating
that "once set aside, the judgment has no effect on the rights of either party." Id.
704. 671 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
705. Id. at 886.
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foreclosure which included the principal balance due on the note, accrued
interest thereon, costs, and attorneys' fees, totaling $336,343.91 .7 6  The
Hensches were the sole bidders at foreclosure, bid the entire amount of the
judgment of foreclosure, and, thereafter, filed a petition for entry of a defi-
ciency judgment which the trial court granted. Included in the deficiency
judgment were $44,271.85 in first mortgage payments made by the Hensches
to preclude foreclosure on the first mortgage, $14,375.02 in delinquent 1992
property taxes, $9,733 in prorated 1993 property taxes, and $8,500 represent-
ing a security deposit paid to Warehouses by a tenant during Warehouses'
possession.707 These sums were added to the balance due on the first mortgage
and the foreclosure judgment, which the trial court then subtracted from the
"fair market value of $700,000.00 to arrive at $139,037.20, the amount of the
deficiency judgment."708
The Hensches relied on section 45.031(8) of the Florida Statutes, which
provides in part:
If the case is one in which a deficiency judgment may be sought
and application is made for a deficiency, the amount bid at the sale
may be considered by the courts as one of the factors in determin-
ing a deficiency under the usual equitable principals.
709
In rejecting the Hensches' arguments and reversing, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal noted that "the established law in this district is that when a mortgagee
purchases the foreclosed property by bidding the full amount of the final
judgment of foreclosure, the mortgagee's judgment is satisfied in full and a
deficiency judgment is not possible." 710
Wilken v. North County Co.7 11 In this case, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal, relying on the authority of Bauer v. Resolution Trust Corp.,71 2 held
that the clerk of the court need not refund registry and sales fees to a successful




709. Warehouses, 671 So. 2d at 886 (citing FLA. STAT. § 45.031(8) (1991)).
710. Id. at 887.
711. 670 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Appellant, Dorothy H. Wilken, appealed
in her capacity as Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. Id.
712. 621 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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without written notice to the clerk, filed a suggestion of bankruptcy in federal
court, requiring the sale to be later invalidated. 13
XXIII. QUIEr THLE
Skelton v. Martin." This case "demonstrates a serious variance between
the statutory method for the maintenance of public records and the electronic
means by which most private and public records are now retrieved."
715
Skelton took title to the subject property under a tax deed recorded January 20,
1994. The previous owner, Ernest Martin, had failed to pay the 1990 taxes on
the lot, and a tax certificate was issued to Bank Atlantic for the unpaid taxes.
The sale was conducted on January 19, 1994, after public notice was published
on four separate dates in the Pinellas County Review.
716
Sandy K. Perry received a deed from Ernest Martin to the same property
at a closing on January 7, 1994. The deed was recorded on January 25, 1994.
Equity Title conducted a title search on the property. Equity neither sent an
abstractor to the courthouse nor examined the notices in the Pinellas County
Review. The abstractor instead used a computer to connect to the "Pinellas
County Computer Dial-Up System" and examined the current tax year screen
which normally indicates if there are delinquent taxes. No delinquencies were
so indicated, and the abstractor did not check the delinquent tax screen.7 17
Since she did not challenge the validity of the tax certificate or of the tax
sale, "[i]n essence, Ms. Perry maintained that the current tax screen on the dial-
up computer misled Equity Title, and that she would have learned of the tax
sale but for this mistake. 7 13 The appellate court responded by stating that
"[t]he question remains whether this error deprived Ms. Perry of constitutional
notice of either the tax certificate or of the pending sale.' 719 The court
concluded that it did not, since the tax certificate was recorded in the manner
required by statute, and it noted that "there is no present statutory right to
accurate information on the Internet. At this point in history, such computer-
ized data is not a form of notice constitutionally guaranteed by article I, section
713. Wilken, 670 So. 2d at 181.
714. 673 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied sub nom. Perry v. Skelton, No.
88,141, 1996 LEXIS 1741, at *1 (Sept. 16, 1996).
715. Id. at 879.
716. Id. at 878.
717. Id.
718. Id. at 879.
719. Skelton, 673 So. 2d at 879.
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Kilgore v. Killearn Homes Ass'n.721 The question before the First District
Court of Appeal was whether the property in question became subject to the
covenants and restrictions of Killeam Estates. 22 The Kilgores were allegedly
in violation of the covenants and restrictions by keeping more than thirty
723miniature horses on the property. The appellate court reversed a portion of
the partial summary judgment which determined that the entire parcel of
Appellant's property was subject to the covenants and restrictions of Killeam
Estates.724
In 1994, the Kilgores purchased the subject property surrounded on three
sides by property that is within Killeam Estates. The property itself is within
Killeam Estates and provides access to a public road and additional adjacent
acreage not within Killearn Estates. The homeowners' association
("Association") alleged that the Kilgores purchased the property subject to all
covenants and restrictions, reservations, and easements of record. The
Association further alleged that J.T. Williams, the initial owner and developer,
made Lot 14 subject to the covenants and restrictions, but did not subject the
several adjacent acres of property. The association also alleged that the
Kilgores' predecessors in title, the Hintikkas, had applied to the City of
Tallahassee to create a minor subdivision, Gardenview Too, from a portion of
the unplatted additional acreage formerly owned by Williams, and in the
process were required by the City to execute a unity of title document, under
which the additional acreage which the Hintikkas retained merged with and
became part of Lot 14 of Killearn Estates and subject to the covenants and
restrictions in question.
The trial court found that the Kilgores' land was subject to the covenants
and restrictions, and it permanently enjoined them from keeping the animals on
the land.725 The First District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the unity
720. Id.
721. 676 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The opinion in this case was modified on
grounds not pertinent to the discussion of this case. See Kilgore v. Killearn Homes Ass'n, 21 Fla.
L. Weekly D1532 (1st Dist. Ct. App. June 25, 1996).
722. Kilgore, 676 So. 2d at 5.
723. Id. at 6.
724. Id. at 5.
725. Id. at 6.
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of title document did not have the effect of merging Lot 14 and the additional
acreage for a purpose other than that intended by the parties to the agree-
ment! 26 The court noted that in general, a unity of title document is meant to
restrict or transfer development rights, and that it is an agreement entered into
by the property owner and the governing authority.727 The appellate court
found that the purpose of the document in this case was to prevent further
subdivision of the additional property without the City's approval, and it noted
that the Association was not a party to the agreement.728 The court also noted
that "covenants restraining the free use of realty are not favored in the law" 729
and are enforceable as private rights arising out of contract.730 In closing, it
found that there was no agreement between the Kilgores, or their predecessors
in title, and the Association which made the subject acreage subject to the
covenants and restrictions. 3
XXV. SALES
Alvarez v. Garcia.7 32 Less than a month after Hurricane Andrew, the
parties entered into a contract for the sale of a house. Before signing the
contract, the buyers knew that the hurricane had damaged the roof. Both sides
got estimates for what the repairs would cost, and the sellers collected under
their property insurance policy. Before closing, the buyers discovered that the
roof damage was more extensive than they had thought and that the roof
damage was causing the house to deteriorate. The seller, having refused to
repair the damage or give the insurance proceeds to the buyers, canceled the
726. Id.
727. Kilgore, 676 So. 2d at 6. See generally Gordon v. Flamingo Holding Partnership, 624
So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 637 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1994); Maturo v.
City of Coral Gables, 619 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
728. Id. at 7.
729. Id. (citing Sinclair Refining Co. v. Watsorr, 65 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1953); Hagan v.
Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d 302,308 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 192 So. 2d 489 (Fla.
1966); Ortega Co. v. Justiss, 175 So. 2d 554,559 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1965)).
730. Id. (citing Dade County v. Matheson, 605 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1992); Board of Public Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637, 641 (Fla.
1955)).
731. Id. at 7.
732. 662 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 670 So. 2d 938 (Fla.
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contract. The buyers sued for reformation of the contract and specific per-
formance and won in the trial court.733 The district court reversed. 3
Based on what the broker had said to the buyers, the trial court reformed
the contract, requiring the seller to apply the insurance proceeds to the roof
repairs.735 That constituted error. A court of equity has the power to reform a
written contract to reflect what the parties actually intended, but there was no
evidence that the seller ever intended this term. There was no evidence that
the broker had the authority to bind the seller to any terms that varied from the
terms of the written contract. Nor was there any evidence that the parties had
left that term out of the written agreement by mutual mistake.
736
The trial court also erred in relying on the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion to find that the buyers were entitled to insurance proceeds.737 First, the
buyers had never pled the doctrine, and second, the doctrine would only apply
if the casualty occurred after the contract had been signed, i.e., when the
buyers were arguably the equitable owners of the land that suffered the
casualty.738 Here, the property was damaged before the contract was signed,
and, therefore, the doctrine was inapplicable.
739
The contract explicitly provided that the seller would be responsible for
roof repairs up to two percent of the purchase price. The seller could have
voluntarily paid more, but was not required to do so. If roof repairs exceeded
two percent and the seller was unwilling to pay the excess, the buyers would
have the right to cancel the contract. 74° An addendum to the contract provided
in essence that if neither party was willing to pay for a required repair and a
compromise could not be reached, then either party could cancel the contract.
The district court ruled these provisions should be read together.74' The roof
repairs easily exceeded the two percent. Neither the seller nor the buyers were
willing to pay the excess. Clearly a compromise was not reached. Thus, the
seller had the right to cancel the contract.
733. Id. at 1313.
734. Id. at 1314.
735. Id.
736. It
737. Alvarez, 662 So. 2d at 1314.
738. Id.
739. hi
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Broward County v. Conner.742 The County began an eminent domain
action to take the Conners' land. Settlement negotiations began and the parties
explored the possibility of settling the case by a real estate exchange. The
parties reached an agreement in principle, and the landowners' lawyer sent a
letter to the County's private attorney which "confirmed the parameters" of the
proposed settlement. The parties subsequently had further meetings, ex-
changed letters, and exchanged unsigned drafts of the settlement. Then, the
County decided not to settle according to these terms.
743
The trial court granted the landowners' motion in the eminent domain
proceeding to specifically enforce the settlement because "the agreement had
been partly performed; that [the landowners] had relied to their detriment
based on the representation of the county's agents and employees; and, that the
county was estopped to deny the settlement."744 The District Court of Appeal
reversed relying on two alternative grounds, the Statute of Frauds and the
Sunshine Law.745 The latter is discussed in the Eminent Domain section of this
survey.74
The court held that the settlement was a contract for the sale of land.7 47
Consequently, the Statute of Frauds748 required that the contract be in writing
and signed by the party to be charged, but the County had not signed the
settlement. The court relied upon Collier v. Brooks749 and the cases cited
therein for the proposition that "[p]art performance does not remove an oral
contract for sale of land from the statute of frauds unless there is payment of
all or part of the consideration, possession by the vendee, and valuable
improvement so as to constitute a fraud on the vendee if there were no per-
formance." 750 The landowner had not established these elements and, there-
fore, could not rely on part performance to take the contract out of the Statute
of Frauds. This author?5 thinks that the court's conclusion on this point was
incorrect. Assuming in fact that there was a contract, a point that this court
742. 660 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 669 So. 2d 250 (Fla.
1996). Judge Klein wrote the opinion in which Chief Judge Gunther concurred. Judge Farmer
wrote a special concurrence.
743. Id. at 289.
744. Id. at 290.
745. Idl
746. See discussion supra pp. 304-06.
747. Conner, 660 So. 2d at 290.
748. FIA. STAT. § 725.01 (1993).
749. 632 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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does not address, the court should not have determined part performance by a
rigid mechanical test. Part performance is an equitable doctrine designed to
prevent the Statute of Frauds from being used as a tool to perpetrate a fraud.
The court should look at all the circumstances to determine if that is what the
county was doing. It is impossible to tell from the facts in the opinion whether
the landowners could have prevailed under the proper analysis.
Judge Farmer made an interesting point in his special concurrence.752 He
would have remanded the case to see if any of the writings signed by the
county's attorneys were sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.75 3  His
approach seems to recognize that the writing requirement can be satisfied by a
combination of writings.
Caronte Enterprises, Inc. v. Berlin.754 The contract of sale provided that
the seller would make certain repairs prior to the closing but did not specify a
closing date, and the "time is of the essence" clause was crossed out. Although
the buyers complained for several months that the repairs were not being made
quickly enough, they never made a formal demand that the repairs be com-
pleted by a particular date. Finally, the seller notified the buyers that the
repairs were complete. The buyers disagreed and brought this suit. The jury
verdict was for the buyers.755 On appeal, the district court ruled that the trial
judge erred by failing to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.756
The district court did not clearly express its theory, but it is apparent that
the court concluded that seller was not yet in breach of the contract. Time was
not of the essence under the contract, and the buyers had never formally
demanded performance by a date certain. So, even if the repairs were not yet
satisfactory, the seller still had the to time to complete the repairs. It is not
known whether the buyers failed to follow the advice of counsel or simply
lacked competent legal advice, but these buyers lost because they simply did
not play this game by the rules.
XXVI. SIGNATURES
Although the Florida Legislature did not seem to enact significant
legislation this year affecting substantive property law, it did pass the Elec-
752. Conner, 660 So. 2d at 290-91 (Farmer, J., concurring specially).
753. Id. at 290.
754. 668 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judges Levy, Gersten and Green con-
curred in the per curiam opinion.
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tronic Signature Act of 1996 ("Act"). 757 One of this Act's primary purposes is
to develop authenticity and integrity to electronic signatures and electronic
commerce. 758 As a result, unless prohibited by law, one may now use an
electronic signature to sign a writing and such a signature has an equal effect
as a written signature.759 However, although it is the Secretary of State's
responsibility to issue to public and private entities certificates (computer-
based records) to verify digital signatures, no public or private entity is
required to participate in such a program.76
XXVII. TAXES
Chapparal Partners v. Department of Revenue.76' Chapparal is a general
partnership composed of Congden Properties, Inc. and First Interstate Bank of
California as trustee. First Interstate held defaulted notes and mortgages on
two Jacksonville properties which were worth substantially less than the
amount due on the notes. First Interstate gave the guarantors of the notes a
covenant not to sue in exchange for conveyances of the properties.
7 62
The present dispute centered on the amount of documentary stamps to be
affixed to those deeds. The parties agreed that the several indebtednesses on
the properties were not discharged and remained encumbrances on the land.
The Department of Revenue, relying on a part of section 201.02(1) of the
Florida Statutes "which defines 'consideration' for a conveyance to include
'the amount of any mortgage ... or other encumbrance, whether or not the
underlying indebtedness is assumed,"' felt the stamp taxes should be assessed
based on the amount of debt encumbering the land at the time of convey-
ance.7 63 The appellants argued that the part of the statute which should govern
provides "'[i]f the consideration ... includes property other than money, it is
presumed that the consideration is equal to the fair market value of the real
property. . .,,764 The appellants submitted that the covenant not to sue is
"'property other than money,"' making the more specific part of the section
referenced by the Department inapplicable to the present case.7 65
757. Ch. 96-224, § 3, 1996 Fla. Laws at 837.
758. Id. § 2, 1996 Fla. Laws at 837.
759. Id. § 3, 1996 Fla. Laws at 838.
760. Id. § 6, 1996 Fla. Laws at 838.
761. 662 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
762. Id. at 728.
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The First District Court of Appeal held that applying the language offered
by the appellant to the present case would "render the clear legislative intent to
define 'consideration' in terms of the amount of an encumbrance that survives
a conveyance as meaningless," and noted that otherwise, the specific definition
could be regularly evaded by "the giving of any non-money consideration."
766
The court thus concluded that the Department of Revenue had correctly based
the assessment of stamps on the amount of the debt.
767
XXVIII. T1TLE INSURANCE
American Title Insurance Co. v. Carter.768 The trial court found that
American Title had a duty under the title insurance policy to defend the Carters
in a boundary dispute, and American Title appealed.769 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal reversed.770 After purchasing the subject property, the Carters
had a professional survey performed, and in reliance thereon, they erected a
fence on what they believed was their eastern boundary line. Their neighbor to
the East, Eugene Calabrese, had a survey performed, which evidenced that the
Carters' fence encroached 26.5 feet onto Calabrese's property.
Calabrese filed an action alleging encroachment, seeking recovery of
possession of the fenced portion, damages, and attorney's fees, and the Carters
made a formal demand on American Title to defend them. American Title
refused, and the Carters filed a third party complaint against American Title
and their predecessors in interest, alleging that American Title insured them
against loss and damages for circumstances as alleged in Calabrese's com-
plaint and breached the policy by failing to defend them in the suit. American
Title answered, stating two bases for its denial of Calabrese's claim as not
covered under the policy. First, Calabrese's claim did not assert any claim to
any lands described in the Carters' deed.771 Second, the claim was not covered
due to the survey exception in Schedule B of the policy.
772
The Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed that American Title was not
under a duty to defend under the policy under these circumstances. 773 The
issue did not pertain to title, but was merely a boundary dispute not covered by
766. Chapparal Partners, 662 So. 2d at 728.
767. Id. at 729.
768. 670 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
769. Id. at 1115.
770. Id. at 1118.
771. Id. at 1116.
772. Id.
773. American Title, 670 So. 2d at 1116.
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the policy.774  Also, there was an exclusion in the policy excluding from
coverage any "encroachments, easements, measurements, variations in area or
content, party walls or other facts which a correct survey of the premises
would show."775 The court thus noted that, "essentially, the Carters are asking
the court to write them an insurance policy superior to the one they pur-
chased." 7
76
National Title Insurance Co. v. Safeco Title Insurance Co.7" National
appealed the trial court's decision to grant a new trial on the issue of damages
while Safeco cross appealed the trial court's denial of its motion for directed
verdict on the issue of liability for breach of contract.778 The Third District
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of directed verdict to Safeco, a
decision which the court felt "moot[ed] ... the appeal in chief.' 779
In 1982, National loaned $103,500 to buyers Younts and Bowman. Home
Title, an agent of Safeco, acted as closing agent for Safeco, the underwriter of
the title insurance policy, which provided that Safeco insured "against loss or
damage... sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of... any defect in
or lien or encumbrance on such title.' 780 The policy listed only National's
mortgage and no second mortgage. At closing, Rosen, president of Home
Title, notarized and witnessed documents78' indicating that no second mort-
gage existed. He did this despite the fact that prior to closing, unbeknownst to
National, the buyers had obtained a second mortgage for $3,009.02 from their
developer, Interdevco, which Rosen had also notarized and witnessed.
National sold the mortgage to the Federal National Mortgage Association
("FNMA") in November 1982, while purchasing private mortgage insurance
from Verex, representing that no second mortgage existed.
The second mortgage was satisfied in 1984, but the buyers defaulted on
the first mortgage. Upon discovery of the second mortgage, the Verex policy
was invalidated despite the fact that it had been satisfied four years prior.
National paid to FNMA $75,000, representing the balance unpaid on the first
mortgage, and it obtained a deed to the property in lieu of foreclosure.
774. Id at 1117.
775. Id. at 1116.
776. Id. at 1117.
777. 661 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 670 So. 2d 939 (Fla.
1996).
778. Id. at 1235.
779. Id. at 1236.
780. Id. at 1235.
781. Among these documents was a Federal National Mortgage Association document
certifying that no second mortgage existed. Id
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In July 1989, National sued Safeco, Interdevco, Home Title, and Rosen
for breach of the title insurance policy and negligence seeking recovery of the
$75,000 payment to FNMA.782 Default judgments were entered against
Interdevco and Home Title. 83 The jury found that Rosen had no knowledge of
the second mortgage at closing.784 Safeco argued that any loss to National was
no result of a breach in its obligations under the policy, and after the trial court
denied its motion for directed verdict on the issue of breach, the jury, by
special interrogatory verdict, found Safeco had breached, resulting in $75,000
in damages to National.785 The jury also found that the two defaulting defen-
dants were negligent and allocated liability among them, with Interdevco
responsible for $50,000 and Home Title responsible for $25,000.786 The trial
court ordered a new trial on the issue of breach, believing that Safeco's
damage liability could not be greater than that of its agent, Home Title.787
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of
Safeco's motion for directed verdict.788 The court felt that even if Safeco had
breached the policy, such breach was not the natural and proximate cause of
National's damages.789 The court then noted that when a title insurer breaches
a mortgagee's policy, the proper measure of damages is "'the difference
between the market value of the mortgage, if the lien thereof were as insured,
and the market value of the mortgage with the title imperfection. ' '' 790 The
court also noted that the second mortgage was not an outstanding encumbrance
when National paid FNMA, and that National's loss was a result of the buyers'
default, not the second mortgage.79 1 The court then affirmed the jury verdict
for Rosen, not reaching the evidentiary issues, but held, as a matter of law, that
Rosen could not be held liable for National's loss because that loss was not
caused by Rosen's failure to disclose the second mortgage, even assuming
Rosen was aware of its existence.
792
782. National Title, 661 So. 2d at 1235.
783. Id.
784. Id. at 1235-36.
785. Id. at 1236.
786. Id.
787. National Title, 661 So. 2d at 1236.
788. Id. at 1237.
789. Id. at 1236.
790. Id. (quoting Goode v. Federal Title & Ins. Corp., 162 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1964); Interstate Title Corp. v. Miller, 581 So. 2d 213,214 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
791. Id.
792. National Title, 661 So. 2d at 1236 (citing Applegate v. Barnett Bank, 377 So. 2d 1150,
1152 (Fla. 1979) (holding that "[e]ven when based on erroneous reasoning, a conclusion or
decision of a trial court will generally be affirmed if the evidence or an alternative theory supports
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XXIX. TRuTH IN LENDING ACT
Beach v. Great Western Bank.793 In this case, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal addressed the following question of first impression in Florida:
[W]hether a consumer has right to rescind a mortgage on a home,
under 15 U.S.C.A. section 1635 of the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), as a defense by way of recoupment to the lender's foreclo-
sure action, when the defense is asserted beyond the three year pe-
riod set forth in the statute.
79
The court held that a consumer was not entitled to rescission; rather, he is
limited to a damage set off.
7 95
The opinion included a brief overview of the T!LA, noting that the Act
gives consumers the right to rescind, for up to three years, any agreement that
results in the lender taking a security interest in the consumer's principal
dwelling, if the creditor fails to make all material disclosures to the borrower
as required.796 Exercise of the right results in discharge of the consumer's
liability for any finance and other charges paid by the consumer, as well as
it."); Bird Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Raskin, 596 So. 2d 133, 134-35 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that a trial court decision may be upheld for any reason appearing in the record)).
793. 670 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 678 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1996).
794. Id. at 988 (citation omitted).
795. Id. at 990. After criticizing the Colorado Supreme Court decision of Dawe v. Mer-
chants Mortgage & Trust Corp., 683 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1984), the court observed that "[w]hether
one may agree with Dawe or not, the ultimate question is whether as a matter of Florida law, the
defensive assertion of rescission should be allowed." Beach, 670 So. 2d at 991. In asserting the
right of statutory rescission, the appellants relied upon the Supreme Court of Florida decision of
Allie v. Ionata, 503 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1987). Id. at 991.
The court distinguished Allie as a case which "addressed a claim barred by a statute of
limitations, which bars not the right, but the remedy." Id. In distinguishing Allie, the court also
noted that in Rybovich Boat Works, Inc. v. Atkins, 585 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1991), the Supreme Court
of Florida later explained that Allie "'rested primarily on consideration of public policy and
fairness as well as an analysis of the purpose of the statute of limitations."' Beach, 670 So. 2d at
991 (quoting Rybovich Boat Works, 585 So. 2d at 270). The court then explained that, in Allie,
the Supreme Court of Florida refused to permit assertion of a claim for specific performance after
the expiration of the statute of limitations due to the adverse consequences on the free alienability
of title. Id, The court was persuaded into similar reasoning by Great Western's argument that the
same reasoning should apply in the present case. Great Western relied on a January 1972 report
submitted to Congress by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in which the
"Board recommended that a limitation on the right to rescind be established because the title to
residential real properties may be clouded by the uncertainty regarding the right of rescission."
Id.
796. Id. at 988.
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discharge of any security interest taken by the creditor in conjunction with the
extension of credit, leaving the creditor with only an unsecured claim on the
principal amount.797 The TILA also allows for money damages for violations
with a one year statute of limitations.798 However, the statute specifically
provides that, as a defense of recoupment or set-off to an action for collection
of the debt by the creditor, the consumer may assert the damages to which the
consumer would be entitled to under the Act for any violations.799
In dissent, Judge Pariente noted that the 1995 amendment to 15 U.S.C. §
1635(i)(3) applied to all consumer credit transactions in existence and pro-
vided "'[n]othing in this subsection affects a consumer's right of rescission in
recoupment under State law,"' 8°° and that the majority's interpretation ran
contrary to Congress' intent.80' Judge Pariente noted that 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f)
was not part of the original statute, "but rather has been described as part of a
series of technical amendments designed to improve the administration of
TILA. In fact, the original version of [15 U.S.C.] § 1635, which created the
statutory remedy of rescission, had no time limitations.'
8 0 2
Finally, the appellate court certified the following question to the Su-
preme Court of Florida as being of great importance:
UNDER FLORIDA LAW, MAY AN ACTION FOR STATU-
TORY RIGHT OF RESCISSION PURSUANT TO THE TRUTH
IN LENDING ACT, 15 U.S.C.A. SECTION 1635 BE REVIVED
AS A DEFENSE IN RECOUPMENT BEYOND THE THREE
YEAR LIMIT ON THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION SET FORTH
IN SECTION 1635(f)?80
3
797. Id. at 999 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(b); Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co.,
898 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd in part, 898 F. 2d 907 (3d Cir. 1990)).
798. Beach, 670 So. 2d at 989 (citation omitted).
799. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(e) (West 1982)). In its reasoning, the court relied on
Bowery v. Babbit, 128 So. 801 (Fla. 1930), for the following general rule of statutory interpreta-
tion:
[Wlhere a statute confers a right and expressly fixes the period within which suit
to enforce the right must be brought, such period is treated as the essence of the
right to maintain the action, and the plaintiff or complainant has the burden of
affirmatively showing that his suit was commenced within the period provided.
Beach, 670 So. 2d at 991.
800. Id. at 994 (Pariente, J., dissenting) (quoting Pub. L. No. 104-29 §§ 5, 8, 109 Stat. 1517
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Home Savings of America, F.S.B. v. Goldstein.804 The trial court granted
summary judgment on the ground that there had been violations of the Federal
Truth in Lending Act ('TfIILA"). 80 5 Five specific grounds were alleged by the
appellees/borrowers, but "the trial court affirmatively refused to specify what
violations it found in the documents.,, 8°r The appellate court stated that its
review was hampered by the trial court's failure in this regard.807 The court
further noted that one of the alleged violations was the exclusion of the Florida
intangible tax finance charge.808 Since the entry of the summary judgment in
this case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided, in Pignato v. Great
Western Bank,09 that the charge was excludable under the TWfA. The trial
court appeared to have relied on Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co.,810 which the
Fourth District Court of Appeal departed from in deciding Pignato.81 1 The
court also found that material issues of fact and law remained on the other
violations.812 Thus, the court reversed and remanded.81 3
XXX. USURY
Donofro v. Dick.14 The first district affirmed the trial court's finding of a
lack of "'corrupt intent to knowingly and willfully charge and receive an
unlawful rate of interest' because the record contained competent and
substantial evidence supporting the finding.815 The court reversed the attor-
neys' fee award of $5,576 because the award exceeded that specified in the
note.816 The note called for an award of ten percent of the principal due under
the note or $750, whichever was greater. Under that provision, $2,200 was
due on the $22,000 outstanding. The court noted that under section 687.06 of
the Florida Statutes,' 7 where the parties have provided for fees in a written
804. 672 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
805. Id. at 883.
806. Id. at 884.
807. Id.
808. Id.
809. 664 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App 1995).
810. 16F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994).
811. Home Savings, 672 So. 2d at 884.
812. Id. (citing Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666, 668-69 (Fla. 1985)).
813. Id.
814. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1339 (1st Dist. Ct. App. June 4, 1996).
815. Id. (quoting Sumner v. Investment Mortgage Co. of Fla., 332 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. 1st
Dist. CL App. 1976), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1977)).
816. Id.
817. FLA. STAT. § 687.06 (1993).
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instrument, and the fee does not exceed ten percent of the principal, the fee is
deemed reasonable and, absent a showing that the fee raises equitable ques-
tions, such as unconscionability, the parties have contracted away their
opportunity to have judicial inquiry into whether a greater or lesser fee should
be awarded.818
Jersey Palm-Gross, Inc. v. Paper.819 The Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Jersey Palm-Gross,
Inc. v. Paper,820 in which the fourth district certified conflict with the Fifth
District Court of Appeal's opinion in Forest Creek Development Co. v. Liberty
Savings & Loan Ass'n.8 2 1 The supreme court disapproved of Forest Creek
insofar as it was inconsistent with the opinion in the present case.822 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal posed the following question, which the
Supreme Court of Florida answered in the negative:
[W]hether the existence of a contractual disclaimer of intent to
violate the usury laws commonly known as a 'usury savings clause'
in the loan documents in this case removes the determination of
usurious intent from a factual inquiry and conclusively proves as a
matter of law that the lender could not have 'willfully' or know-
ingly charged or accepted an excessive interest rate.
8 23
Justice Anstead, who authored the court's opinion,824 announced the
court's core holding on the effect of these clauses, stating, "[W]e conclude that
a usury savings clause cannot, by itself, absolutely insulate a lender from a
818. Id. (citing Dean v. Coyne, 455 So. 2d 576, 576 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); A&E
Int'l Enters., Inc. v. Gold Credit Co., 450 So. 2d 1166, 1166 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 461 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1984); Sepler v. Emanuel, 388 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1980)).
819. 658 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1995).
820. 639 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 651 So. 2d 1194 (Fla.),
decision approved, 658 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1995). See Brown et. al., supra note 423, at 358
(discussing the opinion rendered in this case).
821. 531 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 541 So. 2d 1172 (Fla.
1989).
822. Jersey Palm-Gross, 658 So. 2d at 532.
823. Id. at 533.
824. Concurring in Anstead's opinion were Chief Justice Grimes, and Justices Shaw, Kogan,
Harding, and Wells. Justice Overton also joined Anstead's opinion and wrote a concurrence in
which Justice Wells joined. Justice Overton wrote "to emphasize that a savings clause is still a
valid factor-but not the exclusive factor-in determining the intent of the lender at the time of
making the loan," and ended by noting that the borrower still has the burden of proof on the issue
of usurious intent. Id. at 537.
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finding of usury."8 Rather, such clauses are but one factor properly consid-
ered in the determination of the lender's intent . 26 The court also felt that its
rule struck the proper balance between the legislature's policy and "the need to
preserve otherwise good faith, albeit complex, transactions which may
inadvertently exact an unlawful rate of interest."8 27  Such clauses have a
legitimate purpose and, thus, should be enforced under appropriate circum-
stances, such as where the actual rate charged is close to the legal rate, and
"the transaction is not clearly usurious at the outset but only becomes usurious
upon the happening of a future contingency." 2s This statement raises inter-
esting analytical questions since "it is generally agreed that money, which is
not absolutely payable, is not interest for usury purposes."8 29
Levine v. United Companies Life Insurance Co.8 3° The Supreme Court of
Florida reviewed the Third District Court of Appeal's decision in this case, 831
and it rejected that court's view in so far as it conflicts with the court's opinion
in Jersey Palm-Gross v. Paper,32 holding that a usury savings clause is not
conclusive evidence of lack of usurious intent, but is merely relevant evidence
to be considered on the issue of intent.8 33
XXXI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey of cases and legislation presents selected materials
of significance to real estate professionals. Although there seems to be no
consistent pattern to the case law and legislative development, the survey is
useful in maintaining contact with the progression of real property law.
825. Id. at 535.
826. Id.
827. Jersey Palm-Gross, 658 So. 2d at 535.
828. Id. (quoting and approving of Judge Pariente's statement in the fourth district's opinion
in the present case, Jersey Palm-Gross, 639 So. 2d at 671).
829. Brown et. al., supra note 423, at 360.
830. 659 So. 2d 265 (Fa. 1995).
831. Levine v. United Companies Life Ins., Co., 638 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1994), decision approved, 659 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1995).
832. 658 So. 2d 531 (Fa. 1995).
833. Levine, 659 So. 2d at 267.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
This topic was last surveyed in 1993.1 Cases and statutory changes
addressed in the current survey generally cover the period from 1994 through
the first half of 1996.
* A.B., 1962, Duke University; LL.B., 1964, University of Florida. Rohan Kelley practices
with the firm of Rohan Kelley, P.A., in Fort Lauderdale, where his practice is limited to trusts and
estates and fiduciary litigation. Florida Bar Probate Rules Committee, 1982 to present; Co-
Chairman, 1984-88; Florida Bar Certification Committee for Wills, Estates and Trusts, 1985--86;
Chairman, 1988; Florida Bar Executive Council of the Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law
Section, 1977 to present. Mr. Kelley is a Fellow of the American College of Trusts and Estates
Counsel and serves on the Fiduciary Litigation Committee of that organization. He is the author
of THE FLORDA BAR PROBATE SYSTEM (1996) published by The Florida Bar, Continuing Legal
Education; Chapter 1: Procedural Considerations (co-author), and Chapter 11: Compensation
Disputes, in LrnGATION UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE (1993), published by The Florida Bar,
Continuing Legal Education; and Chapter 15: Fees and Other Expenses of Administration (co-
author), Chapter 19: Homestead and Exempt Personal Property (co-author), and Chapter 20:
Probate Litigation, in PRACnCE UNDER THE FLORIDA PROBATE CODE (1994) published by The
Florida Bar, Continuing Legal Education. He is also author of a series of articles entitled
Homestead Made Easy appearing in the Florida Bar Journal. He has lectured at more than forty
major seminars in the last ten years for The Florida Bar and other professional sponsors on the
topic of trusts and estates.
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To a substantial degree, the topics covered in the prior article are still
the "hot topics" of today. These include attorneys' fees, claims, trusts,
guardianships, joint bank accounts, and elective share. Two added hot topics
are jurisdiction and power of attorney. A topic which has "cooled," and
which has become unusually quiet in the reported cases and in the legisla-
ture, is homestead. This last topic has been addressed in other articles
written or contributed to by this author and will not be covered here.
Contrary to the format in the prior article, coverage of legislation will be
integrated in the topical discussion with the case law, and is briefly summa-
rized here.
In 1994, there were no changes at all to the probate statutes, and only
minor changes to the guardianship and advance directive statutes.2 How-
ever, the 1995 legislature was very active in the trusts and estates area
adopting chapter 95-401, of the Laws of Florida.3 This omnibus bill,
sponsored by the Real Property and Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar,
addressed probate and trust administration fees and commissions, revised
trust claim procedures, including the repeal of significant trust claim legisla-
tion which had been adopted as a part of chapter 93-257, imposed execution
requirements on express trusts, significantly revised the power of attorney
statute, and defined trustee's and personal representative's powers and duties
relative to environmentally contaminated property. An unusual provision
which sounds like "special case" legislation now requires the spouse of a
ward to consent to dissolution before the court can grant special authority to
a guardian to bring or maintain an action for dissolution.
In the 1996 legislative session, there were virtually no statutory changes
relating to trusts or estates statutes, although important legislation in several
relevant areas was introduced. House Bill 2157, which provided for a
significant overhaul of the elective share statutes and incorporated a modi-
fied augmented estate concept, failed to pass. It is expected to be reintro-
duced in the next session.
There were minor changes to chapter 765, having to do with advance
directives, which allow a person to designate a separate surrogate to consent
to mental health treatment, and if no separate surrogate is designated, the
designation of a general surrogate is assumed to include this authority.4
1. Mary Sue Donohue, Probate and Trust Law: 1993 Survey of Florida Law, 18 NOVA L.
REV. 355 (1993).
2. See 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-183.
3. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-401.
4. Ch. 96-169, § 49, 1996 Fla. Laws 243,303.
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There were also some changes to chapter 744 regarding guardianships.5
The amendment provides a definition for a professional guardian as a person
who has been compensated for service as guardian for more than two wards
who were not near relatives.6  A professional guardian petitioning for ap-
pointment must reveal that guardian's professional status.
A ward may be relocated to an adjacent county without court approval,
but even temporary relocation to any other state or other county must be
immediately reported by the guardian to the court. The class of persons who
may serve on an examining committee has been enlarged.7 Also, the fees of
the examining committee are to "be paid by the guardian from the property
of the ward, or if the ward is indigent, by the county."8 Previously, the fees
were paid from the general fund of the county.9 A guardian of the property
may elect to file annual accountings on a fiscal year basis, unless the court
otherwise orders. This election must be made by the filing of a notice of
intention within thirty days after issuance of letters. A broad class of
defined persons are authorized to bring a proceeding for removal of a
guardian, if notice was not given to them of the original appointment.' 0
Authorized persons are relatives who could qualify as a nonresident guardian
and persons with statutory preference in initial appointment. This, practi-
cally, must result in broader service of notice of the initial guardianship
appointment proceedings. Finally, a securities dealer, such as Merrill Lynch,
may now serve as a depository for a guardian in the same manner as a bank
or other financial institution. Otherwise, 1996 was a very quiet year for
relevant legislation.
5. Ch. 96-354, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 2032, 2033 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
744.102(15)).
6. Id.
7. This class includes a graduate gerontologist, and any "other person who by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may in the court's discretion, advise the court in the form
of an expert opinion." Id. § 7, 1996 Fla. Laws at 2034-35 (to be codified at FLA STAT. §
744.331(3)(a)). However, the statute now eliminates lay members and requires that all three
members be qualified persons.
8. Id. § 7, 1996 Fla. Laws at 2035 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. 744.331(7)(b)).
9. This statutory amendment seems to contemplate that the person will be adjudicated inca-
pacitated. What happens if the person is not adjudicated and no guardian is appointed, then what
is the source of payment of the examining committee's fees?
10. See comment on "interested persons" and cases cited under the main title, Guardianships,
infra part VI Guardianships.
11. See Ch. 96-354, §§ 1, 4,7,8,9,10,13, 1996 Fla. Laws 2032,2033-37.
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II. JURISDICTION
Lawyers and trial judges are becoming more jurisdictionally aware.
Previously, the practice was if you could send a formal notice by registered
mail return receipt requested, then jurisdiction was not a problem because
probate or trust administration was an in rem proceeding and the court already
had jurisdiction over the rem. However, the modem view is "first test juris-
diction. ' 2 This was the author's central theme in the articles, Homestead
Made Easy Parts 3 and 3A.13 These articles suggest that jurisdiction or notice
may be deficient in many determinations of homestead status.'
4
In personam jurisdiction based on the long arm statute,1 5 typically
thought to be the concern of the commercial litigator or the negligence
lawyer, has become a real concern to the fiduciary litigator. Two cases
found lack of personal jurisdiction over nonresident trustees based on
allegations under the long arm statute.
In Lampe v. Hoyne,16 a complaint against a successor trustee for breach
of trust, unjust enrichment and declaratory relief alleged jurisdiction over the
defendant stating that she conducted substantial and not isolated activity
within Florida.17 The defendant by special appearance, challenged jurisdic-
tion over her individually and as trustee, and refuted the jurisdictional
allegations of the complaint which alleged only minimum contacts with
Florida.' 8 No traverse was filed by the plaintiff and the appellate court
reversed the trial court holding that there was no jurisdiction over the
trustee. 19
In Beaubien v. Cambridge Consolidated, Ltd.,20 the complaint alleged
that the trustee, acting through an agent, mismanaged the trust and failed to
account to the beneficiary.21 The trustee, Cambridge Consolidated, Ltd., was
12. See generally Rohan Kelley & Tae T. Kelley, Homestead Made Easy Part 3: How to
Find the Courthouse and What To Do Next, 59 FLA. B.J. 105 (1995); Rohan Kelly & Tae T.
Kelley, Homestead Made Easy Part 3A: How to Find the Courthouse and What To Do Next, 69
FLA. B.J. 56 (1995).
13. ld.
14. See id.; see also James J. Altman & Rohan Kelley, Procedural Considerations, in
LIGATION UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE, §§ 1. 12-.17 (1993).
15. FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1995).
16. 652 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
17. Id. at 425.
18. Id. at 426.
19. Id.
20. 652 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
21. Id. at 937.
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a dissolved Cayman Islands corporation. The proper procedure to acquire
personal jurisdiction under the long arm statute is to plead jurisdiction in the
language of the statute.2 A motion to dismiss only tests the legal sufficiency
of the allegations as pled. In order to test the court's jurisdicition, or to
refute the contention of minimum contacts, the defendant must file affidavits
in support of his position. Once this is done, the plaintiff has the burden of
proof, by affidavit or deposition, of the basis upon which jurisdiction may be
obtained.23 Here, the court remanded the matter to the trial court for an
evidentiary hearing on the Florida activities of Cambridge.24
The lack of Florida business activity, however, did not deter the Fourth
District Court of Appeal from finding in Rogers & Wells v. Winston25 that in
personam jurisdiction existed over a New York law firm when it ordered a
possible refund of excess attorneys' fees paid to that firm for work per-
formed, mainly in New York, for a Florida estate.26 In Rogers & Wells v.
Winston, the fourth district held even though "virtually all of the services ...
[largely federal tax return preparation and tax planning] were performed in
New York" and the "fees ... [were] paid by the trustees out of assets in a
New York marital trust [from decedent's predeceased husband]" and not by
the Florida estate, nonetheless, since the firm was employed to perform
services by a Florida estate it "should have foreseen that it would be haled
into a Florida court in the event of litigation over the services performed for
the estate." 27 Since it was employed to perform services for a Florida estate,
this opinion, and the service on which the court's jurisdiction is based,
apparently did not involve the long-arn statute. Nowhere was that statute
cited in this opinion. Service was made on the law firm by mailed notice
under Rule 5.041(b) of the Florida Probate Code.2s
The sense of the opinion is that the Florida court has inherent in
personam jurisdiction over non-residents employed by and furnishing
services to a Florida estate even absent compliance with, or allegations based
upon, the long-arm statute. Under prior application of due process consid-
erations, in rem jurisdiction could be obtained over one claiming an interest
22. Id. at 939.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 940-41.
25. 662 So. 2d 1303 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 675 So. 2d 929 (Fla.
1996). Please note that the author represented one of the parties in this litigation which may
color the objectivity with which this case is analyzed.
26. Id. at 1304.
27. Id. at 1303-04.
28. Id at 1304.
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in the res through mailed notice, however this was not applicable. In
personam jurisdiction could only be obtained through compliance with the
long-arm statute, through an unrestricted appearance, by requesting affirma-
tive relief in a proceeding, or by personal service of a summons within the
State of Florida. However, none of these methods were applicable here.
The fourth district reached a contrary result, however, in Manufacturers
National Bank of Detroit v. Moons,29 wherein the court held that a mailed
notice in a guardianship proceeding to an out of state trustee for the ward
was insufficient to gain jurisdiction over the out of state trustee to order
payment of attorneys' fees of the guardian's attorney in other non-related
proceedings from trust assets3°.
Finally, in Laushway v. Onofrio31 a removed personal representative
was ordered to account for property transferred to him prior to death, by the
decedent.32 The defendant contended that the court lacked jurisdiction over
him. Since the trial court clearly had in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant when he was removed as personal representative after having been
found guilty of procuring the last will by undue influence, that jurisdiction
continued to permit the present order.33
II. ATroRNEYS' FEES
Is the probate and trust attorneys' fee trauma over? Has the birth con-
cluded or are we still in labor? Is the baby healthy or genetically flawed? In
the prior iteration of this article, Ms. Donohue recorded the first and second
phase of the metamorphosis of this topic and this article will record, hopefully,
the final phase.
To recap, prior to 1976 there was no statutory provision relating to how
the fee of the attorneys was to be determined, other than that a personal
29. 659 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
30. Id. at 475.
"[F]ormal notice" used to obtain service in probate and in guardianship matters
was not sufficient in trust related proceedings to confer on the court jurisdiction
over the trustee; rather, pursuant to section 737.201, Florida Statutes, proceed-
ings related to trusts were governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure of Florida.
The latter, of course, prescribe summons or other process issued by or under
authority of the court and served as provided by law.
Id.
31. 670 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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representative was allowed necessary expenses including attorneys' fees
paid in the settlement of the estate.34 The 1976 Florida Probate Code
provided for a "reasonable fee" to be paid to the personal representative, the
attorney and other agents employed by the personal representative.35 Like
many other states, the statute also grafted the ethical concepts which are
used to identify a "reasonable" fee into the statute.36  However, these
concepts did not adapt particularly well to the determination of an attorney's
fee for probate administration 37 and over the sixteen years since this statute
was adopted, there were at least two amendments made in the hopes of
achieving a better fit.
With the 1976 statutory change, the actual practice of setting the fee
remained generally unchanged. Nearly universally, probate attorneys' fees
were set as a percentage of the value of the estate, as were the fees paid to
corporate personal representatives. Over time, market forces, and supply
and demand, overtook the probate bar and demands by some consumers
resulted in some attorneys changing the method used to determine the fee to
be charged. In many cases, lawyers and firms, generally the larger firms,
determined and charged their attorneys' fees for probate matters based on an
hourly charge, with little or no consideration to the value of the assets under
administration. 8
34. FtA. STAT. § 734.01 (1973).
35. Id. § 733.617 (1975).
36. See MODEL Rt.Es OFPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1995). See also FLA. RuLEs
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-1.5(b) (1987).
37. The "reasonable fee" and "ethical" concepts were little help in determining fees for
fiduciaries or their agents, although these fees were also controlled by the same statute and the
same considerations applied.
38. It is understandable that estate beneficiaries generally wish to hire lawyers at the smallest
possible fee. In very large estates, the beneficiaries would want to have the fee determined on an
hourly charge, while in very small estates, the beneficiaries would prefer the fee be calculated
based on a percentage. For purposes of this discussion, assume two example estates. The first
estate has an inventory value of $40,000 and the second, a value of $4,000,000. If both estates
required approximately the same amount of professional time to administer (assume 50 hours),
and a reasonable rate is considered to be $150 per hour for the smaller estate and $300 for the
larger estate, the fee would be $15,000 for the larger estate and the fee for the smaller estate
would be $7,500.
As a percentage of the value of the assets, that translates to 18.75% in the smaller estate and
.375% in the larger. The beneficiaries in the larger estate are pleased. If the fee is percentage-
based (assuming the scale in the 1995 statute), the fee in the smaller estate is $1,500, while the fee
in the larger estate is $95,000. The applicable percentage then is 3.75% for the smaller estate and
2.375% for the larger estate. The beneficiaries in the smaller estate are pleased.
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This was the fee environment in place when Florida Patient's Compen-
sation Fund v. Rowe39 and Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom4°
(neither were probate fee cases) were decided and which defined the
"lodestar" method of fee determination. 41 These cases stood for the propo-
sition that the controlling ethical considerations, taken as a whole, applied to
determine a reasonable fee, to be paid by one who was not the lawyer's
client (the loosing party in these two cases), required imposition of an
hourly-based charge.42 The opinions in Rowe and Quanstrom were written
by Justice Ben Overton, who then also wrote the opinion, In re Estate of
Platt,43 which applied the Rowe and Quanstrom reasoning specifically to fee
determination in probate administration.44 The Platt rule established that, in
the absence of an enforceable agreement, if the fee for the attorney for the
personal representative and the fee for the personal representative is to be set
by the court, it may not be set based solely on a percentage of the value of
the assets.45 This is so in spite of the language of the controlling statute,
which provides that the court shall consider "one or more"46 of the statutory
factors in setting a reasonable fee and which provides that one of the
statutory factors is "[t]he nature and value of the assets of the estate, [and]
the amount of income earned by the estate."
47
Platt was far ranging in laying down rules for the determination of fees
in probate administration matters and included a number of additional rules,
which are more fully reviewed in Ms. Donohue's case analysis in the prior
survey article and also in this author's article in Practice Under Florida
Probate Code.48 However, the "central holding" of Platt was that neither
the attorney's fee nor the personal representative's fee could be determined
While it is true that larger estates generally require the expenditure of more time, this is not
always the case; and in any instance, the relationship is not linear. In some instances, more
professional time is expended on a smaller estate than a larger estate. Of course, it goes without
saying that the lawyer's liability is always much greater in the larger estate.
39. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
40. 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990).
41. Id. at 830-35 (discussing the origin and calculation of attorneys' fees under the
"Lodestar" method); Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150-52.
42. See Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 835; Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150.
43. 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991).
44. la at 333.
45. Id. at 336-37.
46. Id. at 332 (citing FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1975)).
47. Id. at 332-33 (citing FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1989)).
48. See John Arthur Jones & Rohan Kelley, Compensation of Personal Representative and
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based solely on a percentage of the value of the estate.49 The opinion went
on to require the attorney's portion of the fee to be set as an hourly-based
charge, but failed to provide any guidance with regard to how the personal
representative's fee should be set.
It was within this environment that the Real Property Probate and Trust
Law ("RPPTL") section of The Florida Bar determined that the Platt opinion
was too narrow and, while it might work well for the insurance defense bar
or plumbers, fees determined under Platt would not consistently or fairly
compensate the probate bar for legal services performed in probate admini-
stration. This was particularly true in administration of large taxable estates
where the responsibility assumed by the lawyer, but not necessarily the time
expended, was significant.
Since the RPPTL section perceived that reasonable compensation
properly involved two factors, time reasonably expended (effort) and
responsibility assumed (liability), if an hourly rate was the only allowable
compensation method, where responsibility was significant, it could only be
properly compensated if the number of hours expended was also large.
Lawyers observed that generally, responsibility (liability) attached upon
acceptance of the representation and did not increase or decrease regardless
of the effort (hours) required to perform the services. Therefore, if the
responsibility was great because of the nature of the administration and the
value of the assets, but the administration could be accomplished in a small
number of hours, responsibility was under compensated if it was a factor
included in the hourly rate. By contrast, if responsibility was comparatively
small and built into the hourly rate, but the problems experienced were very
time consuming, responsibility was overcompensated. This was true even if
the hourly rate paid was adjusted because, in practice, it was not sufficiently
elastic to adjust for factors which it was not best suited to compensate.
The RPPTL section chairman appointed a committee to study the
problems of compensation which were raised by the Platt decision and to
recommend solutions.50 This committee was know as the Belcher Commit-
tee after its chairman:5
The Belcher Committee proposed a radical and untested formula for
probate attorney compensation which had never been tried either by statute,
rule, or in practice, in any other jurisdiction. The formula was designed to
compensate attorneys for probate administration by separately compensating
49. Platt, 586 So. 2d at 336-37.
50. The author served as a member of that Committee.
51. William S. Belcher, Esq. (1924-1992).
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effort and responsibility. The committee drafted an entirely new statute
incorporating this concept.
The goal of the Committee was to return compensation levels to
approximately those that existed in actual practice prior to 1991 when Platt
changed the rules; it was not the intention of the committee to increase fees
paid to lawyers in probate administration. To accomplish the goal of
fairness to the lawyer and to the client while still retaining historical com-
pensation levels, and also adopting an entire new method of compensation,
the committee members called on their many years of experience in probate
administration and setting fees and devised a formula intended to accomplish
the desired result. That formula provided for a bifurcated fee, a one percent
charge against the probate assets, including income earned during admini-
stration, to compensate responsibility (liability was most directly related to
the value of estate assets) plus an adjusted hourly-based fee to compensate
effort.
So as not to "double-dip," the hourly rate to compensate effort should be
reduced under the lawyer's general office hourly rate because responsibility
assumed, normally a factor in the hourly rate, was being compensated sepa-
rately. By this formula, if effort (time) was high in relation to responsibility
(measured by the size of the estate), then responsibility would not be overcom-
pensated as it would if it was included as a part of an hourly charge. If
responsibility (liability) was high in relation to effort required (time), then
responsibility would be fairly compensated. The formula was self-adjusting
for estates which did not fit a "cookie cutter" composition.
A second new concept adopted was that the fee determined by the
formula was presumptively reasonable. However, by considering a set of
eight probate-specific factors identified in the statute, the presumptively
reasonable fee could be adjusted upward or downward to reach a reasonable
fee for the particular probate administration.
However, the "great experiment" was doomed to failure before it began.
When the Belcher committee reported its recommendations to the executive
counsel of the RPPTL section, in general meeting, that counsel doubled the
proposed responsibility fee from the one percent of the value of the assets
recommended by the Belcher committee to two percent of the value of the
probate assets and tacked on a "surcharge" of an additional one percent of
the value of non-probate assets over which the probate attorney had no
responsibility. Thus, compensation for responsibility was increased from a
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minimum of 100% to perhaps thousands of percent over that recommended
by the Belcher committee.52
Upon becoming law, this new fee statute was immediately perceived by
the bench and the media (as well as substantial portions of the probate bar)
as resulting in excessive compensation for probate attorneys; substantially in
excess of the facts which were in general usage before Platt. At the trial
court level, few judges were willing to award the presumed reasonable fee
and many experienced probate lawyers were quoting fees to their prospective
clients which were substantially less that the presumed reasonable statutory
rate. However, lawyers who were not probate specialists, or who had less
experience in the field, generally quoted fees for their services at the rates
presumed reasonable by the statute. Thus, the anomaly was created that the
most experienced probate lawyers were quoting and charging fees at a lower
rate than lawyers with less experience.53
An example of the anomalous results produced by application of the
statutory presumption is found in Sitomer v. First America Bank-Central.54
In this administration, the probate assets were valued at $104,000, but
decedent had created an out-of-state corporate-trusteed revocable trust with a
value of approximately $25,000,000. 55 The only connection the large trust
had with the probate administration was that it was required to be reported
on the estate's federal estate tax return which, although signed by the
personal representative, was not prepared by the personal representative or
his attorney. 56 By application of the one percent "surcharge" to non-probate
assets, in addition to the two percent of the value of the probate assets and
100 hours of attorney time in the probate, the presumptively reasonable fee
52. The proposed rate was so high that Senator Fred Dudley who was tapped to sponsor the
section's legislative package in the senate, refused to introduce the bill at the rates now included
for responsibility. However, a different sponsor was located in the house and a bill with those
rates was introduced, and was eventually adopted with no change to the rates, as House Bill 1295.
This bill later became chapter 93-257 of the Laws of Florida.
A shortcoming of the proposed change which was inherent in the Belcher Committee pro-
posal was the failure to scale the percentage compensation for responsibility back at higher levels,
for example, over $5,000,000 in asset value.
53. This author was one of those who opposed the increase in the statutory rates over the
levels recommended by the Belcher Committee and consistently lobbied all who would listen for
a reduction in the rates set in the statute.
54. 667 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
55. Id. at 457.
56. The attorney was also the personal representative and signed the federal estate tax return;
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determined by the statutory formula was $265,236.57, an amount that was
more than two and one-half times greater than the value of the total of the
probate estate. The trial court considered the factors in the statute and
determined that $30,000 was a reasonable fee to compensate responsibility
and that an hourly rate of $300 was correct for 100 hours of effort. Accord-
ingly, the court awarded a total adjusted fee of $60,000. This award was
subsequently affirmed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Another case of interest which addressed the fee presumed reasonable
by the 1993 statute was Florida Bar v. Garland.57 This was a disciplinary
case in which one of the charges against the lawyer, on which the referee
determined guilt, was charging a clearly excessive fee in a probate admini-
stration.58 Mr. Garland charged a fee of $32,956.30 on a probate estate with
a gross value of $590,000.59 Expert testimony established a reasonable fee at
$15,000 to $18,000. 60 The fee was determined and collected under the
statute prior to the 1993 amendment as interpreted by Platt.61 The supreme
court overturned the referee's finding of charging a clearly excessive fee
under rule 4-1.5(a)(1). 62 It said:
We agree with Garland that in light of sections 733.617 and
733.6171, Florida Statutes (1993), which provide the manner by
which reasonable fees to the personal representative and attorney
of an estate are to be determined, the referee's recommendation as
to this violation must be rejected. Although sections 733.617 and
733.6171 did not became [sic] effective until after the Locke estate
was closed, if the fee charged in this case were charged today it
likely would be considered reasonable under the new statutory pro-
visions.6 3
This statement of the law was a surprise to the author and others who
believed that a fee could be calculated under the formula provided in the
statute as presumed reasonable, and still violate the constraints of Rule 4-1.5(a)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct of Florida, since one is a guideline
established by the legislature under which a court may determine an attorney's
57. 651 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1995).
58. Id. at 1183.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 1184; Platt, 586 So. 2d at 336-37.
62. Garland, 651 So. 2d at 1184.
63. Id. (footnote omitted).
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fee, and the other is a professionally imposed constraint on charging and
collecting a clearly excessive fee.64 However, it would appear that the final
word, at least for now, has been spoken on this point.
To its credit, the leadership in the probate bar, and specifically in the
RPPTL section, quickly recognized that the 1993 statute often produced an
excessive fee (of course the media was running exposes on the fee-gouging
probate lawyers and judges were routinely adjusting fees downward under
the statutory presumed reasonable rate), and prepared legislation to remedy
the situation.
Two alternative approaches to "fixing the mess" were considered. The
first alternative was to retreat to the compensation levels initially proposed
by the Belcher Committee (and also scaling back the applicable percentage
in larger estates) and giving the bifurcated concept another try to see if it
would work. The second alternative was to scrap the entire bifurcated fee
concept and start over entirely.
The consensus within the RPPTL section was that the "well had been
poisoned" and the bifurcated fee was (perhaps unfairly) branded as the
culprit and as excessive in concept, and not merely by its operation. There-
fore, those who were in a position to make the decision elected to abandon
the bifurcated fee concept entirely and begin again. This is an unfortunate
result, in this author's opinion, since inherently the statutory bifurcated fee is
the most reasonable approach to setting probate attorney's fees and if the
rates had not been initially set at excessive levels, might have served as a
model which could have been adopted in other jurisdictions. However, this
author concurred that the practical solution was to begin anew and in this
case, throw the baby out with the bath water.
In order to accomplish this, the obvious starting point was with the
compensation formula which had been adopted to compensate personal
representatives. This formula was both simple to apply and had not created
the media firestorm which the attorneys' fee statute had. In fact, there had
been little complaint regarding the compensation formula or resulting fees
for personal representatives since the new statute was adopted in 1993
concurrently with the offending attorneys' fee statute.
The other favorable aspect of that statute, in addition to its absence of
controversy, was its simplicity of application. Specifically, time and hourly
rates were not required to be determined. It was generally considered that
the attorney for the personal representative contributed as much value to the
64. This point of view is discussed at section 15.38 of Practice Under Florida Probate
Code. See Jones & Kelley, supra note 48, § 15.38.
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probate administration as did the fiduciary, and the logical extension was
that the attorney should be equally compensated with the fiduciary.65 There
was also some case law authority which predated the adoption of the 1976
statute, for this approach.66
A committee was again appointed by the chairman of the RPPTL
section, comprised of the surviving members of the Belcher Committee and
several others, to draft a proposal for new legislation. Using the personal
representative's compensation formula as a template, with adjustments, a
significant conceptual overhaul was quickly accomplished. Actually, very
little redlining was required in 733.6171; merely deleting subsection (3)(a)
(compensation for responsibility) and subsection (3)(b) (compensation for
effort), and copying over a sliding scale (with minor adjustment), percent-
67age-based formula as found in 733.617(2), the statute setting compensation
for the personal representative. When this had been done, since the formula
compensation clearly excluded compensation for extraordinary services, it
was necessary to define a representative list of those services, and that was
added as new subsection (4).
Of note, and in contrast to the recent media characterization of probate
lawyers as fee-gouging, the Committee believed that the sliding scale at
levels over $3,000,000 in assets, may produce an excessive fee. Therefore,
at that level and upward, the schedule found in the statute providing com-
pensation for the fiduciary was cut back for attorneys' fees by one-half
percent. The Committee's recommendation was adopted by the executive
counsel, this time without the fatal tinkering to the percentages, and a
sponsor offered the bill in the legislature which became chapter 95-401,
section 2, and which became law on June 18, 1995.68
Another revolutionary concept which was reported out of the Commit-
tee, and adopted by the executive counsel, again without change, was a
statutory "presumed reasonable" attorneys' fee for representing a trustee in
the initial administration of a revocable trust as a will substitute. This
65. Although it was not considered by the Committee in drafting the statute, this previous
survey, published shortly after the 1993 amendments to the statute, predicted the ultimate
direction of the law on this point. As Ms. Donohue stated: "It is not clear why there is a
distinction between compensation as a personal representative and for attorney fees paid on the
same estate." Donohue, supra note 1, at 361. With the 1995 change, that is now the law.
66. See, e.g., In re Lieber's Estate, 103 So. 2d 192, 201 (Fla. 1958).
67. See FLA. STAT. § 733.617(2) (1993).
68. Ch. 95-401, § 43, 1995 Fla. Laws 3275, 3310.
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became section 4 of chapter 95-401, which was later codified at section
733.2041, of the Florida Statutes.69
The concept which this statute recognizes is that the legal value added
to the process of administration of a revocable trust as a will substitute is
approximately the same value added to a probate administration of the same
assets. The effort required and the responsibility assumed are approximately
the same. Therefore, reasonable compensation should be approximately the
same.
70
The specific point should be made that the trustee is not required to
retain counsel for administration, contrasted with a personal representative
who is so required. 71 Also, the trustee may retain the lawyer for specific and
limited purposes and, like a similar provision pertaining to probate admini-
stration, may agree to a fee different that the one the statute presumes
reasonable. The substantial public interest to be served is that some cer-
tainty is created regarding fees for this type of service.
The structure of the trustee attorneys' fee statute72 is nearly identical to
the structure of the amended probate attorneys' fee statute.73 The only
difference of note is the inclusion in the trust statute of a laundry list of
ordinary services, that list being absent in the probate statute. The reason for
this difference was that it was felt that ordinary services in probate admini-
stration are generally well known, whereas revocable trust initial admini-
stration is a new concept not widely known throughout the bar. As a result,
in the trust statute, both ordinary legal services as well as extraordinary legal
services are identified.
The compensation rates for trust legal services are set at seventy-five
percent of the rates for probate legal services, and use the same sliding scale
69. See FLA. STAT. § 733.2041 (1995). The Florida Bankers' Association successfully
lobbied an amendment to the bill which eliminates any presumption of a reasonable fee if the
trustee or one of the trustees is a corporate fiduciary. This "bankers exception" may suffer from
congenital constitutional defects.
70. The legal services compensated directly and logically in this statute are the same legal
services which were intended to be compensated by the one percent "surcharge" added to the
1993 version of section 733.6171, except that surcharge applied to all non-probate assets (eg. life
insurance proceeds, IRA roll-overs, joint bank accounts, entireties real property, homestead real
property, etc.). It is true that the lawyer will expend substantial effort and assume substantial
responsibility in the initial trust administration, but probably neither is the case as to the other
listed non-probate assets. This direct approach to a specific situation is far superior to the
"shotgun" approach of the prior statute.
71. FLA. PROBATE CODE RULE 5.030(a) (1996).
72. FLA. STAT. § 733.6171 (1995).
73. See id. § 737.2041 (1995).
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of value to reach a presumed reasonable fee. The reason for the reduction of
twenty-five percent in the fee is that some of the work will not be required in
a trust administration; for example, marshalling of the assets would not be
required if the trust was previously funded.
As is the case in the probate statute, review or preparation of the federal
estate tax return is a defined extraordinary legal service. For preparation, a
presumed reasonable fee is one-half percent of the value of the gross estate
up to ten million and one-quarter percent on the value of the excess.
An interesting but often unnoticed remedial provision was also added
by chapter 95-401 which became subsections (2) through (4) of section
737.204. 74 Under previous procedure, if a beneficiary wished to challenge a
fee paid to the trustee, the trustee's attorney, or any trust agent, the only
alternative was to bring a civil action under the provisions of section
737.201 and serve all necessary parties with a summons or by publication. If
there is a pending associated probate administration, the idea is that a
probate proceeding would be a convenient forum to resolve issues of trust
fees and objections to those fees. So the statutory amendment grants subject
matter jurisdiction to the probate judge and provides that formal notice may
be used, rather than forms of service required in a civil action. One should
note in passing that there are extensive new trust attorneys' fee provisions in
section 737.2041, but there is still no statutory provision which quantifies or
sets a fee for the trustee, not even a statutory requirement that the fee be a
"reasonable fee." As noted below, it is this author's opinion that Platt will
74. Id. § 737.204(2)-(4) (1995). This section, entitled, "Proceedings for review of employ-
ment of agents and review of compensation of trustee and employees of trust--" provides in part:
(2) If the settlor's estate is being probated, the trustee, the attorney, or any
interested person may have the propriety of employment and the reasonableness
of the compensation of the trustee or any person employed by the trustee deter-
mined in the probate proceeding.
(3) In any proceeding under this section the petitioner shall either:
(a) Serve notice on all interested persons in the manner provided for service
of formal notice under s. 731.301, together with a notice advising the interested
person that an answer to the petition must be filed and served on petitioner
within 20 days from the service of the petition or the petition may be considered
ex parte, and such notice shall be sufficient for the court to acquire jurisdiction
for this proceeding over the person receiving formal notice to the extent of the
person's interest in the trust; or
(b) Obtain jurisdiction over interested persons in any other manner permit-
ted by law.
(4) Persons given notice as provided in this section shall be bound by all or-
ders entered on the petition.
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apply to the determination of a trustee's fee, but not (as to those matters
contained in the statute) to the determination of an attorney's fee for the
trustee's attorney.
Section 733.6171(7),75 reversed another of the holdings of Platt. That
subsection provides for the award of attorneys' fees for the attorney for the
personal representative if court proceedings are required to determine
attorney's fees. This would normally be the case where no agreement could
be reached on the fees, and an objection to the fees was filed. The statute
was improved by the 1995 amendment which proscribed the award of fees
under this provision if "the court finds the request for attorney's fees to be
substantially unreasonable. ' 76 This same provision and the same limitation
is also found in section 737.2041 relating to trustee attorneys' fees.
77
An important concept which was included in chapter 93-257 is found in
subsection (8) of section 733.617 1.78 Subsection (8) provides: "This section
shall apply to estates in which an order of discharge has not been entered
prior to its effective date but not to those estates in which attorney's fees
have previously been determined by order of court after notice."
79
The purpose of this effective date provision was to apply the new
procedure to determine reasonable attorneys' fees to estates then in admini-
stration. Of course, this was what happened upon Platt being decided. The
court did not limit its application only to estate probates commenced after
the opinion issued; rather, the Platt procedures for determination of a
reasonable fee applied to all estates then in probate. The intention was to
achieve parity between what the court had done with Platt and what the
legislature had done with chapter 93-257. This same language continues in
the present statute.
However, this provision quickly came under constitutional attack in
Williams College v. Bourne.80 In Williams College, the fifth district initially
75. See id. § 733.6171 (1993). This was renumbered as 733.6171(8) in the 1995 amend-
ment.
76. FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(8) (1995). See also Williams College v. Bourne, 670 So. 2d
1118 (5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996), which was decided approximately three months before the
effective date of this amendment, where the court notes: "Williams College points out that the
mandatory language of this legislation leaves open the argument that fees for the personal
representative's attorney must be paid for the fee litigation even if the fee request is exorbitant
and only a fraction of the claimed fees is awarded." Id at 1121 n.5.
77. See FLA. STAT. § 737.2041 (1995).
78. Id. § 733.6171(8) (1993). This section has been renumbered as 733.6171(10) in the
1995 amendment.
79. Id
80. 625 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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reversed and remanded the trial court's finding from May of 1991 that
Williams College had agreed to a valid percentage-based fee contract with
the attorney. 81 A petition for discharge in the estate was filed on June 29,
1990, which predated Platt and all of the ensuing statutory changes. The
only remaining item of administration was to determine the attorney's fee.
The initial fee request from the attorney for the personal representative was
$125,175.54.82
After remand, but before further trial ensued, section 733.6171(8) was
adopted which directed the court to determine the fee, absent an agreement
(which the appellate court had already determined was not binding), based
on the fee presumed reasonable in the new statute. 83 In accordance with the
statute, the trial judge made that determination and found a fee of $116,676
to be reasonable.84 However, since Platt had also been decided in the
interim, the trial judge also made a determination in accord with the Platt
guidelines, in case section 733.6171(8) was constitutionally defective and
Platt controlled the determination. 85 A reasonable fee decided under the
Platt guidelines was $63,624.86
The constitutionality of the "retroactive" effect of section 733.6171(8)
was argued and the trial judge ruled on that issue. The court ruled that the
portion of the statute which provides how a reasonable fee is to be deter-
mined is not a new right, but rather a modification of existing procedures.87
However, the court held that section 733.6171(7), which allowed fees for the
process of determining fees, was a new entitlement which did not previously
exist, and found this provision to be unconstitutional to the extent it is
applied retroactively. As the court stated:
An analysis of the case law suggests that a distinction should be
drawn between cases where a new right or entitlement is created
and cases where procedures concerning an existing right are modi-
fied. Not surprisingly, this case has both. The estate has always
been obligated to pay a reasonable attorney's fee in this case. The
81. Id. at 914.
82. Williams College v. Bourne, 670 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
83. See Williams College v. Bourne, 656 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
84. Id at 623.
85. Williams College, 625 So. 2d at 914 n.1.
86. Williams College, 656 So. 2d at 623 (applying In re Estate of Platt, 586 So. 2d 328
(Fla. 1991)).
87. In re Estate of Rosenburg, Fla. Admin. Order No. PR88-911 (June 24, 1994) (on file
with Clerk, Probate Div. Orange County Cir. Ct).
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method of determining fees has varied but the obligation has not.
The Court finds that the application of F.S. 733.6171 to determine
a reasonable fee in this case is not an unconstitutional deprivation
of a vested right.
On the other hand, F.S. 733.6176(7) (sic) provides for the re-
covery of costs and fees expended to determine compensation.
These items were not recoverable under Platt and it is fundamen-
tally unfair to impose a new obligation retroactively to this set of
facts. The Court finds that the application of F.S. 733.6171(7) to
impose fees previously unrecoverable to be unconstitutional.88
Not surprisingly, this ruling was appealed.8 9 The appellate court again
reversed the trial judge, this time finding that the fee award was not con-
trolled by section 733.6171(8), but rather application of the statute to
determine attorneys' fees earned for services rendered before the statute
becomes effective was unconstitutional and these fees must be determined in
accordance with the procedures mandated by Platt (requiring the award of an
hourly fee in the amount of $63,624).90 This author disagrees with the fifth
district and believes that the trial judge properly determined the constitu-
tional issues.
The underlying law relating to the constitutionality of a statutory
amendment and its application to events occurring before the amendment is
that substantive changes in the law generally cannot have retroactive effect
although remedial or procedural provisions may. 91 The Fifth District Court
of Appeal addressed the question of whether the amendment to section
733.6171, which fixed the method to be followed to determine a reasonable
fee, is procedural on the one hand, and therefore constitutional, or substan-
tive on the other hand, and thus unconstitutional.92
In Miami Children's Hospital v. Tamayo,93 the court considered
whether its decision in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, Inc. v. Rowe
94
should be applied retroactively to limit attorneys' fees awardable by statute
against the losing party in a medical malpractice action where the action
88. Id.
89. See Williams College v. Bourne, 656 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
90. Id. at 623. It is interesting to note that Plat was also decided after the attorney's
services had been rendered in the estate.
91. Village of El Portal v. City of Miami Shores, 362 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1978).
92. Williams College, 656 So. 2d at 623.
93. 529 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1988).
94. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
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arose prior to the Rowe decision.95 The court held "[w]e emphasize that the
factors to be utilized in computing a reasonable attorney's fee, whether
established by this Court through the Code of Professional Responsibility or
by case law, are procedural in nature.,
96
The supreme court also considered the retroactive effect of section
768.56 (in medical malpractice actions attorneys' fee awarded to the pre-
vailing party-the statute upon which Rowe was based) in cases where the
cause of action accrued before the effective date of the statute.97
In Florida, it is clear that in the absence of an explicit legislative
expression to the contrary, a substantive law is to be construed as
having prospective effect only.... This rule mandates that statutes
that interfere with vested rights will not be given retroactive effect.
On the other hand, statutes which relate only to the procedure or
remedy are generally held applicable to all pending cases. In
McCord v. Smith, 43 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1949), we stated:
A retrospective provision of a legislative act is not necessarily
invalid. It is so only in those cases wherein ... a new obliga-
tion or duty is created or imposed ... in connection with
transactions or considerations previously had or expiated.98
Under these concepts, therefore, the trial judge appears to be correct that a
change in the method by which a reasonable fee is determined is only remedial
and is permitted to have retroactive effect, especially where so directed by the
legislature. However, the creation of a right to collect attorneys' fees for a
dispute involving the determination of fees, where that right did not previously
exist, would be unconstitutional if applied to a fee determination in progress
when the statute was enacted.
The next step in the continuing saga began when the attorney filed a
petition for allowance of attorneys' fees for services rendered in the pro-
ceedings to determine fees, but only for that part of the services rendered
after the statute became effective. This petition was based on language in
the Williams opinion, that "once the services by the attorney for the estate
were rendered, the estate became obligated to pay a reasonable attorney fee
... based on then applicable law." 99 Based on that statement, the attorney
95. Tamayo, 529 So. 2d at 667.
96. Id. at 668.
97. Young v. Altenhaus, 472 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (Fla. 1985).
98. Id. (citations omitted).
99. Williams College, 656 So. 2d at 623.
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reasoned that attorneys' fees incurred after the effective date of section
733.6171(7) incurred on the issue of determination of attorneys' fees, would
be compensable. He filed a motion in the trial court to allow attorney fees
for services after October 1, 1993.100 The trial court allowed those fees and
the appeal ensued. Maintaining its consistency, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal reversed the trial judge and ruled:
[T]he Williams ... panel utilized principles analogous to those
found in Young and L. Ross to find that Ward had a cause of action
against the estate for the value of his services from the moment he
began to render them. It was at that moment when, although the
ultimate fee amount would increase over the course of Ward's
services, the estate's liability to compensate Ward was legally
fixed, as was the legal formula by which the fees would be calcu-
lated. The subsequent enactment of a statute that provided for a
new formula could not constitutionally be effective to enhance that
liability.
... To the extent Ward did or did not possess the right to
compensation calculated in a certain way and the right to charge his
time to litigate his own compensation, these rights were inextrica-
bly bundled at the moment Ward began his representation of the
estate.
10 1
If this is correct law, it is an unfortunate policy result. All estates, probate
of which has commenced after October 1, 1993, and before June 18, 1995,
would be locked into the bloated bifurcated compensation formula that the
probate bar worked so hard to eliminate.
A concept generally overlooked by lawyers and judges who assume that
later statutory amendments in the area of fees "reversed Platt" is that the
Platt rules for determination of a reasonable fee continue to apply in all
probate, trust, and guardianship proceedings for fees other than attorneys'
fees for representing the fiduciary in probate administration and initial trust
administration and fees of the personal representative. This continued
application of Platt would include, at least, determination of a reasonable fee
under section 744.108 (guardianship attorneys' fees and guardians' fees),
section 733.106(2) (attorneys' fees awarded to a person offering a will in
100. Williams College, 670 So. 2d at 1119.
101. Id. at 1121 (referring to Young v. Altenhaus, 472 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1985); L. Ross,
Inc. v. R.W. Roberts Constr. Co., 466 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. (1985), approved,
481 So. 2d484 (Fla. 1986).
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good faith), section 733.106(3) (fees to an attorney who benefits an estate),
section 733.609 (fees awarded in an action challenging proper exercise of a
personal representative's powers), section 737.627 (fees awarded in an
action challenging proper exercise of a trustee's powers), and section
737.204 (trustees' fees). An argument can be made that Platt also applies to
determine fees for employees or agents of the personal representative (or the
trustee); however, there is no further authority on this point, and certain
applications would appear to be illogical (e.g. a fee to a real estate broker for
sale of estate real property, or to an auction house for sale of a valuable
collection of personalty).
Finally, with regard to the topic of probate and trust attorneys' fees,
there is one additional change included in the 1995 amendment and a
sampling of recent cases on the subject of attorney fees which will be
addressed here.
New subsection (9) was added to section 733.6171 which requires that
the amount and manner of determining compensation for the attorney must
be disclosed in the final accounting'02 unless the disclosure is waived in
writing by the parties bearing the impact of the fees, and those waivers must
be filed. If waived, the content of the waiver must meet certain require-
ments. First, the waiver must contain a statement that the party has actual
knowledge of the amount and manner of determining the attorney compen-
sation, and in addition, that the waiving party either has agreed to the
compensation or that the waiving party has a right to petition the court to
decrease the compensation and is waiving that right. 0 3 Waivers which do
not meet these requirements are ineffective.
Two cases are worthy of mention. In Berger v. Brooks'°4 a discharged
attorney for a personal representative was entitled to a fee based on quantum
meruit; however, the amount awarded could not exceed the total of the fee
contracted for. In this case, the agreed fee was $1,000, but the attorney
applied for a quantum meruit fee of $8,800. The trial court also ruled that
section 733.6171 is unconstitutional without stating the basis for that
102. FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(a) (1995). This was an oversight on the part of the legislature.
Disclosures regarding fees are typically stated in the petition for discharge, not, except as a line
item, in the final accounting. Courts and clerks generally are accepting the accounting and the
petition for discharge if the disclosures are contained in the petition for discharge. It is to be
expected that this statute will be amended to conform with the practice.
103. Id.
104. 657 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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ruling.' °5 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed this portion of the
trial judge's order which declared the statute unconstitutional.1 6
In Dew v. Nerreter,10 7 the trial court awarded a fee to the attorney for an
unsuccessful will contestant under 733.106(3).0 s Under some limited
circumstances fees under this statute have been allowed to the attorney for a
nonprevailing party in estate litigation. 1U 9 However the services rendered in
this case were of no benefit to the estate and the fee award was reversed.110
IV. CLAIMS
This topic has been active in recent case law regarding the nature of the
applicable statutory provisions.
There are three possible classifications of statutory provisions purport-
ing to bar claims:
1) a statute of repose or nonclaim;
2) a statute of limitations; and
3) a rule of judicial procedure.
There are also three different actions that may be taken regarding estate
claims which are affected by the different types of statutory provisions:
1) filing the claim
A. where the potential claimant has received notice
B. where the potential claimant has not received notice
2) objection to the claim
3) commencement of an independent action on the claim.
105. Id. at 1282.
106. Id.
107. 664 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
108. Id. at 1180. Section 733.106 entitled, Costs and attorney fees, provides in part:
(3) Any attorney who has rendered services to an estate may apply for an
order awarding attorney fees, and after informal notice to the personal represen-
tative and all persons bearing the impact of the payment the court shall enter its
order on the petition. FLA. STAT. § 733.106(3) (1995).
109. See, e.g., In re Estate of Lewis, 442 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); In re
Whitehead's Estate, 287 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1973).
110. Dew, 664 So. 2d at 1180-81.
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The nature of the statute impacts the rights of the party charged to act if
that action is tardy or does not occur and impacts the ability to obtain relaxa-
tion of the statutory deadline. The importance of determining the effect of the
statutory provisions on the actions or inactions of parties is not well under-
stood, as evidenced by the divergence in result in the reported cases.
A statute of nonclaim or repose is an automatic and complete bar to a
claim. A late filed claim may simply be ignored and need not be stricken on
motion. Defenses such as estoppel or fraud are unavailable to the claimant
and the court cannot extend the time for filing the claim (unless specifically
authorized by the nonclaim statute)."'
A statute of limitations, in contrast, must be pled and proved by the
estate as an affirmative defense or it is waived. It is also subject to the
defense of estoppel or fraud which may be raised by reply under Rule 1.100
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure! 12
A rule of judicial procedure is a limitation which may be relaxed or
extended, even after it has expired, in the broad discretion of the judge for
good cause shown. In Yerex v. Durzo, 1 3 the fourth district interpreted
section 733.705(4) as a rule of judicial procedure rather than a statute of
nonclaim and the court allowed a late filing of an independent action, after
objection to the claim. 14 In this case, the widow's claim was contingent
upon the personal representative suing her, which event had not occurred."
5
Since the filing of an independent action on the claim was premature, the
trial court granted an extension of time to file."
6
A difference of opinion exists regarding the classifications of sections
733.702 and 733.710 as either statutes of nonclaim or statutes of limitation.
What is surprising is the number of reported opinions from the various
courts of appeal which have totally ignored a statement in the supreme court
majority opinion in Spohr v. Berryman117 that "[w]hile known as a statute of
111. See FLA. STAT. § 733.702(3) (1995). This section provides: "an extension [of time to
file a claim] may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the
claims period." Id
112. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.100.
113. 651 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
114. Id. at 221.
115. Id
116. Id
117. 589 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1991).
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nonclaim, it [733.702] is nevertheless a statute of limitations."' 18  Prior
writing by this author" 9 has also concluded that section 733.702 is a statute
of nonclaim, although a contrary view is expressed by another author in the
same treatise.12 The reason Justice Grime's statement in Spohr seems to be
so uniformly ignored is because it is probably wrong; and, in any case, it is
clearly dicta which is not binding on the appellate courts.1
21
As of this writing, the first, third, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal
have held that section 733.702122 in its present form is a statute of nonclaim.
118. Id. at 227 (referring to Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493
So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1986)) (finding that it is a statute of nonclaim, which is uniformly to the
contrary).
119. Kelley, Probate Litigation, in PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE, supra note
48, at §§ 20.39-.40.
120. "It is the author's opinion that practitioners should continue to treat F.S. 733.702 as a
statute of limitations." L. Kathleen Horton-Brown, Creditor's Claims and Family Allowance, in
PRACTICE UNDER FLORiDA PROBATE CODE § 8.7 (1994).
121. Professor David T. Smith of the University of Florida Law School, in his treatise, states,
"Fla. Stat. § 733.702 now is ajurisdictional statute of nonclaim and not a statute of limitations as
it was at the time of Barnett Bank v. Estate of Read." FLORIDA PROBATE CODE MANUAL § 7.2
(Mitchie 1996).
122. Section 733.702, entitled Limitations on presentation of claims, provides:
(1) If not barred by s. 733.710, no claim or demand against the decedent's
estate that arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the state
and any of its subdivisions, whether due or not, direct or contingent, or liqui-
dated or unliquidated; no claim for funeral or burial expenses; no claim for per-
sonal property in the possession of the personal representative; and no claim for
damages, including, but not limited to, an action founded on fraud or another
wrongful act or omission of the decedent, is binding on the estate, on the per-
sonal representative, or on any beneficiary unless filed within the later of 3
months after the time of the first publication of the notice of administration or, as
to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice of administration,
30 days after the date of service of such copy of the notice on the creditor, even
though the personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by paying
a part of it or interest on it or otherwise. The personal representative may settle
in full any claim without the necessity of the claim being filed when the settle-
ment has been approved by the beneficiaries adversely affected according to the
priorities provided in this code and when the settlement is made within the
statutory time for filing claims; or, within 3 months after the first publication of
the notice of administration, he may file a proof of claim of all claims he has paid
or intends to pay.
(2) No cause of action heretofore or hereafter accruing, including, but not
limited to, an action founded upon fraud or other wrongful act or omission, shall
survive the death of the person against whom the claim may be made, whether an
action is pending at the death of the person or not, unless the claim is filed within
the time periods set forth in this part.
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This line of cases began when Judge Smith writing for the First District
Court of Appeal in In re Estate of Parson1 23 first characterized section
733.702, as amended in 1984, as a nonclaim statute. 124 This opinion pre-
ceded Spohr by more than a year. Judge Smith again writing for the court in
Thames v. Jackson,'25 reaffirmed this characterization after Spohr, without
mentioning Spohr.126 Judge Schwartz, writing for the First District Court of
Appeal in Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Carter127 cited Parsons with
approval, but did not mention Spohr. However, the Baptist Hospital char-
acterization of section 733.702, as a statute of nonclaim, was dicta, since the
issue before the court was the nature of section 733.710 as either a statute of
nonclaim or a statute of limitations. Finally, the Fourth District Court of
(3) Any claim not timely filed as provided in this section is barred even
though no objection to the claim is filed on the grounds of timeliness or other-
wise unless the court extends the time in which the claim may be filed. Such an
extension may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient
notice of the claims period. No independent action or declaratory action may be
brought upon a claim which was not timely filed unless such an extension has
been granted. If the personal representative or any other interested person serves
on the creditor a notice to file a petition for an extension or be forever barred, the
creditor shall be limited to a period of 30 days from the date of service of the no-
tice in which to file a petition for extension.
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
(a) A proceeding to enforce any mortgage, security interest, or other lien on
property of the decedent.
(b) To the limits of casualty insurance protection only, any proceeding to
establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which he is
protected by the casualty insurance.
(c) The filing of a claim by the Department of Revenue subsequent to the
expiration of the time for filing claims provided in subsection (1), provided it
does so file within 30 days after the service of the inventory by the personal rep-
resentative on the department or, in the event an amended or supplementary in-
ventory has been prepared, within 30 days after the service of the amended or
supplementary inventory by the personal representative on the department.
(d) The filing of a cross-claim or counterclaim against the estate in an action
instituted by the estate; however, no recovery on such a cross-claim or counter-
claim shall exceed the estate's recovery in such an action.
(5) Nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s.
733.710.
FLA. STAT. § 733.702 (1995).
123. 570 So. 2d 1125 (Fla 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990). "These changes ... indicate the legis-
lature's intent to create a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim which, under the circumstances
specified in the statutes, automatically bars untimely claims." Id. at 1126 (footnote omitted).
124. Id.
125. 598 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
126. See id.
127. 658 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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Appeal fell in line with Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B., v. SDI Operating
Partners, L.P.,128 and found section 733.702 to be a statute of nonclaim.' 29 It
seems most likely when this issue reaches the supreme court that it will
retreat from its characterization of the statue in its current version as a
statute of limitations.
Regarding section 733.710,130 agreement is not uniform among the
districts in classifying that estate, with the Fourth District Court of Appeal
finding it to be a statute of non-claim and the Third District Court of Appeal
finding it to be a statute of limitations.
In Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, the hospital, a known
creditor of decedent, was advised by the widow that the decedent died
without any assets requiring probate administration. 131  However, the
hospital filed a creditor's caveat anyway. 132 Very shortly after the expiration
of a two year period following the decedent's death, the widow commenced
administration of the estate. 133 The hospital was notified of the administra-
tion by the court because of the caveat, and promptly filed its claim.' 34 The
personal representative/widow moved to strike the claim as being barred by
section 733.710 and the trial court struck the claim.
135
The hospital appealed arguing that "733.710 is a statute of limitations,
rather than of repose, [and therefore] fraud or misrepresentation of the type
alleged here may serve to estop the estate from raising the limitations
128. 673 So. 2d 163 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
129. Id. at 168.
130. Section 733.710 entitled Limitations on claims against estates, provides:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death
of a person, neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative (if any), nor
the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the dece-
dent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as pro-
vided in this section.
(2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant
to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person's death, and whose claim has not
been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s. 733.705.
(3) This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or
security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or
the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien.
FLA. STAT. § 733.710(1)-(3) (1995).
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defense."'136 The Third District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed and
remanded for a factual determination of the misrepresentation/estoppel
issue. 37 Had section 733.7 10 been a statute of repose (nonclaim statute), no
defense would have been available and the claim would have been finally
barred. To illustrate a statute that operates with such finality, the opinion
pointed out that section 733.702 was such a statute of repose. 1
8
In direct and certified conflict is Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI
Operating Partners, L.P.139  The probate court, on motion, granted an
extension of time, beyond two years following decedent's death in which to
file its claim. 4° The personal representative appealed arguing that section
733.710 was a statute of repose and unequivocally erases any liability on
claims filed after the repose period.' 4' The Fourth District Court of Appeal
agreed and reversed. 42 The effect of this determination is that none of the
equitable defenses of fraud or estoppel are available to excuse noncompli-
ance with the statute. The reasoning of the Fourth District Court of Appeal
is based on the fact that section 733.702, by its terms, is subordinate to
733.7 10.143 The court reasoned that if section 733.702 most likely is a
statute of repose (in this it agrees with the Third District Court of Appeal),
then section 733.710 which is preeminent, must also be a statute of repose,
and not a statute of limitations.
To its credit, the Fourth District Court of Appeal opinion in Comerica
Bank & Trust is the first opinion which makes note of the "throw-away" line
in Spohr v. Berryman which characterizes section 733.702 as a statute of
limitations. 144 As gently as possible, Judge Farmer writing for the Comerica
136. Baptist Hosp., 658 So. 2d at 561.
137. Id. at 561.
138. Id. at563.
139. Commerica Bank, 673 So. 2d at 163.
140. Id. at 164. There was no issue as to whether the claims were timely under section
733.702, since the period runs from service of notice of administration.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 163.
143. Section 733.702(1) begins: "If not barred by s. 733.710, no claim or demand against
the decedent's estate .... ." FLA. STAT. § 733.702(1) (1991). Also, 733.702(5) provides:
"Nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710." Id. §
733.702(5). Finally, 733.710(1) begins: "Notwithstanding any other provision of the code ......
Id. § 733.710(1). The author agrees with the Fourth District Court of Appeal regarding
preeminence of 733.710, but disagrees that it be at of least equal authority with 733.702. Also,
the balance of the opinion is an intricately constructed model of logic, which rests on a faulty
foundation. It is the author's opinion that section 733.710 is an ordinary statute of limitations.
144. Comerica Bank, 673 So. 2d at 166 n.5.
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court, points out that by the time Spohr was decided, section 733.702 had
been amended from a statute of limitations to a statute of nonclaim
45
Trying to make procedural sense of the unsettled state of the law
becomes difficult for the practitioner. Recognizing widespread disagree-
ment, this author suggests the following:
1.(a) A claimant is not barred until the passage of two years from
decedent's death for failure to timely file a claim if he was reasonably
ascertainable but was not served with notice of administration. The claim
may be filed at any time during the two year period and it will be determined
timely. The better procedure for the claimant would be to file a motion to
extend the time for filing a claim on the authority of section 733.702(3) (on
the grounds of insufficient notice of the claims period) 146 so as not to have
the court mistakenly enter an order of discharge, without notice to the
claimant, believing the claim to have been barred without further action by
section 733.702(3).147 Section 733.710 is a statute of limitations, which
must be pled as an affirmative defense and by case law interpretation is
subject to the equitable defenses of fraud and estoppel.
1.(b) A claimant who has received notice of administration but who has
not timely filed the claim is automatically barred without further action
148
unless the claimant requests an extension of time to file, which may only be
granted on the ground of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims
period. 733.702(3).
2. The time for objection to a claim 149 may be extended by the court
before or after the thirty-day time period expires upon a showing of good
cause. This is a rule of judicial procedure which may be relaxed in the broad
discretion of the trial court.
50
3. An independent action must be commenced by the claimant if the
claim has been objected to, within thirty-days from the date of service of the
145. Id. at 166.
146. This is probably not required for the validity of the filed claim, since the claim simply
has not been barred.
147. See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
148. No motion to strike the claim is required.
149. On or before four months of the first publication of the notice of administration or 30
days from the filing of the claim, whichever is later. See FLA. STAT. § 733.705(2) (1995).
150. Golden v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 481 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1986). Although the court in Golden did not
construe the same portion of the present statute, it may be cited as authority for this proposition.
See also FLA. STAT. § 733.705(2).
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objection. This is a rule of judicial procedure which may be relaxed in the
broad discretion of the trial court for good cause shown.15'
V. TRUSTS
The law of trusts has seen substantial legislative action in the past three
years, especially as it relates to a trust where the settlor has reserved a power to
revoke. 52 Several significant legislative changes have occurred which impact
trusts.
The first, setting a method to determine reasonable attorneys' fees for
the trustee's attorney, was covered in detail above under the section on
attorneys' Fees and will not be further discussed here.
The second involves the "on to off' creditor's procedures imposed on
revocable trusts. The third creates a statute of limitations153 to mirror section
733.710 which is applicable to claims two years after the settlor's death.
54
The fourth involves new execution requirements for trusts with testamentary
aspects. Finally, several trust cases were discussed above in the section on
Jurisdiction.
In the 1993 survey, Ms. Donohue noted that an effect of the recent
legislation "was to make trust administration more similar to probate
administration."'' 55 In fact, the provisions adopted in chapter 93-257, relating
151. See FLA. STAT. § 733.705(4); see also Yerex v. Durzo, 651 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1995).
152. The statutory references in several places throughout the code are to "a trust described
in s. 733.707(3)." That section provides:
(3) Any portion of a trust with respect to which a decedent who is the gran-
tor has at the decedent's death a right of revocation, as defined in paragraph (c),
either alone or in conjunction with any other person, is liable for the expenses of
the administration of the decedent's estate and enforceable claims of the dece-
dent's creditors to the extent the decedent's estate is insufficient to pay them as
provided in § 733.607(2).
FLA. STAT. § 733.707(3) (1995) (emphasis added). The further reference "as defined in
paragraph (c)" is an erroneous reference, as paragraph (3)(c) notes:
(c) This subsection shall not impair any rights an individual has under a
qualified domestic relations order as that term is defined in s. 414(p) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
Id. § 733.707(3)(c). The correct paragraph (c) was omitted through legislative error. Although
the error was created in ch. 95-401, it was not corrected in the 1996 Legislative session.
153. Or a statute of repose, depending on whether you are in the fourth district. See discus-
sion supra p. 407.
154. FLA. STAT. § 737.306(4).
155. Donohue, supra note 1, at 383.
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to creditors' rights in trust assets and trustees' liability to creditors, was the
first step in a trend toward requiring probate of trusts. Ms. Donohue also
noted that this would "[make] such trusts less attractive 1 5
6
Apparently her warnings did not go unheeded. Chapter 95-401 began
reversing that process. The philosophy behind this was that if the public
desired a probate of the estate, that was now available through the use of a
will as a testamentary document. Why should we labor to build a parallel
system to probate trusts when the existing will probate system has evolved
and been refined over many years and is well suited to its purpose. In fact, it
was the intention of many people to avoid probate which motivated the use
of the living trust as a testamentary vehicle. It was unfair and unreasonable
to force the living trust into a probate process.
However, it was also unfair and unreasonable to allow persons to avoid
their just debts, either during lifetime or upon death, by using a revocable
trust as a testamentary alternative to a will. Therefore, the statutory duty of
the trustee to be responsible ultimately to see to the payment of just debts of
the decedent was retained, but in a revised format.
Specifically, the 1993 version of section 737.3056, "[t]rustee's duty to
pay expenses and obligations of settlor's estate," was repealed, as was the
1993 version of section 737.3057, entitled "[tirustee's duty to notice credi-
tors," by chapter 95-401, sections 41 and 42, respectively, effective October
1, 1995. Adopted by chapter 95-401, section 737.3054, entitled "[t]rustee's
duty to pay expenses and obligations of settlor's estate," replaced the prior
statute so the trustee's duty and liability to creditors of the decedent remains
in the statute.'57
Some have described it as a legislative oversight that the trustee's duty
to pay creditors (and expenses of administration of the settlor's estate) under
the conditions described in the statute continues, but no provision for the
trustee to bar creditor's claims remains. This is an accurate analysis of the
present state of the law, however, it was accomplished intentionally rather
than by oversight. If the legislature was to keep the faith with those who
assumed that their revocable trust would avoid probate, and intended it to be
so, it needed to remove the "probate vestige," the creditor's publication and
claim filing procedure from the trust law, which it did. That should not,
however, shelter the trustee or the trust assets from just debts of the dece-
dent, unless those debts are paid by, or extinguished through, a probate
estate.
156. IM.
157. FLA. STAT. § 737.3054(1995). See also id. § 733.707(3).
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So what is the present state of the law? In the absence of a concurrent
probate proceeding, the trustee is well advised to determine and pay the
settlor's just debts from the trust assets. If there are disputed claims,
dissident beneficiaries, challenges to the trust validity by omitted heirs, or
other adversarial matters to which procedural solutions are not provided in
the trust statutes, then a concurrent probate administration of the estate is the
solution. Assuming none of these items are present, an "informal admini-
stration" of the trust alone is required.
The alternative would be to erect a complex procedural structure in the
trust law, identical to that in probate, to resolve these issues for trusts. This
cannot be what is desired by the public.
A practical problem which exists because of the implementation of this
"informal trust administration" concept is that the designated trustee may
have no authority to pay claims directly to the claimants. The statute does
not authorize the trustee to make direct payments of creditors. That author-
ity, if it exists, could only come from the governing instrument, the trust.
Certainly 99.9% of the trust documents presently in place do not allow the
trustee that authority. What results is that the payments are either made with
the formal or informal consents of all beneficiaries, or a concurrent probate
is initiated. The former solution should prevail in most of the trust admini-
strations where the plan benefits only a surviving spouse, or the spouse and
children. In the latter instance, the procedures of the statute158 will operate
to provide the structure to accomplish the desired result, that being payment
of the settlor' s just debts. The trustee is now defined as an interested person
in the probate administration' 59 and would, therefore, have the right to
petition for administration.' 60
A part of the new concept of a trust's responsibility for payment of the
just debts of the decedent, is the necessity that the trust and the trustee
become known to the creditors or to the personal representative. This is
accomplished by requiring the trustee to file a notice of trust with the
clerk.1
61
158. See generally id. § 737.3054.
159. Id. § 731.201(21).
160. l § 733.202(1).
161. See ch. 95-401, § 4, 1995 Fla. Laws 3275, 3281 (adopting FLA. STAT. § 737.308
(1995). Section 737.308 provides:
(1) Upon the death of a settlor of a trust described in s. 733.707(3), the
trustee must file a notice of trust with the court of the county of the settlor's
domicile and the court having jurisdiction of the settlor's estate.
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That notice is indexed by the clerk in the manner of a caveat if no probate
proceeding is then pending, or is filed in the probate file with a copy sent by
the clerk to the personal representative if such a proceeding is then pending.
The structure of this procedure provided by statute is that the personal
representative (who is aware of the trust and the trustee by virtue of the
notice of trust which was filed and served as required in 737.308(4)) will
certify in writing to the trustee the estate's shortfall after the residuary of the
probate estate (or in case of intestacy, all assets other than statutory entitle-
ments, such as family allowance) has been consumed. Note that preresidu-
ary devises and statutory entitlements are protected. 62 The trustee, after
reserving sufficient sums to pay the expenses of trust administration,
including fees of the trustee and the trustee's attorney, remits amounts
sufficient to fund the personal representative's certification. A settlor in the
trust document may provide for the manner in which the remittitur is
apportioned within the trust among the various interests, but absent specifi-
cation in the trust document, the statute creates the schedule of apportion-
ment.
Most lawyers have assumed that the concurrent probate administration,
with its published notice of administration and required service on known or
reasonably ascertainable creditors, will also bar the rights of creditors in the
trust assets and extinguish the liability of the trustee for payment (before the
two year statute of limitations expires); however, some have questioned this
(2) The notice of trust must contain the name of the settlor, the settlor's date
of death, the title of the trust, if any, the date of the trust, and the name and ad-
dress of the trustee.
(3) If the settlor's probate proceeding has been commenced, the clerk must
notify the trustee in writing of the date of the commencement of the probate pro-
ceeding and the file number.
(4) The clerk shall file and index the notice of trust in the same manner as a
caveat, unless there exists a probate proceeding for the settlor's estate in which
case the notice of trust must be filed in the probate proceeding and the clerk shall
send a copy to the personal representative.
(5) In any proceeding affecting the expenses of the administration of the es-
tate, or any claims described in s. 733.702(1), the trustee of a trust described in s.
733.707(3) is an interested person in the administration of the grantor's estate.
(6) Any proceeding affecting the expenses of the administration of the estate
or any claims described in s. 733.702(l) prior to the trustee filing a notice of trust
are binding upon the trustee.
(7) The trustee's failure to file the notice of trust does not affect the trustee's
obligation to pay expenses of administration and enforceable claims as provided
in s. 733.607(2).
FLA. STAT. § 737.308 (1995).
162. Id § 733.607(2) (1995).
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result. The operative statute 16 provides: "no claim or demand against the
decedent's estate ... is binding on the personal representative, or on any
beneficiary unless filed within the later of 3 months after the time of the first
publication of the notice of administration.
''64
An amendment to this statute is being considered by the probate law
committee of the RPPTL section to add specific reference to the trust, trustee,
and trust beneficiaries in this section.
Another significant legislative change which must be considered by the
practitioner in drafting living trusts is chapter 95-401, specifically section
11, which later became section 737.111.165 This statute reversed the holding
in Zuckerman v. Alter 166 to the effect that a trust of personal property
(specifically stocks and a bank account), which included post-death disposi-
tions, did not require witnesses as a condition of validity.' 67 Under the terms
of the new statute, the testamentary aspects of an express trust, as defined in
section 731.201(33), are invalid unless the trust is executed with the for-
malities required by section 732.502168 for execution of a will. The compel-
163. Id. § 733.702 (1995).
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Section 737.111 of the Florida Statutes is entitled "Execution requirements for express
trusts" and provides:
(1) The testamentary aspects of a trust defined in s. 731.201(33), are invalid
unless the trust is executed with the formalities required for the execution of a
will.
(2) The testamentary aspects of a trust created by a nonresident are not inva-
lid because the trust does not meet the requirements of this section, if the trust is
valid under the laws of the state or country where the settlor was at the time of
execution.
(3) The testamentary aspects of an amendment to a trust are invalid unless
the amendment is executed with the same formalities as a will.
(4) For the purposes of this section, the term "testamentary aspects" means
those provisions of the trust that dispose of the trust property on the death of the
settlor other than to the settlor's estate.
FLA. STAT. § 737.111 (1995).
166. 615 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1993). See Donohue, supra note 1, at 376 (providing additional
discussion on this case).
167. Trusts of real property have always required execution with the formalities of a deed,
requiring two witnesses, as a condition to validity. FLA. STAT. §§ 689.01, .05, .06 (1995).
However, the formalities required for execution of deed differ from the formalities required for
execution of a will, even though both require two witnesses.
168. See section 732.502 which provides that every will must be in writing and executed as
follows:
(1)(a) Testator's signature.-
1. The testator must sign the will at the end; or
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ling question, especially as it relates to self-trusteed trusts, is why should one
be able to make a deathtime disposition of property by a trust, without
witnesses present and subscribing, while that same disposition, if done by
will, would require present and subscribing witnesses. Witnesses should be
required in both or neither. The consensus is that the dignity and formality
added to the event, together with the potential for later eye witness testi-
mony, mandates the presence of witnesses. Because of the definitional
breadth in section 731.201(33),169 all of the popular forms of split interest
trusts and the qualified personal residence trust 170 are caught within the
scope of this execution requirement.
The drafting oversight is that existing trusts were not excluded from the
operation of this section. While revocable or amendable trusts may cure the
problem with an amendment or revocation, the real problem lies in existing
trusts which are neither revocable or amendable. The argument may be
made by testate or residuary beneficiaries of the decedent's probate estate,' 7'
that application of the statute to existing qualified charitable remainder
trusts, or pooled income funds created in the trust form, invalidate the post
death disposition provisions. Moreover, these trust assets are properly assets
2. The testator's name must be subscribed at the end of the will by some




a. That he has previously signed the will, or
b. That another person has subscribed the testator's name to it, must be in
the presence of at least two attesting witnestes.
(c) Witnesses' signatures.-The attesting witnesses must sign the will in the
presence of the testator and in the presence of each other.
(2) Any will, other than a holographic or nuncupative will, executed by a
nonresident of Florida, either before or after this law takes effect, is valid as a
will in this state if valid under the laws of the state or country where the testator
was at the time of execution. A will in the testator's handwriting that has been
executed in accordance with subsection (1) shall not be considered a holographic
will.
(3) No particular form of words is necessary to the validity of a will if it is
executed with the formalities required by law.
(4) A codicil shall be executed with the same formalities as a will.
FLA. STAT. § 732.502 (1995).
169. Section 731.201(33) provides that, "'[t]rust"' means an express trust, private or charita-
ble, with additions to it, wherever and however created. It also includes a trust created or
determined by a judgment or decree under which the trust is to be administered in the manner of
an express trust." FLA. STAT. § 731.201(33) (1995).
170. To the extent of any testamentary aspects.
171. Or perhaps by the IRS.
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subject to the residuary clause of the grantor/settlor's will, or to be inherited
by beneficiaries of the intestate grantor/settlor. Assuming, however, these
trusts are of the nature of contracts, then retroactive application of this
statute is constitutionally defective as impairing the right to contract. This
deficiency was recognized after the passage of chapter 95-401, however,
since no legislation of any consequence in the trusts and estates area passed
during the 1996 Legislative session, this oversight was not corrected.
Chapter 95-401 added several new trust administration aspects which
create a power in the trustee to hold new additions to the trust as a separate
trust, or incorporate them into the trust, and also creates a right to sever an
existing trust.172 These powers are granted principally to avoid tax conse-
quences involving the generation skipping tax. 173 In the first instance, if a
devise is made to an existing exempt generation skipping trust, whether one
which is grandfathered as exempt, or one which was created as exempt, by
keeping the new assets separate, a taint of the existing trust will be avoided.
In the second instance, this will allow a fiduciary, absent documentary
authority, to divide a trust which might have an inclusion ratio' 74 of greater
than zero and less than one into two identical trusts, one having an inclusion
ratio of zero and the other of one. This will facilitate administration and will
affect taxable distributions and taxable terminations.'
75
VI. GUARDIANSHIPS
With a court order, a guardian may exercise certain defined powers
regarding trusts held by the ward in a fiduciary capacity. 176 In In re Guardian-
172. See FLA. STAT. § 737.402(2)(c) (1995). The court is also granted authority to order
severance or combination of trust. FLA. STAT. § 737.403 (1995).
173. See I.R.C. § 2613 (1995).
174. Id.
175. Id §§ 2612, 2621.
176. See FLA. STAT. § 744.441 (1995). This section entitled Powers of guardian upon
court approval provides:
(1) After obtaining approval of the court pursuant to a petition for authori-
zation to act, a plenary guardian of the property, or a limited guardian of the
property within the powers granted by the order appointing the guardian or an
approved annual or amended guardianship report, may:
(2) Execute, exercise, or release any powers as trustee, personal representa-
tive, custodian for minors, conservator, or donee of any power of appointment or
other power that the ward might have lawfully exercised, consummated, or exe-
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ship of Muller,177 the guardian who was the decedent's son, wanted to remove
the serving trustee of the decedent's preexisting revocable trust on the grounds
of conflict of interest. There was pending litigation between the guardian on
behalf of the ward and the person who was serving as trustee of the trust. The
equities were clearly with the guardian, but the trial judge "with reluctance"
denied the petition finding that the statutes relied upon by the movants did not
contain the authority to remove a trustee.1
78
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in a per curiam opinion from a panel
of senior judges construed the language of section 744.441(2) providing "or
other power" to include the power a ward reserved to amend his own trust.
This construction ignores the well established rule of statutory and document
construction, ejusdem generis, which provides that a general reference fol-
lowing a specific list is to be construed as limited by the types of items in the
specific list.179 In this instance, all the powers referred to are powers held in a
fiduciary capacity.'80 That rule of construction would require the reference to
"other power" to be interpreted as, "other fiduciary power." In this instance,
the reserved power of the ward was a personal power as grantor, to amend his
trust. It is curious that if there was an actual present conflict of interest
between the trustee and the ward, that the circuit court, in a proceeding brought
under section 737.201(1)(a), which gives the court specific power to "[a]ppoint
or remove a trustee," 18' would not have done so.
Another Fourth District Court of Appeal case decided one year later
also addresses section 744.441. I82 In In re Guardianship of Sherry,83 the
court would not permit a circuit judge to allow a guardian to create a trust
for the ward so as to change the ultimate beneficiary of the ward's estate
because it would not result in any tax savings.184 As the court stated, there is
no reason to negate the general principal that a guardian cannot exercise a
cuted if not incapacitated, if the best interest of the ward requires such execution,
exercise, or release.
(19) Create revocable or irrevocable trusts of property of the ward's estate
which may extend beyond the disability or life of the ward in connection with
estate, gift, income, or other tax planning or in connection with estate planning.
Id § 744.441(1), (2), (19).
177. 650 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
178. Id at 699.
179. See generally Metropolis Publishing Co. v. Lee, 170 So. 442 (Fla. 1936).
180. Except the reference to a power of appointment, which is a personal power.
181. FLA. STAT. § 737.201(1)(a) (1995).
182. See FLA. STAT. § 744.441(19).
183. 668 So. 2d 659 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
184. Id. at 660.
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purely personal right of the ward. I8 5 In this case, the ward, Ruth, and her
husband, George, were the co-grantors of a joint revocable trust. That trust
provided for disposition of its assets on the death of both grantors to Harold
and his wife, George's son and daughter-in-law. At the time of the guardian-
ship adjudication, Ruth and George were in dissolution proceedings. The
guardianship court approved an agreement between the guardian and George
(who was the trustee of the trust) to distribute one-half of the family assets
by means of a distributions of the corpus of the trust to Ruth's guardian.
Harold and his wife did not approve the agreement.
Ruth's guardian received the distribution of assets, but Ruth's existing
will poured her assets on death back into the trust. The guardian petitioned
to create a new trust for Ruth into which the funds would be placed, which
provided testamentary disposition to Ruth's friends. George objected and
the court held:
the trial court erred in approving Appellee's petition to create a
trust that would change the ultimate beneficiary of Ruth's estate
from Harold and his wife to Fields, as it is clear that doing so had
nothing to do with either tax or estate planning, as authorized under
the statute. No benefits will accrue to the estate as a result of the
guardian's substituting his judgment of what the ward would do
now if she were not incapacitated. 1
86
There is another interesting line of cases which limits fees that are
charged and collected by close family members for guardianship services. In
one such case, a mother became a guardian for her daughter and was the
recipient of a medical malpractice settlement of $2.85 million on behalf of her
daughter. 87 An estrangement later developed between the mother and her now
adult daughter, which resulted in removal of the mother as guardian and
restoration of some of the rights of the ward. As a part of her removal, the
mother/guardian applied for the award of guardian's fees. The court in In re
Guardianship of Neher held:
a daughter is not entitled to compensation as a guardian of the per-
son of her mother for doing what a daughter does. In re Read v.
Kenefick, 555 So.2d 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). There is also no
reason that a mother should be entitled to compensation for doing
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. In re Guardianship of Neher, 659 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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what a mother does. In this case, however, not all of Sharon Ne-
her's actions were actions that are normally done by a mother, and
she should have received compensation for those services that were
not. This ruling constitutes a holding that Sharon Neher preformed
some compensable services for the guardianship. Sharon Neher
established a guardianship for her daughter, filed annual account-
ings, performed other services that were beyond the duties of a
mother, and successfully thwarted an attempt to terminate the
guardianship. Therefore, she should be compensated for some
services.1
88
Another interesting case, which follows a developing line of authority is
Wright v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. 189 Ms. Wright, a
professional guardian, was removed from all guardianships on a finding of
probable cause by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
("HRS") that "she had exploited her wards by improper management of
funds."'19° The statute requires that the guardian "file with the court a true,
complete, and final report of [her] guardianship within twenty days after [her]
removal." 19' Ms. Wright refused to do so claiming her fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The court held her in contempt for refusal
to comply with its order and ordered her incarcerated until compliance.' 92 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal made an extensive review of the law from
other states, and federal jurisdictions, and concluded that by accepting her
fiduciary position, with its requirement to account, that Ms. Wright waived her
future right not to incriminate herself by fulfilling those incumbent duties.
193
The issue of standing in a guardianship matter is one not well defined in
the statutes. Persons who allege that they are "relatives and beneficiaries
under the ward's will" and who were taking care of the ward before she was
declared incapacitated are interested persons under Rule 5.700(a) of the
Florida Probate Rules, and have standing to object to a final accounting and
petition for discharge of the guardian of a deceased ward.
194
188. Id. at 1297.
189. 668 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
190. Id. at 662.
191. See FLA. STAT. § 744.511 (1995).
192. Id. at 662.
193. Id. at 662-63.
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If they do not have a sufficient interest to question how her funds
were spent, there is probably no one who does, and we do not think
that should be the case. As Judge Sharp observed in SunBank and
Trust Co. v. Jones, "[c]ourts must scrupulously oversee the han-
dling of the affairs of incompetent persons under their jurisdiction
and err on the side of over-supervising rather than indifference."'
' 95
Judge Glickstein's dissent follows McGinnis v. Kanevsky holding to the
contrary.
196
Finally, in Lawyers Surety Corp. v. Saltz, a surcharge action, the court
found that the burden of proof of improper expenditures was with the
plaintiff and that the plaintiff had failed to meet that burden. 197 The guardian
had paid $3,000 per month to the ward's wife for eight months for the care
of the ward. The allowance was deposited by the ward's wife into a joint
account from which her personal expenses were also paid. The guardian did
not require or obtain any accounting from the wife for the expenditures. The
court found that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of proof to show that
the guardianship had been damaged by this admittedly improper disburse-
ment by the guardian.
198
VII. ELECTIVE SHARE
In 1994, the Third District Court of Appeal decided an important elective
share case entitled, Friedberg v. SunBank/Miami, N.A. 199 The widow peti-
tioned to take an elective share against the assets of a revocable intervivos
trust created by the decedent two years prior to death. The marriage was a
thirty-eight year marriage. The total value of the estate exceeded $7,000,000
of which all but about $250,000 was funded in the decedent's revocable trust
at the time of his death. The trust provided for the majority of the estate to
pass outright to charity, with a small portion to remain in trust in order to
generate income for the widow during her lifetime. The opinion suggests
that the trust was created and intended "to diminish or eliminate a surviving
195. Id. at 188 (quoting SunBank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 645 So. 2d 1008, 1017 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
196. Id. (Glickstein, J., dissenting) (following McGinnis v. Kanesky, 564 So. 2d 1141
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
197. 658 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
198. ld. at 1152-53.
199. 648 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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spouse's statutory elective share." 2°° The opinion noted that the legislature
had considered and rejected adoption of the "augmented estate" concept in
the Uniform Probate Code, which includes in the elective share right the
value of assets not subject to probate, but over which the decedent exercised
ownership or control; in this case the value of the revocable trust would have
been included under that provision of the Uniform Probate Code.
The court was troubled by this result and indicated:
[w]e must point out, however, that we are troubled by this result.
This case involves a long term, intact marriage. We find it strange
that a divorced spouse is entitled under section 61.075, Florida
Statutes, to reach assets held in a revocable, inter vivos trust, but a
loving, devoted spouse is not.... Indeed, the amicus brief stated
that a citizen has "a constitutional right to be a mean-spirited, no
good curmudgeon" and that there are no "statutory impediments to
developing an estate plan that cuts out the spouse." Although we
believe this to be a manifestly unfair result and poor public policy,
we recognize that we are not the appropriate forum to correct the
same. We encourage the legislature to revisit the issue.20
1
The admonition in the opinion for the legislature to revisit the issue was
prophetic because, while the court was deciding this issue, a special committee
of the RPPTL section was drafting proposed legislation which would reverse
the Friedberg result by adoption of a hybrid version2° of the augmented estate
concept. A motivating factor for this revision was a different situation similar
to Friedberg, whereby, a well know trusts and estates lawyer who died in 1993
created and funded a revocable living trust before his death to deprive his
widow in a very long term marriage of any interest in his estate. Under the
proposed legislation, Mrs. Friedberg would have had an entitlement to forty
200. Ma at 205 (citation omitted).
201. Id. at 206.
202. The current version of the augmented estate in the Uniform Probate Code includes not
only the decedent's probate and nonprobate estate in the calculation, but also includes the
surviving spouse's net personal estate (including certain nonprobate transfers to others and
reduced by "enforceable claims" against the surviving spouse) in the calculation, first "grossing
up" all the family property, then considering the wife's net personal assets as being first funded in
satisfaction of the elective share. U.P.C. § 2-207. If there remains a deficiency, then assets of the
decedent's estate are used to satisfy the "short fall." In the Florida modification, the surviving
spouse's assets (and obligations) are neither counted in the original pool, nor in the funding
formula. This was a concession to simplicity at the expense of perfect equity.
1996]
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percent of the value of the assets of the revocable living trust, with a partial
credit for the value of the income trust created for her.
In reality, the elective share is a right only available to spouses of
decedents who do not have good legal advice on the ease with which it may
be avoided. If there is a public policy in this state to prevent total disinheri-
tance of a spouse, the law should be amended so it accomplish its intended
result; if not, it should be repealed.
After several years of intensive work, the special elective share com-
mittee 2°3 reported proposed legislation to the executive counsel, which
approved the recommendation and this was introduced in the 1996 Legisla-
ture as House Bill 2157. This bill was not reported out of the committee on
either the house or the senate side and did not receive action during 1996. It
will be reintroduced again in 1997.
VIII. JoINT BANK AccouNTs
The topic of joint and survivorship bank accounts has remained active in
the case law since the last survey, and remains both unsettled, conflicting, and
confusing.
A difficult concept is the effect of creation of a joint account with right
of survivorship as it relates to creation of an immediate ownership in the
funds deposited by the non-depositing joint tenant. This arises in the context
of the effect on a non-withdrawing joint tenant's rights when another joint
tenant withdraws the proceeds in the account. The Third District Court of
Appeal has held that, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,
creation of a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship presumed the immedi-
ate creation of ownership rights by present gift in the non-contributing
tenant(s), and that interest survives withdrawal by another tenant.204 This
view is based on cases which found the immediate creation of an interest in
the joint tenant, so as to avoid difficulty with the failure to comply with the
statute of wills. The theory was that the statute of wills required that
testamentary dispositions of property only occur if the instrument complied
with the requirements for execution of a will. Bank signature cards, al-
though providing for survivorship, did not comply. Therefore, before
appropriate changes to the statutes, the only way courts could validate the
survivorship provisions in signature cards was to find that a gift of the
203. The author served as a member of this Committee.
204. De Soto v. Guardianship of De Soto, 664 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Hagopian v. Zimmer, 653 So. 2d 474 (Fla 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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account occurred at its creation. Some of the old cases discussed the fact
that the surviving joint tenant was in possession of the passbook, evidencing
the "donor's" intent to make a present gift.2 5 That fiction is unnecessary
under the present statutory provisions206 and the old cases which found the
legal fiction of a present gift in order to validate the survivorship rights are
no longer required.20 7 However, they are still being cited, and in the Third
District Court of Appeal, are still good law.
However, in Katz v. Katz,208 where the contributing joint tenant with-
drew the funds from the joint account and purchased securities in his own
name, the Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected the argument of his
surviving spouse that, following his death, the securities belonged to her
since the funds used to purchase the securities had been joint funds.20 In the
third district, the funds would have resulted in an immediate gift to the non-
contributing spouse, and she would have been entitled to at least one-half of
the securities, since it was presumably her funds (by gift) which were used to
purchase that one-half. The better reasoned view is that there is no immedi-
ate gift upon deposit and that the interest of the non-contributing joint tenant
or tenants is only created by the survivorship provisions of the account and
only comes into possession after the death of the contributing tenant.
There is also some case law suggesting that such accounts may be
owned by the entireties, if the joint tenants are also husband and wife. 10
This concept is sometimes applied to bank accounts to shelter them from
lifetime third party creditor claims of one tenant. However, the concept is
native to real property interests and does not fit well when applied to
personal property ownership. Since an entireties interest cannot be severed
without the consent of both spouses, one characteristic of such a bank
account is that neither spouse can withdraw funds from the account without
the consent of the other. In practice, this would require two signatures on
each check or withdrawal order.
205. See generally Spark v. Canny, 88 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1956); Chase Federal Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Sullivan, 127 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1960).
206. See ch. 92-303, § 48, 1992 Fla. Laws 2739, 2788 (creating FLA. STAT. § 655.79 (Supp.
1992) (effective July 3, 1992)).
207. See In re Estate of Combee, 601 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 1992); In re Guardianship of Med-
ley, 573 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990), cause dismissed, 629 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1993).
208. 666 So. 2d 1025 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 675 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1996).
209. Id. at 1027.
210. Sitomer v. Orlan 660 So. 2d 141 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
1996]
427
: Nova Law Review 21, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
IX. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
1995 was an important legislative year for powers of attorney. Section 17
of chapter 95-401 substantially reworded section 709.08, entitled "Durable
power of attorney. ''21 This was another piece of important legislation which
had been drafted by a special committee212 of the RPPTL section, and which
had previously been introduced, but failed to pass.
Among the changes brought by this amendment was to allow "a
financial institution as defined in chapter 655, with trust powers, having a
place of business in this state and authorized to conduct trust business in this
state" to serve as an attorney in fact. If a petition to adjudicate incapacity of
the principal is filed, notice of the petition must be served on each know
attorney in fact. This is because adjudication will suspend the power of
attorney unless the guardianship court orders otherwise.
One of the most important aspects of the new statute is the authority of
third parties to rely on the power of attorney until notice of revocation is
received. The principal must hold each third party harmless from any loss or
liability suffered as a result of actions taken at the direction of the attorney in
fact. It also authorizes the third party to require the attorney in fact to
execute and deliver an affidavit stating that the principal is not deceased, a
petition to determine incapacity is not pending, that the principal has not
been adjudicated incapacitated, and has not revoked the power. A statutory
form of the affidavit is provided.
However, what makes the law work, is a provision which allows for
assessment of attorneys' fees against any third party who unreasonably
refuses the directions of an attorney in fact pursuant to the power. It had
been a very common practice for banks and stock brokers to decline to
accept instructions of an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of
attorney. In practice, that now appears to be the exception rather than the
rule so long as the power of attorney is executed after October 1, 1995 and
pursuant to the amended statute. In fact, although prior powers continue to
be valid, to gain the protection and expanded scope of the new law, the
power must be executed after October 1, 1995.
Another provision of the new law which should give pause to prospec-
tive attorneys in fact, is that the attorney is charged as a fiduciary who must
observe the standards of care applicable to trustees. Also, the attorney in
fact is liable to interested persons if the power is exercised improperly. The
211. See FLA. STAT. § 709.08 (1995) (effective Oct. 1, 1995).
212. The author served as a member of this committee.
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prevailing party in an action under this provision is entitled to award of
attorneys' fees. In the case of multiple attorneys in fact, each is required to
attempt to prevent a breach of the fiduciary obligations by the other or
others.
X. CONCLUSION
It is not only the tax laws which are continuously in a state of change that
need to be of concern to the trusts and estates lawyer, it is the changes in
substantive state law and applicable state procedure. An up-to-date lawyer is
as important to the practice in this substantive area as an up-to-date judge.
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In Florida, it is a third degree felony, punishable by up to five years
imprisonment,' for a private party to tape a private conversation unless all
participants consent.2 Any tape made without the consent of all participants
is inadmissible.3 Anthony Paul Inciarrano least expected that Earvin Herman
Trimble was taping Inciarrano when Inciarrano shot Trimble to death in
Trimble's office on July 7, 1982.4 Because the tape was the only evidence of
the murder, the Florida courts were forced to decide whether they would
apply the plain language of the Florida statutes or allow a cold-blooded
murderer to go free.
Trimble had once been extremely successful in the real estate business
in Riverside, California. Apparently, Trimble began losing profits from the
business, and customers' down payments, gambling on the horse races. In
1979, when he was about to stand trial for thirteen counts of grand theft,
Trimble left California for Florida and changed his name to Michael A.
Phillips. First he became Reverend Phillips, a minister of the First Church
of Utilitarian Science, whose mail order church sponsored a bingo parlor.
Then, under phony credentials, he opened an office in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida and practiced psychology as Dr. Michael A. Phillips.
5
Inciarrano's bingo hall in Oakland Park, Florida, had been closed down
by the police. Phillips met Inciarrano in 1982 through a newspaper ad and
they struck a deal for Inciarrano to invest $7000 and become a partner with
Phillips in the bingo business. Later, Phillips decided not to go into business
with Inciarrano. Inciarrano and Phillips argued about their business deal on
July 1, 1982, in Phillips' office. Phillips tape recorded the conversation by
hiding a microphone in a pencil holder, with the microphone connected by
wire to a tape recorder in a desk drawer.
6
1. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(d) (1995).
2. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d) (1995).
3. See id. § 934.03, .06 (1995). Section 934.10 would have allowed Inciarrano to recover
statutory and punitive damages as well as attorney's fees and costs. FLA. STAT. § 934.10
(1995).
4. Barry Bearak, Court to Consider Privacy Issue; Victim Taped His Murder but Slayer
May Be Freed, L.A.TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1985, at 1.
5. Id.; Brian Dickerson, Murder Tape is Allowed as Evidence, NAT'L L.J., July 22, 1985,
at 5.
6. Bearak, supra note 4, at 1.
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On July 6, 1982, Inciarrano went to Phillips' office and they argued
again, with the tape recorder running.7 The tape caught Inciarrano yelling,
"[w]e have a deal, yes or no?"'8 Then Inciarrano cocked his gun and fired
five times at Phillips. Phillips groaned and fell to the floor beside his desk.9
At approximately 3:30 to 3:40 p.m., a neighbor heard gunshots and called
the police.10 The police found Phillips' body, the tape recorder, and the tape.
The tape was the sole piece of evidence against Inciarrano. "Nobody saw
Inciarrano go in; nobody saw him go out.... The murder weapon was never
discovered. There were no fingerprints."" Inciarrano claimed that he had
the right to have the tape suppressed because it had been obtained illegally,
even though he admitted it was his voice on the tape.12 He based his claim
on the Florida statute, 13 which allows tape recording of an "oral communica-
tion" only if all parties to the communication consent. As more fully
explained in Part III of this article, the Florida courts struggled with this
dilemma until the Supreme Court of Florida created a case law exception to
the Florida law to keep Inciarrano in jail.l14
This article examines how the Florida courts have interpreted the two
party consent requirement of the Florida Security of Communications Act.'
5
It concludes that because there are many legitimate reasons for a participant
in a conversation to tape the conversation, the action should not carry civil
and criminal penalties, and the tape should not be inadmissible because of
the interception alone. If it benefits anyone, the two party consent require-
ment benefits the criminal element. Accordingly, this article argues that the
Florida Act should be amended to allow taping upon the consent of one party
to the conversation.
Part II of this article illustrates the many reasons for intercepting
conversations. Part HI examines selected provisions of the Omnibus Crime
7. Id.
8. Barry Bearak, Conviction Upheld in Illegally Recorded Murder, L.A. TIMES, June 28,
1985, at 22.
9. Dickerson, supra note 5, at 5.
10. Inciarrano v. State, 447 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984), quashed, 473
So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985); Privacy for a Murder, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1985, at A20.
11. Statement of the prosecutor, Richard T. Garfield; Bearak, supra note 4, at 1.
12. FLA. STAT. § 934.09(9)(a) (1995); Dickerson, supra note 5, at 5.
13. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d).
14. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1273.
15. Chapter 934, Florida Statutes is entitled "Security of Communications," and is com-
monly referred to as the Security of Communications Act. Sections 934.01-.10 of this Act
will hereinafter be referred to as the "Florida Act."
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Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,16 as amended, 7 and selected decisions
of the United States Supreme Court to provide background for the balance of
the article. Part IV analyzes the Florida Act, and Part V evaluates the
privacy provisions of the Florida Constitution. Finally, Part VI explains
how the two party consent requirement is irrational.
11. WHAT IS THE REASON FOR TAPING?
The reasons for taping or intercepting conversations are many, ranging
from blackmail or causing embarrassment, to entertainment, satisfaction of
one's prurient interest, gathering information, gathering evidence of a crime
or tort, improving workplace security or efficiency, to gathering evidence to
use in divorce cases, as well as industrial espionage. In addition, some
interception may be inadvertent. Still, some reasons for intercepting conver-
sations are more legitimate than others.
The legitimate reasons include gathering information (possibly to later
defend oneself) and gathering evidence of a crime or tort. At the other
extreme, certain reasons for taping, such as blackmail and industrial espio-
nage, are crimes or torts, even aside from the Florida Act. The argument
made more fully in Part VI of this article is that the legitimate reasons for
taping should not carry criminal and civil consequences, especially given the
pervasiveness of taping.
Although illegal in Florida, if done by a private party,18 intercepting
conversations is pervasive, as shown by the following examples. The
examples involve either nationally known personalities or interceptions in
Florida. Some were collected from newspaper articles and others from
reported cases.
A. To Blackmail or Embarrass
Politics is rife with taping. Politicians are either taping or being taped.
While President Nixon taped conversations in the oval office, Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson tape recorded conversations as well. President
16. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 82, STAT. 197 (1968) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22
(1994)).
17. The 1968 Act was amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
and by the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The 1968 Act as
amended by the 1986 and the 1994 Acts shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Federal Act."
18. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d). This statute requires all participants to consent to the
taping. However, section 934.03(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes, allows a police informant who
is a party to a conversation to intercept the conversation. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(c).
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Kennedy could press a button under the cabinet table to tape record meetings
or press a button for his secretary to record telephone calls he selected. The
"selected" taping totaled 248 hours of meetings and twelve hours of tele-
phone calls. 19 Gennifer Flowers tape recorded President Clinton "during
four separate telephone conversations from December, 1990, when Clinton
had just won reelection as governor, to December, 1991, the early weeks of
the presidential campaign," 20 and later sold copies of the tapes for $19.95.21
Ross Perot telephoned Colonel Oliver North and offered assistance, all the
while taping the call.22 HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros almost lost his job
when Linda Medlar, with whom Cisneros had an affair, made available tapes
of conversations between herself and Cisneros.23 Medlar had taped their
conversations over a period of almost four years. 24
B. To Entertain or to Satisfy One's Prurient Interest
Some people seem to enjoy learning private details of someone else's
life. The private details are surreptitiously taped or listened to either to
entertain or to satisfy one's prurient interest. According to a recent Liz
Taylor biographer, Liz's third husband, Michael Todd, taped the sounds of
19. William Safire, Kennedy's Betrayal of Trust - 260 Hours Worth of Tapes, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1994, at Al1. Mr. Safire comments:
Hundreds of people who spoke to the [P]resident with the reasonable expectation
of privacy were betrayed. And a nation that was dismayed and infuriated at the
revelation of the Nixon taping system in 1973 can see today where that sleazy
business began in earnest: in 1962, at the personal direction of John Fitzgerald
Kennedy.
Id.
20. William C. Rempel, Flowers to Market Tapes of Conversations with Clinton, L.A.
TIMES, May 24, 1994, at A18.
21. Id.
22. William Safire, Will Phone Taps for 'Protection' Turn Us Into a Nation of Spies?,
CHI. TRm., Nov. 13, 1992, at C19.
23. Cisneros to Remain, Fight Probe, ORLANDo SENT., Mar. 15, 1995, at Al, A4.
24. Excerpt from Reno's Letter on Cisneros, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at B9.
The tapes, secretly recorded by Ms. Medlar over four years, showed that he had
discussed payments to her that were higher than Mr. Cisneros had publicly ac-
knowledged he had paid. In addition, the tapes indicated he had continued pay-
ing her after he joined the Cabinet in early 1993, which he had publicly denied.
David Johnston, Concluding that Cisneros Lied, Reno Urges a Special Prosecutor, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at Al.
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he and Liz making love, "complete with 'fervid moaning and groaning, '' 5
and made copies of the tape for his friends.
26
In the 1980s, Anthony LaPorte was convicted of five felony counts
under the Florida Act.27 La Porte videotaped models in "modeling-video"
sessions involving several changes of clothing. When LaPorte left the room
to allow the models to change, he left the video camera running. The
resulting videos captured what the models were saying as they undressed and
dressed.2
Newspaper articles from January and February of 1995, chronicle a
number of such instances. In January 1995, an Orlando, Florida, couple
were charged with kidnapping and interception of oral communications,
among other charges. They apparently had a practice of finding single
women in a parking lot of a local nightclub, propositioning the women, and
taking them home. On one occasion, the "thrill-seeking couple kidnapped a
woman from a nightclub ... and forced her to perform sex acts for seven
hours while two children slept nearby.... At one point, they took a break so
that [the female thrill-seeker] could drive to her mother's house and get a
tape recorder to make an audio recording of the event.'29
In January of 1995, in St. Petersburg, Florida, a suspected rapist was
arrested. Police found some twenty tapes at the rapist's home. The alleged
rape assault for which the arrest was made was recorded on one videotape
with the victim saying, "'[n]o, don't do that. I don't want this to happen. ' ' 30
Apparently, the same videotape shows the rape of another woman.
31
In February of 1995, an Orlando area man pleaded no contest to
unlawful interception of oral communication. The communications occurred
at Walt Disney World's Epcot Center. The man "would angle a video
camera under the restroom stall to catch women disrobing and using the
facilities. 32 Also in February 1995, a man was looking for a television cable
25. Bio Paints a Lurid Portrait of a Boozy, Pill-popping Liz, ORLANDO SENT., Apr. 11,
1995, at A2.
26. Id.
27. LaPorte v. State, 512 So. 2d 984, 985 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied,
519 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1988).
28. Id. at 986. LaPorte was convicted of interception of oral communications. Id. at 985.
29. Tom Leithauser, Couple Charged with Rape, ORLANDO SENT., Jan. 7, 1995, at DI,
D4.
30. Suspect's Video has a Surprise, ORLANDO SENT., Jan. 17, 1995, at C3.
31. Id.
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in the attic above an adjoining apartment. The man had crossed through a
hole in the fire wall separating the attic above his apartment from the attic
above his neighbors' apartment. Once above the neighbors' apartment, the
man allegedly disconnected an air conditioning duct and "stole a peek ... at
[the] two neighbors having sex. 33
C. To Gather Information
With today's litigious atmosphere, how would you defend yourself
against charges of sexual harassment or other types of impropriety? A tape
might be vital where the testimony of witnesses are so conflicting that you
know someone is lying. What would have happened if Clarence Thomas or
Anita Hill had taped their conversations? A damaging tape would have kept
him off the United States Supreme Court. If he had taped a particular
conversation that she testified to in detail, he could use the tape to impeach
her credibility. A tape of a conversation is often much more accurate than
someone testifying as to that person's recollection of what happened. In
Florida, you could serve up to five years in prison3 4 if you tape a conversa-
tion without the other person's consent, 35 even though it may be the only
means of gathering information or later defending yourself.
Scott Bentley was a star place kicker for the Florida State University
("FSU") football team and "kicked four field goals, including a game-
winning 22-yarder, in FSU's national championship victory over Nebraska in
the Jan. 1[, 1994] Orange Bowl. 3 6 Bentley, who is from Colorado, had seen
his father tape conversations in Colorado when he wanted to protect himself.
Bentley and his father talked about protecting oneself from charges of date
rape. The father said, [in Tallahassee,] "Florida State is the focus of every-
thing. You can be a target. If someone accuses you, how do you defend
yourself? I've really talked to Scotty a lot about date-rape over the past
couple of years. 37  Scott Bentley had a three week relationship with a
Florida A&M pre-nursing student, which he described as a "one-night stand,
33. Intruder Accused of Trying to Watch Neighbors in Bed, ORLANDO SENT., Feb. 9,
1995, at C3.
34. Under section 775.082(3)(d), a third degree felony is punishable by up to five years
imprisonment. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(d) (1995).
35. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d).
36. Alan Schmadtke, FSU's Bentley Fined, Penalized in Sex Tape Case, FT. LAUD. SUN
SENT., May 17, 1994, at IC.
37. Clay Latimer & Curtis Eichelberger, Rogers Ready to Step it Up; Nuggets Rookie
Knows Team Needs Him to Have Big Game; Bentley Sentenced for Illegal Recording, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 17, 1994, at 6B.
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basically," 38 at her apartment in February of 1994, near the end of the
relationship. Scott Bentley taped the consensual sexual activity and later
played the tape to two other football players and a friend. The woman
pressed charges under the Florida statute, which prohibits taping without the
prior consent of all parties. 39 After admitting he made the tape, Bentley
pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor charge and was sentenced to forty
hours community service and a $500 fine. He was also ordered to pay $150
in court costs and was placed on probation for six months. Scott Bentley
stated, "the crime was to protect myself. What I did is legal in 48 states. If I
had known it was illegal, I would never have done it.... I wanted to protect
myself from date rape or potential allegations by her."'4
The Florida Act also limits the media's ability to gather information. In
a 1977 case, the media challenged the constitutionality of the Florida Act. In
Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corporation,41 a television station and the
Miami Herald challenged the Florida Act requirement of obtaining consent
of all participants to tape a conversation. The news media claimed that the
provision "impaired its news gathering dissemination activities and consti-
tuted a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment,"42 alleging that
"three basic elements ... necessitate the use of concealed recording equip-
ment in investigative reporting: accuracy; candidness of person interviewed;
and corroboration. 43 Investigation of "consumer fraud, housing discrimina-
tion, illegal abortion, [and] corruption of officials," among other topics,
would be substantially impaired without the ability to make concealed
recordings. 44 The Supreme Court of Florida held that the Florida Security of
Communications Act was constitutional because the Act did not restrict what
the news media could publish.45
D. To Gather Evidence of a Crime or a Tort
The Florida Act has become a ready tool of law enforcement, allowing
officers to gather evidence of a crime. After detaining someone, a police
officer might find the need to investigate further or to search a vehicle.
38. Scott Tolley, Bentley Sentenced for Tape Recording, PALM BCH. POST, May 17, 1994,
at IC.
39. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d).
40. Tolley, supra note 38, at 1C.
41. 351 So. 2d 723, 725 (Fla. 1977).
42. Id. at 725.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 726-27.
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Although not under arrest, the officer may suggest that the detainee sit in the
back seat of the patrol car for the individual's "safety" or "convenience."
And, of course, after arrest, the arrested individual is placed in the back seat
of the patrol car for transportation to the police station. While the individual
is in the patrol car, the officer may have a tape recorder running, in hopes
that the tape will intercept useful information or incriminating statements.
One Florida court considered the following pre-arrest scenario:
Some time after the police stopped the vehicle in which appellant
traveled with two other males, the officer asked the driver if he
could search the vehicle. When the driver consented to the search,
the officer asked the driver and two passengers, one being appel-
lant, if they would sit in the patrol car while he searched the vehi-
cle. According to the officer, he advised these individuals that they
did not have to sit in the police vehicle and that they were free to
leave if they so desired. The officer admitted that he requested
they sit in the patrol car because he wanted to tape record their
conversations. The officer's search revealed no contraband, and
the officer sent the three men on their way. When the officer lis-
tened to the tape recorded conversation, however, he heard one of
the males tell the others that the contraband was in his shoe. The
officer then radioed this information to the Okeechobee Sheriff's
Office and that department later apprehended the three males.4
6
When the Supreme Court of Florida considered a similar pre-arrest situation,
it applied article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution47 and held that "a
person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a police car and
... any statements intercepted therein may be admissible as evidence. 48
Thus, because a person in a police car has no expectation of privacy in a
police car, any communication made in a police car would not be protected
by the Florida Act.
In June 1991, a Sarasota police detective obtained a court order allow-
ing detectives to monitor numbers called into Roberta Jackson's display
pager. The detectives intercepted the numbers by using a duplicate pager.
Thus, when numbers were displayed on Jackson's pager, they were also
46. Barrett v. State, 618 So. 2d 269, 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), cause dismissed,
623 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1993). The fourth district ruled that the tape recording should have been
suppressed. Id. at 270. However, Barrett is no longer good law. See also State v. Smith, 641
So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1994).
47. See infra notes 144, 153 and accompanying text.
48. Smith, 641 So. 2d at 852.
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displayed on the detectives' pager. "[T]he numbers included a two- or three-
digit code that identified the caller, the caller's telephone number, and the
amount of drugs the caller wanted to purchase from Jackson., 49  After
conducting visual surveillance of Jackson in her car, the police searched her
car pursuant to a search warrant and arrested Jackson after they found
cocaine. In appealing her conviction, Jackson argued that the interception of
numbers on the display pager was unconstitutional because the court order
had been obtained without following the stringent wiretap procedures of the
Florida Act.50 The Supreme Court of Florida held that a wiretap order
involving a display pager must follow the wiretap procedure of the Florida
Act.51 The court noted, "because the interception of a pager may disclose
telephone numbers and coded messages as dialed by the caller, monitoring a
pager with a duplicate digital display pager is more intrusive than using a
pen register or a trap-and-trace device. 52
In early 1995, a would-be hit man and police informant, Peter Laquerre,
recorded conversations between himself and a Florida State University
second year law school student, Joann Plachy. Plachy claimed a professor
made unwanted sexual advances. A few days later a law school secretary
accused Plachy of stealing a copy of a law school exam before it was given.
Plachy allegedly called Laquerre to hire him to kill the secretary. Plachy
stated:
If I don't take this person out of the picture, I'm just screwed....
I'm looking at losing my whole law career, and I'm just about a
straight-A student.... I cannot emphasize how very important it is.
It must look like a total accident.... I'm talking about a situation
like, say, something like there's a one-car accident; the car leaves
the road and hits a tree or whatever, and the driver has a broken
neck.
53
Plachy was arrested on February 20, 1995, and charged with the murder-for-
hire scheme.54 As more fully explained in Part III of this article, Laquerre's
49. State v. Jackson, 650 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 1995).
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id. at28.
52. Id.
53. Jack Wheaton & Mark Silva, Student Wanted to Murder School Snitch, Police Say,
Tims PICAYuNE, Feb. 22, 1995, at A9.
54. Sharon Rauch, A Law Degree to Kill For, TALL. DEM., Feb. 21, 1995, at 1A.
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tape would not run afoul of the Florida Act because Laquerre was a police
informant.
E. To Improve the Workplace
Apparently, many employers eavesdrop on employees. In a 1993
survey conducted by Macworld Magazine, more than twenty-one percent of
the 301 businesses surveyed "engaged in searches of employee computer
files, voice mail, electronic mail, or other networking communications."
55
These searches were primarily conducted to monitor work flow, investigate
thefts, or investigate espionage. 6 An exception to the wiretap statutes
allows employers to tap phone and data lines. The exception applies if the
"subscriber or user" of the electronic communication service intercepts
communications "in the ordinary course of its business. ' 7
A recent example of employer eavesdropping that made headlines
occurred in North Miami Beach. A North Miami Beach bank supervisor
monitored telephone conversations of employees at the bank. The supervi-
sor allegedly overheard a conversation between William McCarthy, a bank
employee, and a potential customer. McCarthy claims that the supervisor
"accused him [McCarthy] of trying to steer a prospective loan customer to a
competitor," fired McCarthy when he refused to disclose the potential loan
customer's name, and "challenged McCarthy's application for unemploy-
,,58
ment compensation.
55. Survey Shows Snooping By Employers Widespread: Millions in the U.S. May Be
Subject to Electronic Monitoring on the Job, a Magazine Reports, ORLANDO SENT., May 23,
1993, at A13.
56. Id
57. FLA. STAT. § 934.02(4)(a)(1) (1995). The business exception was the key in two
Florida murder cases. In the two cases, the victims had received calls from the alleged
murders while at work, the conversations were monitored on extension phones, and the
victims were murdered shortly after the calls. The issue in each case was whether the
testimony of the eavesdropper was admissible. State v. Nova, 361 So. 2d 411, 412-13 (Fla.
1978); Horn v. State, 298 So. 2d 194, 196 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 308 So.
2d 117 (Fla. 1975). In Nova, the testimony of the eavesdropper, the victim's supervisor, was
held admissible because an earlier call had left the victim "visibly upset," and the supervisor
monitored the second call as the victim's supervisor. Nova, 361 So. 2d at 413. In Horn, the
court found that a co-worker had monitored the victim's call out of curiosity and the co-
worker's testimony was therefore inadmissible. Horn, 298 So. 2d at 198-99.
The Federal Act contains the same exception. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1994).
58. Ex-worker Says Boss Bugged Telephone and Then Fired Him, ORLANDO SENT., Jan.
4, 1995, at D5.
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F. To Use in Domestic Disputes
The temptation is great for one spouse to tape the other spouse when the
spouses are separated or contemplating divorce. In addition, access makes
the installation of an eavesdropping device relatively easy. Considering the
Federal Act, courts have split, some holding that the Federal Act covers
interspousal taping and others holding that the Federal Act is not applicable
to interspousal taping.59
In two cases, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that the Florida Act
is applicable to interspousal taping. In the first decision, the court ruled that
a tape made surreptitiously by one spouse is inadmissible and that one
spouse may recover civil damages against the other spouse who surrepti-
tiously recorded a telephone conversation. In Markham v. Markham,60 the
Markhams had two telephone lines in their home. The first line was listed in
Thomas Markham's name, and the second line was an extension of a line
installed at the Nancy Markham School of Dance several blocks away.
Thomas, a recording engineer, attached a tape recorder to the two lines and
intercepted a number of telephone calls. Thomas offered several of the
taped conversations into evidence in the Markhams' dissolution of marriage
action.61 The Supreme Court of Florida noted that the Florida Act contains
no exception for domestic relations cases and affirmed the district court's
decision holding the tapes inadmissible.
62
In the second case, Mr. and Mrs. Burgess had separated when "Mr.
Burgess stole into the family home, climbed into the attic, and spliced an
electronic device onto the telephone lines in an effort to intercept and record
Mrs. Burgess' telephone conversations. He then played these recordings to
neighbors and used them for purposes of gaining an advantage for himself in
the dissolution proceedings." 63 The court held "that the doctrine of inter-
spousal tort immunity does not bar a civil cause of action for money dam-
ages brought by one spouse against the other under section 934. 10." 4
59. Jonathan Niemeyer, All in the Family: Interspousal and Parental Wiretapping Under
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Act, 81 KY. L.J. 237, 253 (1992-93); Coi D. Stephens, Note:
All's Fair: No Remedy Under Title Ill for Interspousal Surveillance, 57 FORDHAM L. REV.
1035, 1037 (1989).
60. 265 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972), af'd, 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973).
61. Id. at 60.
62. Markham, 272 So. 2d at 814.
63. Burgess v. Burgess, 447 So. 2d 220, 221 (Fla. 1984).
64. Id. at 223.
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G. To Learn a Competitor's Secrets
Federal law makes it a crime to manufacture "any electronic, mechani-
cal, or other device, knowing or having reason to know that the design of
such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications." 65 Even so, "spy
shops" in a number of cities had been selling illegal "bugs" useful in
industrial espionage. A sixteen month investigation ended on April 5, 1995,
with United Stated Customs Service agents raiding spy shops in twenty-four
cities across the country. Some of the bugs seized were radio transmitters
concealed in pens, calculators, light sockets, telephone jacks, and electric
power strips. In addition, some of the bugs could "pick up conversations and
transmit them more than a mile away to a receiver the size of a pack of
cigarettes." 66
H. Inadvertent Interception
Conversations may be picked up over an AM/FM radio or short wave
radio inadvertently. In one Florida case, John Sion, who lived in a tenth
floor apartment near Picciolo's Restaurant, woke up one morning at 2:50
a.m., switched on his ham radio receiver, and began reading a book. When
he heard a conversation over the radio that seemed to concern a robbery, he
began taping it. What he had intercepted was a walkie talkie conversation
between officers Chandler and Granger of the Miami Beach Police Depart-
ment.67 When Picciolo's Restaurant opened for business on May 23, 1977,
one of the cooks discovered that the floor safe was empty. Even though
Granger was not working the May 22, 1977, 11:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m. shift,
another officer testified that he saw Granger at approximately 3:00 a.m. on
May 23, 1977, driving a marked police car. Chandler claimed that he and
Granger "staged a bogus burglary on the air as a part of a wager to see
whether anyone was listening.' 68 The court held that the Florida Act did not
prohibit the interception because walkie talkie radio signals did not come
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (1994).
66. James C. McKinley, Jr., U.S. Agents Raid Stores in 24 Cities to Seize Spy Gear, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 6, 1995, at Al, B12; John Lantigua, The Bug Stops Here: Raids Hit Spy Shops,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 6, 1995, at 1A, 10A.
67. Chandler v. State, 366 So. 2d 64, 66, 70 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied,
376 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
68. Id. at 66-67, 70.
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within the Act, and because Chandler and Granger claimed to be staging a
"bogus burglary," they had no reasonable expectation of privacy.
69
III. EAVESDROPPING: SELECTED UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
CASES AND THE FEDERAL ACT
The 1967 United States Supreme Court opinion, Katz v. United States ,
is the seminal privacy decision of this half of the century. In Katz, FBI
agents suspected that Charles Katz was telephoning gambling information to
persons in other states, in violation of federal law. Based upon visual
surveillance, the agents predicted that Katz would use a public telephone
booth to make the calls at approximately the same time each morning. The
agents attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of
the telephone booth and recorded six conversations, approximately three
minutes long. During the conversations, Katz was visible through the glass
panels of the telephone booth. The tapes were admitted at trial, and Katz
was convicted.7'
The issue in the United States Supreme Court was "whether the search
and seizure conducted in this case complied with constitutional standards. ' 2
The Court held that "[t]he Government's activities in electronically listening
to and recording [Katz's] words violated the privacy upon which he justifia-
bly relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 73  The Court
reasoned,
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.... No less than an individual in a
business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in
69. Id. at 70. At the time the case was decided, the Florida Act only covered those wire
communications transmitted by "wire, cable, or other like connection." Id. The Florida Act
was subsequently amended to include protection for radio communications as an "electronic
communication" but there is an exception for any radio communication "readily accessible to
the general public." FLA. STAT. § 934.02(12), .03(2)(h)(1) (1995).
70. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
71. Id. at 354 n.14.
72. Id. at 354.
73. Id. at 353.
[Vol. 21:431
443
: Nova Law Review 21, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
1996] Bast 445
a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.74
The Court noted that the interception would have been constitutional if
the agents had obtained a warrant.
7 5
When later courts have had to decide whether the interception of a
communication is constitutional, most have used the two-part test from
Justice Harlan's concurrence, which is as follows:
[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable." Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place
where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that
he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected" be-
cause no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On
the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected
against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the
circumstances would be unreasonable. 
76
Katz set forth the privacy framework in the context of search and
seizure and led to the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 [hereinafter the "1968 Act"]. The 1968 Act filled in the
Katz framework. The introductory language to Title HI of the 1968 Act
states:
In order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral commu-
nications, to protect the integrity of court and administrative pro-
ceedings, and to prevent the obstruction of interstate commerce, it
is necessary for Congress to define on a uniform basis the circum-
stances and conditions under which the interception of wire and
oral communications may be authorized, to prohibit any unauthor-
ized interception of such communications, and the use of the con-
tents thereof in evidence in courts and administrative proceed-
ings.77
74. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
75. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354.
76. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
77. OMNIUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS Acr OF 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 82,
STAT. 197 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 237, 253.
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In passing the 1968 Act, Congress attempted to prevent the interception
of oral and wire communications without the consent of at least one party to
the communication. The Act required a court order to intercept a communi-
cation without the consent of any of the parties to the conversation.78
Evidence obtained from unauthorized interception was inadmissible in court.
The Act also provided criminal penalties for its violation and authorized
civil damages.79
The Federal Act generally protects wire, electronic, and oral communi-
cations from interception, and the communications, once intercepted, are
protected from being disclosed to others. 80 Wire and electronic communica-
tions are not protected if they are "readily accessible to the general public.'
Harlan's two part test from Katz also comprises part of the definition of an
"oral communication" under the Federal Act. Oral communications are
protected if "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such commu-
nication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such
expectation.' 82 Two exceptions to the Federal Act83 allow a law enforce-
ment officer or informant participating in the conversation, and a private
party84 to the conversation to record the conversation. Absent the consent of
a participant, interception and disclosure may be done only after obtaining a
court order.85 Unlawfully intercepted communications are inadmissible,
8 6
and the person intercepting or disclosing the communications in violation of
the Federal Act may be subject to fine, imprisonment, and civil damages.87
In the Plachy murder-for-hire scheme outlined in Part II, the would be
hit man, Peter Laquerre, was working as an informant for the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement ("FDLE"), allowing the FDLE to tape
conversations between himself and Plachy.88 Informants are often used by
police to gather information. The informant meeting with a suspect is often
fitted with a "bug," located on the informant's person, which transmits the
78. Id. at 253.
79. Id. at 253-54.
80. Id. at 253.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (1994).
82. Id. § 2510(2) (1994).
83. Id. § 2511(2)(c)-(d).
84. The private party exception applies "unless such communication is intercepted for the
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act...." Id. § 2511 (2)(d).
85. Id. §§ 2516, 2517 (1994).
86. Id. § 2515 (1994).
87. Id. §§ 2511(4)-(5), 2520 (1994).
88. Wheaton & Silva, supra note 53, at A9.
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conversation between the suspect and the informant, to an officer located at
a distance. Under the Federal and Florida Act, an informant can intercept a
conversation.89 Although the constitutionality of the use of informants to
gather information has been questioned, the United States Supreme Court
has never held their use to be unconstitutional. 9°
The Federal Act preempted regulation of interception of communica-
tions by the states. Thus, the Florida Act must provide at least as much
protection against interception of communications as does the Federal Act.
In addition, the Florida Act can provide more protection against interception
of communications than does the Federal Act.91 In one major respect, the
Florida Act does provide more protection than the Federal Act. Florida
requires all participants to consent before a private party may tape a conver-
sation even though the Federal Act only requires one party consent.
IV. THE FLORIDA ACT
In many respects, the Florida Act closely follows the Federal Act. The
Florida Act also generally protects wire, electronic, and oral communications
from interception, and the communications, once intercepted, are protected
from being disclosed to others. Wire and electronic communications are not
protected if they are "readily accessible to the general public,"92 and oral
communications are protected if "uttered by a person exhibiting an expecta-
tion that such communication is not subject to interception under circum-
89. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(c) provides:
It is lawful under ss. 934.03-934.09 for an investigative or law enforcement offi-
cer or a person acting under the direction of an investigative or law enforcement
officer to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication when such person is
a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to such interception and the purpose of such interception is
to obtain evidence of a criminal act.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law
to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a
party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to such interception.
90. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971) (plurality decision), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 962 (1972); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
91. State v. Rivers, 660 So. 2d 1360, 1362 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1019
(1996).
92. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(h)(1).
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stances justifying such expectation., 93 Two exceptions to the Florida Act94
allow conversations to be recorded when either a law enforcement officer or
informant is participating in the conversation, or where a private party to the
conversation has obtained prior consent by the other parties involved in the
conversation.95 If a law enforcement officer or informant is a participant,
only the law enforcement officer or informant need consent. In contrast to
the Federal Act, the Florida Act requires all private parties to consent, if only
private parties are participants. Absent consent, interception and disclosure
may be done only after obtaining a court order.96 The Florida Act also
makes it unlawful "to intercept any communication for the purpose of
committing any criminal act. 97 Unlawfully intercepted communications are
inadmissible, 98 and the person intercepting or disclosing the communications
in violation of the Florida Act is guilty of a third degree felony punishable
by not more than five years imprisonment or a $5000 fine.99 The person may
also be subject to statutory damages of the greater of $100 per day or
$10,000 in punitive damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, and court costs.1°°
The Florida Act contains a good faith defense not included in the Federal
Act:
(2) A good faith reliance on:
(b) A good faith determination that federal or Florida law per-
mitted the conduct complained of shall constitute a complete de-
fense to any civil or criminal, or administrative action arising out of
such conduct under the laws of this state.1 1
93. Id § 934.02(2).
94. Id. § 934.03(2)(c)-(d). For the content of subsection (2)(c), see supra text accompa-
nying note 89. Section 934.03(2)(d) provides:
It is lawful under §§ 934.03-934.09 for a person to intercept a wire, oral, or
electronic communication when all of the parties to the communication have
given prior consent to such interception.
FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d).
95. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(c).
96. Id. §§ 934.07-.08 (1995).
97. Id. § 934.03(2)(e).
98. Id § 934.06.
99. Id. §§ 775.082(3)(d), .083(1)(c) (1995), 934.03(4)(a).
100. FLA. STAT. § 934.10(1) (1995).
101. Id. § 934.10(2)(b). Although effective October 1, 1989, the ambiguous wording of
the good faith exception has received only very slight attention. Only two reported cases have
referenced the good faith exception. Wood v. State, 654 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
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This article opened with the facts from Inciarrano, a case in which the
murder victim taped his own murder. Prior to Inciarrano, the admissibility
of surreptitious tapings had been the subject of State v. Walls,1°2 an extortion
case, and State v. Tsavaris,1°3 a murder case. The taping in those cases
would have been admissible under the Federal Act because one of the
participants consented to the taping. In Walls and Tsavaris, the Supreme
Court of Florida applied the plain language of the Florida Act and held that
the tapings were inadmissible. This portion of the article will first review
Walls and Tsavaris and will examine how the Florida courts dealt with
Inciarrano.
A. State v. Walls
In Walls, Harold Walls and Stanley Gerstenfeld had been charged with
extortion.1 4 Walls and Gerstenfeld allegedly threatened Francis Antel in
Antel's home on February 19, 1975. Antel had recorded the conversation
between himself and the two suspects. Although Antel was ready to testify
as to the contents of the conversation at trial, the State wanted to introduce
the taping to bolster Antel's testimony.'05 The Supreme Court of Florida
ruled the applicable portions of the Security of Communications Act consti-
tutional and affirmed the trial court's order suppressing the tape.) 6
1995); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Lazzara Oil Co., 601 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
The Reliance court noted that the exception was not applicable because the alleged recordings
were made before the effective date of the exception. Reliance, 601 So. 2d at 1242 n.1. In
Wood, Kevin Earl Wood had previously been involved in a federal lawsuit, and a state divorce
and custody case and had taped two conversations in connection with those cases. Wood, 654
So. 2d at 219. He was later convicted of unlawful interception of communications. Id. At his
trial, he attempted to introduce a good faith defense under section 934.10(2)(b) of the Florida
Statutes. The trial court refused to allow testimony on the good faith defense, but the defense
was allowed to proffer certain information. The proffer showed that, unable to initially afford
an attorney, Wood researched case law and spoke with people involved in amending the
Florida Act to include the good faith exception. When Wood finally obtained an attorney, the
attorney "agreed with his interpretation of the Florida wire-tapping law, which was that if a
federal law permitted the activity in question, the state law did so also." Id. On appeal, the
court reversed and remanded for a new trial to allow evidence as to whether Wood "acted in
good-faith reliance on a good-faith determination." Id. at 220.
Does the good faith exception in effect amend the Florida Act to allow a private party
participant to record a conversation if the party has first obtained a legal opinion from an
attorney?
102. 356 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1978).
103. 394 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981), review denied, 424 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1983).
104. Walls, 356 So. 2d at 295.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 297.
Bast
448
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
The language of the statutes in question is clear and unambiguous,
and no exception for the situation we have before us is provided.
This Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature
and create an exception which would encompass the instant cir-
cumstances.... The function of this Court is to interpret the law
and is neither to legislate nor determine the wisdom of the policy
of the Legislature.10 7
B. Tsavaris v. Scruggs
In Tsavaris, Dr. Louis J. Tsavaris, a psychiatrist, was charged with the
first degree murder of one of his patients and his alleged lover, Cassandra
Burton.108 On April 19, 1975, Dr. Tsavaris called an ambulance to Burton's
apartment. Burton was already dead when the ambulance arrived. Initially,
Dr. Tsavaris suggested that Burton had died of a drug overdose and empha-
sized that he and Burton were no more than patient and psychiatrist.10 9
The next day, however, a friend of Miss Burton told a sheriffs
deputy that Miss Burton and Dr. Tsavaris had been having an af-
fair; that she had become pregnant; and that she had undergone an
abortion only four weeks earlier. According to the deputy's infor-
mant, Miss Burton had not wanted the abortion, but Dr. Tsavaris
insisted; the couple's relationship was a stormy one, and they had
recently quarreled over Miss Burton's demand that Tsavaris obtain
a divorce in order to marry her.
110
On Sunday, April 20, 1975, Detective Poindexter of the Hillsborough
County Sheriffs Department was conferring with Dr. Feegel at the morgue.
Feegel was the forensic pathologist who was performing Burton's autopsy.
Poindexter had told Feegel about the alleged relationship between Tsavaris
and Burton, and Burton's abortion. Dr. Tsavaris called for the autopsy
results and Feegel took the call on speaker phone. After Dr. Tsavaris
identified himself, Feegel and Poindexter exchanged glances and Feegel
turned on a tape recorder, which would pick up sounds in the room. When
Feegel explained that he did not have the results of the autopsy, Tsavaris
asked if he could call back and Feegel suggested Tsavaris call at 1:30.
107. Id. at 296 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
108. Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 1977).
109. Id. at 747-48.
110. Id. at 748.
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Tsavaris called two more times that day, and each time the sheriff's officers
recorded the conversations.111 Dr. John Feegel testified at trial that Burton
died from manual strangulation.
Although he found no bruises or other evidence of strangulation on
the skin of the neck, he stated that a strangulation can occur with-
out leaving marks on the neck.
Feegel apprised the court and jury of a technique of reducing
the blood flow to the brain to enhance pleasure during a sexual ex-
perience. This technique ... involves partial strangulation. The
technique is also used by cardiologists to change or stop heart
rhythm. It is a dangerous procedure to be used only under con-
trolled conditions, since the loss of oxygen to the brain (which is
what increases sexual enjoyment) can lead to unconsciousness, and
heart stoppage can also occur. There [is] some indication that
[Tsavaris] was familiar with this technique, and there was testi-
mony that he had once said he knew how to strangle a person with-
out leaving marks. And there was evidence found by Feegel that
Burton had engaged in sexual activity shortly before her death.112
While the autopsy was in progress, Dr. Tsavaris called the
morgue to inquire about the results of the autopsy and reiterated his
claim that he only knew the deceased professionally. He was told
to call back later. When Dr. Tsavaris called the second time, he
was told that the autopsy was not complete but that the pathologist
had concluded that an abortion had recently been performed. He
denied having any knowledge of the abortion. By the time a third
telephone call came from Dr. Tsavaris, the medical examiners had
satisfied themselves that Miss Burton's death was caused by stran-
gulation. This was kept from Dr. Tsavaris, however, who was told
instead that the official report might be inconclusive because no
cause of death had been discovered. At this point, the person at the
other end of the line said, he "could tell the change in Tsavaris'
voice. I could sense the relief."113
111. State v. Tsavaris, 382 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), review denied,
424 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1983).
112. Tsavaris v. State, 414 So. 2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982), review de-
nied, 424 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1983).
113. Tsavaris, 360 So. 2d at 748.
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The trial judge suppressed Feegel's tape. 1 4 The Second District Court
of Appeals affirmed and certified the following question to the Supreme
Court of Florida: "[d]oes the recording of a conversation by one of the
participants constitute the interception of a wire or oral communication
within the meaning of chapter 934 Florida Statutes (1979). ' 15 The Supreme
Court of Florida held that the recording was made in violation of the Florida
statute requiring all parties to consent to the recording of a conversation. 1 6
In reaching its decision, the court noted that the Florida statute had been
amended in 1974 to require consent of all parties prior to an interception." 7
On the floor of the Florida House of Representatives, the only re-
corded debate on the two-party consent requirement of section
934.03(2)(d) was this comment by Representative Shreve:
'[What this bill does] is to prevent, make it illegal, for a
person to record a conversation, even though he's a party
to it, without the other person's consent.'
With no further debate, the bill passed the House 109-1. 118
The court rejected the district court's interpretation of "interception" to
mean an interception by wiretap of the conversation before reaching the
intended recipient." 19 Justice Alderman, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, would have accepted the district court's interpretation of
"interception."' 20 He also noted the seriousness of the offense of intercep-
tion of communications to which Antel and Feegel could be subject, consid-
ering that the tapings were evidence of extortion and murder. 12
1
I cannot believe that the legislature intended to brand as a
third-degree felon the victim of extortionary threats, who, while in
his home, electronically records the threats made against him. E.g.
State v. Walls. Likewise, I do not believe the legislature intended
that a public-spirited citizen like Dr. Feegel, who, in the course of
114. State v. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d 418,420 (Fla. 1981).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 427.
117. Id. at 422.
118. Id. (citations omitted).
119. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d at 422.
120. Id. at 430 (Alderman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id. at 432.
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his employment as medical examiner, records a lawfully received
telephone communication relevant to a pending murder investiga-
tion, should be subjected to the possibility of criminal prosecu-
tion....
The majority says that the legislature intended that for this public-
spirited action Dr. Feegel is guilty of a third-degree felony. Surely,
the legislature did not intend such an absurd result.'22
C. State v. Inciarrano
The trial judge denied Inciarrano's motion to suppress.'23 Inciarrano
pleaded no contest and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. On
appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, feeling constrained by the plain
wording of the statutes and prior case law, reversed. 24 The Supreme Court
of Florida then had to decide whether to create a case law exception to the
Florida statutes or to let a cold-blooded murderer go free. The court phrased
the issue as "whether the tape recording made by a victim of his own murder
must be excluded from evidence pursuant to chapter 934,"125 and held "that
under the circumstances of this case the subject tape recording does not fall
within the statutory proscription of chapter 934." 126 The court concluded
that the statutes did not apply because Inciarrano had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.' 27 This conclusion was unsupported by any analysis to offer
guidance in future cases.1
2
122. Id.
123. The definition of "oral communication" is "any oral communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation." FLA. STAT. § 934.02(2) (1995). In reaching its
decision, the trial court noted "the quasi-public nature of the premises within which the
conversations occurred, the physical proximity and accessibility of the premises to bystanders,
and the location and visibility to the unaided eye of the microphone used to record the
conversations." State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 1985).
124. Inciarrano v. State, 447 So. 2d 386, 390 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984), quashed by
473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985).
125. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1273.
126. Id. at 1274.
127. Id. at 1276.
128. Id. at 1275. Four Supreme Court of Florida Justices joined in the opinion and three
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Inciarrano went to the victim's office with the intent to do him
harm. He did not go as a patient. The district court, in the present
case, correctly stated:
One who enters the business premises of another for a
lawful purpose is an invitee. At the moment that his in-
tention changes, that is, if he suddenly decides to steal or
pillage, or murder, or rape, then at that moment he be-
comes a trespasser and has no further right upon the
premises. Thus, here, if appellant ever had a privilege, it
dissolved in the sound of gunfire.
129
Accordingly, we hold that because Inciarrano had no reasonable
expectation of privacy, the exclusionary rule of section 934.06 does
not apply.
130
The two concurrences "flesh out" the majority opinion, though in quite
different ways. Justice Overton wrote:
I concur and write to emphasize that when an individual enters
someone else's home or business, he has no expectation of privacy
in what he says or does there, and chapter 934 does not apply. It is
a different question, however, when the individual whose conver-
sation is being recorded is in his own home or office. 131
In his concurrence, Justice Ehrlich is much more critical of the majority's
reasoning:
Privacy rights attach to individuals, not to actions ... , [T]o hold,
as the majority does, that the commission of a criminal act waives a
privacy right requires an entirely new legal definition of privacy
rights which would, in turn, shake the foundation of fourth amend-
ment analysis.... It would be more judicially honest to admit the
error and recede from Walls and Tsavaris and to hold that the stat-
ute is inapplicable. The victim no more "intercepted" the conver-
sation than he "intercepted" the bullets that ended his life....
129. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1275-76 (citing Inciarrano v. State, 447 So. 2d at 389).
130. Md at 1276.
131. Id. (Overton, J., concurring).
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If criminal acts waive privacy rights, as the majority implies,
police have the right and duty to intrude without a warrant into a
bedroom where the owner/resident is smoking marijuana, reasoning
that the fourth amendment protection has "gone up in smoke."' 32
What Justice Ehrlich seems to suggest is that Florida interprets its statute as
requiring "all of the parties to the communication [to] have given prior
consent to such interception,"' 133 in order to allow a participant to a conver-
sation to lawfully record the conversation.
D. State v. Walls, Tsavaris v. Scruggs, and State v. Inciarrano
Inciarrano was a very difficult case for the Supreme Court of Florida.
If the court applied the plain language of the statute, then the tape recording
of Inciarrano murdering Trimble would have been inadmissible. The
available evidence was much different in Inciarrano than in Walls and
Tsavaris. In Walls and Tsavaris, at least one party to the conversation, other
than the defendant, could testify, and in Tsavaris, there was documentary
and medical evidence. There was no other evidence in Inciarrano to tie
Inciarrano to Trimble's murder except for the tape recording. Inciarrano
admitted it was his voice on the tape. Faced with a difficult decision, the
Supreme Court of Florida created a case law exception to the plainly worded
Florida statute. The Inciarrano majority decided that the tape was admissi-
ble because Inciarrano had no expectation of privacy. True, the Florida
statute, like the Federal Act, defines an "oral communication" as a conversa-
tion in which the participants have a justified expectation of privacy. But
why did Inciarrano have no expectation of privacy? Was it because he was
committing a crime, or was it because of the physical surroundings-that
Inciarrano and Trimble were in an office, subject to being interrupted at any
time, or was it because it was Trimble's office? The court never adequately
explained its rationale for deciding that Trimble had no expectation of
privacy.
E. People, Not Places
Katz v. United States134 changed prior search and seizure law to protect
people, not places. The Supreme Court of Florida, with little analysis, has
ruled that a suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy recognized by
132. Id at 1277 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
133. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d) (1995).
134. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See discussion supra pp. 444-50.
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society in the suspect's home (Mozo), 135 but not in a private office
(Inciarrano).136 Contrary to Katz, the court seems to be protecting places,
not people. The Florida Act should be interpreted consistently with Katz to
make a person's privacy depend on the person's reasonable expectation of
privacy, as recognized by society, and not on the person's location. In
interpreting the Florida Act, the Florida courts have considered conversa-
tions originating in a variety of locations. These locations range from the
home (Wall and Mozo), to the office (Inciarrano), to the patrol car
(Smith),137 to the jail. The First District Court of Appeal of Florida created a
case law exception to the Florida Security of Communications Act to allow a
prison guard to monitor an inmate's outgoing call. 138 In Katz, the United
States Supreme Court recognized an expectation of privacy in a glass
paneled telephone booth and, in dicta, said that an expectation of privacy
could apply to other locations such as "in a business office, in a friend's
apartment, or in a taxicab."'' 39 In Mozo, the Florida Supreme Court recog-
nized that the Mozos had an expectation of privacy to talk on a cordless
phone in their own apartment without being intercepted.' 4° Inciarrano had
no expectation of privacy in Trimble's office, nor did Smith in a patrol car,
nor did prisoners in jail, except perhaps if a prisoner had recently invoked
his right to an attorney.1 41  If Floridians have any expectation of privacy,
135. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
138. In Pires v. Wainwright, 419 So. 2d 358, 359 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), a guard
monitored Pires' telephone call to someone outside the prison. Pires, an inmate at Union
Correctional Institute, was calling to arrange an escape and was disciplined because of the
information learned by the monitoring officer. The court found that society's interest in
prison security outweighed Pires' expectation of privacy and created a case law exception to
the Florida Security of Communications Act. Id. at 359. "[W]e hold there is an exception to
the Security of Communications Act permitting prison officials to wiretap telephone calls
from prisoners incarcerated in our prisons." Id.
139. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (citations omitted).
140. State v. Mozo, 655 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1995).
141. In State v. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d 241, 242-43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), David
and McCall Calhoun, brothers, were in jail. When the brothers were placed in an interview
room, the officers monitored their conversation. When McCall was removed, an officer again
gave David his Miranda rights and David requested his public defender. Upon denying David
his request, McCall was placed back in the interview room with David. The officers both
video and audio taped their fifteen minute conversation. The court held that the videotape
should have been excluded. Id. at 245. The court based its decision on sections 12 and 23 of
article I of the Florida Constitution, the Florida Security of Communications Act, David's
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. Id.
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which will be recognized by the Supreme Court of Florida, it is apparently
only in one's own home.
Thus far, Florida courts have not recognized that it is possible to have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a location other than one's home.
Apparently, the conversation between Inciarrano and Trimble was private.
A neighbor did hear gunshots, but no one heard the sound of their voices nor
saw Inciarrano enter or exit Trimble's office. Even ruling that Inciarrano
had no expectation of privacy because he was in Trimble's office and not in
his own office, is contrary to Katz. If Trimble had gone to Inciarrano's
office instead, but still had recorded his own murder, the court probably
would have ruled that Inciarrano had no expectation of privacy because it
was an office and not a home. The real problem with Inciarrano is that it
was such a difficult case because of the two party consent requirement of the
Florida Act.
V. FLORIDA-CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROVISIONS
This section examines the two privacy provisions of the Florida
Constitution and their applicability to protecting communications. Article I,
section 12 of the Florida Constitution, Florida's search and seizure provi-
sion, prohibits "unreasonable interception of private communications by any
means" and article I, section 23, contains an explicit right to privacy. 42 In
1968, article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution provided:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against
the unreasonable interception of private communications by any
means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except
upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describ-
ing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing
A jailhouse conversation may be overheard if a suspect's voice is so loud that it carries
through a closed door. Taylor v. State, 292 So. 2d 375, 376 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 298 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1974). Taylor was in a line up room being used as a conference
room when he said in a loud voice: "[t]hat mother ... couldn't identify me; I had a stocking
over my face." Id. at 376. Two officers heard the statement through the closed door. The
trial court had allowed testimony about the statement into evidence and the appellate court
affirmed, ruling that overhearing the statement was not in violation of the Florida Security of
Communications Act. Id. at 377.
142. Joseph W. Little & Steven E. Lohr, Textual History of the Florida Declaration of
Rights, 22 STETSON L. REV. 549, 629 (1993).
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or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the
nature of evidence to be obtained.
143
In 1980, article I, section 23, was added to the Florida Constitution.1 44
Article I, section 23 provides:
Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the
public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided
by law.
145
In State v. Sarmiento,146 a Supreme Court of Florida landmark decision,
the issue before the court was "whether the warrantless, electronic intercep-
tion by state agents of a conversation between defendant and an undercover
police officer in defendant's home is an unreasonable interception of
defendant's private communications in violation of article I, section 12,
Florida Constitution."'147 The court concluded that the interception was
unreasonable, even though section 934.03(2)(c) allowed interception by a
law enforcement officer or informant. 148 "Our response to this contention is
simple; insofar as that statute authorizes the warrantless interception of a
private conversation conducted in the home, it is unconstitutional and
unenforceable."'149 Thus, the court interpreted the Florida Constitution to
provide more protection than the United States Constitution.
Although subsequent decisions limited Sarmiento's ban on the use of
informants to the home, 150 article I, section 12, was amended in 1982,'1' to
143. Id. at 629.
144. Id. at 635 (citations omitted).
145. Id.
146. 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981).
147. Id. at 644.
148. Id. at 645.
149. Id.
150. The right of privacy does not extend to one's private business office. For similar
cases involving failure to extend the right of privacy, see, eg., Morningstar v. State, 428 So. 2d
220 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983) (discussing privacy in a private business
office); Zacke v. State, 418 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982), review denied, 426 So.
2d 29 (Fla. 1983) (discussing privacy in a suspect's back yard); State v. Vanyo, 417 So. 2d
1104 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (discussing privacy in a parking lot); Ruiz v. State, 416
So. 2d 32 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (discussing privacy in a motel room); Miller v. State,
411 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 419 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1982)
(discussing privacy in a suspect's truck); Hurst v. State, 409 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
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do away with Sarmiento by appending the following two sentences to the
end of the provision:
This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in viola-
tion of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles
or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United
States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 15
Thus, after the effective date of the amendment, an informant or police
officer would be able to tape a conversation, even if the conversation
occurred in the suspect's home.
A suspect arguing that an intercepted communication should be sup-
pressed would have no better luck relying on article I, section 23, than
relying on article I, section 12. The Supreme Court of Florida has held that
article I, section 23, does not expand the protection afforded a suspect in the
search and seizure context. "[O]ur right of privacy provision, article I,
section 23, does not modify the applicability of article I, section 12, particu-
larly since section 23 was adopted prior to the present section 12."153 The
decision thus limits the protection of article I, section 23, against government
intrusion to situations other than those involving search and seizure.
Since Sarmiento, the Supreme Court of Florida has been loath to protect
communications under either of the Florida Constitution's privacy provi-
sions. This is so even though either or both of the provisions arguably could
provide more protection than the Florida Act. In an April 1995 cordless
telephone case, Mozo,' 54 the court used convoluted reasoning to base its
holding on the Florida Act rather than on sections 12 or 23 of article I of the
Florida Constitution, as had the lower court. "[W]e adhere to the settled
App. 1982) (discussing privacy in an informant's home); Chiarenza v. State, 406 So. 2d 66
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), review denied, 413 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1982) (discussing privacy
in a motel room); Padgett v. State, 404 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (discussing
privacy in a restaurant, a truck, and an outdoor setting); Pittman v. State, 397 So. 2d 1205
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 407 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1981). The right of privacy did
extend to the suspect's apartment. Copeland v. State, 435 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (application of amendment to article I, section 12, prospective in effect), review denied,
443 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1983).
151. Little & Lohr, supra note 142, at 629.
152. Id.
153. State v. Jimeno, 588 So. 2d 233, 233 (Fla. 1991).
154. 655 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1995).
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principle of constitutional law that courts should endeavor to implement the
legislative intent of statutes and avoid constitutional issues."1 55
Mozo involved the following facts. In 1991, in Plantation, Florida,
police detectives were using a scanner to intercept cordless telephone calls
near an apartment complex. When they picked up a suspicious conversation,
they continued to monitor the same radio frequency and taped calls. They
obtained a search warrant for the Mozos' apartment in the complex based on
the intercepted information and the unusual amount of activity observed at
the apartment. The Mozos were arrested after drugs and drug paraphernalia
were found in the search. When their motion to suppress was denied, they
pled nolo contendere, reserving their right to appeal the denial of their
motion to suppress.156 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
"oral communications conducted over a cordless phone within the privacy of
one's own home are protected by Florida's Security of Communications
Act" because the Mozos had a reasonable expectation of privacy that
cordless telephone calls originating in their home would not be inter-
cepted. 57 "Oral communication" in the Florida Act is defined as:
any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expecta-
tion that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any
public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any elec-
tronic communication.
58
Two concurring justices would have based the decision on article I, section
23 of the Florida Constitution, rather than the Florida Act. They noted that
the definition of an "electronic communication" in the Florida Act specifi-
cally excludes "[t]he radio portion of a cordless telephone communication
that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base
unit.,,
159
[B]ecause cordless telephone communications are expressly ex-
cluded from the definition of electronic communications, it makes
little sense to construe the definition of oral communications as in-
cluding cordless telephone communications. Further, the Florida
155. Id. at 1117.
156. Id. at 1116.
157. Id. at 1117.
158. FLA. STAT. § 934.02(2) (1995).
159. Id. § 934.02(12)(a).
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Act was patterned after federal legislation, and it is clear from the
legislative history that Congress intended to exclude cordless tele-
phone communications from the purview of the federal Act. 160
It seems more appropriate to base the decision on an available constitutional
provision, as the concurring justices would have, than on tortured language
of the Florida Act.
Aside from the lack of a sound statutory basis for its decision, Mozo
provides little guidance for future decisions involving cordless telephones.
The court ruled that the interception of the cordless telephone conversation
occurred where it "originated" and that the Mozos had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in their own home. 61 The court again seems to be protecting
places, not people, which is contrary to Katz. The other problem was in the
ruling that the conversations originated in the Mozos' home. Although the
court did not explain why this was so, the conversations apparently origi-
nated in the Mozos' home because that was the end of the conversation in
which the officers were interested. What if the other party had called the
Mozos first? What if the other end of the conversation was not in a home?
If the officers had intercepted what the Mozos were saying by accident, only
after conducting surveillance of an alleged drug buyer calling from a pay
phone, would the Mozos' conversations still be protected?
VI. Two-PARTY CONSENT
The Florida Act should be amended to allow taping upon the consent of
one party to the conversation. The Florida Act two-party consent require-
ment has caused the Florida courts to legislate in difficult cases. In Walls,
the Supreme Court of Florida emphatically declared that it should not
legislate.1 62 Even so, it and the lower courts have done so in hard cases like
Inciarrano. The Inciarrano court ruled that, since Inciarrano was in Trim-
ble's office, Inciarrano had no reasonable expectation of privacy. 63 As
explained in this portion of the article, the reasons for allowing taping on the
consent of one participant far outweigh the reasons for requiring all partici-
pants to consent.
160. Mozo, 655 So. 2d at 1117 (Grimes, C.J., concurring).
161. I
162. Walls, 356 So. 2d at 296.
163. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d. at 1275-76.
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The principle arguments supporting two party consent are that surrepti-
tious taping will have a chilling effect on conversation and that it is unfair.
Those who focus on the chilling effect emphasize that surreptitious taping
will make people feel that they cannot say what they really mean, let off
steam, complain, tell jokes, or criticize without running afoul of the "thought
police." "Big brother" will be monitoring what you say and you will be
punished if your speech is not politically correct. Another facet of the
argument is that taping without the other person's consent is ethically and
morally wrong. There must be some devious purpose if one has to tape
without receiving the other party's consent. Why can't you just ask for
consent if you want to gather information or have the taping serve as a
memory aid? One discovering later that the conversation has been taped will
regard the taping as a betrayal of confidence.
There are many legitimate reasons for allowing one participant to tape.
Examples include aiding one's memory, having an accurate record, gathering
information of a crime or tort, and defending oneself. After all, how else
could you protect yourself against charges such as sexual harassment or
employment discrimination? It is irrational to allow someone to testify
about a conversation but not allow a tape recording of the same conversation
to be admitted into evidence. A tape recording is much more accurate than
someone testifying as to that person's recollection of what happened because
it captures statements in context. In addition, a tape may be vital where the
testimony of witnesses is so conflicting that you know someone is lying.
What would have happened if Clarence Thomas or Anita Hill had taped their
conversations?
The statute requiring two party consent follows someone's perceived
idea of morality and sweeps too broadly, potentially capturing public-minded
citizens like Antel and Feegel within its grasp. The ambiguous "good faith"
defense is not enough to protect the person with a legitimate reason to tape.
Wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes are the only "search and seizure"
proscription against private action. Otherwise, state action has to be in-
volved to have evidence excluded. Criminals like Walls, Tsavaris, and
Inciarrano are the ones to benefit if the plain language of the Florida Act is
followed. Walls, Tsavaris, and Inciarrano could have sued Antel, Feegel,
and Trimble's estate for civil damages, and Walls and Tsavaris could have
pressed for third degree felony charges. Public figures, and people such as
Walls, Tsavaris, and Inciarrano, who have the right to be distrustful that a
confidence will be betrayed, are the ones who will be more careful anyway
and will perhaps guard themselves against surreptitious interception.
Otherwise, if there is nothing illegal taking place, the likelihood of someone
[Vol. 21:431
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taping a private conversation is small. It is usually too cumbersome to set up
a taping and it is too difficult to infiltrate a group and gain the group's
confidence. The risk that someone will tape is approximately the same or
less than the risk that the party will divulge the contents of a confidential
conversation.
In Florida, the private party who tapes a conversation is likely to be
punished much more severely than a police officer or an informant. A police
officer is allowed to tape a conversation and to have the conversation
admitted into evidence if the police officer is a party to the conversation or
an informant/participant has consented to the taping.'64 In contrast, a private
party is prohibited from taping without all participants' consent, and a
conversation taped with only one party consent is inadmissible. This, in
effect, sanctions the entrance of big brother into the conversation, but allows
someone taping a conversation for innocent reasons to be prosecuted for the
taping.
Some people foolishly trust the other party to the conversation not to
record the conversation, and they have the unpleasant surprise later of
learning that the conversation was recorded. Other people, who may or may
not have something to hide, are shrewd enough to know that things that are
not said cannot be taped. In 1990, in California, a daughter testified from
her repressed memory that years before she had seen her father murder her
best friend, then eight. The father was tried and convicted.16 Before trial,
the daughter went to visit the father in prison. In the prison visitation room,
the daughter asked the father to admit he had murdered her friend.1 66 The
father pointed to the sign on the wall, "Conversations May Be Monitored"
and refused to answer.1 67 At trial, the daughter was allowed to testify about
her father's refusal to answer. On April 4, 1995, a federal judge ruled that
the conviction could not stand. 168 One of the errors ruled reversible by the
judge was the admittance into evidence of comments on the father's refusal
to answer the daughter's question.
169
Why single out audio taping for statutory protection and not also protect
against videotaping? There are certain situations in which videotaping is
164. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(a)(3)(c) (1995).
165. Franklin v. Duncan, 884 F. Supp. 1435, 1438 (N.D. Cal.), aft'd, 70 F.3d 75 (9th Cir.
1995).
166. Tamar Lewin, Judge Upsets Murder Conviction Focused on 'Repressed Memory,'
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 1995, at Al8.
167. Franklin, 884 F. Supp. at 1445.
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more invidious than audio taping. Scott Bentley's taping of consensual
sexual activity was prosecuted criminally, whereas a videotaping of the same
event may not have had attendant criminal charges. If the reason for the
taping is one's prurient interest, a videotaping of a romantic episode may be
much worse than the audio tape. The section of Part II of this article entitled
"To Entertain or to Satisfy One's Prurient Interest" contains a number of
"revealing" incidents which were taped or videotaped. Although an audio-
tape of the incidents was certainly an invasion of privacy, a videotaped
picture of the incidents would be an even more serious invasion of privacy.
Does the all party consent requirement coincide with the public's
expectations? Many individuals in all party consent states may not realize
the state has such a requirement. Thus, they may inadvertently subject
themselves to being prosecuted and to being sued civilly. For most other
crimes with similarly severe punishment, there is at least a feeling that the
action is wrong. In contrast, participant taping of a conversation may be
entirely innocent. People's idea of morality is changing. Surreptitious
taping is not perceived by many to be wrong. This is the electronic age.
Like Scott Bentley, most people would not imagine that clicking on a tape
recorder without asking the other person for consent would be illegal. For
an action that many people do not realize is illegal, the punishment is severe.
Disclosure of taped material is also illegal and carries the same penalties.
Thus, Gennifer Flowers may have legally recorded her conversations with
President Clinton, but she could face criminal charges if she sold her tapes in
Florida.
Why does Florida need interception of communications dealt with both
criminally and civilly? Most "bad" interception is already dealt with in other
criminal statutes, or there is a tort action available. For example, an individ-
ual may be charged with blackmail or sued for invasion of privacy. The
Florida Act forces the courts to legislate in the difficult cases. Because it is
very difficult to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate reasons for
taping, it would be almost impossible to draft an appropriate statute.
VII. CONCLUSION
The two-party consent requirement is irrational and the statute should
be amended to eliminate it. The rationale supporting the two-party consent
requirement is far outstripped by the reasons, detailed above, for eliminating
it. In Florida, it is a third degree felony for a private party to tape a conver-
sation unless all participants consent. Any tape made without the consent of
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all participants is inadmissible and a nonconsenting party can recover civil
damages from the person who taped the conversation.
Presumably, all parties are required to consent because surreptitious
taping may be considered unfair. Another reason given is that allowing
surreptitious taping may have a chilling effect on conversation. The broad
sweep of the two party consent requirement has caught up many unsuspect-
ing, otherwise-innocent people within its grasp. The requirement forecloses
taping for legitimate reasons such as gathering information (possibly to later
defend oneself) and gathering evidence of a tort or crime.
In contrast, criminals, like Walls, Tsavaris, and Inciarrano, stand to
benefit from it. Inciarrano is an example of a difficult case, in which the
application of the two-party consent requirement could have allowed the
only evidence of a murder to be suppressed. Thus, a court faced with a
similarly difficult case would probably enlarge the case law exception
created by Inciarrano.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The District Courts of Appeal in Florida have recently been confronted
with the issue of whether the economic loss rule ("ELR") should bar recovery
of economic losses suffered from independent fraud in the inducement claims.
Every court which has faced this issue, other than the Second District Court of
Appeal, has concluded that the ELR should not bar tort recovery for fraud in
the inducement claims.' This article explores the conflicting application of the
1. Following the writing of this article and immediately prior to publication, the Supreme
Court of Florida decided this issue. Where possible, the author has incorporated the holding of
this recent decision into the discussion of this article.
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ELR in Florida courts to intentional, independent torts, such as fraud in the
inducement, and the issues which ultimately led to the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision that the ELR will not bar such claims.
Part II of this article briefly explores the history of the ELR. In order to
provide a more thorough understanding of the ELR, Part II is broken down into
subsections which discuss the elements of the ELR, exceptions to the ELR,
and the reasons for the ELR's existence. Part III provides an overview of the
independent, intentional tort exception to Florida's ELR by concentrating on
the factors which define these torts and more specifically concentrates on the
tort of fraud in the inducement. Part IV evaluates the ELR and fraud in the
inducement as they have been applied in recent 1995 and 1996 cases. Finally,
Part V concludes with an analysis of the reasons why the ELR has not been
expanded to bar fraud in the inducement claims.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF FLORIDA'S ECONOMIC Loss RULE
The question most often asked in discussions on Florida's ELR is, what
does it do? Although the parameters of the ELR are hazy, stated simply, the
ELR prohibits recovery in tort for economic damages arising under contracts
for goods or services, unless there is personal injury or damage to other
property.2 Despite the specific language of the ELR, there is no clear answer
that explains exactly how the ELR should be applied. As one commentator
wrote, "it is clear that judges, lawyers, and commercial clients alike are all
desperately struggling to define the parameters of the economic loss [rule]."3
In order to thoroughly understand the fundamentals of the ELR, an analysis of
each element of the ELR is required.
A. Elements of the Rule
The first part of the ELR prohibits tort recovery for contracted goods or
4services. Tort recovery is an alternative form of recovery that a party to a
contract may seek instead of relying upon a breach of contract form of recov-
ery.5  Florida courts have distinguished between unintentional torts, i.e.
2. Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1245
(Fla. 1993).
3. Paul J. Schweip, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The Monster That Ate Commercial
Torts, 69 FLA. B.J. 34, 34 (Nov. 1995).
4. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1245 (citations omitted).
5. See AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla. 1987)
(holding that parties to a contract can only seek tort damages if conduct occurs that establishes a
tort that is distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract). See also Atkinson v.
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negligence, and intentional tort claims. 6 Until recently, negligence was the
only tort claim barred by the ELR, when unaccompanied by damage to other
property or bodily injury.7 However, in the landmark case, Casa Clara
Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.,8 the Supreme Court of
Florida strictly applied the ELR and refused to observe a previous exception,
which had permitted negligence claims by those not in privity with the con-
tracting parties, in the absence of any other remedy. 9 Presently, the ELR bars
negligence claims and certain intertwined intentional tort claims for contracted
goods or services, even by parties lacking privity.
10
The second part of the ELR provides exceptions which allow tort recov-
ery for contracted goods and services when there is personal injury and/or
other property damage.11 While personal injury is easily recognizable, "other
property" has defied easy description. 2 The courts in East River Steamship
Orkin Exterminating Co., 625 P.2d 505, 511 (Kan. Ct. App.), aff'd, 634 P.2d 1071 (Kan. 1981)
(explaining that the difference between a tort and a contract action is that a breach of contract is
a failure to perform a duty arising under or imposed by an agreement; whereas, a tort is a
violation of a duty imposed by law).
6. See Serina v. Albertson's, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
7. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246; see also Sandarac Ass'n Inc. v. W.R. Frizzell Ar-
chitects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992). In Sandarac, the court
explained that historically the courts have limited the interest protected in negligence to interests
concerning the safety of one's person and property. Id. The court stated that to allow an
exception to the ELR by allowing recovery for negligence claims would be to allow an actual
expansion of negligence law to protect interests not traditionally protected in negligence law. Id.
8. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1244.
9. Id. at 1248 (overruling Latite Roofing Co. v. Urbanek, 528 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1988)). In Latite, the defendant/appellant, Latite Roofing Co., was the roofing contractor
on the construction of a shopping center. Latite constructed most of the roof area on the
shopping center before being compelled to stop work. The plaintiffs/appellees, Urbanek and
Kohl, purchased the center after work had been stopped and before Latite finished construction.
Urbanek and Kohl sued Latite seeking damages for the negligent construction and installation of
the roof. Relying on the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in AFM, the court held that use of
the ELR to bar tort claims for only economic loss applies only when there are alternative theories
of recovery better suited to compensate the damaged party for a peculiar kind of loss. Latite, 528
So. 2d at 1383. The court explained that due to the fact that the parties lacked privity, no
alternate theory of recovery existed and, therefore, the ELR could not bar recovery for the
plaintiffs' pure economic loss. Id. at 1382-83.
10. See Hoseline, Inc. v. U.S.A. Diversified Prod., Inc., 40 F.3d 1198, 1199-200 (11th Cir.
1994).
11. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1245 (citations omitted).
12. Southland Constr., Inc. v. Richeson Corp., 642 So. 2d 5, 9 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1994). The court stated: "[w]hat constitutes damage to 'other property' is sometimes a puzzling
circumstance to determine in resolution of economic loss cases." Id.
1996]
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Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,13 and Casa Clara14 have attempted a
practical definition.
In East River, the United States Supreme Court was asked to decide
"whether a cause of action in tort is stated when a defective product purchased
in a commercial transaction malfunctions, injuring only the product itself and
causing purely economic loss.'' 5 In this case, a shipbuilder contracted with the
respondent to design, manufacture, and supervise the installation of turbines in
four supertankers. After the ships were built, the turbines on all supertankers
malfunctioned due to design and manufacturing defects. The Supreme Court
held since each turbine was supplied as an integrated package, regarded as a
single unit, the product only damaged itself. 6
Initially, damage to other property provided a narrow exception to the
ELR.17 In Casa Clara, 8 however, the Supreme Court of Florida strictly
applied the ELR to bar recovery of economic losses to condominium owners
whose condominiums were built with defective concrete. 19 The concrete
supplied by the defendant, Toppino, contained a high content of salt that
caused the reinforcing steel inserted in the concrete to rust, which, in turn
caused the concrete to rust and break off.20 The plaintiffs owned condominium
units and single-family homes built with, and allegedly damaged by, the
concrete.2 ' The Supreme Court of Florida was confronted with the issue of
"whether a homeowner [could] recover for purely economic losses from a
concrete supplier under a negligence theory. 22
In its landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Florida held that because
there were no personal injuries and no other property was damaged, the
homeowners could not recover in tort.23 The court explained the damage to
13. 476 U.S. 858, 867 (1986). East River was a landmark case that involved an admiralty
action concerning products liability and the ELR. Id at 858.
14. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1244.
15. East River, 476 U.S. at 859.
16. Id. at 867. The Supreme Court stated "[s]ince all but the very simplest of machines have
component parts, [a contrary] holding would require a finding of 'property damage' in virtually
every case where a product damages itself." Id.
17. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1244.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1245.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1245.
23. Id. at 1247. Casa Clara is a landmark case not only because the Supreme Court of
Florida failed to apply the other property exception, but also because the homeowners were not
in privity with the defendant and they lacked contractual remedies. Id.
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other property exception by stating "[tihe character of a loss determines the
appropriate remedies, and, to determine the character of a loss, one must look
to the product purchased by the plaintiff, not the product sold by the defen-
dant."24  The Supreme Court of Florida further explained that since the
concrete was an essential part of the house, which the buyers had bargained
for, the concrete did not injure "other" property; therefore, the other property
exception did not apply.25 As can be identified from the above descriptions,
both of these cases have held that when pure economic loss is suffered due to
one component of an ihtegrated product injuring another component, the ELR
will apply.
B. Rationale
The ELR is based on both policy and practical considerations. The policy
underlying the ELR is that parties have the power and should protect against
the risk of economic loss, from breach of contract based on failure of the
product or services to perform as expected, during contract negotiations
through warranty provisions and price adjustments.2 6 Then, in the event of a
breach, the parties should recover based on the provisions which were bar-
gained for, rather than attempting to recover under tort law after the breach.27
The practical basis for the ELR is judicial economy.2 Some justices may
view the ELR as a tool to clear their dockets because the ELR is a bright line
rule and it can be applied as a matter of law, rather than when the courts
become bogged down with the prima facie elements of torts.29 Justices are
reluctant to find an exception to the ELR for independent torts, such as fraud
in the inducement, because cases can be expedited faster when causes of action
are a matter of law.30
24. Id. (citations omitted).
25. Id.
26. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 901 (Fla.
1987); Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246 ("The rule is 'the fundamental boundary between
contract law, which is designed to enforce the expectancy interests of the parties, and tort law,
which imposes a duty of reasonable care and thereby encourages citizens to avoid causing
physical harm to others."') (citations omitted). See also Strickland-Collins Constr. v. Barnett
Bank, 545 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding Florida will not create a tort
duty allowing for economic loss recovery, "where the litigants have allocated the various risks of
their bargain by contract.").
27. Id.
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The cases that have invoked the ELR have consistently demonstrated the
rationale that contract negotiations and warranty law are the appropriate
vehicles to remedy breaches that result in purely economic loss. This rule is a
fairly recent development of contract law, in that, the United States Supreme
Court laid its foundation only ten years ago in East River.31 Shortly after the
United States Supreme Court articulated the rule in 1986, the Supreme Court
of Florida added the rule to Florida common law in 1987 in the Florida Power
& Light v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. decision.32 However, in Florida
Power & Light,33 the Supreme Court of Florida acknowledged that the doctrine
was "not a new principle of law in Florida," but rather stemmed from the
fundamental privity requirements of contract claims.
In Florida Power & Light, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the
negligence claim of Florida Power & Light ("FPL"), which arose out of a
contract between FPL and the defendant, Westinghouse Electric Corporation.
("Westinghouse").35 FPL brought suit claiming Westinghouse was liable for
breach of express warranties in the contract and for negligence. 36 The Court
dismissed FPL's tort claim on the ground that Westinghouse had no duty under
either a negligence or a strict products liability theory to prevent a product
from causing economic loss only.37
The Florida Power & Light court looked to the seminal United States
Supreme Court ELR case, East River, for guidance.38 In East River,39 the
United States Supreme Court held that, "[d]amage to a product itself is most
naturally understood as a warranty claim." 4 The Supreme Court examined the
policy grounds for the ELR and noted "we must determine whether injury to a
31. East River, 476 U.S. at 858.
32. Florida Power & Light, 510 So. 2d at 902.
33. Id. at 899.
34. Id. at 902. See also Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734,
739-40 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining the court's 1987 decision in Florida Power & Light). In
Florida Power & Light, the court stated, "the economic loss rule has a long, historic basis
originating with the privity doctrine, which precluded recovery of economic losses outside a
contractual setting." Florida Power & Light, 510 So. 2d at 902.
35. Florida Power & Light, 510 So. 2d at 902. FPL and Westinghouse entered into a con-
tract, whereby, FPL was to purchase six steam generators from Westinghouse. Id. at 900. FPL
discovered leaks in the generators and brought suit. Id.
36. Id,
37. Id. at 901-02 (citing East River, 476 U.S. at 858).
38. Florida Power & Light, 510 So. 2d at 901.
39. East River, 476 U.S. at 858. The plaintiff purchased turbines which were found to be
defective resulting in damage to only the turbines themselves. Id. at 860.
40. Id. at 872.
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product itself is the kind of harm that should be protected by products liability
or left entirely to the law of contracts., 41 The Supreme Court determined that
warranty law provides the purchaser with the benefit of his/her bargain and
thus, sufficiently protects the public's interests.42 Based on this analysis, the
East River court determined that when the only injury claimed is economic
loss, whether stated in strict liability or negligence, there shall be no products
liability claim.43 The Supreme Court noted to hold otherwise would be to
allow "contract law to drown in a sea of tort."44
Since the Florida Power & Light decision, the ELR has been debated and
expanded into a variety of contexts.45 In AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell,46 the
Supreme Court of Florida framed the issue as: "Does Florida permit a pur-
chaser of services to recover economic losses in tort without a claim for
personal injury or property damage?" 47 The Supreme Court of Florida, relying
on the decisions of Florida Power & Light and East River, concluded that
"without some conduct resulting in personal injury or other property damage,
there can be no independent tort flowing from a contractual breach which
would justify a tort claim solely for economic losses. 48
Following AFM Corp., the Supreme Court of Florida made a landmark
decision by a four to three vote in Casa Clara.49 As one commentator of the
ELR stated after the Casa Clara decision was handed down, the Supreme
Court of Florida "[is] put[ting] its foot forcefully down on the rule's accelera-
tor pedal, ensuring its speedy romp through commercial torts. ' 50
41. Id. at 859.
42. Id. at 873.
43. East River, 476 U.S. at 876.
44. Id. at 866 (citations omitted).
45. See Pulte, 60 F.3d at 740 (citing AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 180) (extending the ELR to
contracts for services); Sandarac Ass'n v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1355
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a condominium association could not sue the general
contractor or architects in negligence for defects in the condominium's common areas);
Strickland-Collins Constr. v. Barnett Bank of Naples, 545 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that the ELR bars a general contractor's negligence claim against a bank for
misapplication of funds from a construction loan).
46. AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 180.
47. Id. AFM Corp. contracted with Southern Bell for advertising in the yellow pages. Id.
When the yellow pages were distributed, AFM's advertisement was printed incorrectly and, after
some other compounded problems, AFM chose to sue solely on a tort theory and not on any
contractual theories. Id. at 180-81.
48. Id. at 181-82.
49. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1244.
50. Schweip, supra note 3, at 38.
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Casa Clara fueled the ELR in two distinct ways.51 First, Casa Clara
extinguished negligence claims for contracted goods and services, including
claims by plaintiffs not in privity with the defendant.52 This can be illustrated
by the fact that the plaintiffs in Casa Clara had no contract with the defendant
because they had bought their homes under contracts with various develop-
ers.53 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Florida invoked the ELR, reiterating
the already familiar rationale that contract principles are more appropriate than
tort principles for recovering economic loss without an accompanying physical
injury or damage to other property.54
Second, Casa Clara distinguished the "other property" exception to the
ELR by eliminating components of a product. 55  For example, the court
determined that because the plaintiffs had bargained for their condominiums
and single family homes, and not the condo's and home's various components,
the concrete, which made up the buildings, was "an integral part of the
finished product .... ,56 As a result, the court held that the concrete only
damaged itself.57 "Casa Clara explained many cases that preceded it and tried
to state, with some finality, the extent of the ELR." 58 However, the courts
continue to struggle for a consistent application of the ELR.
59
51. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246.
52. Id. at 1247.
53. Id. at 1245.
54. See id. The majority overlooked the fact that the parties lacked privity and, therefore,
there existed no opportunity for the parties to engage in negotiations and bargaining. Id. The
dissent stated "[tihe rationale of the economic loss rule is that parties who have bargained for the
distribution of risk of loss should not be permitted to circumvent their bargain after loss occurs
to the property that was the subject of the bargain." Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1248. (Shaw, J.,
dissenting). The dissent felt that the ELR could not and should not apply in this situation
because the "key premise underlying the [ELR] is that parties in a business context have the
ability to allocate economic risks and remedies as part of their contractual negotiations" and that
premise did not exist in Casa Clara. Id. at 1248. (Barkett, C.J., dissenting). While Justice Shaw
in the dissent agreed with the majority, that parties who have freely bargained and entered a
contract pertaining to a particular subject matter should be held to the terms of that contract,
including the distribution of losses, Justice Shaw stated "the theory is stretched when it is used to
deny a cause of action to an innocent third party who the defendant knew or should have known
would be injured by the tortious conduct." Id. at 1249 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1247.
56. Id.
57. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247.
58. Daniel M. Bachi and Bard D. Rockenbach, The Practical Limitations of the Economic
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C. Exceptions to Florida's Economic Loss Rule
Although the ELR provides two exceptions on its face, personal injury
and other property damage, Florida courts have found additional exceptions in
certain circumstances. 60 In Sandarac Ass'n v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc.,
the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida stated "[l]awyers and judges
alike have found it difficult to determine when the rule applies and when an
exception is appropriate.,,61 However, the Sandarac court recognized three
exceptions to the general rules of negligence in order to permit recovery for
economic loss that would otherwise be barred under the ELR. 62 The Sandarac
court recognized recovery of economic damages arising from negligent actions
by attorneys, abstractors, and accountants.
63
These exceptions are recognized by other Florida courts as well. For
example, in First Florida Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co.,64 the Supreme Court of
Florida indicated that it will not apply the ELR or require privity for a claim
against an accountant. Similarly, in First American Title Insurance Co. v.
First Title Service Co. of the Florida Keys,66 the court addressed a claim by a
party not in privity with an abstract company for negligent preparation of an
abstract.67 The First American court found that the plaintiff was a third party
beneficiary of the abstractor's employment contract and limited liability to
parties to the abstract transaction and intended and known third party benefici-
aries, rather than to all foreseeable injured parties. 68 The patterns of excep-
tions recognized in these cases suggest that concurrent breach of contract and
60. Sandarac Ass'n v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (citing First Florida Bank, N.A. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
1990); First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Serv. Co. of the Fla. Keys, 457 So. 2d 467 (Fla.
1984)); see also Southland Constr., Inc. v. Richeson Corp.., 642 So. 2d 5, 8 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (explaining that an engineer, who knew the tractor would be damaged if he
negligently performed, is liable in tort even though there is no contract between the parties).
61. SandaracAss'n, 609 So. 2d at 1352.
62. Id. at 1353.
63. Id. The court explained that "[u]nder restricted circumstances, attorneys, abstractors,
and accountants may be liable to specific plaintiffs for economic damages arising from their
negligent performance of professional services." Id. (See infra note 69 for examples of cases
which found these exceptions).
64. First Florida Bank, 558 So. 2d at 9.
65. Id. at 14.
66. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Serv. Co. of the Fla. Keys, 457 So. 2d 467 (Fla.
1984).
67. Id. at 468.
68. id at 473.
19961
473
: Nova Law Review 21, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review [Vol. 21:467
negligence claims may be permitted where the breaching party has a higher
degree of care and foreseeable third parties may be harmed by the breach.69
D. The Independent Tort Exception to Florida's Economic Loss Rule
When there is a breach of contract claim for goods and services, the initial
question is whether the plaintiff put at issue an intentional tort claim.70 Since
the ELR bars all negligence claims for contracted goods and services, the only
viable application for the independent tort exception occurs when an inten-
tional tort is at issue.71 To constitute a viable independent tort claim, the
intentional tort must not be intertwined with the breach of contract.72 An
independent tort claim "must be based on 'some additional conduct' beyond
the conduct constituting a breach of contract. 73 In other words, "[a] tort is
independent of a breach of contract if the facts comprising the breach are not
relied upon to establish the elements of the tort.
74
Some of the intentional torts which have provided an additional exception
to the ELR, and which have been considered independent of contractual duties,
include: fraud; fraud in the inducement; intentional interference with an
existing contract; civil theft; deceit; and other torts which require proof of
intent.75 In order to fully understand the relationship between the ELR and
69. The following cases discuss exceptions to the ELR where the cited parties had a higher
degree of care: Southland Constr., 642 So. 2d at 5 (engineer); Angel, Cohen and Rogovin v.
Overson Inv., N.V., 512 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1987) (attorney); McElvy, Jennewein, Stefany,
Howard, Inc. v. Arlington Elec., Inc., 582 So. 2d 47, 49-50 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), cause
dismissed, Arlington Elec., Inc. v. McElvy, Jennewein, Stefany, Howard, Inc., 587 So. 2d 1327
(1991) (architects); Bay Garden Manor Condominium, Ass'n v. James D. Marks, Assocs., 576
So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (engineers); First State Savings Bank v. Albright &
Assocs. of Ocala, 561 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 576 So. 2d 284 (Fla.
1990) (real estate appraiser); Lorraine v. Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber, P.A., 467 So. 2d
315 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (attorney).
70. SFC Valve Corp. v. Wright Mach. Corp., 883 F. Supp. 710, 716 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (citing
Greenberg v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. of Greater Miami, Inc., 629 So. 2d 252, 255 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1993)). Throughout this article, when independent torts are discussed in the context of
courts allowing an exception to the ELR, the author refers to intentional, independent torts.
71. See Hoseline, Inc. v. U.S.A. Diversified Prod., Inc., 40 F.3d 1198, 1199 (lth Cir.
1994).
72. See id. at 1200 (citing Serena v. Albertson's Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D. Fla. 1990)).
73. Petitioner's Initial Brief at 19; Woodson v. Martin, 677 So. 2d 842 (Fla.), quashed, No.
87,057, 1996 WL 600478 (Fla. Oct. 17, 1996) (citations omitted).
74. SFC Valve Corp., 883 F. Supp. at 716.
75. See McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(recognizing a malpractice claim for the economic damages of an intended beneficiary negli-
gently omitted from the will); see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Pickard, 269 So. 2d 714, 723 (Fla. 3d
474
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fraud, an in-depth look at the elements used to determine independent torts is
necessary.
III. INDEPENDENT TORTS AND FLORIDA'S ECONOMIC Loss RULE
The independent tort doctrine provides that in order to plead a tort claim
in an action arising out of a contract, "there must be a tort 'distinguishable
from or independent of [the] breach of contract."' 76  One reason for this
doctrine is that contract remedies were intentionally created to provide relief
for breaches of contract. 77 Since breaches of contract create strict liability,
there is no justification for fault or conduct based claims when either the duty
or resulting damage arises from the contractual relationship. 78 Conversely,
when the source of duty and/or damages falls outside the contract, then
contract remedies do not make the non-breaching party whole and an inde-
pendent tort exists.79 When determining whether a cause of action arose out of
contract or tort, the dividing line is not always clear. "[A] tort is ordinarily a
violation of a duty imposed by law, independent of contract, though it may
sometimes have relation to obligations growing out of, or coincident with, a
contract."80 This creates the recurring difficulty courts face in determining the
existence of an independent tort.
A. Factors Defining Independent Torts
1. Duty
One of the reasons why the application of the ELR is so confusing is
because duties exist in both tort law and contract law.81 As noted above, a tort
Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 285 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1973) (noting that deceit is an intentional
tort recognized by the common law); Brass v. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1427, 1428 (S.D. Fla.
1993) (finding that the ELR does not bar fraud in the inducement). Contra Woodson v. Martin,
663 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the ELR bars fraud in the
inducement claims).
76. AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181 (citations omitted).
77. See Florida Power & Light, 510 So. 2d at 901.
78. See id
79. See Brass, 826 F. Supp. at 1428 (citing AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 180).
80. FLA. JUR. 2d Torts § 7 (1995).
81. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246. In Casa Clara, the court explained the difference
between a duty in tort and a contractual duty by stating:
The purpose of a duty in tort is to protect society's interest in being free from harm,
... and the cost of protecting society from harm is borne by society in general.
Contractual duties, on the other hand, come from society's interest in performance
of promises. When only economic harm is involved, the question becomes
1996]
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duty must be independent of the contract duty in order for an exception to the
ELR to apply.82 Factors which make a duty in tort independent of a duty in
contract depend upon the nature of the underlying tort or contract.8 3 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida recently stated:
If the contract places the parties in a unique relationship that creates
new duties not otherwise imposed by law, then a dispute regarding a
breach of a contractually-imposed duty is one that arises from the
contract.... If, on the other hand, the duty alleged to be breached is
one imposed by law in recognition of public policy and is generally
owed to others besides the contracting parties, then a dispute regard-
ing such a breach is not one arising from the contract, but sounds in
tort.1
4
In certain cases, duties may merge, making it difficult to determine
whether failure to perform the duty amounts to a breach of contract or an
independent tort. For example, the duty of good faith and fair dealing exists
both in the creation of the contract and in the performance of the contract.85 If
the duty of good faith and fair dealing was breached before the contract was
entered into, then an independent tort has been found to exist.86 On the other
hand, if the duty is breached once the contract has been entered into, then a
breach of contract has been committed.87
'whether the consuming public as a whole should bear the cost of economic losses
sustained by those who failed to bargain for adequate contract remedies.'
Id. at 1246-47 (citations omitted).
82. AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181.
83. See Jarmco, Inc. v. Polygard, Inc., 668 So. 2d 300, 303 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
84. Terminix Int'l Co. v. Michaels, 668 So. 2d 1013, 1014 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(citations omitted).
85. Cf. Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985). Johnson involved an action for
breach of contract and fraud regarding the purchase of a home which, the buyers learned after
they purchased it, had a defective roof. One of the issues presented for review was whether the
sellers, who were aware of the problems regarding the roof, had a duty to disclose the problems
to the buyers. The Johnson court held that the sellers had a duty to disclose the defective roof
because the doctrine of caveat emptor was not in tune with the times and did not conform with
current notions of justice, equity, and fair dealing. Id. at 628. By eliminating the doctrine of
caveat emptor, the court held that the seller had a duty of good faith and fair dealing to disclose
material defects, which the seller had knowledge of, both before entering the contract and after
entering the contract. See id.
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Florida courts have long recognized that there are independent torts which
impose tort duties on parties outside of their contractual duties.88 One example
of a tort which the Florida courts hold imposes duties independent of contrac-
tual duties is civil theft.89 In Burke v. Napieracz,90 the court declined to allow
the ELR to bar the plaintiffs civil theft claim because the court refused to
abolish a legislatively created tort designed to extend a civil remedy to those
harmed by alleged criminal activity.91 In sum, the ELR "means that in certain
kinds of cases .... no tort duty is imposed on the defendant to avoid economic
harm to the plaintiff."92 Outside of those cases, the existence of tort duties,
such as civil theft, remain independent of contractual duties.
93
2. Damages
When a tort claim is based on damages, which cannot be recovered from a
breach of contract claim, "an issue of fact remains as to whether the [p]laintiff
suffered extra-contractual damages." 94  "Only two jurisdictions other than
Florida... have used damages to define whether an independent tort exists."
95
For example, in Grace Petroleum Corp. v. Williamson,96 the Twelfth District
Court of Appeals of Texas reversed an exemplary damages award based on
concurrent claims for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation on
the grounds that the fraudulent misrepresentation claim lacked damages
distinct from those found under the breach of contract.97 The court noted that
in order to determine whether the plaintiff could recover on an asserted tort
88. Brief of Amicus Curiae Florida Consumer Action Network in Support of Position of
Respondents at 11, HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Areas Costarricenses, S.A., 661 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (No. 94-2779), approved, No. 86, 913, 1996 WL 600501 (Fla. Oct. 17,
1996) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae] (giving examples such as conversion, slander of title,
defamation, and civil theft).
89. Burke v. Napieracz, 674 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 758.
92. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 11, HTP, Ltd. (No. 94-2779).
93. Id.
94. Petitioner's Initial Brief at 29, Woodson (No. 87-057) (citing Burton v. Linotype, Co.,
556 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
95. Theresa Montalbano Bennett, Lies and Broken Promises: Fraud and the Economic Loss
Rule After Woodson v. Martin, 74 FLA. B.J. 46, 48 (1996) (citing Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493,494-95 (Tex. 1991); Jim Walters Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W. 2d
617, 618 (Tex. 1986)).
96. 906 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
97. Id. at 68.
1996]
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theory, it had to "examine the nature of the plaintiff's loss, because the nature
of the injury most often determines which duty has been breached. 98
The ELR does not always act to bar recovery of pure economic loss. 99
When an independent tort claim is alleged, outside a breach of contract, courts
have held that if the damages sought are distinct from damages within the
breach of contract, the plaintiff may recover regardless of whether the damages
are purely economic.) °
3. Time
The most obvious way to distinguish an independent tort from a breach of
contract is by determining when the alleged independent tort took place.'0 '
Typically, causes of action which arise before entering into a contract consti-
tute independent torts because no duty has yet been created under contract.1
02
Therefore, the duty which has been breached lies in tort.10 3 For example, fraud
in the inducement occurs prior to entering a contract because it occurs prior to
the formation of the contract. Therefore, no contractual duty is breached when
fraud in the inducement occurs.
On the other hand, once a contract has been entered into, it becomes more
difficult to distinguish between contractual duties and independent tort duties
since there are duties under contracts which also arise under common law.'
4
For example, fraud in the performance of a contract is not an independent tort
because the duty owed arose out of the duties set forth in the contract.1
0 5
One case which clearly illustrates the time element is Hoseline, Inc. v.
U.S.A. Diversified.'6 In Hoseline,'0 7 the appellee, Hoseline, entered into a
contract with appellant, USA Diversified ("USA"), in which USA agreed to
98. Id. (citations omitted).
99. Brief of Amicus Curiae, at 11, HTP Ltd. (No. 94-2779).
100. See id. (citing McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985)).
101. See Williams Elec. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1225, 1237 (N.D. Fla. 1991).
102. See Leisure Founders, Inc. v. CUC Int'l, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1562, 1572 (S.D. Fla.
1993) (holding fraud in the inducement claims do not fall within the scope of the ELR because




105. See Williams Elec. Co., 772 F. Supp. at 1237 (explaining that fraud in the performance
is distinct from fraud in the inducement).
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ship certain quantities of wire harness loom to Hoseline.108 Hoseline discov-
ered that USA had been undershipping the loom forty-five to fifty percent.
109
Hoseline demanded a refund, but USA refused. n0 Hoseline then filed suit
alleging breach of contract and common law fraud and civil theft.", The
Eleventh Circuit rejected Hoseline's civil theft and fraud claims based on the
ELR and held that since both claims arose out of USA's breach of their
contractual duties, Hoseline could not recover in tort."
12
Hoseline demonstrates the importance of establishing a timeline. Time-
lines help to separate when a duty has been breached, since it may be more
difficult to determine whether an independent tort exists once the contract has
been formed. Additionally, courts typically hold that the ELR does not bar tort
claims which occur prior to the formation of a contract"13
B. Fraud in the Inducement
One of the essential elements of a contract is that parties to the contract
enter into it freely and without assent obtained through fraud, mistake, duress,
or undue influence! 14 One example of a tort which has been recognized as
existing, independent of a breach of contract, is fraud in the inducement115
Fraud in the inducement has been recognized in Florida for decades specifi-
cally because it is a tort based on conduct which is independent of any breach
of contract conduct.16 Fraud in the inducement contains the elements consis-
tent with the elements that constitute an independent tort. For example, fraud
in the inducement of a contract occurs prior to the actual contract.1 17 Likewise,
108. Id. at 1199.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Hoseline, 40 F.3d at 1199. After Hoseline filed the lawsuit, USA filed for bankruptcy
causing Hoseline to abandon the breach of contract claim. Id. at 1199.
112. Id. In making this determination, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Serina v. Albertson's,
Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D. Fla. 1990). In Serina, the court held that a plaintiff could not
bring a separate tort action where facts surrounding a breach of contract and the separate and
distinct tort are intertwined. Id. at 1118.
113. See Williams Elec. Co., 772 F. Supp. at 1237.
114. FLA. JUR. 2D Contracts § 35 (1995).
115. See, e.g., Burton v. Linotype Co., 556 So. 2d 1126, 1126 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989);
Johnson v. Bokor, 548 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a party
fraudulently induced into a contract may sue for fraud in the inducement or for breach of
contract).
116. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 5, HTP, Ltd. (No. 94-2779) (citing Isom v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 189 So. 253, 259 (Fla. 1939)).
117. See Williams Elec. Co., 772 F. Supp. at 1238; Leisure Founders, Inc. v. CUC Int'l,
Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1562, 1572 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
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"[t]he tort of fraudulent inducement recognizes, as do all tort claims, a societal
belief that individuals entering into agreements with one another owe each
other a duty."" 8 The specific duty encompassed by fraud in the inducement
claims is the duty of the parties entering into the contract to speak honestly as
to elements which make up the contract."
9
C. Elements of Fraud in the Inducement
Fraud is a particularly difficult claim to prove because its elements
include proof of the defrauder's intent and proof of the defrauded party's
reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation.12  However, in order to prove
fraud in the inducement, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating all of the
following elements of common law fraud: 1) misrepresentation of material
fact; 2) the representor of the misrepresentation knew or should have known of
the statement's falsity; 3) intent by the representor that the representation will
induce another to rely and act on it; and 4) resulting injury to the party acting
in justifiable reliance on the representation. 12 1
A claim of fraudulent inducement requires a full examination into the
facts and circumstances surrounding the claim before the occurrence of fraud
can be determined. 22 The first element of fraud in the inducement requires
that there be a misrepresentation of material fact made by the defendant.123 In
Cavic v. Grand Bahama Development Co., 124 the Eleventh Circuit held:
[T]o constitute actionable fraud, a false representation must relate to
an existing or pre-existing-fact, an unspecific and false statement of
opinion such as occurs in puffing generally cannot constitute fraud.
118. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 13, HTP, Ltd. (No. 94-2779).
119. Id.
120. See Pettinelli v. Danzig, 722 F.2d 706, 709 (11 th Cir. 1984).
121. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Savage, 570 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (citations omitted).
122. Burton, 556 So. 2d at 1128 (citations omitted).
123. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet, 570 So. 2d at 308.
124. 701 F.2d 879 (1 1th Cir. 1983). In Cavic, the appellees sued the appellant for common
law fraud alleging that they were induced by fraudulent misrepresentations to enter into contracts
to purchase land from the appellant. The appellees complained that the appellant made false
representations regarding land appreciation, resale factors, and recovery of equity, which
induced the appellees to enter the contracts. The jury found that the appellants made the
representations with the knowledge of their falsity and with the intent to induce the appellees to
act upon the representations. The Eleventh Circuit held that the jury was justified in its
determination and confirmed that the appellant's misrepresentations went beyond mere sales
puffing. Id. at 885.
482 [Vol. 21:467
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Also, a promise of future action or a prediction of future events can-
not, standing alone, be a basis for fraud because it is not a represei-
tation, there is no right to rely on it, and it is not false when made. W
Likewise, in Plantation Key Developers, Inc. v. Colonial Mortgage Co. of
Indiana,'26 the court held that "a mere broken promise does not constitute
fraud."'
127
In a recent case concerning fraud in the inducement and the ELR, Pulte
Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc.,128 the Eleventh Circuit held
that the ELR does not bar a claim for damages when it is accompanied by an
independent tort, such as fraud in the inducement.' 29 In Pulte, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the plaintiff, Pulte, had a valid claim for fraud in the induce-
ment.130 However, the court held that Pulte did not meet the burden of proof
needed to support the claim because Pulte failed to show any misrepresenta-
tion by the defendant, Osmose, and Pulte failed to show that it relied on any
alleged misrepresentations.131 The Eleventh Circuit's finding offers evidence
that a valid claim for fraud in the inducement can only succeed if the plaintiff
meets his/her burden of proof.
The second element of fraud in the inducement requires the plaintiff to
prove that the false misrepresentation made by the defendant was known, or
should have been known, to be false at the time it was made. 132 Coinciding
with the second element, the third element of fraud requires the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant made the misrepresentation with the intent that it
would induce the plaintiff to rely and act on it. 133 In a seminal case involving
fraudulent misrepresentation, Finney v. Frost,34 the court set aside a jury
125. Cavic, 701 F.2d at 883 (citations omitted).
126. 589 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1979).
127. Id. at 172 (citing Brod v. Jernigan, 188 So. 2d 575, 579 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966)).
128. 60 F.3d 734 (llth Cir. 1995).
129. Id. at 742 (citing AFM Corp. 515 So. 2d at 181-82; Burton, 556 So. 2d at 1128).
130. Pulte, 60 F.3d at 742.
131. Id. Pulte alleged that Osmose had fraudulently induced it to buy a certain plywood
because the plywood contained certifications that it complied with applicable building codes and
standards, which Pulte alleged was false. Id. at 734. Additionally, Pulte asserted that Osmose's
promotional literature misrepresented that the Osmose-treated plywood conformed to those
building codes. Id. at 736. The court held that the record contained no showing that Pulte's
allegations were true. Id. at 742.
132. Poliakoff v. National Emblem Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 477, 478 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1971). Poliakoff is often cited to for the essential elements of fraud.
133. Id.; see also Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet, 570 So. 2d at 308.
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verdict in favor of the plaintiff because the court felt there was insufficient
evidence to support the plaintiff's allegations that the defendant knowingly
provided false information which was intended to induce the plaintiff to act.135
In Finney, the plaintiff purchased a yacht from the defendant with a bill of
sale declaring the vessel to be free and clear of all liens, mortgages, taxes, and
encumbrances. 36 The plaintiff sued the defendant because two months after
the receipt of the yacht and bill of sale, the boat was attached and sold for
unpaid bills.' 37 The Finney court held that there was no evidence "to establish
that the defendant knew the bills were not paid or that he told the plaintiff that
the bills were paid to induce plaintiff to act."' 
38
On the other hand, in American Eagle Credit Corp. v. Select Holding,
Inc.,' 39 the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
held that the plaintiff, American Eagle, established the elements of fraud and,
therefore, the court entered judgment against the defendant, Roffers."40 In this
case, American Eagle sued Dean Roffers, secretary/treasurer of Select Hold-
ings and Select Restaurant Group, Inc., for fraud. Roffers made a false
statement regarding equipment that American Eagle had contracted to pur-
chase from a vendor. Roffers told another Select Holdings employee to tell
American Eagle that the equipment had been manufactured, was inspected in
the vendor's warehouse, and was found acceptable by the Select companies,
therefore, American Eagle should go ahead and pay the vendor. Roffers did
not deny that the statements were false, and the court held that Roffers knew
the statements were false at the time he made them.' 4' Additionally, the court
held that Roffers made the false statement regarding the equipment in order to
induce American Eagle to act.142
135. Id. at 618.
136. The bill of sale specifically stated:
The sellers further warrant that the said vessel is free and clear of all liens, mort-
gages, taxes, and encumbrances of any nature or kind and hereby agree to indem-
nify and save harmless, the purchaser against and from any and all claims arising by





139. 865 F. Supp. 800 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
140. Id. at 813.
141. Id. at 812.
142. Id. The facts stated that American Eagle was not going to pay the vendor until they
were assured that the equipment had been inspected and was acceptable. Id.
[Vol. 21:467
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The final and most important element of fraud in the inducement requires
the plaintiff to have justifiably relied upon a misrepresentation and, as a result
thereof, suffered damages. 43  Justifiable reliance is the most significant
element because it ensures that the defendant will not be liable in tort for
representations the plaintiff could not have been expected to rely upon.' 44 In
the seminal case of Besett v. Basnett, 45 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
a "recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justified in relying upon its
truth if he knows that it is false or its falsity is obvious to him.' ' 146 However,
the supreme court noted that a plaintiff is not precluded from recovery in tort
just because he/she failed to make an independent investigation of the state-
ment.' 47 Moreover, the court held that "[a] person guilty of fraud should not
be permitted to use the law as his shield."'
' 48
In another monumental case, Johnson v. Davis,149 the Supreme Court of
Florida explained that, "[t]he doctrine of caveat emptor does not exempt a
seller from responsibility for the statements and representations which he
makes to induce the buyer to act, when under the circumstances these amount
to fraud in the legal sense."'' 50 The Johnson court held that a seller of residen-
tial property has a duty to disclose material facts affecting the value of prop-
erty which are not readily observable to the buyer and which are not known to
the buyer. 15 ' The significance of this element is that parties cannot proceed on
143. See Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet, 570 So. 2d at 308.
144. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 14, HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 661
So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (No. 94-2779).
145. 389 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 1980).
146. Id. at 997.
147. Id. In Besett, the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Basnett, filed a complaint against the Besetts
and their real estate broker, the defendants, alleging that the defendants had made a fraudulent
misrepresentation for the purpose of inducing the plaintiffs to buy a lodge and a particular piece
of property. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had misrepresented the amount of
business income the lodge had previously produced and the defendants had misrepresented the
size of the lodge. The trial court dismissed the complaint for falling to state a cause of action;
however, the district court reversed the trial court's decision. Id. at 996. The supreme court held
that the plaintiffs were justified in relying upon the representations made by the defendants, even
though they might have learned that the representations were false had they made an independent
investigation. Id. at 998.
148. Besett, 389 So. 2d at 998.
149. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
150. Id. at 627. Prior to the Supreme Court of Florida's decision, the doctrine of caveat
emptor was applied to the sales of residential homes. Id. at 628. This doctrine, which stands for
"let the buyer beware," held that it was the buyer's responsibility to be informed and examine his
purchase prior to entering the contract. See id.
151. Id.
483
: Nova Law Review 21, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
a fraud in the inducement claim unless they are justified in relying on the
representation.
Likewise, a party cannot be successful on a fraud in the inducement claim
unless all of the elements of fraud are proven. This provides yet another
reason why the economic loss rule should not bar fraud in the inducement
claims. Fraud in the inducement, in and of itself, contains sufficient safe-
guards against meritless claims without applying the ELR to bar fraud claims
prior to a factual determination of the elements.
IV. THE ECONOMIC Loss RULE AND FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT IN
RELATION TO RECENT 1995 AND 1996 CASES
Fraud in the inducement has been considered an independent tort which
may be brought separately from a breach of contract claim by essentially every
district in Florida, including the second district. 52 However, in a relatively
recent decision, the Second District Court of Appeal held that the ELR bars
fraud in the inducement claims.' 53 In Woodson v. Martin,154 the court was
asked to determine the following question, which it then certified to the
Supreme Court of Florida as a question of great public importance: "Is a buyer
of residential property ... prevented by the 'economic loss rule' from recov-
ering damages for fraud in the inducement against [a] real estate agent and its
individual agent.., representing the sellers?"'55
In making its decision, the second district explained that "the nature of the
damages suffered determines whether the economic loss rule bars recovery
based on tort theories."'15 6 The court noted "if the damages sought are eco-
nomic losses only, the party seeking recovery for those damages must proceed
152. Monco Enters., Inc. v. Ziebart Corp., 673 So. 2d 491, 492 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (citing Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985)); see also TGI Dev. Corp. v. CV
Reit, 665 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses,
S.A., 661 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Burton, 556 So. 2d at 1128; Johnson v.
Bokor, 548 So. 2d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
153. Woodson v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), quashed, No.
87,057 1996 WL 600478 (Fla. Oct. 17, 1996). In Woodson, the appellant bought an expensive
home which he alleged was represented to him by the appellees as almost new. Id. at 1327. The
appellant claimed that the appellees were guilty of a variety of misrepresentations and that he
relied on those misrepresentations in deciding to buy the house. Id. When the appellant and his
wife moved into the house, they discovered numerous, serious defects which led them to sue the
appellees on several theories, including fraud in the inducement. Id.
154. 663 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
155. Id. at 1327.
156. Id. at 1329.
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on contract theories of liability. '157 Based on this reasoning, the court found
that because the only damages suffered by the appellant, Woodson, were
damages to his house, the ELR barred recovery for the fraud in the inducement
claim. 58  The second district relied on several decisions, including the Su-
preme Court of Florida's holding in Casa Clara, despite the fact that only one
of the decisions actually involved a fraud in the inducement claim.'59
Prior to the second district's decision in Woodson, the Third District
Court of Appeal of Florida held, in HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costar-
ricenses, 16 that fraud in the inducement claims were not barred by the ELR.161
In HTP, the plaintiff, Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, filed a complaint against
the defendant, HTP, alleging that the plaintiff had been fraudulently induced
into entering into a settlement agreement. The defendant counterclaimed that
the plaintiff was in breach of the settlement agreement. HTP subsequently
sought the dismissal of Lineas Aereas Costarricenses' fraudulent inducement
claim on the ground that Florida's ELR barred the claim. The third district
rejected HTP's breach of the settlement agreement claim and found that a
"cause of action for fraud in the inducement [is] an independent tort that [is]
not barred by the economic loss rule." 16
2
Although several Florida courts have addressed the issue of whether the
ELR should bar fraud in the inducement claims, 63 the second district was the
only court in Florida to apply the Woodson rationale in finding that the ELR
should bar such claims. However, the Supreme Court of Florida's recent
157. Id.
158. Id. The Woodson court referred to the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Casa
Clara, which the Woodson court interpreted as barring all claims, regardless of whether they are
independent, if the only damages suffered are economic. Woodson, 663 So. 2d at 1329.
159. Id. at 1328-29. The Woodson court relied on the following cases: Palte, 60 F.3d at
744 (holding the ELR does not bar fraud in the inducement claims; the plaintiff just failed to
prove the claim); Hoseline, Inc. v. U.S.A. Diversified Prod., Inc., 40 F.3d 1198, 1200 (11 th Cir.
1994) (involving a fraud in the performance claim); Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car,
Inc., 660 So. 2d 628, 631 (Fla. 1995) (applying the ELR to negligence claims); Casa Clara
Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, 620 So. 2d 1244, 1248 (Fla. 1993) (applying
the rule only to negligence claims and abolishing recovery when only economic damages are
suffered).
160. 661 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
161. Id. at 1222 (citing Burton, 556 So. 2d at 1128).
162. Id.
163. See Linn-Well Dev. Corp. v. Preston & Farley, Inc., 666 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1995). In Linn-Well, the second district affirmed its decision in Woodson, and certified a
similar question to the Supreme Court of Florida: "Is a buyer of commercial property prevented
by the 'economic loss rule' from recovering damages for fraud in the inducement against the real
estate agent and its individual agent representing the sellers?" Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
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decision in HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 164 ended the
conflict by holding that the ELR does not bar fraud in the inducement claims.
This decision is long overdue since, aside from the third district's decision in
HTP, the Eleventh Circuit, 65 the First District Court of Appeal, 66 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, 167 the Fifth District Court of Appeal, 168 and every
other appellate court in Florida has held that the ELR does not bar fraud in the
inducement claims. 169  The second district's decision in Woodson caused
several of these courts to certify conflict to the Supreme Court of Florida on
this issue. 170 Furthermore, the second district's rationale offered no persuasive
explanation for extending the ELR to bar fraud in the inducement claims.'
71
As one commentator has stated: "if fraudulent inducement claims were no
longer available in breach of contract claims, parties would be foreclosed from
protecting themselves from fraud."'
172
V. CONCLUSION
The alleged intent of the ELR was to separate negligence claims for
personal injury damages from contract claims for economic damages. How-
ever, when the Second District Court of Appeal applied the ELR to bar fraud
in the inducement claims, this expansion of the ELR went too far.
164. No. 86,913, 1996 WL 600501 (Fla. Oct. 17, 1996), approving, HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas
Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 661 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
165. See, e.g., Pulte, 60 F.3d at 742 (stating that "[a]lthough the economic loss rule bars
recovery for tort claims arising from breach of contract, the doctrine does not preclude a claim
for damages occasioned by an independent tort, including fraud in the inducement of a con-
tract").
166. See, e.g., Monco Enter., 673 So. 2d at 492 (explaining that fraud in the inducement is
an independent tort which is not barred by the ELR).
167. See, e.g., TGI Dev., 665 So. 2d at 366 (holding that "[f]raud in the inducement, even
when only economic damages are sought to be recovered, is the kind of independent tort that is
not barred by the economic loss rule"). See also Jarmco, 668 So. 2d at 301 (affirming TGI Dev.,
Inc., and holding that the ELR does not bar a common law fraud in the inducement claim
seeking to recover only economic losses).
168. See, e.g., Lee v. Paxson, 641 So. 2d 145, 145-46 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(explaining the "argument that the economic loss rule bars [a] fraudulent inducement claim is
specious; nevertheless, it is clear that, under Florida law, appellant has no enforceable claim.").
169. Respondents' Answer Brief at 21, HTP, Ltd. (No. 94-2779).
170. See Jarmco, 668 So. 2d at 300; Monco Enter., 673 So. 2d at 491; TGI Dev., 665 So. 2d
at 366; HTP., Ltd., 661 So. 2d at 1221.
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Fraud in the inducement, whether based on an intentional act or a negli-
gent act, is an independent tort claim which cannot be insured against and is
discovered only after the formation of the contract. The context of this kind of
tort claim makes limiting the recovery of damages to economic damages under
contract law wholly inadequate.
In quashing the second district's decision to expand the ELR to bar fraud
in the inducement claims, the Supreme Court of Florida supported the author's
reasoning that sound public policy should require, rather than restrict, the levy
of punishment against fraudulent actors and the reward of full compensation to
victims of fraud. The removal of any kind of fraud claim from the menu of tort
law claims available to injured parties, weakens the protections afforded by
law. In essence, the Second District Court of Appeal's application of the ELR
encouraged intentional and negligent acts of trickery and deceit' 73 because of
the limitation, if not the elimination, of a means of full recovery.
Although the Second District Court of Appeal's opinion in Woodson v.
Martin sparked debate among lawyers and judges as to the proper application
of the ELR, this debate did not cloud the real consequences of applying the
ELR to bar fraud in the inducement claims. The Supreme Court of Florida's
very recent decision has confirmed this author's opinions; thereby ending the
conflict in Florida courts and permitting recovery to the victims who have
entered into contracts obtained through trickery and deceit.
Geri Lynn Mankofy
173. See Respondents' Answer Brief at 16, HTP, Ltd. (No. 94-2779).
* The author would like to thank Theresa Montalbano Bennett, a Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
attorney, and Professor Michael Flynn of Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law
Center, for their time and guidance in the preparation of this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nancy and Larry Garrett were married in Jacksonville, Florida on
November 23, 1974. On March 9, 1978, their daughter Amy Rebecca was
born in Jacksonville, and the parties lived continuously in Jacksonville from
the time they were married until June of 1986.1 The Garrett family subse-
quently moved to Arlington, Texas and resided there until the couple's
separation in July of 1991.2 Shortly thereafter, Nancy and Amy Garrett
returned to Jacksonville and have remained there ever since leaving Texas.
Larry Garrett also left Texas after the separation and took up residence in
Greenwood, Indiana in August of 1992.3
On November 17, 1993, Nancy Gale Garrett petitioned the Circuit
Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County, Florida, for
dissolution of marriage from her husband, Larry Allen Garrett.4 Her hus-
band, while residing out of state, was served in Indiana with the petition for
1. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Garrett v. Garrett, 668 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1996) (No. 85,384).
2. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Garreu (No. 85,384).
3. Id.
4. See Garrett v. Garrett, 652 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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dissolution of marriage.5 In her petition, Nancy Garrett alleged that Florida
jurisdiction was proper for various reasons.6  The husband responded by
filing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction stating that section
48.193 of the Florida Statutes did not confer personal jurisdiction over him
in Florida.7 The trial court denied the husband's motion and ruled that
Florida did have personal jurisdiction in the matter due to the husband's
significant contacts with the state.8
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the decision of
the trial court, holding that the criteria of Florida's long arm statute had not
been met.9 Accordingly, the trial court could not have properly exercised
personal jurisdiction over Larry Garrett.10 The appellate court cited to three
cases of precedent" in determining that personal jurisdiction was lacking
over Mr. Garrett. In each of these cases, the gap in time between the
defendant's prior residence in Florida and the commencement of the action
was determined to be too remote, thus barring exercise of personal jurisdic-
5. Iti
6. Garrett v. Garrett, 668 So. 2d 991, 992-93 (Fla. 1996). Among her reasons were that:
1) she had been a resident for six months prior to the filing of the petition for dissolution of
marriage; 2) she married Larry Garrett in Florida in 1974 and lived in Florida until the couple
moved to Texas in 1986 with their Florida born daughter, Amy Rebecca Garrett; 3) her
husband was born in Florida and currently travels to Florida to visit the daughter and other
family members; and 4) her husband visits Florida to conduct business within the state. Id.
7. Id. at 993.
8. Id. Judge Hugh A. Carithers, Jr. based his denial of Mr. Garrett's motion on the dura-
tion of the parties' marriage in Florida before moving to Texas, Mr. Garrett's personal and
business trips to Florida, and the child support payments made by Mr. Garrett in Florida. Id.
at 993 n.l.
9. Garrett, 652 So. 2d at 378. The First District Court of Appeal construed section
48.193(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes to mean that the defendant's residency must proximately
precede the commencement of the action for dissolution of marriage. Id. at 379. This was a
rejection of the argument proffered by Nancy Garrett that proximity is not merely a temporal
determination, but must be determined by the totality of the circumstances. IU.
10. Id.
11. First, in Shammay v. Shammay, 491 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), the
court interpreted section 48.193 to mean that the defendant's residency in the state must
proximately precede the commencement of the action. Id. at 285. Second, in Soule v.
Rosacco-Soule, 386 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980), the court rejected the position
that merely because a defendant resided in Florida sometime prior to the commencement of
the action, personal jurisdiction could be invoked under section 48.193. Id. at 863. Third, in
Bofonchik v. Smith, 622 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993), the court found that a
husband's residence in Florida from 1984 to 1986 was insufficient to support personal
jurisdiction under section 48.193 in an action for child support filed by the wife in Florida in
1989. d. at 1357.
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tion over the defendant. 12 On rehearing en banc,'3 the First District Court of
Appeal reaffirmed the reasoning in their original opinion, but certified a
question of great public importance to the Supreme Court of Florida.
14
The Supreme Court of Florida, answering a revised certified question,
15
stated that Mrs. Garrett could not obtain personal jurisdiction over her
husband and, as a result, affirmed the decision of the First District Court of
Appeal)5 Although recognizing the minimum contacts that a nonresident
might have with a state so as to allow a court to obtain personal jurisdiction
consistent with the Due Process Clause, 17 the court chose to rely on whether
Larry Garrett's conduct fell within one of the statutory grounds for jurisdic-
tion found in Florida's long arm statute.' 8 The court stated that the language
of section 48.193(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes does not allow a Florida court
to obtain personal jurisdiction over any parties to a dissolution proceeding
where the spouses once resided in Florida but "abandoned Florida as their
state of residence" for any length of time.' 9 In other words, Mrs. Garrett
could not simply return to Florida, file for dissolution of marriage, and
obtain personal jurisdiction over her husband once she abandoned the
protection of Florida's laws by taking up residence in another state. Finally,
the court stated that Mr. Garrett's frequent trips to Florida for business and
his voluntary payment of child support were not relevant facts when applied
to the issue of whether section 48.193(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes allows
12. See Bofonchik, 622 So. 2d at 1355; Shammay, 491 So. 2d at 284; Soule, 386 So. 2d at
862.
13. Garrett, 652 So. 2d at 381.
14. Id. The question, as originally certified, asked: "WHEN MAY A RESPONDENT'S
PRIOR RESIDENCE IN FLORIDA BE SUFFICIENT TO CREATE PERSONAL JURIS-
DICTION IN AN ACTION CONCERNING ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT, OR DIVISION
OF PROPERTY?" Id. at 381-82.
15. The Supreme Court of Florida reworded the question: 'WHEN A MARRIED COU-
PLE RESIDING IN FLORIDA MOVES TO ANOTHER STATE, MAY ONE SPOUSE,
AFTER SEPARATION, SUBSEQUENTLY RETURN TO FLORIDA AND OBTAIN
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE OTHER SPOUSE BASED ON THE 'PRIOR
RESIDENCE' SECTION OF FLORIDA'S LONG ARM STATUTE?" Garrett v. Garrett, 668
So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. 1996).
16. Id. at 994.
17. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion states: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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for a resident spouse to obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
spouse in a dissolution of marriage action.
20
This comment will focus on the potential harmful ramifications this
decision will have on the law of personal jurisdiction with regard to a
dissolution of marriage action in Florida. Part II will discuss the modem
concept of minimum contacts between a defendant and the forum state, and it
will examine how specific long arm statutes can restrict the outside limits of
due process established through the minimum contacts analysis. Part I1 will
focus on the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Florida in deciding Garrett.
Part IV will criticize the decision in light of a minimum contacts approach
which would have allowed the trial court to obtain personal jurisdiction over
the nonresident husband. Furthermore, this part will discuss the impact of
the decision on dissolution of marriage cases involving families in transition
and the possible consequences suffered by a resident spouse denied the
opportunity to litigate in Florida. Part V will conclude that the Florida
Legislature should amend section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes to allow
Florida courts jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a dissolution of
marriage action who has minimum contacts with the state, such that the suit
does not offend the notions of substantial justice.
II. IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
A. The Modem Development of Personal Jurisdiction
Over fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held, in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington,1 that due process only requires that "in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he not be present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.'" 22 Since International Shoe, there has been a line of
cases2 interpreting the minimum contacts a nonresident defendant must have
20. Id.
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (second emphasis
added).
23. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal.,
436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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with the forum state before a court can obtain personal jurisdiction consis-
tent with the Due Process Clause.24 These cases explored the outer bounda-
ries of personal jurisdiction under due process. Many states have narrowed
these outer boundaries for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant by enacting long arm statutes that limit a plaintiff's ability to hale
a defendant into court. For example, in Florida, a court cannot find personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless allowed by a grant of
statutory authorization pursuant to Florida's long arm statute?2 Florida's
long arm statute specifies in detail the acts or conduct which allow for the
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
From the beginning of our federal system, courts have had to grapple
with the problem of the authority of a state to assert jurisdiction over parties
and property in cases involving transactions not occurring entirely within the
boundaries of a single state. Regardless, in every case, the court must have
power over the parties to the lawsuit to render an enforceable judgment.
Due process is the principal limit on the scope of this power.26 By com-
mencing the action in a particular forum, the plaintiff consents to personal
jurisdiction. The defendant however, is brought into the litigation involun-
tarily, and the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant must
satisfy constitutional due process standards.27
Historically, presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court
established personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, thus satisfy-
ing constitutional due process standards. In Pennoyer v. Neff,28 the notion of
24. In this context, the Court has referred solely to the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
25. Section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who per-
sonally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection
thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is natural person, his or her
personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause
of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts:
e) With respect to a proceeding for alimony, child support, or division of
property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or with respect to an
independent action for support of dependents, maintaining a matrimonial domi-
cile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defen-
dant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether co-
habiting during that time or not.
FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(e) (1995).
26. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
27. Id.
28. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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personal jurisdiction of a state court over a defendant was limited to persons
served within the state, persons domiciled in the state, and persons consent-
ing to jurisdiction.29 In Pennoyer, the Court stated that "[t]he authority of
every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in
which it is established. 30  Pennoyer established the nineteenth century
constitutional doctrine that every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property served with process within the
territory of the forum court.3
More recently, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the proposi-
tion that service within the forum state subjects a nonresident defendant to
the personal jurisdiction of the court.32 In the plurality opinion of Burnham
v. Superior Court of California,33 the Court clearly followed the precedent
established in Pennoyer, holding that if a party is served properly with
process while present in the forum, a court has personal jurisdiction over that
party regardless of the existence or nonexistence of minimum contacts with
the forum. 34 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, stated that "[a]mong the
most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction ... is that the
courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically
present in the State. 35 Consequently, the Court rejected the notion that in
the absence of continuous and systematic contacts with the forum, a nonresi-
dent defendant can be subjected to judgment only as to matters that arise out
of or relate to his contacts with the forum.
36
29. IL at 714.
30. I1 at 720.
31. Id. at 722.
32. See Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
33. IM
34. Id. at 618.
35. Id. at 610. In Burnham, the Court referred to matters that arise out of or relate to a
defendant's contacts with the forum. See generally Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S.
604 (1990). These terms are synonymous with "general" and "specific" jurisdiction. General
jurisdiction exists when the number and quality of a defendant's contacts with the forum state
are sufficiently substantial such that one may litigate any dispute in the courts of the forum,
whether or not that dispute grows out of those contacts. Arthur T. Von Mehren and Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136
(1966) [hereinafter Von Mehren and Trautman]. Specific jurisdiction exists when the contacts
with the forum are related to the dispute sought to be adjudicated. Id. More recently,
Professor Mary Twitchell proposed to replace the terms general and specific with "dispute-
blind" and "dispute-specific." See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101
HARv. L. REV. 610, 613 (1988) [hereinafter Twitchell].
36. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 616.
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The opinion also recognized the weakening of Pennoyer's rationale. 37
This weakening was due to changes in the technology of transportation and
communication and the tremendous growth of interstate business activity.
38
These changes led to a "'relaxation of the strict limits on state jurisdic-
tion' ' '39 over nonresident individuals. Furthermore, the Court noted that
many state courts were focusing their attention on the minimum contacts
analysis and overlooking the simple fact that a defendant might have been
present in the forum, no matter how fleeting his presence. Nevertheless, in
Burnham, the Court held that obtaining personal jurisdiction by complying
with Pennoyer's requirement of presence within the forum satisfied the
constitutional requirements of due process. 40 The plurality concluded that
jurisdiction based on presence alone constitutes due process because
presence is one of the continuing traditions that defines the due process
standard of "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 4 '
Unlike physical presence, the minimum contacts analysis developed by
the Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington42 involves a balancing of
the quality and nature of the defendant's contacts in the forum state, his or
her connection with the cause of action, and the interests of the forum in
protecting citizens from nonresidents. 43 The development of the minimum
contacts analysis expanded the Nineteenth Century view of personal juris-
diction found in Pennoyer v. Neff. Under International Shoe, the amount of
contact with a forum state necessary to justify an exercise of jurisdiction
depends on the relationship between the defendant's contacts with the forum
and the plaintiff's cause of action.44
International Shoe eliminated the need to resort to a finding of consent
to jurisdiction or a finding of presence within the jurisdiction. Two new
criteria were set forth by the Court, such that personal jurisdiction would be
proper if the cause of action arose from the party's activities within the state,
or if the cause of action arose from conduct outside the forum state by a
party who engaged in continuous and systematic business within the state.
45
These two standards of International Shoe have evolved into the concepts of
37. Id. at 617.
38. 1
39. I. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J. dissenting)).
40. Id. at 618.
41. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619.
42. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
43. See id. at 319-20.
44. See id. at 320.
45. See id. at 319-21.
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specific and general jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction exists over an out of
state party when the cause of action arose out of that party's contacts with
the forum, regardless of whether those contacts occurred within the state.46
General jurisdiction exists over any cause of action if an out of state party
has engaged in continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state.47
The most important contribution to the personal jurisdiction analysis by the
Court in International Shoe was the determination that the Due Process
Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in
personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state
has no contacts, ties, or relations. 4 8
The State of Washington claimed that International Shoe owed the state
unemployment compensation fund contributions. 49 The State of Washington
filed suit in a Washington court in an attempt to collect the unpaid funds.
The issue in the case became whether, within the limitations of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the State of Washington
could assert personal jurisdiction over the International Shoe Company.50
The Court's widely quoted holding stated that due process required only
that a defendant "have certain minimum contacts [with the forum] such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."51 Using the facts of the case, the Court applied this
new standard of minimum contacts and found that the activities and conduct
of the International Shoe Company were "neither irregular nor casual. 5 2
The company's activities resulted in a large volume of business, in the
course of which the International Shoe Company received "the benefits and
protections of the laws of [Washington], including the right to resort to the
courts for enforcement of [the company's] rights. 53 The Court also held
that the company's conduct was "systematic and continuous throughout the
years in question. 54 Accordingly, the Court felt that the International Shoe
Company's operations established sufficient contacts with the State of
46. See Twitchell, supra note 35, at 613.
47. See Von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 35, at 1136.
48. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
49. Id. at 311.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
52. Id. at 320.
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Washington to permit the state to enforce any obligations or debts which the
company incurred in Washington.55
Several cases since International Shoe have further defined the scope
and meaning of a defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state. In
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,56 the Court held that personal
jurisdiction was improper unless the defendant purposefully availed himself
of the privileges and protection of the forum's laws by conducting activities
within the forum state.5 7  The Court also stated that when a defendant
purposefully directs activities at the forum state, the defendant has notice of
the possibility of being haled into the forum's courts.5
Additionally, in Kulko v. Superior Court of California,59 the United
States Supreme Court found that a California court had no personal jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident father living in New York who paid child support to
his daughter living in California.60 The Court reasoned that the mere act of
sending his daughter to live in California and paying child support suggested
no intent by the father to purposefully avail himself of any benefits from the
55. Id. at 319-20.
56. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., Harry and Kay Robinson
purchased a new Audi car from Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. in Massena, New York in 1976.
During their move to Arizona the following year, the Robinsons were struck in the rear by
another car while driving in Oklahoma. An alleged defect in their Audi left Mrs. Robinson
and her two children severely burned from a fire caused by the accident. Subsequently, the
Robinsons joined World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. as a defendant in the products liability
litigation. The Court held that this defendant had no ties, contacts, or relations with the State
of Oklahoma and that the lower court lacked personal jurisdiction over World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. Id. at 299.
57. Id. at 297 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
58. Id.
59. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
60. Id. at 96. Under a separation agreement executed by Sharon and Ezra Kulko in 1972,
their children were to remain in New York with the father during the school year and spend
vacations in California with the mother. Ezra Kulko agreed to pay $3,000 per year in child
support for the periods that the children were with Sharon in California. In 1976, Sharon,
now remarried, filed an action in Superior Court of California asking for permanent custody of
the children. The father appeared specially and moved to quash service of the summons,
claiming that he was not a California resident and lacked sufficient minimum contacts with
California as formulated in International Shoe. Id. at 88. The trial court denied his motion,
which he appealed to the California Court of Appeal. Id. The appeals court affirmed the trial
court ruling, reasoning that by allowing his children to live in California, and by paying child
support, he had caused an effect in the state warranting the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over him. Id. at 88-89. The Supreme Court of California granted review and affirmed the
rulings of the lower state courts. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 89. Thereafter, Ezra Kulko petitioned for
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 90.
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forum state.6' Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall stated that, "the
state courts in the instant case failed to heed our admonition that 'the
flexible standard of International Shoe' does not 'heral[d] the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.' 62
Also, in Hanson v. Denckla,63 the Court held that personal jurisdiction
was proper only if the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protection of that state's laws.64 The Court held that Florida had not satis-
fied this test in attempting to assert jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee in a
dispute over the validity of a trust that had been established by a Pennsylva-
nia domiciliary who subsequently moved to Florida.65  The majority's
conclusion that minimum contacts was not a mechanical application, but
rather a factual determination of the requisite "affiliating circumstances" of
the case, broadened the scope of obtaining personal jurisdiction under due
process.
66
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 67 however, Justice Brennan took
the minimum contacts analysis one step further by stating that even if
minimum contacts with the forum exist, other factors may be considered that
would prevent a court from obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.68  These factors led to a reformulation of the minimum contacts
analysis in that, depending on the presence or absence of these factors, more
or fewer contacts will suffice. Applying the reformulated approach to the
minimum contacts analysis, the Court held that personal jurisdiction existed
over Rudzewicz, a Michigan franchisee of Burger King, in a suit in Florida
based on a franchise agreement. 69 The Court emphasized that Rudzewicz's
ongoing contractual relationship with Burger King's corporate headquarters
in Miami was purposefully directed to the forum and gave Rudzewicz fair
61. Id. at 96.
62. IM. at 101 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).
63. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
64. See id. at 235.
65. Id. at 254.
66. Id. at 246.
67. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
68. Id. at 476. These factors include: "'the burden on the defendant,' 'the forum State's
interest in adjudicating the dispute,' 'the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief,' 'the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies,' and the 'shared interests of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies."' Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1990)).
69. ld1 at 487.
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warning of being subject to suit in Florida.7° Justice Brennan also cited to
the fact that Florida had a legitimate interest in protecting a resident corpo-
ration from a breach of contract by a nonresident franchisee.7'
In the complex case of Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall,72 the Court held that Helicol's 73 contacts with the State of Texas were
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.74 In Helicopteros, all the parties conceded that the
claims against Helicol did not arise out of, and were not related to, Helicol's
activities with Texas. 75 Because of this concession, the Court explored the
nature of Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas to determine whether
those contacts were the kind of systematic and continuous business activities
that would allow the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.76 Using this approach, the majority concluded that Helicol's contacts
with Texas were insufficient to satisfy due process and reversed the judg-
ment of the Supreme Court of Texas which earlier held that Helicol was
subject to the jurisdiction of the Texas court system.77
In Justice Brennan's dissent, the suggestion was made that the majority
made no distinction between controversies that relate to a defendant's
contacts with a forum and those that arise out of such contacts.78 Justice
Brennan believed that the undisputed contacts between Helicol and the State
of Texas were sufficiently important and sufficiently related to the underly-
ing cause of action.79 Justice Brennan stated that Helicol had purposefully
70. Id. at 482.
71. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482-83.
72. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
73. Helicol is the common trade name of Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
74. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418-19. On January 26, 1976, a helicopter owned by
Helicol crashed in Peru. Four United States citizens were among those who lost their lives in
the accident. Helicol is a Colombian corporation with its principal place of business in the
city of Bogota, Colombia. The decedents of the crash were employed by a Peruvian consor-
tium headquartered in Houston, Texas. This consortium, through Helicol, purchased
helicopters, spare parts, and accessories for more than four million dollars from Bell Helicop-
ter Company in Fort Worth, Texas. Helicol also sent pilots to Fort Worth for training and
received into its New York City bank accounts over five million dollars in payment from the
consortium for the purchase of the helicopters. Despite these contacts, the majority opinion of
the Court was unwilling to analyze Helicopteros as a "specific" jurisdiction case based on
these specific contacts with the United States. Id.
75. Id. at 415.
76. Id. at415-16.
77. Id at418-19.
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availed itself of the benefits and obligations of Texas law, and that these
contacts would not "'offend [the] 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.'"80 In response to Justice Brennan's dissent, the major-
ity stated that the distinction between controversies that relate to a defen-
dant's contacts with a forum and those that arise out of such contacts was
never raised as an issue in the case.81 The majority cited to the fact that the
decedents' representatives made no argument that their cause of action either
arose out of or was related to Helicol' s contacts with the State of Texas.
82
In the most recent personal jurisdiction case, Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court of California,83 a divided Court revisited the issue of
personal jurisdiction based on a defendant's minimum contacts with the
forum state.84 Asahi, a Japanese corporation, manufactured a valve assembly
used by a Taiwanese corporate defendant in a motorcycle tire tube.85 The
Taiwanese corporation, Cheng Shin, impleaded Asahi in a personal injury
suit filed in California.86 Asahi was aware that the valves were used in
products sold in California, but knew of no other contacts with the State of
California.87
The opinion, written by Justice O'Connor and joined only by three
other Justices, concluded that merely injecting a product into the stream of
commerce, even knowing that the product might end up in the forum state, is
insufficient for a finding of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.88 This
portion of the plurality opinion further stated that absent more purposeful
conduct, such as advertising designed specifically for the market, or provid-
ing service facilities in the forum, the minimum contacts analysis could not
be met in this case.89
80. See id. at 420 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
81. Id. at 416.
82. Id.
83. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
84. lI at 105.
85. Id at 106.
86. Id. On September 23, 1978, in California, Gary Zurcher lost control of his Honda
motorcycle and collided with a tractor. In September of the following year, Zurcher filed a
product liability action against Cheng Shin, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the bicycle tube.
Id. Cheng Shin impleaded Asahi Metal Indus. Co., the manufacturer of the tubes' valve
assembly. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106.
87. Id. at 107.
88. Id. at 112. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Powell and Scalia, concurred in this
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In another part of Justice O'Connor's opinion, eight of the Justices
joined in holding that, regardless of the existence of minimum contacts, an
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi would "offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." '90 In Asahi, the Court explained
that the determination of the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in
each case will depend on an evaluation of several factors. 91 A court must
consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state, and the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination
"'the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies."' 92 The Court considered these factors in Asahi
and held that, even apart from the question of the placement of goods in the
stream of commerce, it would be unreasonable to allow the assertion of
jurisdiction over Asahi.93 The Court concluded that the burden on the
defendant was unreasonable, particularly because Asahi was an international
defendant, and the only claim remaining before the California court was the
third party indemnification claim by Cheng Shin against Asahi.94
The decision in Asahi called for a court to consider the procedural and
substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the
95assertion of jurisdiction by a state court. In every case, those interests, as
well as the federal government's interest in foreign relations, will be better
served by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of
jurisdiction in the particular case. 96 By viewing this case in an international
context, the Court managed to find that the heavy burden on Asahi, weighed
against the slight interest of the plaintiff, Gary Zurcher, and the forum state,
was too great to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California
court over an alien defendant.97 Thus, in similar cases, perhaps limited to
foreign parties, the reasonableness of jurisdiction must be examined even
though the party has minimum contacts with the forum state.
90. Id. at 113 (quoting International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
91. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
92. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
93. Id. at 116.
94. Id. at 114.
95. Id. at 115.
96. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115.
97. Id. at 116.
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B. Long Arm Statutes Narrow Minimum Contacts
Statutes conferring the power to exercise personal jurisdiction over
persons outside the state are called long arm statutes. To assert personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a state court must satisfy the
requirements enumerated in the state's personal jurisdiction statute.98 Long
arm statutes allow personal jurisdiction whenever federal due process is
satisfied or they allow personal jurisdiction on narrower grounds, such as by
performing specific acts within the forum state. Even though due process
may be satisfied, personal jurisdiction may be improper if the state long arm
statute's requirements are not met.
A number of states, such as California,99 have enacted statutes that
permit courts in those states to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full
extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The proper analysis under this type of coextensive long arm statute is simply
to evaluate whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum.
Other states, such as Florida,1°° have long arm statutes that set forth particu-
lar circumstances that permit courts in those states to allow an exercise of
personal jurisdiction over persons outside the state. In these states, the outer
boundary of the statutorily conferred jurisdiction is the maximum extent of
jurisdiction that a court can assume.
I-l. GARRETr V. GARRE=T
In the First District Court of Appeal opinion of Garrett v. Garrett,'0' the
court addressed the issue of whether the trial court lawfully acquired
personal jurisdiction over Larry Garrett pursuant to Florida's long arm
statute.102  The trial court cited several factors that established sufficient
contacts with Florida which allowed the court to obtain personal jurisdiction
over Mr. Garrett. Among these factors were the duration of the marriage in
Florida before the parties moved to Texas, the husband's frequent trips to
Florida for business, the husband's voluntary payment of support in Florida,
and the wife's representation that the husband expressed a desire to return
98. See Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
99. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (Deering 1991). This section states that: "A court of
this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this
state or of the United States." Id.
100. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1995).
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his residence to Florida.103 The appellate court disagreed with the trial
court's finding and stated that long arm jurisdiction may be exercised only if
the cause of action is based on conduct or omissions of the nonresident
defendant that arose out of his residency in Florida.1 4 The First District
Court of Appeal further stated that both parties voluntarily left Florida for
their new residence in Texas and left no real property in Florida. 05 Also, the
couple remained in Texas for five years prior to their separation. These
factors created an insufficient showing of residential proximity in Florida to
support a finding of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Florida's long arm
statute.106
Nancy Garrett argued that the determination of proximity is not merely
a temporal determination but must be examined in light of the totality of the
circumstances.' 7 Mrs. Garrett cited Durand v. Durand,10 8 a case in which
the Third District Court of Appeal found long arm jurisdiction over a
husband who had not resided in the state for over six years prior to the
commencement of the action.1' 9 In Durand, the court based its decision on
the totality of the circumstances, which encompassed several facts including
the wife and children's continued residence in Florida and the parties
ownership of real property in Florida.110 Furthermore, the court focused on
the fact that the marital home was in Florida and the separation of the
marriage occurred in Florida.' However, the First District Court of Appeal
ruled that, unlike the situation in Durand, Mr. Garrett's residency was too
far remote in time from the cause of action1 12 As a result, no Florida court
could have obtained personal jurisdiction over Mr. Garrett." 3
In dissent, Judge Benton stated that when personal service has been
accomplished, as was the case with Mr. Garrett, the only limitation on the
grant of personal jurisdiction was that the husband have sufficient minimum
103. Id
104. Id at 379.
105. Id.
106. Garrett, 652 So. 2d at 379.
107. Id.
108. 569 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 583 So. 2d 1034 (Fla.
1991).
109. 1d at 839.
110. Id
111. I
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contacts with Florida. 14 Moreover, Judge Benton believed that the totality
of the circumstances in the present case satisfied the minimum contacts
analysis required for due process." 15 Nevertheless, the First District Court of
Appeal rejected this position, stating that a defendant's residency in the state
must proximately precede the commencement of the action." 6 Alternatively,
the majority concluded that the totality of the circumstances insufficiently
supported a finding of personal jurisdiction over Larry Garrett, and it
vacated the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.' 17
When the Garrett case reached the Supreme Court of Florida," 8 the
court distinguished between the minimum contacts analysis and the strict
language codified in Florida's long arm statute in determining when a
nonresident defendant may be subject to the power of a state court. 19 The
court began the analysis by establishing that a state's power to exercise
personal jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 20  Next, the court acknowledged that the United States
Supreme Court had decided many cases using the minimum contacts
approach in determining when a state court can exert personal jurisdiction
consistent with due process. 121 The court concluded that a state has the
power to enact statutes governing the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents as long as the statutes are either "coextensive with or more restrictive
than" the outside limits of due process established by the United States
Supreme Court. 122 Finally, the court pointed to the fact that Florida's long
arm statute 12 enumerates the specific situations in which jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant is proper.124
First, the court focused on the language of section 48.193(1)(e) of the
Florida Statutes, the specific part of the long arm statute dealing with
proceedings connected to a dissolution of marriage action. 15 The court
114. Id. at 380 (Benton, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 380-81.
116. Id. at 379.
117. Garrett, 652 So. 2d at 379.
118. Garrett v. Garrett, 668 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1996).
119. Id. at 993-94.




123. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1995).
124. Garrett, 668 So. 2d at 994.
125. Id. at 993 (citing FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(e)).
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quoted a section of the statute that reads, "if the defendant resided in this
state preceding the commencement of the action,"'' 26 and it stated that this
portion of the statute cannot be taken "quite so literally."' 27 Turning to the
facts of the case, the court stated that when the Garretts left Florida in 1986
to set up residence in Texas, they effectively "abandoned" Florida.' 28 The
opinion went on to state that, "[t]o allow the court to obtain personal
jurisdiction under these circumstances would empower the Florida courts to
exercise jurisdiction over any party to a dissolution proceeding if the couple
had ever lived in this state, for however brief a time."
129
In defense of this position, the court cited two district court of appeal
cases which allowed personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(e) of the
Florida Statutes."30 In each of those cases, the matrimonial domicile had
been in Florida and one spouse continued to maintain residence in Florida
after the parties separated. By contrast, the Garretts lived in Texas as a
married couple for five years after leaving Florida and maintained no
residence or real property in Florida until Nancy Garrett returned to Florida
after the separation in 1992.131 Based on the dissimilarities between the
Garrett case and the two district court cases interpreting section
48.193(1)(e), the court stated that obtaining personal jurisdiction over Mr.
Garrett was not possible under Florida's long arm statute.
32
Nancy Garrett alternatively argued that the Florida courts could exer-
cise jurisdiction over her husband under a minimum contacts analysis. Mrs.
Garrett stated that her husband had sufficient contacts with Florida which
allowed her to file suit in Florida. 33 First, she alleged that her husband
periodically came to Florida to visit their daughter, Amy Rebecca, and also
to visit other family members living in Jacksonville. 34 Second, Mrs. Garrett
stated that her husband often traveled to Florida to conduct business in
preparation for his possible return to Florida.135 Finally, Mr. Garrett was
126. Id. at 994 (quoting FLA. STAT. §48.193(l)(e)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Garrett, 668 So. 2d at 994.
130. See Durand v. Durand, 569 So. 2d 838 (Fa. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Binger v.
Binger, 555 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 560 So. 2d 232 (Fla.
1990).
131. Garrett, 668 So. 2d at 994.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 992-93.
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directly maling child support payments in Florida on behalf of Amy Re-
becca. 136 Despite these contacts with Florida, the court stated that a mini-
mum contacts analysis was not legally relevant to the issue of whether the
prior residence provision of section 48.193(1)(e) applied to a grant of
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Garrett in a dissolution of marriage action.' 37
The court concluded the opinion by holding that because the Garretts jointly
abandoned Florida as their state of residence, Mrs. Garrett lost the
"protection' of section 48.193(1)(e).' '138 Accordingly, the decision of the
First District Court of Appeal was affirmed.
139
IV. IMPACT OF GARRETr
A. Disregard for Minimum Contacts
If a person freely and expressly consents to the jurisdiction of a state,
there can be no question that the state may legitimately exercise authority
over him. However, if a person does not consent to the jurisdiction of a
state, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
without violating any procedural due process right' 4° by applying a minimum
contacts analysis to the facts of the case. Despite the approval of the
minimum contacts analysis by the United States Supreme Court, many state
legislatures have enacted long arm statutes that limit the situations in which
a state may obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The Florida
Legislature enacted section 48.193 which limits personal jurisdiction to the
acts enumerated in the statute. 41
As a result, a defendant's minimum contacts with Florida may not
become legally relevant in resolving the final determination of a court's
power over a nonresident spouse in a dissolution of marriage action. 42 This
was the problem that Nancy Garrett encountered when her case came before
the Supreme Court of Florida.143 Indeed, Larry Garrett had the requisite
minimum contacts with the State of Florida' 44 to allow a Florida court to
136. Garrett, 668 So. 2d at 993.
137. Id. at 994.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. For a discussion of procedural due process, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976).
141. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193.
142. See generally Garrett, 668 So. 2d at 991.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 991.
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obtain personal jurisdiction over him pursuant to section 48.193(2). 145 By
narrowly focusing the Garrett decision on the language of section
48.193(1)(e), the Supreme Court of Florida failed to recognize that Larry
Garrett's activities within the state subjected him to the jurisdiction of the
court pursuant to section 48.193(2).
Section 48.193(2) of Florida's long arm statute is defined as a "general
jurisdiction" statute. When a defendant has systematic and continuous
contacts with the forum state, a court in that state may exercise jurisdiction
over the defendant regardless of the connection to the defendant's activities
within the forum.146 In Garrett, the husband periodically visited his daughter
in Florida, paid voluntary child support in Florida, and frequently visited
Florida on business trips. This type of continuous contact satisfies the due
process analysis articulated in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 47 and
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.148 This conduct also
falls within the language of Florida's restrictive long arm statute.
149
The court's decision in Garrett failed to look beyond the issue of Mr.
Garrett's residential proximity to the underlying cause of action. In fact, the
court should have analyzed Mr. Garrett's numerous contacts with the state
which were sufficient to support Mrs. Garrett's claim that the trial court had
proper jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding. The real issue in Garrett
was whether a nonresident had consented to personal jurisdiction in Florida
based on his purposeful availment of the protections and benefits of the
forum. This affiliation with Florida was free and knowing because, by
intentionally establishing a relationship with Florida, the defendant had
voluntarily submitted to the sovereign authority of the state.
Mr. Garrett was voluntarily paying child support to his daughter in
Florida. Furthermore, Mr. Garrett conducted business activities in Florida
during various trips throughout the year. Finally, his frequent visits to see
his family in Florida demonstrated his purposeful and continuous contacts
with the state. Due process only requires that a defendant have a reasonable
expectation that he may be haled into court in the forum state as a result of
145. Subsection (2) of section 48.193 states that: "A defendant who is engaged in sub-
stantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate,
intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not
the claim arises from that activity." FLA. STAT. § 48.193(2) (1995).
146. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
147. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
148. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
149. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193(2) (1995).
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his activities within the state.' 50 Again, Mr. Garrett purposefully availed
himself of the benefits of Florida's laws by freely conducting business and
personal visits within the state. After all, nonresidents cannot be denied
entry into a state,151 and nonresidents cannot be refused the opportunity to
engage in economic activity within a state. 52 Accordingly, Larry Garrett's
contacts with Florida were such that the Supreme Court of Florida could
have allowed for a grant of personal jurisdiction by the trial court under a
minimum contacts analysis.
In addition, none of the policy factors that weigh against a grant of
jurisdiction, despite a finding of minimum contacts with the forum, would
have denied the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Garrett. These
factors include the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state,
and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief.153 Moreover, a court must also
consider the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining efficient
resolution to controversies and the shared interest of the several states in
furthering social policies. 154 In World-Wide Volkswagen 155 and Asahi,156 the
Court explained that the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in
each case will depend on an evaluation of these factors. Finally, the Court
clearly stated that when minimum contacts have been established, the
interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will
justify "even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant."'157
Turning to the facts in Garrett, Mr. Garrett had voluntarily placed
himself within Florida's jurisdiction many times prior to the filing of the
dissolution of marriage action. The burden on Mr. Garrett to physically
appear in a Florida court was substantially lessened by his ongoing willing-
ness to visit Florida for various reasons. Also, Nancy Garrett submitted an
affidavit to the court alleging that Mr. Garrett desired to move back to
Florida and that he was continuously seeking suitable employment in
Florida. 58 In this case, the defendant's contacts were established, and the
defendant showed a desire to return to the forum state permanently. Thus,
the burden on the defendant was minimal, if not non-existent.
150. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
151. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
152. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
153. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
154. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
155. Id
156. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
157. Id.
158. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Garrett v. Garrett, 668 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1996) (No. 85,384).
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Second, Florida's strong public policy favoring parental responsibil-
itY1 59 was impaired by denying the trial court the authority to obtain personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident father who voluntarily paid child support in
Florida for the benefit of his daughter. The Supreme Court of Florida
ignored Florida's strong social policy' 6° of protecting a child's parental
support. Therefore, since the burden on the defendant was minimal and the
state's interest was great, the court erred by not affirming Mrs. Garrett's
claim of personal jurisdiction over her nonresident husband.
Mrs. Garrett had a compelling interest in her litigation with her hus-
band. First, her monthly salary of $1,283.75161 was grossly insufficient to
cover her living expenses. Unless Mrs. Garrett was granted the divorce in
Florida, her financial circumstances limited her ability to pursue her rights
out of state.162 Florida clearly has an interest in protecting dependent wives
and their children from impoverishment and possible dependency on state
services due to the inability to obtain relief in a dissolution of marriage
action.163 This compelling interest in the litigation was never thoroughly
considered by the court anywhere in the Garrett decision.
Second, a denial of personal jurisdiction over her husband would
unduly impede Mrs. Garrett's ability to seek the financial settlement neces-
sary to alleviate her financial shortfall. Again, if a spouse is unable to
159. See Morris v. Morris, 672 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). In Morris, the
first district, following the supreme court decision in Garrett, rejected a grant of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident husband in a dissolution of marriage action. Specially
concurring, Justice Booth stated:
The facts of the instant case appear to be more egregious than those in Garrett in
that Appellee's minor child, who was born in this state and resided here for ten
of his twelve years, suffers from Down's Syndrome. The child is now effectively
deprived of parental support, contrary to this state's strong public policy favoring
parental responsibility and jurisdiction of courts based on the presence of the
child.
Id. at 624 (Booth, J., specially concurring). Justice Booth criticized the decision in Garrett
which held that, "'[b]ecause the Garretts jointly abandoned Florida as their state of residence,
the wife lost the 'protection' of section 48.193(1)(e)."' Id. Justice Booth stated, "There is no
mention in Garrett of the child's right to the protection of the statute, and this was, I believe, a
major oversight. A minor child's right to parental support is not readily subject to waiver or
abandonment." Id.
160. See id. at 622.
161. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Garrett v. Garrett, 668 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1996) (No.
85,384).
162. ld.
163. Telephone Interview with Nancy N. Nowlis, Attorney at Law (Aug. 7, 1996)
(Nowlis was the attorney for Nancy Garrett in the case at issue in this case comment).
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establish alimony or equitable distribution rights in a dissolution of marriage
action, then the ability to obtain effective relief is diminished, resulting in a
devastating effect on dependent children. Despite this sincere need by Mrs.
Garrett to obtain relief, the Supreme Court of Florida disregarded these
factors in the analysis of whether personal jurisdiction over her husband in
Florida was proper.
B. The Cost of Ongoing Litigation
Mrs. Garrett's first attempt to litigate this matter occurred in Texas
where she filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.164 Shortly thereafter,
she dismissed her petition in Texas and moved to Florida. Then, in 1994,
Mrs. Garrett filed a second petition for dissolution of marriage in the Circuit
Court for Duval County, Florida. After the trial court found that Florida did
have personal jurisdiction over her husband, Mr. Garrett filed an appeal with
the First District Court of Appeal.65
This appeal added further cost to Mrs. Garrett's strained financial
budget. As a result of the appellate decision in Garrett, Mrs. Garrett was
forced to appeal her case to the Supreme Court of Florida.166 After the final
decision by the Supreme Court of Florida, Mrs. Garrett was left with the
costly prospect of filing a third dissolution of marriage action in her hus-
band's state of residence, Indiana. Certainly, the interstate judicial system
would not be harmed by allowing a spouse the opportunity to litigate in
Florida with a nonresident spouse who clearly meets the minimum contacts
analysis developed by the United States Supreme Court and meets the
statutory criteria of Florida's long arm statue. In fact, the efficient resolution
of the case in Florida would have put an end to the litigation and prevent the
potentially costly litigation in the Indiana court system.
V. CONCLUSION
There is confusion "in respect to Florida courts having personal
jurisdiction and Florida courts obtaining personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant by service of process pursuant to the 'long arm stat-
ute."' 67 Even the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the
difficulty of defining when a forum state can exercise personal jurisdiction
164. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Garrett v. Garrett, 668 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1996) (No. 85,384).
165. See Garrett, 668 So. 2d at 993.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 994 (Wells, J., concurring).
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over a nonresident defendant.168 Furthermore, long arm statutes that enu-
merate the contacts which subject a defendant to jurisdiction within a state
may prevent a plaintiff from obtaining judicial relief over a nonresident
defendant whose minimum contacts with the state do not meet the long arm
statute's narrow list of acceptable contacts. One solution is to use a purpose-
ful affiliation analysis for all personal jurisdiction cases in the State of
Florida. 169 This solution focuses attention on the extent to which the person
has freely and knowingly associated himself with the state in a way that
subjects him to the sovereign power of that state.170 However, this solution
fails to take into account other factors such as the defendant's burden to
litigate in a foreign state, the plaintiff's interest in the litigation, and the
state's interest in protecting its own citizens.
In Florida, the better solution is to clearly enact a statute that allows a
plaintiff spouse in a dissolution of marriage action to obtain personal
jurisdiction over a defendant spouse when the defendant spouse has mini-
mum contacts with Florida such that the "maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'""7' By using
the minimum contacts analysis developed by the United States Supreme
Court, Florida's courts can go beyond the restrictive language of the long
arm statute and consider other factors relevant to the determination of
personal jurisdiction. These factors include "'the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies;"' and the interest of the plaintiff in seeking adequate relief.
172
The Florida Legislature must amend section 48.193(1)(e) to allow for the use
of a minimum contacts approach in replacement of the current language
which states in part, "if the defendant resided in this state preceding the
168. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal.,
436 U.S. 84 (1978); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
169. For a good discussion on adopting a purposeful affiliation test nationwide, see Roger
H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
849, 890 (1989).
170. Id.
171. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
172. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
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commencement of the action.' 173 The current language is ambiguously
written, causing confusion as to the residential proximity a defendant must
have in Florida prior to the commencement of the action. The minimum
contacts approach alleviates this confusion and allows the court to properly
focus on the conduct of the defendant within the state, thus permitting the
court to examine other factors relevant to the maintenance of the suit and
due process.
Gregory P. McMahon
173. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(e) (1995).
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